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 Michigan goveRnoR John engleR eliminated the state’s General 
Assistance program, which provided relief to unemployed individuals, in 
October 1991. Other states followed his course, and the number of states pro-
viding General Assistance benefits dropped from twenty-three to thirteen.1 
Engler’s efforts to reduce welfare costs were mirrored at the national level, cul-
minating in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. The 
presumption behind many of these reforms was that welfare recipients could 
work but refused to do so. Michael Katz argues that the 1996 law “signaled 
the victory of three great forces—the war on dependence, the devolution of 
public authority, and the application of market models to public policy.”2 The 
1996 reforms emphasized the link between work and citizenship, and the 1996 
law redefined work to exclude any training program that took more than one 
year; recipients could no longer pursue post-secondary education and have it 
 1. Ruth Connif, “Welfare, Ground Zero: Michigan Tries to End It All,” The Nation (May 
27, 1996): 16; Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State 
(New York: Henry Holt, 2001), 86–88; John A. Begala and Carol Bethel, “A Transformation 
within the Welfare State,” in The Council of State Governments 65.1 (1992): 26; Lyke Thompson, 
“The Death of General Assistance in Michigan,” in The Politics of Welfare Reform, eds. Donald 
F. Norris and Lyke Thompson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 79–80.
 2. Katz, The Price of Citizenship, 1. Katz argues that welfare “reform” has redefined citizen-
ship and strengthened the link between employment and benefits.
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considered a “work-related activity.”3 Work was only work if it paid wages. The 
goal of early-twentieth-century maternalists—to provide mothers’ pensions to 
enable mothers to care for their children at home—fully disappeared. Child 
care qualified as “work” only if one was watching someone else’s children.4 The 
emphasis of these reforms was on one’s responsibility to provide for oneself 
and one’s family.
 A key goal of the reforms of the 1990s was to return control over welfare to 
the states. Proponents of such reforms, like Engler, questioned the role of the 
federal government in welfare provision. The shift to federalism dates to the 
1930s, when the federal government first entered the arena of public welfare. 
According to Katz, “Instead of the constitutional allocation of government 
functions by level, federalism became a system in which major functions were 
shared among local, state, and national governments.” Welfare became a part-
nership between the different levels of government, and financial responsibil-
ity and administrative control shifted, in part, from the county and township 
levels to the state and federal governments. Engler and other governors sought 
to reverse that in the early 1990s, arguing that it was not the federal govern-
ment’s role to end poverty. Engler was extremely critical of the programs of 
the Great Society in the 1960s, and believed they should be dismantled and 
authority returned to the states: “These programs,” he claimed, “have worked 
untold mischief on the American republic.” Engler led the charge to return 
the power to develop programs to the states; he welcomed federal funds, but 
argued that states could more effectively administer those funds, resulting in 
more cost-effective programs that would encourage independence.
 My goal is to provide a historical foundation to this narrative by study-
ing the debates of the 1930s, which led to the federal and state partnership 
that Engler and other welfare-reform advocates sought to dismantle. I do this 
by analyzing the experiences in Michigan from 1930 to 1940, the period in 
which the administration of relief policies shifted, at least in part, from local 
communities to the state and federal governments. The New Deal was, in 
fact, a compilation of many “little New Deals” at the state and local levels; 
implementation of the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 and the Social 
Security Act of 1935 varied tremendously across the nation. Edwin Amenta 
 3. Jyl J. Josephson, “Gender and Social Policy,” in Gender and American Politics: Women, 
Men, and the Political Process, eds. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson (Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe, 2000), 149–50.
 4. Gwendolyn Mink, “The Lady and the Tramp (II): Feminist Welfare Politics, Poor Single 
Mothers, and the Challenge of Welfare Justice,” Feminist Studies 24 (Spring 1998): 59–61; see 
also Mink, Welfare’s End (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 22, 108–9.
 5. Katz, The Price of Citizenship, 79, 84.
 6. Edwin Amenta, Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American 
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argues that the limited and uneven change brought by the New Deal resulted 
from this variance in the states’ implementation of those programs. States with 
limited public welfare before the Great Depression saw the greatest change, as 
the New Deal programs fostered the creation of a public welfare system. States 
with a strong network of private welfare agencies saw at least a partial shift to 
public welfare programs under the Social Security Act. Other states, such as 
Michigan, whose needy residents relied on public welfare, saw a mix of change 
and continuity. Despite the new laws, Michigan’s welfare system reestablished 
local control, within the legal limits of the Social Security Act, in 1939. The 
question of which level of government—local, state, or federal—would create 
and implement public welfare policy was a major issue in Michigan’s debates.
 Defense of local control, and thus of democracy, is central to understand-
ing the development of welfare programs in Michigan. Early efforts to respond 
to the economic crisis of the Great Depression were framed by what I term 
fiscal localism: the attempt to minimize local expenditures and provide tax 
relief, even at the expense of welfare services. A fear of creating dependence 
and a reliance on the private sector for solutions to the economic downturn 
were central to this idea. A significant antitax sentiment fueled fiscal localism, 
which overlapped and at times merged with a belief in home rule. Local offi-
cials did not seek an end to public relief programs and believed such programs 
were necessary for the truly needy and deserving; they also welcomed state 
and federal funds. They did argue, however, that they could best administer 
the programs, with minimal state or federal oversight. Home rule advocates 
shared a hostility to professional social work, arguing that business profes-
sionals were the most competent welfare administrators. Home rule advocates 
believed local control was the best means to limit taxation and to achieve fiscal 
efficiency. Both home rule and fiscal localism appear throughout the decade.
 The emergency-relief period did not end in Michigan until 1940, when 
the 1939 Welfare Reorganization Act was applied. Although Michigan quali-
fied for funds under the Social Security Act’s Aid to Dependent Children, Aid 
to Blind, and Old Age Assistance programs beginning in 1936, administra-
tion of those programs continued under the emergency-relief administrative 
structure (local welfare-relief commissions and the State Emergency Relief 
Administration) until 1940. The emergency-relief structure remained in 
Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). See particularly chapter 5, “Some 
Little New Deals Are Littler than Others.” For a similar argument regarding court reform in 
the Progressive Era, see Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era 
Chicago (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 7. SERA administered relief efforts at the state level, using local welfare-relief commissions 
(also referred to as county emergency-relief administrations). Both terms were used in the 
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place in Michigan, and in other states, well beyond the demise of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration in December of 1935. Those years saw the 
overlap and intertwining of numerous welfare programs, including traditional 
poor relief, county infirmary care, mothers’ and old-age pensions, direct relief, 
work relief, and the categorical aid programs. The 1939 Welfare Reorganiza-
tion Act attempted to consolidate the state’s welfare system while conforming 
to the requirements of the Social Security Act to permit the state to continue 
to receive federal funding.
 The decade witnessed significant debate and conflict over the state’s social 
welfare policy. Debates operated at numerous levels in Michigan’s diverse 
demographics: rural and urban, industrial and agricultural, native-born white 
and immigrant or nonwhite. Through these counties we see the negotiations 
of relief at all levels. In my research, I analyze four counties: Marquette, Sagi-
naw, Van Buren, and Wayne. Collectively they illuminate Michigan’s combined 
rural and urban and agricultural and industrial economy, as well as its popula-
tion demographics. It is at this level that we see the actual implementation of 
the New Deal programs, rather than just what the federal government envi-
sioned when the laws were written.
 Numerous state and local studies of the New Deal have appeared in recent 
years, adding to our understanding of the operation of these programs at the 
local and state levels. The New Deal encompassed a range of programs and 
issues, and scholars vary in their emphasis by necessity; an all-inclusive study 
of the New Deal is impossible in a single monograph. Many state studies assess 
the New Deal programs, and the relationships between federal and state gov-
ernments, as well as the effects of the programs on different groups: farmers, 
workers, minorities, etc. The studies are often organized around the specific 
programs, including the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works 
Progress Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Social 
Security Act. Some emphasize labor or farm issues.
 Studies such as those by Jo Ann Argersinger and Douglass Smith examine 
the impact of the programs on urban politics: Argersinger in Baltimore, and 
Smith in four southern cities. Cecelia Bucki examines the role of the Socialist 
Party, and third-party politics in general, in Bridgeport, Connecticut, in the 
fifteen years leading to the Depression and the New Deal years. Other studies, 
1930s, but I tend to rely on the former (WRC).
 8. For example, see George T. Blakey, Hard Times and New Deal in Kentucky, 1929–1939 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986); Jack Irby Hayes Jr., South Carolina and the 
New Deal (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001); and Ronald L. Heinemann, 
Depression and New Deal in Virginia: The Enduring Dominion (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1983).
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such as Karen Ferguson’s Black Politics in New Deal Atlanta, look at the issue 
of race and black activism during the New Deal.
 A key goal in this study is to examine these years through the lens of relief 
and welfare, and thus other issues, including farm and labor programs, are 
given minimal attention.10 I consider programs, particularly work relief, as 
they intersected with welfare programs and were conceived as an alternative 
to “the dole.” The title, Negotiating Relief, refers to the multiple negotiations 
that took place between various groups during the debates about how best 
to provide for the state’s needy residents. Local officials, state officials, local 
welfare-relief commissions, relief workers, professional social workers, and the 
recipients of relief—all took part in these negotiations and helped to shape the 
outcome of relief administration. These multiple perspectives reveal the often-
competing narratives of relief that emerged during the 1930s in Michigan. Fre-
quently local government representatives, particularly those from rural areas 
of the state, were at odds with those who sought progressive change in welfare 
administration. Time and again recipients had different ideas about relief and, 
although in positions of minimal power, used the system to gain support for 
their families.
 Competing professional visions in welfare administration took center stage 
in the 1930s in Michigan. The debate centered on what expertise and training 
were required to administer relief. In its most basic form, the debate pitted 
home rule advocates who favored a return to pre–New Deal local control of 
relief (although they welcomed the state and federal monies of the New Deal) 
against those who advocated a centralized welfare system staffed by profes-
sional social workers. The first group saw welfare as a business; therefore, 
business expertise, and not social work experience, was central to the admin-
istration of welfare. Two groups of professionals were behind these debates: 
local officials and their professional organizations, including the Michigan 
State Association of Supervisors and the State Association of the Superinten-
dents of the Poor, and professional social workers educated in college social 
 9. See Jo Ann R. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal in Baltimore (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1988); Douglas L. Smith, The New Deal in the Urban South. (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Cecilia Bucki, Bridgeport’s Socialist New Deal, 
1915–1936 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001); and Karen Ferguson, Black 
Politics in New Deal Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
 10. Jerry Bruce Thomas analyzes the evolution of welfare programs as a part of his study 
of West Virginia, but most scholars spend minimal time on that issue. See An Appalachian 
New Deal: West Virginia and the Great Depression (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1998), particularly chapters 6 and 7. Susan Traverso analyzes the roles of religion, ethnicity, and 
gender in welfare developments in Boston from 1910 and 1940. See Welfare Politics in Boston, 
1910–1940 (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).
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work programs. Social workers believed that social work training, including 
casework methods and family counseling, was critical. The reaction against 
the passage of the 1937 law reorganizing welfare, which implemented in large 
measure the recommendations of the 1936 Welfare and Relief Study Commis-
sion, illustrates these polar views. The subsequent 1939 Welfare Reorganiza-
tion Act was a blend of more-traditional practices and more-modern ideas 
about social welfare.
 The story of welfare reorganization is intertwined with the development 
of the profession of social work. Social workers entered public welfare in an 
unprecedented way with the onset of the emergency-relief programs of 1933, 
and were critical negotiators of relief, both with local officials and individual 
recipients. The profession faced its own internal conflicts during the 1930s, 
including debates about the role of the “new” relief worker, who did not fit the 
professional model constructed so carefully by professional organizations in 
the previous decades. The professional social work system was hard-pressed to 
meet the training and educational demands of its untrained emergency work-
ers. The status of social work as a profession was contested, and like others 
employed in the “semiprofessions” or female-dominated fields, social workers 
were underpaid, but the administrative costs of the emergency-relief system, 
in particular the salaries paid to caseworkers, were at the heart of criticisms 
by opponents of professional social work. Competing visions of professional-
ization, or how to define or use it, existed within the ranks of relief workers. 
Some wanted no part of the “profession,” opting instead to use unionization 
to address issues such as working conditions, low pay, and high caseloads, and 
some allied with relief recipients to secure more adequate benefits.
 Michigan’s debates about welfare and relief speak to larger issues operating 
throughout the nation during this difficult and turbulent period. Fears about 
the centralization of government and the decline of the local community, and 
the values associated with notions of community, were at the center of several 
New Deal–era movements, and also have a larger history in the American 
past. The reaction against social work, and centralized, state-supervised relief 
administration, was rooted in these larger national issues, although it mani-
fested itself in the relief debates in this state. Criticisms of local government 
actually predate the Depression, and political scientists and policy makers 
questioned the quality and efficiency of county and township governments. 
The Depression’s severity, and the inability of local governments to respond 
fully to that crisis, further called into question local government structure. But 
belief in the sanctity of local control ran deep, as William Brock argues:
Whatever professional critics might say, local government was, in popular 
estimation, the seed bed of American democracy. If the depression brought 
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it to the verge of ruin, more would be at stake than the functions of county 
commissioners, boards of supervisors, township trustees, and overseers of 
the poor; however pressing the case for centralization, many Americans 
would consider that the erosion of local responsibility had inflicted fatal 
injury upon self-government.11
 Alan Brinkley’s study of Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin, the 
popular “radio priest” based in a parish in Royal Oak, Michigan, presents an 
example of this belief in local control and autonomy. Brinkley argues that the 
importance of these two men and their movements extended far beyond their 
limited constituencies: “They were manifestations of one of the most powerful 
impulses of the Great Depression, and of many decades of American life before 
it: the urge to defend the autonomy of the individual and the independence 
of the community against encroachments from the modern industrial state.”12 
This study of Michigan’s relief debates further validates the resonance of those 
feelings. The hopes and fears tapped by Long and Coughlin, and described by 
Brock, were remarkably similar to those evidenced in these debates, and in 
part explain why opponents of professional welfare administration were ulti-
mately successful. Fueled by anti-intellectualism, antiradicalism, antitax senti-
ment, partisan politics, and growing opposition to the New Deal programs by 
1935, opponents of welfare reform advocated a return to local administration 
of relief, to ensure that relief administration did not become too far removed 
from the electoral reach of Michigan voters. The rhetoric they employed struck 
a familiar chord among Michigan voters in the 1938 referendum on welfare 
reform.
 One of my central arguments is analyzing the continuities in social welfare 
history, as well as the key changes resulting from the New Deal. The hardship 
of the Great Depression in the 1930s prompted some of the boldest initia-
tives in social welfare in American history. Two centuries of American poor 
law, with responsibility for social welfare firmly rooted in local communities, 
changed as a result, but at times in limited ways. Although a major period 
that witnessed significant changes and sparked heated debates, the New Deal 
continued many practices found in pre-Depression relief. The New Deal did 
introduce the professional social worker to public welfare on a much greater 
scale than earlier, shifted the source of funding from primarily local to a finan-
cial partnership between local, state, and federal governments, and of course 
changed the magnitude and scope of welfare. In fact numerous continuities 
 11. William R. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 45, 50–52.
 12. Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1983), xi.
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existed between pre–New Deal relief and the establishment of the Social Secu-
rity Act’s Aid to Dependent Children and Old Age Assistance programs, as 
well as general-relief programs under the 1939 state law.
 One area of continuity was the distinction between earned benefits and 
public assistance. As Barbara Nelson and other scholars have argued, the New 
Deal entrenched the “two track” welfare system, separating those who were 
entitled to help from those who needed benefits. Connected to this was the 
notion that some recipients deserved assistance, such as widowed mothers of 
a certain ethnicity or culture, while others did not. The issues of gender and 
race played important roles. Women and nonwhites often were among those 
who did not work in paid employment areas included in the early workers’ 
compensation or the Social Security Act’s insurance program; instead, they 
often fell under the area of dependent mothers.13 A key change from mothers’ 
pensions was the administrative placement of the program; no longer a part 
of the Probate Court, ADC was situated squarely in public assistance. This 
was a significant shift, and a contested one, in some counties, while in others 
it simply codified the administrative practices of mothers’ pensions.
 Welfare reorganization created what I term a “third track” of welfare, or 
the general-relief programs which were outside the federal arena, the same 
aid (General Assistance) eliminated in 1991. Home rule advocates had suc-
cessfully regained control of these services in the 1939 law. These programs, 
often forgotten in the analysis of federal welfare under the Social Security Act, 
served those people not eligible for aid under Aid to Dependent Children, Old 
Age Assistance, or Aid to the Blind: often the disabled or those unable to work 
but too young for OAA. The state government began to contribute funds to 
general relief after the 1939 reorganization, a key change from pre–New Deal 
years. Control over this third track of welfare was a contentious part of the 
debates over welfare reorganization in the 1930s, as local officials fought to 
prevent the centralization of all relief. For many counties, that translated into 
a wholesale return to poor-relief practices and traditions. Local officials, par-
ticularly township supervisors, continued to wield extraordinary influence in 
the administration of relief. General relief became the “third track” of welfare 
provision, and perhaps the most stigmatized of all the welfare programs. The 
 13. Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic 
Citizenship in 20th-Century America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
95–96, 105–6. Kessler-Harris argues that the social insurance program under the Social Security 
Act excluded 55 percent of all black workers, 80 percent of all women workers, and 87 percent 
of all black women workers. See also Barbara Nelson, “The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare 
State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aid,” in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda 
Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). 
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state replaced these county programs in 1976 with General Assistance, with 
the state fully funding the program, completing the centralization of relief 
started in the 1930s.14 The arguments for the welfare reforms of the 1990s 
hearken to those put forth in the 1930s by groups and individuals opposed to 
the federalism created by the New Deal. Michigan’s General Assistance pro-
gram, which provided both cash aid and health care for unemployed residents, 
evolved from the changes of the 1930s.1
 Another area of continuity, intertwined with the issue of gender, was the 
role of the family in welfare administration. Central to that administration is 
the ideology of family responsibility, closely linked to the family wage. Social 
welfare law in Michigan, and in most other states as well, contained stipula-
tions that family members had a legal responsibility to support other family 
members, if able to do so. For young children, fathers were the logical first 
step as the expected family breadwinner. If the father could not provide, that 
duty extended to other family members. The responsible-relative clause dates 
to Michigan’s earliest poor laws in the nineteenth century, and it remained in 
force in Public Act 146 of 1925, which consolidated Michigan’s relief system. 
Township supervisors or county superintendents of the poor enforced support 
of relatives in the county’s probate court. Children who had been deserted 
or abandoned by parents before they reached the age of sixteen were exempt 
from the responsibility, but they had to prove that they were in fact deserted.1 
The 1935 Social Security Act did not require that states enforce any family 
responsibility in administration of the categorical aid programs, but a large 
number of states, including Michigan, nevertheless retained those provisions 
in their laws.1 The responsible-relative clause persisted in emergency-relief 
 14. Josephson, “Gender and Social Policy,” 141; Report of the Michigan Department of 
Social Services for 1976 (Lansing: 1976), 12; Public Act 237 of 1975, Public and Local Acts of the 
Legislature of the State of Michigan, 607–11.
 15. Opponents of the program argued that recipients were employable, able-bodied adults 
who refused to work. Katz points out that more than 40 percent of GA recipients in Michigan 
were over the age of forty and 61 percent were never employed; the majority of the latter 
category were “many newly widowed or divorced women.” Only 38 percent found work within 
two years, and only 26 percent earned an income comparable to their benefits under GA. 
Katz, The Price of Citizenship, 87–88. The program served many of the state’s seasonal workers, 
employed in construction, tourism, and agriculture, as well as some auto workers. Thompson, 
“The Death of General Assistance,” 81–82.
 16. Edith Abbott, Public Assistance: American Principles and Policies, Vol. I (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1966), 277–80; Isabel Campbell Bruce and Edith Eickhoff, The Michigan Poor 
Law: Its Development and Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 31. 
 17. A Works Progress Administration study found that just nine states, and the District of 
Columbia, had no provisions for relatives’ support. Another nine states included grandparents, 
grandchildren, and siblings among the responsible relatives, and nine others excluded only 
siblings. The Social Security Bulletin reported in 1939 that twenty-seven of the fifty-one Old 
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administration practices, and also in the 1937 and 1939 welfare-reorganiza-
tion laws in Michigan.1
 All relief programs, whether direct relief or work programs, framed aid 
through the lens of the family. Whether it was the earnings of a father or 
brother with a Works Progress Administration assignment, or of a young man 
sent to a Civilian Conservation Corps camp, such aid was for the family’s 
needs, and was budgeted accordingly. Program administration often ignored 
individual needs and dissension within the family in their focus on the fam-
ily as a unit. The WPA, CCC, and other work-relief assignments operated 
with the expectation that wages would support the family and household. The 
enforcement of the responsible-relative clause was a key source of conflict 
among social workers, relief recipients, and their families before, during, and 
after the New Deal. Often when families balked at helping other members, 
particularly elderly parents on OAA or mothers receiving ADC, the recipient 
paid the price in terms of delayed or lost benefits. Although the intention of 
the law was to use the state as a means of support as a last resort, the outcome 
at times was to punish those who needed the aid the most, and who often had 
the least power to persuade family members to contribute. Gender played a 
critical role in this debate, both in what social workers expected of recipients 
and in the positions individuals held in the negotiation of relief in households 
and families.
 Recipients were very much a part of the relief story, and provided their own 
narrative of the experience of receiving relief during the 1930s. Case records 
from the emergency-relief programs and the early years of the categorical-aid 
programs permit the inclusion of their voices, although filtered through the 
lens of the caseworker. Four counties serve as case studies based in part on 
the availability of case-file materials from those localities; all four counties’ 
case records from the New Deal programs have survived to some extent.1 
Age Assistance programs required relatives’ support, and another fourteen states had such 
requirements in their general poor laws. Robert C. Lowe, State Public Welfare Legislation 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 63–67; “Public Assistance,” Social 
Security Yearbook: Annual Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin 3 (1939): 161. 
 18. See Public Act 146 of 1925, Chapter 1, Sections 1–21; Public Act 258 of 1937, Sections 
30–31; Public Act 280 of 1939, Sections 76–77, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the 
State of Michigan; “Local Public Welfare,” n.d., WRSC Records, RG 35 Box 5, Folder 10, 96; 
Bruce and Eickhoff, 3, 10, 26, and 31. Under a 1953 law, grandparents were relieved of the 
burden of caring for grandchildren when the grandchildren reached the age of sixteen, but the 
responsibility of other relatives to support family members did not undergo significant change 
until 1970. See Public Act 148 of 1953 and Public Act 88 of 1970, chapter 1.
 19. All case files of the Department of Human Services have restricted access in the ar-
chives. Researchers must obtain permission from the department to see the files, and they 
cannot record any proper names of recipients. Thus my records include only case numbers and 
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(See maps I.1 and I.2.) Van Buren County’s Emergency Relief Administration 
case-file collection includes 102 case files dating from 1930 to 1940, and is 
the most complete source base I have located.20 I also analyzed the OAA and 
ADC case files from Saginaw County, in the thumb area of Michigan, on the 
east side of the state; Marquette County, on the shores of Lake Superior, in the 
Upper Peninsula; and Wayne County, which includes Detroit, the state’s larg-
est city. I focused on cases initiated before the close of 1940, when the emer-
gency-relief period ends. These case files include original application forms, 
verification investigations conducted by social workers, detailed case histories 
chronicling case visits, and correspondence.21 Particularly valuable are letters 
or other correspondence written by recipients voicing their views on the relief 
programs serving them. These records make it possible not only to study the 
basic questions of who sought relief and why, but also to reconstruct the inter-
active relationships between the various individuals and agencies involved in 
the administration and receipt of welfare aid. In addition, the records enabled 
me to assess how both groups viewed welfare policy and their individual case, 
and how relief recipients influenced the program’s administration.22
the personal characteristics of the recipient. All recipients’ names are fictitious, although I have 
endeavored to retain ethnic characteristics in the selection of a name. All case numbers, and 
footnote references to archival locations and microfilm reel numbers, are accurate; anyone who 
obtains permission from the department can identify specific cases using the case number.
 20. The full collection includes 133 records through 1945, but as with the ADC and OAA 
files, I examined only those initiated before or during 1940. Samples of other counties’ ERA 
records survive for Kent and Bay counties but contain only a handful of case files. While useful 
for anecdotal purposes, they are too limited for any statistical analysis or for the county’s ad-
ministrative practices. Most counties’ emergency-relief records were apparently lost, although 
many of the categorical-aid records include ERA information. A large number of OAA and 
ADC recipients in the late 1930s also received direct relief under FERA.
 21. Saginaw’s collection is the most complete, including 409 ADC cases and 218 OAA 
cases. I analyzed the complete run of surviving ADC files and a sampling (every tenth case) of 
OAA records. A sampling of Wayne County’s collection (every fiftieth case) yielded a base of 
319 ADC and 285 OAA cases. Marquette’s collection is much smaller, with just 16 ADC cases 
and 39 OAA cases. Only about a quarter of Michigan counties are represented in the collections 
with a significant number of case files; most collections contain only a 2 percent sample, thus 
limiting the counties available for study.
 22. The ERA case files and the categorical-aid records represent different relief popula-
tions. ERA records reflect a variety of case types, from unemployment to ill health to dependent 
mothers. They include anyone who applied for relief during the emergency-relief period. In 
contrast, the ADC and OAA programs served unemployable individuals, or those people who 
either could not work, physically, or should not work, according to policy makers, because of 
parental responsibilities. Many of the categorical-aid recipients also received emergency relief 
and were simply transferred to the ADC and OAA programs in 1936. Although they were 
categorized as ADC or OAA, the local welfare-relief commission continued to administer 
those programs until the 1939 law was implemented. Thus they continued under the New Deal 
emergency-relief umbrella until the end of the decade.
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 Although New Deal programs were opposed and criticized from the start, 
they were important to Michigan residents, providing relief and employment 
when there were few other outlets. The state of Michigan suffered high unem-
ployment and relief rates during the Depression years, and its economic prob-
lems dated to the 1920s. Much of the state was already in a recession by the 
crash of 1929, and the problems only worsened in the 1930s. By 1933 between 
13 and 16 percent of all Michigan residents depended on some kind of relief, 
and those numbers approached 20 to 30 percent in the northern parts of the 
state, especially the Upper Peninsula.23
 Michigan was a diverse state in terms of demographics and economics 
in the 1930s, and thus its residents experienced the Depression in different 
 23. William Haber and Paul L. Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security: 
A Survey of Michigan’s Relief and Unemployment Problem (Lansing: State Emergency Welfare 
Relief Commission, 1936), 19, 39.
Map	I.1 Michigan counties
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ways, depending upon one’s region, race, nativity, citizenship, sex, age, and 
occupation. Although Michigan contained a relatively small minority popu-
lation (just 4 percent in 1930, the vast majority of which was African-Ameri-
can), its foreign-born population was 19.8 percent in 1920 and 17.4 percent 
in 1930. Its economy varied from the industrial centers of Detroit and Flint 
to the agricultural centers in southwestern Michigan, mid-Michigan, and 
the thumb area on the east side of the state between Saginaw Bay and Lake 
Huron. The Upper Peninsula and the northern Lower Peninsula centered 
on lumbering and lake commerce, and mining also was a critical industry 
in the Upper Peninsula. The counties selected for this case study reflect this 
diversity in population demographics and economics, both of which are 
intertwined with the need for and delivery of relief and social welfare ser-
vices in the 1930s. Representing that diversity, in conjunction with securing 
the case-file source base, were critical factors in selecting the counties for 
Map	I.2 key locations in the development of social welfare, 1930–40
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study. Historians know much more about social welfare, relief, and the New 
Deal programs in large urban centers than they do about smaller towns and 
rural areas. My study seeks to illuminate both the rural and urban nature of 
relief.
 Van Buren County, largely white and native born, represents the rural, 
agricultural experience in Michigan, while Marquette County illustrates the 
mining and lumbering (and some agriculture) economy of the Upper Pen-
insula. Saginaw County, with its racial and ethnic diversity, represents the 
“simultaneous growth of industry and agriculture” characteristic of Michigan 
and other Midwestern states.24 Its economy centered on sugar beets and other 
agriculture, but industry also played an increasing role, particularly with the 
rise of the automotive and steel industries, and later the defense plants of the 
1940s.2 These job opportunities attracted African-Americans and Mexicans, 
offering an opportunity to assess the role of race and citizenship in the wel-
fare process. Race was and is a critical issue in welfare policy, but citizenship 
also played an important role. Noncitizens of all nationalities experienced 
discrimination in welfare programs as well as in employment opportunities, 
and both Saginaw and Wayne counties offer the basis for this analysis. Mexi-
can populations in Saginaw and Wayne counties also faced repatriation efforts 
in the 1930s, a strategy used at the state and local level to remove noncitizens 
who might take jobs, or relief benefits, from citizens and residents.
 Wayne County was the center of Michigan’s automotive industry (and later 
the defense industry). It had the highest population of any county, and its racial 
demographics were very similar to Saginaw County (see table I.1). Those two 
counties contained the majority of the state’s African-American and Mexican 
populations. Wayne County had more than half of all Mexicans who lived in 
the state, but the Mexican population in Saginaw made up a greater percentage 
of the county’s overall population.2 Wayne County (and Detroit) experienced 
a unique relief situation. Detroit professionalized its social welfare department 
in the 1920s, and thus does not represent the larger experiences in the state. 
Detroit’s size also permitted it to create a Department of Social Welfare sepa-
rate from Wayne County under the 1939 Welfare Reorganization Act.
 Van Buren County, largely rural, with only one city (South Haven) in the 
1930s, had a population of 32,637 in 1930. At that time, the county’s popula-
 24. Daniel Nelson, Farm and Factory: Workers in the Midwest, 1880–1990 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995), vii.
 25. Alan Clive, State of War: Michigan in World War II (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1979), 20–22.
 26. Wayne County’s 1930 census listed 7,104 Mexicans—more than half of the state’s 13,336 
Mexicans. Saginaw had the next greatest number (2,270), which represented nearly 2 percent 
of the county’s population. See Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Vol. I, Population 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), 1152.
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tion was 88 percent native-born white, 10.5 percent foreign-born white and 
1.4 percent African-American (see table I.1).2 More than half of its employed 
residents labored in the farming industry, either on their own farms or as 
laborers. Other key areas of employment included retail, construction, and 
domestic work (for women).2
 Van Buren County residents made their living through the century from 
fruit production, including berries (blueberries, strawberries, and cherries), 
apples, pears, and peaches. Grape vineyards not only yielded fruit but also fed 
the wine and juice industries. Juice companies had organized in the early years 
of the twentieth century, with companies in Lawton and Paw Paw. Welch Grape 
Juice Company, for instance, started business in Van Buren during World War 
I, manufacturing grape jelly for the armed forces. With the demise of Prohibi-
tion, in 1933, came the growth of the wine-making industry, and by 1937 the 
county boasted five wineries.2 Some residents also labored in the paper mills 
of Watervliet, in nearby Berrien County, as well as in Kalamazoo and Grand 
Rapids.
 Marquette County, like much of the Upper Peninsula, had a significant for-
eign-born population. It was slightly larger than Van Buren, with a population 
in 1930 of 44,076. Nearly one-quarter of its residents were non-native-born 
whites; the foreign-born population was 22.8 percent. However, as was true 
for much of Michigan, Marquette had few nonwhite residents, with just 0.4 
percent of its population listed as African-American.30 Immigrants from Scan-
dinavian countries—especially Finland, Norway, and Sweden—and also from 
 27. Fifteenth Census, 1140.
 28. Fifteenth Census, 1164.
 29. Douglas L. Semark, ed., A History of Van Buren County, Michigan (Hartford, MI: Van 
Buren County Historical Society, 1983), 1, 3–5. 
 30. Fifteenth Census, table 13, 1138, 1140.
table	I.1
foreIgn-born	and	MInorIty	populatIonS	In	1930
county
0 census 
population
% Foreign-
born
% african-
american % Mexican
Marquette 44,076 22.8 0.4 0.0
Saginaw 120,717 9.1 3.9 1.9
van buren 32,637 10.3 1.4 0.0
Wayne 1,888,946 25.3 7.0 0.37
State of Michigan 4,842,325 7.4 3.5 0.3
Source: Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Vol. I, Population, 1115, 1152.
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Ireland, Scotland, England, and Canada, helped to settle Marquette. Some 
came under contract with mining companies, while others migrated for land 
in addition to the promise of employment.31
 Like much of the Lake Superior shore of the Upper Peninsula, Marquette 
centered its economic base on extractive industries such as mining and lum-
bering, dating to the mid-nineteenth century. For the Marquette area, iron 
ore was the major material, as compared to copper in the Keewenaw Pen-
insula. Iron ore was first found in the region in 1844, and by 1845 the first 
mine—Jackson Mine—opened, and became the site of the city of Negaunee 
in Marquette County.32 Other mining ventures soon followed, including the 
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company. The county’s location on the shores of Lake 
Superior made it a natural choice as an urban center for the Upper Peninsula 
and the mining industry, and completion of the shipping locks in 1855 at Sault 
Ste. Marie—connecting Lake Superior with the lower Great Lakes—only facili-
tated the industry’s growth. Until the late nineteenth century, all of Michigan’s 
iron-ore industry was concentrated in the Marquette range.33
 Of the companies founded during the peak of Marquette’s mining indus-
try, the Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company, the largest, continued to operate into 
the mid-twentieth century, and gained ownership of several smaller mines 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mining contin-
ued to be a key employer in the area by 1930.34 In addition to its role as a ship-
ping center, Marquette also developed other industries, including chemical 
production (nitroglycerin), sawmills, brownstone quarries, flour mills, and a 
brickyard, in addition to agriculture. Its key industries—mining, forestry, and 
railroads—were all on the decline by the Depression, however, and the short 
growing season made agriculture less than ideal in the Upper Peninsula.3 But 
its more diverse industrial base saved it from disappearing, as some mining 
towns did.
 Saginaw County represents the state’s mix of industry and agriculture. 
Originally founded as a major lumber town, Saginaw, both the city and the 
 31. Warren Vander Hill, “So Many Different People,” in A Most Superior Land, ed. Susan 
Newhof Pyle (Lansing: TwoPeninsula Press, 1983), 19–23.
 32. John S. Burt, “‘Boys, look around and see what you can find,’” Michigan History 78.6 
(November/December 1994): 11, 14.
 33. “A Bond of Interest,” in Harlow’s Wooden Man: Quarterly Journal of the Marquette 
County Historical Society XIII, no. 5 (Fall 1978): 6–10; Kathleen Marie Blee, “The Impact of 
Family Settlement Patterns on the Politics of Lake Superior Communities, 1890–1920” (PhD 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1982), 87–88.
 34. “A Bond of Interest,” 16; Blee, “The Impact of Family Settlement Patterns,” 87–88.
 35. Fifteenth Census, 1162; Michigan: A Guide to the Wolverine State (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1941), 345–46.
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larger county, developed an industrial base that helped it to weather the worst 
of the Depression years. Saginaw County had a population of 120,717; of its 
residents, 9.1 percent were foreign-born, 3.9 percent were African-American, 
and 1.9 percent were Mexican (see table I.1). Immigrants from Germany, 
Poland, and Canada (French), some of whom were recruited to work in the 
lumber industry, helped to settle the area by the 1870s, although native-born 
workers continued to dominate the lumber workforce. Sugar beet farming and 
processing emerged by the early twentieth century as a major part of Saginaw’s 
economy, bringing the area’s first Mexicans to Saginaw as migrant laborers.3
 Lumbering provided the economic foundation for Saginaw, and the first 
sawmills were built on the shores of the Saginaw River in the 1830s. Saginaw’s 
location—just downstream from the convergence of four major tributaries 
of the Saginaw River—made it a logical site for storing logs and constructing 
sawmills.3 The lumber industry prospered in the nineteenth century, and thus 
so did the city of Saginaw and the surrounding area. By the 1880s and 1890s, 
however, lumbering of the pine forests was on the decline, and only half of the 
sawmills remained in operation at the close of the nineteenth century. By the 
turn of the century, manufacturing began to replace lumbering as the domi-
nant industry. Manufacturing companies, both metal and automotive, devel-
oped rapidly, including what would become the largest employers in the area: 
Jackson-Church and Wilcox (later to be General Motors and Saginaw Steering 
Gear) and Valley Grey Iron (Chevrolet Grey Iron Foundry). The auto-parts 
manufacturers would be major employers by World War I. By the 1920s more 
than ten thousand people worked in the Saginaw Steering Gear Division.3
 Negotiating Relief is organized chronologically in the first half and topically 
in the latter. Chapter 1 describes pre-Depression relief in Michigan, focusing 
on Marquette, Saginaw, Van Buren, and Wayne counties and their social wel-
fare systems. Michigan’s welfare system was locally administered and publicly 
funded, even before the New Deal. Chapter 2 chronicles the efforts of both 
public and private agencies to meet the rising demand for unemployment 
relief in the early years of the Great Depression, before the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration. Ultimately, all counties would face major financial cri-
ses as a result of the relief problem, but resistance to federal aid remained 
strong until 1932, and never entirely disappeared.
 36. Germans and Canadians were the major proportion (81 percent) of Saginaw’s 
immigrant population by 1890. Jeremy W. Kilar, Michigan’s Lumbertowns: Lumbermen and 
Laborers in Saginaw, Bay City, and Muskegon, 1870–1905 (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1990), 174, 177, 194; Jeremy W. Kilar and Sandy L. Schwan, Saginaw’s Changeable Past: 
An Illustrated History (St. Louis: G. Bradley Publishing, 1994), 66, 98, 118–19.
 37. Kilar, Michigan’s Lumbertowns, 20–22.
 38. Ibid., 293; Kilar and Schwan, Saginaw’s Changeable Past, 114–15.
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 Chapter 3 assesses the implementation of the Federal Emergency Relief 
Act in 1933. The FERA years foreshadowed the deep anticentralization views 
regarding relief administration that would only magnify in the next five years. 
Local officials sought to defend home rule. Many counties resented the intru-
sion of the federal and state governments into what they saw as their business; 
they welcomed the financial help, but did not want the rules that accompa-
nied that aid. Chapter 4 chronicles the work-relief programs of the New Deal, 
particularly the Civil Works Administration, Works Progress Administration, 
National Youth Administration, and Civilian Conservation Corps. These pro-
grams were important in bringing millions of dollars in wages to the state, and 
often served as a vehicle for family support until private employment became 
available.
 Chapters 5 and 6 turn to two groups critical to relief negotiations in this 
period: social workers (and the profession at large) and the recipients of relief. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the competing professional visions for relief administra-
tion, with a focus on the effects of the Great Depression and New Deal years 
on social workers and the profession of social work. High demand for case-
workers created an influx of untrained relief workers who did not meet the 
professional-education standards, creating tension and division within the 
profession. The conflict culminated in the spread of social worker unions to 
address the labor grievances of relief workers. This chapter also examines the 
influence of professional social work on public welfare agencies.
 Chapter 6 analyzes the relief negotiations between caseworkers and recipi-
ents, who saw federal and state officials as new allies in the administration of 
welfare. The recipients’ narrative often contrasted sharply with that described 
by the caseworker. At the center of these negotiations were expectations of 
family responsibility, and the framing of relief around the unit of the family. 
Recipients were not passive participants, but agents in the administration of 
relief in the 1930s.
 Chapter 7 turns to the statewide negotiation of relief in the welfare-reform 
debate after FERA’s end in 1935. The ideologies of home rule and fiscal localism 
are central. Michigan’s welfare law needed major revision to enable the state 
to receive federal grants under the Social Security Act. The conflicts outlined 
in chapter 3 only intensified as local officials sought to defend their authority 
against what they saw as encroachment by the federal and state governments. 
Debates took place during meetings and hearings of the Welfare and Relief 
Study Commission, appointed in 1936 to assess the state’s welfare system. 
Local officials, and their representative associations, successfully mobilized to 
defeat the 1937 laws that resulted from the commission’s recommendations, in 
a victory for home rule.
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 Debates about relief in Michigan in the 1930s centered on notions of 
expertise and power, as well as on home rule and fiscal localism. Differences 
between key groups, particularly local officials and advocates of professional 
social work, focused on beliefs about what expertise was needed for relief 
administration. In detailing these debates, and the competing narratives they 
generate, I do not aim to privilege one over the other, but seek to give voice 
to the complexity of those debates and to illuminate the experiences of those 
involved. Although associations representing specific groups often took a firm 
stand on welfare issues, the individuals within those groups represented a 
spectrum of beliefs. Some local officials advocated professional social work 
and centralization of relief, while some advocates of social work practices 
did not believe those methods were needed in public welfare. The complexi-
ties, revealed in part by the lack of a unified voice and a diversity of motives, 
resulted ultimately in a welfare system that represented both change and con-
tinuity.3 The mixed nature of the 1939 Welfare Reorganization Act left few 
people on any side fully satisfied, and welfare administration continued to be 
debated in the years that followed.
 39. Johanna Schoen, Choice and Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Pub-
lic Health and Welfare (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 13–15. Schoen’s 
introduction provides a helpful discussion of the diversity of motivations behind reproductive 
policy and the agency of women affected by that policy. 
 the onSet oF the Great Depression precipitated an unprecedented 
demand for social welfare and relief services in Michigan and throughout the 
United States, prompting extensive debates about the most effective means 
to administer relief. Michigan as a whole suffered extremely high unemploy-
ment once the Depression began. State Emergency Relief administrator Wil-
liam Haber recalled that Michigan was extremely hard-hit by the Depression, 
even in a national context: “When the country has a cold, Michigan has pneu-
monia.”1 In 1930 agricultural unemployment was 18 percent. Unemployment 
at the Ford plants in Detroit reached 32 percent by early 1931. Employment 
dropped from more than 100,000 workers at the end of 1929 to 84,000 work-
ers in the spring of 1931, and down to 37,000 by the end of that summer. 
In addition, those who were employed worked only part-time or at reduced 
wages.2 Similar trends occurred in Flint, another major automobile-manufac-
turing town. In 1928 General Motors employed 208,981 workers; by 1932 that 
fell nearly 50 percent to 116,152, and the company’s payroll fell 60 percent.3 
 1. The William Haber Oral Biography Project: Edited Transcripts, Bentley Historical 
Library, Tape X, 204.
 2. Zaragosa Vargas, Proletarians of the North: A History of Mexican Industrial Workers in 
Detroit and the Midwest, 1917–1933 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 172.
 3. Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936–1937 (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1975), 21.
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Between 1930 and 1933 the state overall had an unemployment rate of 34 
percent, far higher than the national average of 26 percent. In October 1932, 
employment rates in Michigan’s industries dropped to 41 percent of the rates 
in the mid-1920s. In 1933 unemployment reached 46 percent, with 485,000 
people out of work. At one point, more than half a million people were seeking 
work in the state. As one historian writes, “Michigan was perilously close to 
economic disaster.”4
 By Black Tuesday, many workers were unable to deal with the more serious 
problems of the Depression. Many laborers, especially those in unskilled or 
low-wage occupations, had no savings or had already exhausted those funds 
during the uncertain 1920s. When the Depression reached its worst in 1932, 
public and private welfare services were strained to the point of bankruptcy. 
Many fund-raising drives held by private organizations fell short of their goals, 
and agencies were forced to cut budgets. Private agencies directed more of 
their funds toward unemployment relief, but could not raise enough money 
to meet the rising demand; as a result, more and more people turned to public 
agencies for help.
 Public relief for poor, unemployed, or otherwise needy individuals or 
families was not new, but the administration of that relief changed dramati-
cally in the 1930s. The New Deal programs often signify to many people the 
beginning of America’s welfare state, although 1932 marked the first federal 
appropriations for public relief.5 Unlike some states, Michigan had an exten-
sive public welfare system before the 1930s. This system was almost exclusively 
local, funded with local tax dollars.6 Much of Michigan’s poor-relief system 
had existed, with only minor changes, for more than a century, and was rooted 
in township, city, and county governmental institutions. Local elected offi-
cials, including township supervisors and probate judges, dictated appropria-
tions for the varied kinds of poor relief, and, if they did not administer such 
 4. James Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed: Community and Union Activists in the 
Industrial Heartland (Albany: State University of New York, 1996), 3–4; William Haber and 
Paul Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan (Lansing: Franklin DeKleine Company, 
1935), 2; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 17; Daniel Ne-
lson, Farm and Factory: Workers in the Midwest, 1880–1990 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 119–21.
 5. Jeffrey Singleton, The American Dole: Unemployment Relief and the Welfare State in the 
Great Depression (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 6.
 6. Some states and cities lacked public welfare agencies, generally because of constitu-
tional limitations or the voluntary nature of such agencies. See Karen Ferguson, Black Politics 
in New Deal Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 74; Ronald L. 
Heinemann, Depression and New Deal in Virginia: The Enduring Dominion (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1983), 155–56; and Douglas L. Smith, The New Deal in the Urban 
South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 64–65.
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relief directly, appointed the people who did. Local officials, then, wielded 
significant power in the distribution of that relief, and would fight to retain 
that power later in the decade. Public funding and local administration were 
the central features of Michigan’s social welfare system long before the Great 
Depression and the New Deal.
 An 1809 statute established Michigan’s poor law and would continue largely 
unchanged for the next century. It was modeled after English law, with provi-
sions including residency requirements of one year and disbursement of funds 
by local officials.7 Many states, following the lead of Pennsylvania, organized 
relief through the counties. Welfare services included both institutional (usu-
ally a poorhouse or poor farm) and outdoor relief. Outdoor relief included all 
noninstitutional aid, usually cash or in-kind services or goods. Providing relief 
in most states, including Michigan, was voluntary, although most counties 
offered some poor relief.8 Counties could select either the county-wide or the 
township system. Under the township program, found in Saginaw and Wayne 
counties, cities and townships within the county administered and financed 
their own relief programs. Township supervisors or city poor-department 
superintendents handled the relief responsibilities. Marquette and Van Buren 
counties used the county system, in which the superintendents of the poor, 
appointed by the county board of supervisors, administered relief.9 Virtually 
all welfare needs—temporary relief needs, medical care, placement in a county 
or state institution, or even requests for sterilization—originated with a local 
official.10
 Eligibility for relief rested on proof of residence for at least one year and 
evidence of need. Relief recipients in general were to own no property or other 
means of securing a living. Individuals who had no income or means of sup-
port, but who did own property, had to sign their property rights over to the 
county before receiving aid.11 This process could be reversed once the indi-
 7. Opal V. Matson, Local Relief to Dependents (Detroit: Detroit Bureau of Governmental 
Research, 1933), 9.
 8. Marian Gertrude Simons, “Public Welfare Administration in Michigan” (master’s the-
sis, University of Chicago School of Social Administration, 1931), 127; Bruce and Eickhoff, The 
Michigan Poor Law, 12, 31.
 9. Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 12; Annual Abstract of the Reports of Superinten-
dents of the Poor in the State of Michigan (Lansing), 1891, 1895, and 1900. According to these 
reports, forty-seven of Michigan’s eighty-three counties used the county system of organization 
for poor relief, while twenty-five counties used the township system.
 10. Welfare and Relief Study Commission records, Box 5, Folder 10, RG 35, Archives 
of Michigan, Lansing, “Local Public Welfare,” draft report, n.d., 33–34; Jeffrey Alan Hodges, 
“Euthenics, Eugenics, and Compulsory Sterilization in Michigan: 1897–1960” (master’s thesis, 
Michigan State University, 1995).
 11. Frank M. Landers and Claude R. Tharp, Administration and Financing of Public Relief, 
Michigan Pamphlets No. 17 (Bureau of Government: University of Michigan, 1942), 2–3. 
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vidual became self-supporting. The goal was to permit the county to recover 
its relief costs from an estate if a recipient died while receiving public aid.12 
In some cases, poor individuals who owned property deeded ownership to 
the county in exchange for regular support payments. The superintendent of 
the poor agreed to provide weekly relief payments and fuel, and the recipient 
retained a life lease on their home. Upon death, the county received the prop-
erty. Mrs. Maria Lercat of Paw Paw (Van Buren County), for instance, sought 
county care for her property in June of 1912; she received $1.50 per week 
plus fuel and deeded her house and lot to the county.13 Such cases generally 
involved property owners who had no family who could care for them or to 
whom they could leave their property in exchange for care. Mrs. Lachapelle 
of Marquette, on the other hand, a widow who owned property that gener-
ated some rental income, refused to sign a deed transfer and therefore did not 
receive aid.14 Individuals who refused to deed property to the county generally 
were ineligible for poor relief, a practice that continued under the state’s old-
age pension law.
 The responsibility of families to support their members was a cornerstone 
of poor relief administration. Laws mandated this implementation. Fam-
ily members, including parents, grandparents, spouses, and children, were 
expected to contribute to, if not fully support, family members in need. The 
responsible-relative clause is found in the earliest poor laws and remained 
in force under Public Act 146 of 1925, which consolidated Michigan’s poor 
laws. Township supervisors or superintendents of the poor enforced such sup-
port through the probate court, which could order family members to pro-
vide financial support.15 Officials often refused relief to individuals if they 
believed relatives were able to support them, or reduced the poor-relief grants 
to applicants if family members could contribute. Anne Kokka was receiving 
 12. This was used most often for individuals committed to an institution for relief, such as 
the poor farm, poorhouse, or county infirmary. Such aid was considered “permanent support,” 
while outdoor relief was seen as temporary.
 13. Minutes of the Superintendent of the Poor and Poor Commission, Van Buren County, 
Western Michigan University Archives, entries for June 6, 1912, and October 1, 1936.
 14. “Proceedings of the Board of Superintendents of the Poor,” Marquette County, Decem-
ber 17, 1926, Marquette County Historical Society.
 15. See Section 2, Chapter 1 of Public Act No. 146 of 1925, Public Acts of the Legislature of 
the State of Michigan (Lansing: Robert Smith Printers, 1925), 88. Michigan differed from some 
states, including Illinois, in its exclusion of brothers and sisters from the responsible-relative 
clause. See Isabel Campbell Bruce and Edith Eickhoff, The Michigan Poor Law: Its Development 
and Administration with Special Reference to State Provision for Medical Care of the Indigent 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 48. Courts of domestic relations, such as those 
found in Chicago and New York, often were the site of family-support enforcement. See Anna 
R. Igra, Wives without Husbands: Marriage, Desertion, and Welfare in New York, 1900–1935 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 87.
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medical care from Marquette County, but an investigation found that she 
had several adult children, with one daughter living with her, and owned her 
home. The superintendents of the poor agreed that her children could provide 
her medical care and support her.16 Mrs. Elliot was also cut off from aid when 
superintendents learned she had a daughter willing to take her in. Subsequent 
investigation discovered that the daughter had moved and did not save room 
for her mother, and aid was resumed.17 Most poor-relief officials looked to 
families first for support, a practice that would continue in the New Deal pro-
grams and the reorganized welfare programs that followed.
 Records documenting poor-relief practices often include only lists of 
bills paid and weekly or monthly totals of relief disbursed. In some cases, 
the administrator listed individual names and dates, as well as items or ser-
vices granted. Although limited, these records do yield some insights. Outdoor 
relief, for example, could be in the form of grocery orders (redeemable for 
certain items at specific stores), fuel (wood or coal), clothing, and medical care 
(doctor’s visits, medicine, or medical supplies). Car repairs and items such as 
stoves might also be provided if deemed necessary. Cash relief was a rarity not 
only in Michigan welfare but throughout the country before the New Deal 
years.
 Michigan’s medical system was a mix of state and local services, with sig-
nificant variation throughout the state. Counties provided and investigated 
medical needs in different ways, and the system relied in part on the abil-
ity and willingness of the medical profession to provide services to the poor. 
Nathan Sinai, a public health expert who authored a 1933 report on the status 
of the state’s medical relief, argued that it was “an outstanding example of 
social ‘blindspot,’” one that developed “so widely and so largely and yet so 
haphazardly.”18 Sinai was extraordinarily critical of the system: “Under the 
system of relief in effect prior to the inauguration of the Emergency Relief 
Administration, medical relief appeared to be everybody’s business in general 
but nobody’s job in particular.”19
 Medical relief was coordinated at the local level, and its organization cen-
tered on whether the county operated relief under the county or township 
system, as with poor relief. Hospitalization was provided through the Univer-
 16. “Proceedings of the Board of Superintendents of the Poor,” Marquette County, January 
18, 1924, Marquette County Historical Society.
 17. “Proceedings of the Board of Superintendents of the Poor,” Marquette County, October 
19, 1927, January 17, 1929.
 18. Nathan Sinai, Marguerite F. Hallo, V. M. Hogue, and Miriam Steep, Medical Relief in 
Michigan: A Study of the Experience in Ten Counties (Ann Arbor, MI: Edward Brothers, Inc, 
1938), 2.
 19. Sinai et al., 12.
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sity of Michigan Hospital, created in 1875 to serve the needs of the poor in the 
state and to offer teaching opportunities for medical students. Once approved 
by the probate court, patients were cared for at the hospital, with the local 
unit paying the hospital costs but the state covering professional services. In 
1933 the law allowed care at a local approved hospital, but local units paid all 
costs. Children were eligible for hospital care beginning in 1875, and adults 
were eligible under a 1915 law. Children’s hospitalization was covered by state 
funds.20
 Physician care was part of the state’s outdoor-relief system and thus was 
both administered and financed entirely by local funds. Counties used a vari-
ety of systems to provide medical care to the poor, but virtually all reports 
examining the system concurred with Sinai’s assessment: the medical-relief 
system was one of overlapping and duplicating agencies with little coordina-
tion, which resulted in higher costs and lower patient care. Some contracted 
with medical societies, and two counties (Wayne and Kent) operated medical 
clinics for the poor. Some counties employed a physician for a monthly salary, 
while others paid their county physicians on a fee basis. Critics argued that 
contracts for physician care often went to the “lowest bidder,” with little atten-
tion to the quality of care.21 Van Buren County’s poor officials, for instance, 
received several bids from doctors in 1912 for medical care, but opted for the 
lowest bid. When that physician died a year later, they again chose the lowest 
bid among the submissions.22 Investigation and approval for such care was the 
responsibility of local officials, either superintendents of the poor, township 
supervisors, or county agents, depending on the administrative setup in the 
county.
 Temporary, or outdoor, relief was the dominant form of poor relief offered 
both in Michigan’s counties and in the country as a whole. Residents sought 
aid from either a township supervisor or a superintendent of the poor, who 
decided what relief to provide. Historian Michael Katz argues that outdoor 
relief served far more people than did institutions in the United States, a trend 
true in Michigan’s eighty-three counties.23 People were much more likely 
to receive a grocery or fuel order, or perhaps assistance with medical treat-
ment or rent, than they were to seek care in an infirmary. Infirmary residents 
 20. Sinai et al., 16–17; Isabel Campbell Bruce and Edith Eickhoff, The Michigan Poor Law 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 95; and Edith Abbott, Public Assistance: American 
Principles and Politics, Vol. I (Ann Arbor, MI: Edward Brothers, Inc, 1938), 2.
 21. Sinai et al., 18; Bruce and Eickhoff, 82–83.
 22. Minutes, Superintendents of the Poor, Van Buren County, entries for February 12, 
1912, and April 2, 1913.
 23. Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, 
Rev. Ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 38.
  |  Chapter One
accounted for a small portion of the care provided through local public chan-
nels—usually less than 5 or 10 percent for all counties. Statewide figures show 
that infirmaries served anywhere from 6 percent of all cases receiving aid (in 
1895) to a high of 16.5 percent in 1920, while the remainder received nonin-
stitutional relief.24
 Wayne County passed Michigan’s first law enabling the construction of a 
county infirmary in 1828. The territory followed suit the following year, pass-
ing legislation that allowed counties, townships, and cities to raise tax funds 
to construct such institutions to be run by appointed boards.25 Many of these 
institutions developed in states across the country in the antebellum period, 
a part of the shift to institutional care for many groups classed as “depen-
dents” in society.26 Michigan had eighty-one infirmaries by 1933.27 Superin-
tendents of the poor or township supervisors authorized institutional care. A 
1933 report on Michigan’s welfare system noted that few formal requirements 
for the administrative positions existed, and “in a few instances the position 
is given to the lowest bidder.” This study also found that more than half of all 
infirmary keepers were farmers. Such institutions usually were administered 
by a husband and wife, where the husband served as keeper, responsible for 
operating the farm, and the wife as matron, responsible for the management 
of the infirmary.28 Residents receiving outdoor relief also might be required to 
work at the infirmary for their aid.29
 Michigan’s infirmaries housed anywhere from five thousand individuals 
in 1891 to thirty thousand in 1938—five years after the New Deal programs 
began. Residents of infirmaries represented only a fraction of those receiv-
ing relief of some form, but the infirmaries remained an important part of 
the relief structure. Men tended to outnumber women residents, accounting 
for about three-quarters of reported residents from 1891 to 1938. Children 
 24. See Abstract of the Reports of the Superintendents of the Poor, table II. The figures used 
in this section on Michigan infirmaries come from a sampling of annual reports of the super-
intendents of the poor. I examined figures in every fifth year available, beginning with 1891 (the 
1890 report was not available) and ending with 1938, the last published report. See Abstract of 
the Reports of the Superintendents of the Poor, table I, 1891, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, 1920, 
1925, 1930, 1935, 1938.
 25. Bruce and Eickhoff, The Michigan Poor Law, 18–19, 74–75.
 26. David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New 
Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 181–86.
 27. Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 25.
 28. Ibid., 25; Bruce and Eickhoff, The Michigan Poor Law, 42; “Local Public Welfare,” 
WRSC, 58–59; Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, 193; and Katz, In the Shadow of the 
Poorhouse, 29.
 29. St. Clair Superintendent of the Poor Records, Box 1, Folder 2, State of Michigan Ar-
chives, Lansing.
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also continued to reside in infirmaries, although institutions had attempted to 
cease admitting children by the 1870s and 1880s, since such care was deemed 
damaging to children. Michigan sought to remove children from its infirma-
ries in 1871 with the founding of a state school for dependent children. (Small 
children could remain with their mothers if in a county institution.) Never a 
large portion of the state totals, children did comprise anywhere from 1 to 8 
percent of the total poorhouse population.30
 County infirmaries, formerly known as poorhouses, were also key institu-
tions in the care of the aged and infirm. Originally conceived as institutions 
to provide for the poor, infirmaries had evolved by the twentieth century into 
informal nursing homes for the elderly poor, and by the 1930s had a “great 
proportion of mentally and physically infirm,” with only a very small number 
of residents considered employable.31 Medical care was the “weakest spot in 
the whole program of infirmary care.” Just one infirmary had routine medical 
examinations, and just twenty scheduled regular visits by doctors. In 1933, 
two infirmaries even housed tubercular patients with other residents.32 Three 
years later, still only seven infirmaries had hospital accommodations, and 
some counties transferred terminal patients to the infirmaries to die.33
 People of color were underrepresented in infirmary populations, seldom 
accounting for 2 percent of the total in the years reported.34 In Wayne County, 
which had the largest concentration of African-American residents in Michi-
gan, blacks rarely were more than 4 or 5 percent of the infirmary population.35 
In part this reflects the low numbers of African-Americans in the total state 
population. People of color were 4.4 percent of the state’s population in 1930, 
2 percent in 1920, and less than 1 percent in 1910. But such figures were much 
higher for specific counties. Wayne County’s black population, for instance, 
had increased from 1.1 percent in 1910, to 3.7 percent in 1920, to 7 percent 
in 1930; other counties with significant black populations were Cass, Lake, 
 30. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 107–9; Walter Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare 
State: A History of Social Welfare in America, 4th Ed. (New York: Free Press, 1989), 107–13. The 
Michigan data are drawn from the Abstracts of the Reports of the Superintendents of the Poor, 
1891, 1895, etc.
 31. “Local Public Welfare,” chapter III, Local Public Welfare Institutions, 62–63, WRSC 
Records, Box 5, Folder 10.
 32. Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 30.
 33. “Local Public Welfare,” 58.
 34. Reports provide a breakdown by race (including figures for African-Americans, mulat-
toes, and Indians) until the turn of the century. After that year, reports included nonwhites in 
the “foreign-born” figure.
 35. See Annual Reports for County of Wayne, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915; also Abstract of 
the Reports of the Superintendents of the Poor, State of Michigan, years aforementioned in previ-
ous footnote.
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and Saginaw.36 The issue of race received little attention in surviving records, 
including the published reports of both the state and Wayne County. The small 
number of nonwhite residents in county infirmaries was likely a combination 
of racism and exclusion.
 Infirmaries were important sources of aid for Michigan’s foreign-born resi-
dents, although statistics on citizenship status were not reported. Infirmaries 
in nineteenth-century America tended to have high numbers of foreign-born 
populations in relation to reported census figures.37 State figures show that 
native-born white Americans accounted for about half of county institutional 
residents through 1925. After that year, native-born whites accounted for 
slightly more than half: 54 percent in 1925, 62 percent in 1930, 53 percent in 
1935, and 56 percent in 1938. The slight decline in numbers of foreign-born 
residents likely reflects the more restrictive immigration laws in effect, but 
throughout the period foreign-born whites nevertheless resided in institutions 
in far greater numbers than their share of the state populations.38 Nineteenth-
century critics argued that the presence of the foreign-born in infirmaries 
dominated because of the negative character traits attributed to many immi-
grants, such as laziness or ignorance, rather than circumstances or factors 
outside the infirmary residents’ control.39
JudIcIal	authorIty,
localISM,	and	the	caSe	of	MotherS’	penSIonS
Implementation of mothers’ pensions in 1913 represented Michigan’s first new 
welfare program in decades, and continued the trend that programs be funded 
and administered locally. Enacted at the state level and administered by local 
officials, mothers’ pensions sought to provide poor mothers with a means to 
raise their children in their home and were a part of the philosophical shift 
from institutional child care to home care for dependent children. The term 
 36. See Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, table 2, 1115; table 13, 1135–40; Thir-
teenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910, Vol. II, Population, 946; Fourteenth 
Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1920, Vol. III, Population, 487.
 37. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 92–94. 
 38. Abstract of the Reports of the Superintendents of the Poor, years aforementioned. Fif-
teenth Census of the United States: 1930, Vol. I, Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1931), table 2, 1115. As noted, the poor reports do not specify citizenship 
status, so it is not known how many of those classified as foreign-born were naturalized citizens. 
According to census figures in 1920 and 1930, 28.6 percent and 34.2 percent (respectively) of 
the foreign-born had not pursued citizenship at some stage.
 39. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, 290–91.
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“pension” was critical; mothers were to be paid for the work of raising chil-
dren. It was not to be relief or welfare, but an earned benefit much like a 
veteran’s pension.40 Like many such laws, Michigan’s 1913 mothers’ pension 
law did not allocate state funding, and counties had to provide money for the 
program from their own budgets. Michigan’s law placed the program within 
the juvenile court, and thus probate judges, along with county agents, were 
its chief administrators. Disputes over whether mothers’ pensions were, in 
fact, pensions or were instead poor relief, ambiguities in the law, as well as 
what David Rothman has called the “cult of judicial personality,” resulted in 
significant variations in the program’s administration across Michigan and in 
many other states.41
 Juvenile court programs and mothers’ pensions both grew from the Pro-
gressive Era’s efforts to marshal the power and authority of the state to address 
social problems. Mothers’ pensions emerged as part of domestic relations 
law, directed by what Michael Grossberg calls a “judicial patriarchy.” Judges 
“became the buffer and the referee between the family and the state,” with 
considerable power over the family: “Family law became their patriarchal 
domain.”42 Grossberg argues that, by the end of the nineteenth century, judi-
cial patriarchy defined the role of judges in family law. In the early twentieth 
century, this judicial authority extended into the realm of welfare and poverty 
with two goals: to provide appropriate care for dependent children but also 
to limit financial dependency on the state.43 Many states, including Michigan, 
criminalized desertion and nonsupport by fathers in an effort to force fathers 
to provide for their children. Without support, children could be placed either 
in boarding homes or institutions, or their mothers could seek a pension. 
Administration of welfare and juvenile justice intersected in what Michael 
 40. Joanne L. Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform: Mothers’ Pensions in 
Chicago, 1911–1929 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 36–38; Molly Ladd-Taylor, 
Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890–1930 (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1994), 137, 143–48; Kriste Lindenmeyer, “A Right to Childhood”: The U.S. Children’s Bu-
reau and Child Welfare (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 152–56; and 
Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917–1942 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), 32–34. 
 41. David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in 
Progressive America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980). See chapter 7, “The Cult of 
Judicial Personality.”
 42. Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 289–91.
 43. Anna Igra argues that a “dual system of family law” developed in this period, particu-
larly in relation to antidesertion efforts. The category of deserted wives became separate from 
widows in the early 1900s, and deserted wives were directed to the legal system, rather than the 
welfare system, for support. See Wives Without Husbands, 43.
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Willrich terms a “mode of governance whose object is not merely to provide a 
modicum of economic security to citizens but to keep legitimate claims upon 
the public purse to a minimum.”44 Public support was to be the last resort for 
financial support for children, as was the case in poor relief. The ambiguous 
position of mothers’ pensions illustrates the tension created by competing 
goals: providing adequately for dependent children, recognizing the work of 
motherhood, and minimizing the state’s welfare burden.
 The first mothers’ pension laws at the state level emerged in the second 
decade of the twentieth century, and by 1926 forty-two states had mothers’ pen-
sion programs. Nearly half of those states, including Michigan, placed admin-
istration of the program in the juvenile court.45 Some states simply placed the 
program under existing welfare administrators, such as superintendents of 
the poor, while other states created a new local agency that often was respon-
sible for all forms of poor relief, including mothers’ pensions. Administra-
tive designations fell somewhat along regional lines; Midwestern and Western 
states tended to use juvenile courts more than states in the Northeast.46 Most 
Michigan counties administered the program through the juvenile court staff, 
usually comprised of the judge, county agent, and perhaps a probation officer. 
Larger urban counties, such as Wayne and Kent, created separate departments 
and staffs for the mothers’ pension program. The placement of the program 
in the juvenile court continued to be debated, because some judges and other 
officials believed it belonged in the poor-relief program.47 But the programs 
were funded and administered locally in all states; the only variation was 
which local officials were the administrators.
 The choice of the juvenile court reflected the link some experts saw between 
the presence of mothers in the home and the rate of juvenile delinquency: 
allowing mothers to remain in their home to raise their children would reduce 
 44. Michael Willrich, “Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in Modern America,” 
Journal of American History 87.2 (September 2000): 463; See also David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile 
Justice in the Making (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) and Willrich, City 
of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).
 45. Emma Octavia Lundberg, Public Aid to Mothers with Dependent Children, U.S. Chil-
dren’s Bureau Publication No. 162 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), 
2, 10. For a discussion of Chicago, see Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform.
 46. Christopher Howard, “Sowing the Seeds of ‘Welfare’: The Transformation of Mothers’ 
Pensions, 1900–1940.” Journal of Policy History 4.2 (1992): 197.
 47. The issue appears periodically in the proceedings of the National Probation Associa-
tion, but it is also telling how rarely mothers’ pensions are discussed at the national meetings. 
For an example of the argument that the court was not the appropriate site for the program, see 
James Hoge Ricks, “The Place of the Juvenile Court in the Care of Dependent Children,” Social 
Service and the Courts, the Annual Report and Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Conference 
of the National Probation Association (Albany, NY: National Probation Association, 1920): 
124–29; Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 37–39.
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the chances that the children would become delinquent.48 Mothers’ pensions 
were a means to prevent juvenile delinquency in families where the only prob-
lem was poverty due to the absence of a male breadwinner. Wayne County’s 
Judge D. J. Healy, in fact, called the program “preventive” and argued that chil-
dren under the supervision of the mothers’ pension program became delin-
quent at a much smaller rate than children outside the program.49 Those who, 
like Judge Healy, supported placement of the program in the juvenile court 
argued that pensions were distinct from relief and did not belong in a welfare 
agency. Some recipients preferred administration by the juvenile court not so 
much because of support for the probate judges, but rather for its separation 
from other welfare programs. To them and to part of the public, mothers’ 
pensions were not stigmatized in the way that other welfare programs were. 
Consequently, benefits were sometimes more generous.
 Michigan’s 1913 mothers’ pension law provided material support for 
needy children whose mother was a “suitable guardian” and for whom the 
only problem was financial need. Like many other state mothers’ pension laws, 
Michigan’s program relied solely on local tax dollars budgeted through county 
boards of supervisors. Probate judges, elected to four-year terms, adminis-
tered the program and had an extraordinary amount of discretion, including 
who would receive pensions and for how much. They hired the staff—either 
investigators of the mothers’ pensions, or county agents—who dealt with the 
scrutiny of pension applications, and had final say in whether a pension was 
awarded.50 Their discretion was linked to Progressive Era beliefs that indi-
vidual treatment was the best way to address issues related to crime, including 
juvenile delinquency. As a result, juvenile courts had very few guidelines, a 
situation that produced a “cult of judicial personality,” or “a system that made 
the personality of the judge, his likes and dislikes, attitudes and prejudices, 
consistencies and caprices, the decisive element in shaping the character of his 
courtroom.”51 Probate courts varied considerably in their operation, including 
the administration of mothers’ pensions, regardless of the state law.
 Guidelines by the National Probation Association and the U.S. Children’s 
Bureau recommended that a probate judge have “special qualifications for 
juvenile court work. He should have legal training, acquaintance with social 
 48. Lundberg, Public Aid to Mothers with Dependent Children, 10; Goodwin, Gender and 
the Politics of Welfare Reform, 101–4.
 49. D. J. Healy, “Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,” in Probation in Theory and Practice, 
Michigan Probation Association 1937 Yearbook, 38.
 50. Public Act 228, Public Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, 1913 (Lansing: 
Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1913), 444–45; Arthur W. Bromage and Thomas H. Reed, 
Organization and Cost of County and Township Government (Detroit: Detroit Bureau of Gov-
ernmental Research, 1933), 61–62.
 51. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience, 238.
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problems, and understanding of child psychology.” But this was not always 
the case, according to NPA field secretary Francis Hiller, and Michigan viv-
idly illustrates the gulf between theory and practice.52 Probate judges were 
elected officials generally identified with one of the major political parties. The 
position had no eligibility requirements, aside from U.S. citizenship, county 
residence, and a successful bid for election. Neither legal training nor edu-
cation was necessary, and many judges in fact were not attorneys.53 A 1933 
study of six Michigan counties found that just three judges had legal training, 
while three others were a civil engineer and farmer, a general store owner 
with an eighth-grade education, and a former lumber-company foreman.54 A 
1936 Michigan study of seventeen counties reported that some judges serving 
on the bench had less than an eighth-grade education. Just four judges were 
attorneys, and most did not have training either in law or in social work. Sit-
ting probate judges were formerly farmers, barbers, county sheriffs, real estate 
salesmen, and court employees. They were an all-male, older population, with 
half beyond the age of fifty.55 Few met the guidelines advocated by the NPA 
and the Children’s Bureau.
 Michigan’s case also illustrates the significant variation in administrative 
practices, a trend rooted in the program’s local administration and funding. 
The lack of uniformity is explained largely by the varied beliefs and practices 
of the probate judges. Michigan’s law was among the most liberal and inclusive 
in the country. On its face, all mothers—unmarried, deserted, widowed and 
divorced, white and nonwhite, citizen and noncitizen—were eligible for pen-
sions.56 Michigan was also one of just three states to provide aid to unmarried 
mothers.57 But a 1934 study by the State Department of Welfare found that 
 52. Francis H. Hiller, “The Juvenile Court as a Case-Working Agency,” in The Courts and 
the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency: Annual Reports and Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual 
Conference of the National Probation Association (Albany, NY: National Probation Association, 
1926), 207.
 53. Mabel Brown Ellis, “Juvenile Courts and Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan,” unpublished 
[1917].
 54. The 1933 study included the counties of Antrim, Cass, Iron, Kent, Luce, and Roscom-
mon. Bromage and Reed, Organization and Cost of County and Township Government, 25, 61.
 55. “Local Public Welfare,” draft of study, WRSC records, RG 35 Archives of Michigan, 
Lansing, Box 5, Folder 10, 81–82; “Sampling Survey” for WRSC, county notes, WRSC Records, 
Boxes 6 and 7.
 56. Public Act No. 228 of 1913; Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform, 
160–66.
 57. Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 467; Mothers’ Aid, 1931, U.S. 
Children’s Bureau Publication No. 220 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1933), 12. New York’s law was among the most conservative, directing nonwidows to the legal 
system to secure support. See Igra, Wives Without Husbands, 35, 107.
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twenty-one counties refused aid to certain categories of mothers, despite the 
broad scope of the law. Seventeen counties refused pensions to divorced or 
unmarried mothers and four counties excluded aid to children whose fathers 
were in prison.58 Widows were the overwhelming majority of recipients 
throughout the life of the program, often accounting for as many as three-
quarters of the petitions granted.59 Many counties would not support mothers 
with only one child, and some also excluded cases involving desertion, alco-
hol, insanity, and the physically handicapped.60 The state attorney general also 
reinforced the discretion accorded to probate judges in 1938, arguing that the 
word may in the law was key; the judge had the power to grant aid, but was 
not required to, and any grant continued only “until the further order of the 
court.”61
 Although the evidence of overt discrimination is somewhat limited, the 
racial demographics of mothers’ pension recipients further point to judicial 
discretion in the program’s administration. Historians have documented the 
discriminatory nature of the program in many states, linking such discrimi-
nation to local administrative control. A 1931 U.S. Children’s Bureau report 
found that just 3 percent of all pension recipients were black, and many of 
those were concentrated in just two states.62 As Joanne Goodwin has shown, 
the numbers of black recipients in Chicago were not proportionate to the 
size of the black population, despite the city’s high number of female-headed 
households from 1910 to 1919.63 By contrast, the proportions of blacks in 
the mothers’ pension program were higher in some regions of the country 
than the number of blacks in the population.64 Mothers’ pension programs did 
 58. Reba F. Harris, Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan: Report of a Study Made by the State 
Welfare Department (Lansing: State Welfare Department, 1934), 1, 3–5; Memorandum of State 
Welfare Department, “Report on Mothers’ Pensions for the Fiscal Year,” 1935, WRSC Records, 
Research and Information Files, Box 14, Folder 5, Archives of Michigan; “Sampling Survey,” 
Box 6, Folder 5 (Hillsdale County), and Box 7, Folder 5 (Oakland County), WRSC Records.
 59. Kay Walters Ofman, “A Rural View of Mothers’ Pensions: The Allegan County, Michi-
gan, Mothers’ Pension Program, 1913–1928.” Social Service Review 70.1 (March 1996): 102, 107. 
See also Biennial Reports of the Michigan State Board of Corrections and Charities, 1913–1928.
 60. Harris, Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan, 6. Widows accounted for 61 percent of the cases 
analyzed in the report, with unmarried mothers accounting for just 1.25 percent. Divorced 
mothers were 8.8 percent of the total, and deserted mothers 16 percent.
 61. Biennial Report of the Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Attorney General Ray-
mond W. Starr (Lansing: Franklin DeKleine Company, 1938), 3.
 62. Mothers’ Aid, 1931, U.S. Children’s Bureau publication No. 220. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933, 13–14, and table A-III; Howard, “Sowing the Seeds of 
Welfare,” 200–201.
 63. Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform, 162–64.
 64. Barbara J. Nelson, “The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen’s 
Compensation and Mothers’ Aid,” in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda Gordon 
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provide aid to immigrants and generally perceived them as able to integrate 
fully as Americans.65
 Nonwhite mothers did have access to mothers’ pensions in some areas of 
Michigan, but their numbers were relatively small. State reports in Michigan 
recorded only the marital status of the recipient, and later also recorded nativ-
ity, and the 1934 study included no information on the operation of race in 
the program.66 A state investigation of Saginaw County’s poor-relief system in 
1933 revealed that mothers’ pensions were extended to a somewhat diverse 
group of dependent mothers. This group included the foreign-born, women 
of color (both African-American and Mexican), and nonwidows. Five percent 
of Saginaw County’s mothers’ pension recipients in 1932 were either African-
American or Mexican.67 Yet it is difficult to determine how many other appli-
cants were turned away or discouraged from applying in the first place.68 Given 
the larger obstacles to financial stability for nonwhites (e.g., employment and 
housing discrimination), these numbers likely underrepresent the actual need 
for aid among these mothers of color. Who was granted aid remained an issue 
of local discretion.
 Despite efforts to separate the program from welfare, administrative prac-
tices often blurred the distinction. The 1934 study by the State Department 
of Welfare argued that although the pensions were not intended to be poor 
relief, courts and probate judges used them in that way. Opal Matson, for 
instance, clearly placed mothers’ pensions in the welfare system in her 1933 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 139.
 65. Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare (New 
York: Knopf, 1994), 47–48, 87; Mink, The Wages of Motherhood, 30, 37–41; Kyle E. Ciani, 
“Choosing to Care: Meeting Children’s Needs in Detroit and San Diego, 1880–1945,” (PhD 
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1998), 102–3; Kyle E. Ciani, “Hidden Laborers: Female 
Day Workers in Detroit, 1870–1920,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 4.1 (January 
2005): 43–44; and Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform, 128–29, 162.
 66. Ciani, “Choosing to Care,” 102–3, and “Hidden Laborers,” 43–44; Victoria W. Wolcott, 
Remaking Respectability: African-American Women in Interwar Detroit (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2001), 43. 
 67. Seventy percent of recipients of mothers’ pensions, according to the 1933 report, were 
native born. Some mothers’ spouses were in institutions, and one was unmarried. Proceedings, 
Saginaw County Board of Supervisors, January 11, 1933, 54–55. Similar figures appeared in the 
1936 study of Kalamazoo County’s program. Sixty-five percent of recipients were widows, and 
20 percent were divorced or deserted. Just 3 percent were unmarried, and 12 percent had spous-
es in institutions (prison, insane asylum, or tuberculosis hospital). Probate Court, Kalamazoo 
County, Welfare and Relief Study Commission Records, Box 7, Folder 2, Kalamazoo County.
 68. State reports (Michigan Board of Corrections and Charities 1913–1920; Michigan State 
Welfare Commission 1921–28) indicate that many applicants were never granted aid, but the 
reports do not provide any information about whose applications were denied. See also Ofman, 
“A Rural View of Mothers’ Pensions,” 102.
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assessment of relief programs in Michigan.69 More than one attorney general, 
however, ruled that the mothers’ pension program was not poor relief, and 
was separate and independent of poor-relief legislation for a reason: “Had 
the legislature intended this to be poor relief, it is reasonable to assume that it 
would have given supervision of such allowances to the superintendents of the 
poor and the township supervisors who have the charge of poor relief.”70 But 
not all agreed with that assessment. Seven Michigan counties had no mothers’ 
pension programs even by 1917, not because of a lack of funds, but “due to a 
deliberate conviction on the part of the [probate] judge that the county poor 
officials are better fitted to handle relief work than the court.”71 Marquette 
County’s probate judge and poor officials worked together to determine the 
most cost-effective means to provide aid. The judge referred some cases to the 
poor commission, believing that it could provide support more cheaply than 
the mothers’ pension program. In one case, the judge requested poor relief 
instead of a mothers’ pension because he didn’t think a cash allowance would 
“be properly and judiciously spent.”72 No specifics were listed, but the judge 
told the board that “home conditions were such that if a Mothers Pension were 
granted, the children would not receive the full benefit of that aid.”73 Many 
counties refused to provide both mothers’ aid and poor relief, regardless of the 
adequacy of her mothers’ pension grant.74
 The perception of mothers’ pensions as poor relief depended in part on the 
investigative methods of the probate judge. Investigation procedures varied, 
and were directly linked to whether judges saw the pensions as poor relief 
or a “pension.” Sixty-two counties used the county agent to investigate such 
cases, as stipulated by law. Six counties used either the probation officer or an 
investigator of mothers’ pensions. But the report harshly criticized the seven 
 69. Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 36–39.
 70. Biennial Report of the Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Attorney General 
Patrick H. O’Brien (Lansing: Franklin DeKleine Company, 1934), 355; Harris, Mothers’ Pensions 
in Michigan, 3.
 71. Ellis, “Juvenile Courts and Mothers’ Pensions,” 4–5.
 72. “Proceedings of the Board of Superintendents of the Poor, Marquette County,” Mar-
quette County Historical Society, January 18, 1924, and March 21, 1924, 37, 44.
 73. “Proceedings, Superintendents of the Poor, Marquette County,” January 22, 1931, 187. 
The mother received a rental allowance of ten dollars per month, and a monthly grocery order 
for twenty dollars.
 74. Mrs. Mary Blaud of Van Buren County asked the poor commission to cease payments 
to her, as the probate judge refused her a mothers’ pension as long as she received poor relief. 
Why she preferred a mothers’ pension is not clear, but the reason was likely either that the 
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counties who used superintendents of the poor, township supervisors, or even 
jail officials as investigating officers. It also criticized the influence of such offi-
cials on the investigations, even if they were not conducting them.75 To many 
probate judges, a mother’s pension was poor relief, and thus they administered 
the law as such.
 Judicial discretion, in conjunction with budget limitations, also affected 
the size of mothers’ pension grants, which seldom reached the legal maximum 
level. Although by 1921 the law allowed up to $10 per week—and not less than 
$2 for one child—benefits averaged far below that, and also varied depending 
on what category the mother’s situation fit. Counties paid a low of $0.40 per 
child per week in extreme cases to anywhere from $1.22 to $2.33. The state 
average was $1.75. Some probate judges would provide funds for only three 
or four children, regardless of the size of the family.76 By the 1930s benefits in 
some counties barely covered the family’s food, not to mention rent, clothing, 
and medical care. Variations in grant amounts point to the extremely limited 
funding of mothers’ pensions, reinforcing Joanne Goodwin’s argument that 
such aid was merely partial support.77 Inadequate grants were a national prob-
lem with mothers’ pensions, and Michigan actually ranked sixth in a 1931 
study of average grants. But variations within the state, again because of judi-
cial discretion and local control, rendered the averages less meaningful.78
 Inadequate grants prompted many recipients (up to 44 percent) to seek 
paid work, or to have older children work. The numbers are likely low, as 
many mothers hid their employment in fear of losing their benefits.79 In part, 
inadequacy was a function of finances, particularly during the Depression, as 
counties eliminated pensions or reduced grants. But variations in grants, and 
the inadequacy of mothers’ pensions, predated the Depression, according to 
a 1926 study. The study pointed directly to the discretion of judges and poor 
investigative methods as the reasons for the varied amounts of grants: “The 
differences seem to be mainly due to different attitudes on the part of the 
 75. In many counties, the report stated, such individuals dictated the policies and adminis-
tration of the mothers’ pension programs, and in eight counties the local officials actually placed 
the mothers’ pension checks in their own accounts. This point is emphasized in the 1934 study 
as well as the 1936 Welfare Relief and Study Commission report on Michigan’s welfare system. 
Both criticized the program’s administrative practices.
 76. Harris, Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan, 8–9; Public Act No. 16, Michigan Public Acts, 
1921, 787.
 77. Harris, 8–9; Ciani, “Choosing to Care,” 99–102; Ciani, “Hidden Laborers,” 45–46; and 
Goodwin, The Politics of Welfare Reform, 169–75.
 78. Howard, “Sowing the Seeds of ‘Welfare,’” 202.
 79. Harris, Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan, 13–14. For a study of Allegan County, Michigan, 
and this issue, see Ofman, “A Rural View of Mothers’ Pensions,” 110–11.
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judges, some being more in sympathy with the system than the others.”80 The 
variation in grants reveals the gulf between the ideal of supporting a mother’s 
full-time care of her children, and the views of many probate judges.
 Some probate judges did not believe that mothers’ pensions should be 
full support and administered the program deliberately using the concept of 
“partial support.” Manistee County Probate Judge Fred Stone told the annual 
gathering of superintendents of the poor in 1924 that the pension was to sup-
plement the mother’s income (or income from older children). He rejected 
the notion that women’s role was simply the home caretaker, and argued that 
most women had to help the family with wage work at some point. “It is very 
seldom that the probate court is called upon to aid those where the wife didn’t 
help out during the husband’s life time, and I don’t believe that she should 
expect or the people should expect that she should be supported entirely by 
the county and do nothing for herself to earn money.”81 Stone argued that 
the pension was to be the supplementary income in the family—not the sole 
source of support. The mothers’ pension was not to bring these families into 
the middle-class ideal of a mother whose sole focus was care of the home 
and family, as advocates of the pension concept argued. The Manistee County 
Board of Supervisors agreed with this philosophy in 1933 when it protested 
the minimum provision of $2 per week because it was “inadvisable, unneces-
sary and tends toward undue allowance under present conditions.” The super-
visors believed the amount of the grant should be the discretion of the probate 
judge.82 Kent County Judge Clark Higbee expressed similar ideas in 1914, not-
ing that one mother receiving a mothers’ pension had “fine children; no better 
in Michigan.” They needed “her care and attention; they require that she stay 
in her home and care for them.” But he also noted that “she is helping too,” 
financially.83
 80. National Probation Association, Report of a Study of Juvenile Courts and Adult Pro-
bation in Certain Counties of Michigan (National Probation Association and Michigan State 
Conference of Social Work, 1926), 10. A copy is at the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library at the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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intendents of the Poor, Keepers and Matrons of the County Infirmaries, and City Poor Directors, 
August 28, 1924, 55–56. See also “Local Public Welfare,” WRSC, 96–97.
 82. “Supervisors’ Proceedings, Manistee County,” vol. 13, April 12, 1933, 98–99. The resolu-
tion opposing the minimum allowance passed unanimously. Wayne County also supported the 
resolution. Official Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors of Wayne County, 1933, September 
18, 1933, 239.
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the	1920S:	early	SIgnS	of	StreSS
It is true that the Great Depression placed an immense strain on Michigan’s 
poor-relief system, but the state’s economic problems originated in the 1920s 
and went far beyond unemployed auto workers. As in many other parts of the 
country, the relief needs in Michigan also increased in the decade prior to the 
Great Depression. Michigan residents worked in agriculture, extractive indus-
tries such as lumber and mining, and, by the 1920s and 1930s, the growing 
industrial centers of Flint and Detroit. Agriculture was a statewide occupa-
tion, although the best land was found in the southern and middle parts of 
Michigan (including Van Buren County) and in what is known as the thumb 
area, around Saginaw Bay and the Lake Huron shoreline. Parts of the northern 
Lower Peninsula also yielded significant fruit production.84 Mining was an 
Upper Peninsula industry, particularly in the Lake Superior regions (includ-
ing Marquette County), and the lumber industry was centered in the northern 
Lower Peninsula and the Upper Peninsula. Counties that relied on a single 
industry, such as Wayne, which includes Detroit, suffered immeasurably more 
than counties and cities, like Saginaw, that had more diverse economies.
 Michigan agriculture produced a variety of crops, including fruit, grains, 
beans, and sugar beets, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.85 
Michigan’s total acreage in agriculture—about half of the available land in 
the state—peaked at more than 19 million acres in 1920. The value of the 
state’s farmland reached a high of seventy-five dollars per acre in 1920, but 
fell to forty-five dollars by 1930. The value of Michigan’s agricultural prod-
ucts reached a record high in 1920, but would not again attain that level until 
1969.86 Farming areas could weather hard times with subsistence agriculture 
in a way that urban workers could not, but the 1920s still proved difficult for 
many farmers and agricultural workers.
 Mining, a Michigan industry that was in its heyday in the nineteenth cen-
tury, remained a significant source of employment into the twentieth century.87 
Michigan produced half of the world’s copper in the mid-nineteenth century, 
 84. Michigan: A Guide to the Wolverine State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 
7–8, 59–60.
 85. Kalamazoo was a major producer of celery, and the Lake Michigan shore, stretching 
from southwestern Michigan north to Grand Traverse Bay, was the state’s major fruit belt, 
producing peaches, apples, and berries. The state ranked second in the nation in sugar beet 
production. Michigan, 59–60.
 86. Willis F. Dunbar and George S. May, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State, 3rd 
Rev. Ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 502–3.
 87. Michigan, 63.
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and remained in third place as late as 1913.88 World War I prompted a new 
boom in copper and iron-ore mining. Iron-ore production reached its peak in 
1920, but fell to less than 25 percent of that level the following year. Increased 
mechanization also reduced the need for labor, sending many workers to the 
unemployment line. Employing 19,000 workers in 1909, copper mining in the 
Upper Peninsula employed only 12,200 workers ten years later and was down 
to 7,800 by 1929.89 Between 1921 and 1925, 25,000 people left the copper-min-
ing regions of the Upper Peninsula for opportunities in the auto industry in 
Detroit and Flint.90
 Lumbering experienced a history similar to that of mining. Lumbering 
was at its peak in the nineteenth century, particularly in the cities of Saginaw 
and Muskegon, though lumber mills and camps were found throughout the 
northern parts of Michigan. Michigan led the nation in lumber production 
and employed more than 45,000 workers in 1889. By the turn of the century 
lumber was on the decline, but the state still had 437 sawmills in 1905. Two 
decades later, however, the industry was in a serious downturn, with only 
12,000 workers in 1925.91 Workers often combined part-time lumber employ-
ment with farming or other seasonal work as the industry scaled back in the 
early part of the twentieth century into the 1920s.92
 Michigan’s increasing reliance on industrial production worsened the 
effects of the economic depression. Its industrial production increased mark-
edly in the early twentieth century, in large part because of the development 
of the automotive industry, as well as foundries and machine shops. Other sig-
nificant industries included paper manufacturing and cereal production in the 
southwestern region and furniture manufacturing in the Grand Rapids area.93 
Cities hit especially hard in the 1920s included Detroit and others dependent 
on the automotive industry. The 1920s was a period of ups and downs for 
the auto industry, with layoffs occurring several times during that period. 
Employment fluctuations, and layoffs for retooling, contributed to what was a 
 88. Ibid., 62–64. For copper mining see Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and 
Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Arthur 
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 92. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 136–38. See also 
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very unstable period for many workers, who turned to local welfare agencies, 
both public and private, for aid when their own resources were exhausted.94 
Racism usually resulted in quicker layoffs for both African-American and 
Mexican workers, but all workers, particularly the unskilled, faced uncertain 
times in the years before the Great Depression. By the end of 1920 about 80 
percent of Detroit’s auto workers were unemployed. Another production slow-
down occurred just a few years later, resulting in a recession and more layoffs 
in 1926–1927. For workers with little experience in urban living, unemploy-
ment with no land resources on which to draw was daunting. These problems 
placed heavy burdens on local relief agencies. Communities such as Saginaw, 
which manufactured auto parts for the Detroit plants, also experienced down-
turns, but a more diversified industrial base lessened the magnitude of the 
Depression’s unemployment.95
publIc	vS.	prIvate	relIef
Both public and private welfare services existed in most Michigan commu-
nities by the 1920s, but the two represented different approaches to social 
welfare. For the trained social worker, private welfare was the only likely place 
for employment. Few public programs were large enough to warrant full-time 
staff, and few areas saw a need for a professional social worker. Very few public 
agencies were members of the major social work organizations, including the 
Family Welfare Association, and most membership requirements precluded 
the admission of public agencies.96 Private agencies focused on family case-
work, with relief as a supplemental service.97 They sought to help families or 
 94. Martin Edward Sullivan, “‘On the Dole’: The Relief Issue in Detroit, 1929–1939” (PhD 
dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1974), 36–37; Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cul-
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Rutgers University Press, 1987), 116–17.
 95. Vargas, Proletarians of the North, 80–82; Richard W. Thomas, Life for Us Is What We 
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Press, 1992), 45–47.
 96. Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief, 1929–1939 (New York: Henry Holt, 1940), 
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individuals solve the problems that caused their “need” for aid, which they 
understood to stem from other issues, including family conflict, ill health, 
or other situations that had caused their economic difficulties. Rather than 
simply providing material relief, private social workers sought to help fami-
lies become self-supporting. Even in Detroit, the state’s largest city, no private 
agency provided relief to needy individuals, who had to turn to the public 
agencies.98 In contrast, public welfare was a temporary measure focusing only 
on the immediate material needs of the recipient. A common criticism of pub-
lic welfare by the early twentieth century was the lack of record keeping and 
casework conducted by public officials.99
 Private welfare encompassed a range of agencies that served a variety of 
constituencies. Some centered on specific religious, racial, or ethnic groups, 
while others were more broadly based. The development of private welfare was 
largely an urban phenomenon, and rural areas had far fewer private charity 
organizations, further highlighting the importance of public relief in the state. 
Each private welfare organization’s focus on a specific group—serving “its 
own”—excluded others from receiving aid, and based many restrictions solely 
on citizenship or race.100 Exclusion from public welfare programs was often part 
of the impetus for groups such as African-Americans, Mexican immigrants, 
and Mexican-Americans to establish their own social service organizations.101 
Major charities operating in Michigan included the Associated Charities (a 
member of the Family Welfare Association), the Salvation Army, the League 
of Catholic Women, the St. Vincent de Paul Society, the Detroit Urban League, 
and the City Rescue Mission, among others. Cities such as Detroit, Flint, and 
Grand Rapids had fairly extensive networks of private welfare (although not 
all provided material relief services), while other more rural areas, including 
Van Buren County, had far fewer options. Manistee County, in rural northern 
Michigan, had a county Social Welfare League, and Marquette County a Social 
Service Bureau, which coordinated social welfare efforts.102 Most counties had 
State, 73–103.
 98. Joanna C. Colcord, Cash Relief (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1936), 86; Wil-
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a chapter of the American Red Cross as well. Some cities, including Detroit 
and Grand Rapids, coordinated their fund-raising for private charity through 
the local community chest, which then distributed the funds to its member 
organizations.103 Van Buren County had no centralized social welfare organi-
zation. (Saginaw’s private agencies were funded in part by the Saginaw Welfare 
League.) Some of the state’s midsize cities, including Pontiac, lacked a private 
family welfare agency even by the 1930s.104
 In some areas private agencies investigated cases for the public welfare 
system, but the funding was still public. Smaller cities and rural governments 
funneled their public relief funds through local private agencies, rather than 
having public officials distribute relief dollars. The Social Service Department 
of the Civic League in Bay City, which had a population of about fifty thou-
sand in 1921, investigated cases and dispensed city funds for relief. The city 
also provided office space and supplies for the agency, and paid the salaries of 
some workers.105 Manistee’s Social Welfare League coordinated the mothers’ 
pension program and transient relief.106 Jackson’s Welfare Bureau, a private 
agency, took over the city’s poor-relief work when Jackson abolished the poor-
relief department. Instead, it paid the Welfare Bureau’s staff and provided a 
relief budget.107 Flint’s Social Service Bureau investigated cases for the public 
agency until 1930.108 In some cases private agencies investigated relief cases, 
but dispensed public, not private, welfare funds.
 The relief options for rural communities were more limited than those of 
urban areas in Michigan and throughout the nation, although rural welfare 
practices have received much less study than urban agencies. Few rural areas 
had chests or welfare leagues to coordinate fund-raising. But they did have 
private welfare organizations, including the American Red Cross, Salvation 
Army, and others often connected to local churches. Although the welfare sys-
tem was less systematic and visible, it did exist. But given that even large cities 
 103. Lubove, The Professional Altruist, 187–88; Brown, Public Relief, 55. For information on 
the Detroit Associated Charities, see Oliver Zunz, The Changing Face of Inequality: Urbaniza-
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and urban areas found the needy dependent upon public relief funds, such a 
trend is even more likely in rural communities, where residents often had few 
choices but to turn to their local officials for aid when they faced unemploy-
ment or an inability to support themselves or their families.
 Historically, Michigan’s welfare system was local and funded with public 
monies. New Deal programs continued this practice, but with greater federal 
and state involvement. What shifted in Michigan was the level of government 
involved in relief. Private agencies were concentrated in more-urban areas, 
and even then did not provide significant relief aid. The largest new program 
in the pre–New Deal years was the mothers’ pension program, which con-
tinued the practice of public funding and local administration. Local, pub-
lic relief was critical for Michigan’s unemployed, both before and during the 
Great Depression.
 a  newSpapeR editorial seeking support for the fund-raising cam-
paign of Saginaw’s Social Welfare League highlighted the widespread belief 
that solutions to the Depression’s economic and relief crises rested in the pri-
vate sector. The editorial stressed the tremendous need for the drive that year, 
and the consequences if it failed: “Whereas in other years failure to reach 
the campaign quota would have been merely unfortunate, this year such a 
failure would assume the proportions of a catastrophe.” The editorial further 
cautioned against waiting for the government to step in, because that strategy, 
it argued, would simply result in paying through higher taxes: “This resolves 
itself into a local problem which each community must solve in its own way, 
using its established agencies as the basis of the whole program.”1
 The editorial’s emphasis on private relief stands in stark contrast to the real-
ity that Michigan’s relief system was overwhelmingly public. By 1931 private 
agencies’ relief expenditures accounted for just 5 percent of all relief costs in 
Saginaw that year, a trend true for much of the state. The newspaper’s editorial 
illustrates the persistent belief that relief was a local, and preferably a private, 
responsibility. A reluctance to go into debt, the widespread antitax sentiment, 
and the fear of creating a class of people dependent on “the dole” prompted 
many government and community leaders to look to the private business sector 
 1. “Saginaw Cares—and Shares,” Saginaw Daily News, October 4, 1931, 6.
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to provide employment. Those views, which I term fiscal localism, created 
definite ideological barriers to the potential solutions offered. Resistance to 
federal aid was profound, and only when poor-relief costs threatened to bank-
rupt local communities did that change.
 The uneven economic situation in the state in the 1920s prompted increases 
in relief spending, and much of the increase was in public welfare. Anne Ged-
des’s 1937 study of relief in the early twentieth century dated the trend in 
rising relief costs to around 1910, nearly two decades before the Great Depres-
sion. Relief costs predictably rose during economic downturns, including the 
1921–22 depression, but Geddes found that relief costs seldom returned to 
their predepression levels throughout the entire period. But she also found 
that “after each depression they again moved upward from a new and higher 
base.”2 Geddes reported not only that relief expenditures had grown faster 
than the population rate, but also that public relief increases, especially in the 
larger cities, were greater than most other governmental expenditures. In part 
this was due to the spread of mothers’ pensions, but the increase also signified 
that public agencies were taking on a larger responsibility for welfare.3 Histo-
rian Jeff Singleton argues that “means-tested relief was becoming the safety net 
for low-wage workers” before the Depression.4 Residents in need of aid in this 
period turned largely to public agencies, and not private welfare organizations, 
for help.
 Michigan funded most of its relief costs with public, and not private, funds 
before the infusion of federal relief dollars in 1932. Studies revealed that public 
funds had shouldered the relief load to a much greater degree than previ-
ously thought. In most cities and regions, private organizations funded only 
a fraction of relief. Even social work professionals were surprised to find that 
before the Depression, in 1928, 71.6 percent of relief in fifteen cities through-
out the United States (including Detroit and Chicago) was funded through 
public agencies.5 A study by the President’s Organization on Unemployment 
Relief analyzed both public and private organizations’ relief expenditures in 
the first three months of 1929 and 1931. Fifteen Michigan cities were in the 
study, including Saginaw, Detroit, and Grand Rapids.6 Michigan’s 1931 relief 
 2. Anne E. Geddes, Trends in Relief Expenditures, 1910–1935, WPA Research Monograph 
X (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 1; Singleton, The American Dole, 
27, 44.
 3. Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief, 1929–1939 (New York: Henry Holt, 1940), 
56–57; Geddes, Trends in Relief Expenditures, xiii–xiv.
 4. Singleton, The American Dole, 27.
 5. Brown, Public Relief, 55.
 6. Relief Expenditures by Governmental and Private Organizations, 1929 and 1931 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 30. 
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expenditures were more than six times the 1929 figure for both public and pri-
vate agencies in cities with populations of more than 30,000. Relief expenses 
increased 179 percent in cities under 30,000.7 Wayne County’s welfare costs, 
which included institutional care, general relief, and mothers’ pensions, 
increased from 39 percent of the county’s budget in 1925–26 to 49 percent 
in 1928–29.8 Public funds provided 96.7 percent of relief dollars in Detroit in 
1929.9 The trend continued throughout the decade.10
 What is significant is the ratio of public to private expenditures. Even in 
1929, public funds accounted for far more of the relief aid in Michigan than 
did private monies. Michigan’s larger cities aided 33,840 people per month (on 
average) in those first months of 1929, while private agencies assisted 9,580. In 
1931 those numbers increased to 264,227 through public agencies and 37,387 
for private organizations, increases of 680 and 290 percent, respectively. In 
Michigan private funds were not maintaining a larger share of relief aid even 
before the Depression, a trend shared by twelve other states in this study.11 The 
same trend held true for relief funds spent by public and private agencies. All 
Michigan cities in the study expended far more through public agencies, even 
in 1929, than private (table 2.1).12 Detroit’s relief burden was financed almost 
entirely by public funds in the Department of Public Welfare. In 1930 and 
1931 the city’s share of relief funding was at 98.7 and 95.5 percent, respectively. 
Detroit’s relief costs were among the highest in the country: “Detroit, alone, 
accounted for more than 25 percent of all the public general relief dispensed 
in the United States in 1930 and more than 13 percent in 1931.”13 
 Michigan was not alone in its reliance on public funds for welfare before 
the New Deal, and the trends between public and private are not necessarily 
defined by region. Ten other states also relied more heavily on public agencies 
for relief, including Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jer-
sey, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Utah, and California. Iowa and Montana 
 7. Relief Expenditures, 10.
 8. Board of County Auditors, Wayne County, The Cost of County Government: An Analysis 
of the Wayne County Budget, 1925–1929 (Detroit: Board of County Auditors, 1929), 10.
 9. Sydnor H. Walker, “Privately Supported Social Work,” Recent Social Trends in the 
United States: Report of the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends, Vol. II (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1933), 1194.
 10. Emma A. Winslow, Trends in Different Types of Public and Private Relief in Urban Areas, 
1929–1935 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 77.
 11. Relief Expenditures, 18–24.
 12. Ibid., 30. These numbers did not include institutional care in county infirmaries, which 
also would be public expenditures. Few states were as consistent as Michigan, in which just one 
city (Kalamazoo) deviated from the statewide trend.
 13. Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1975), 307.
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shared this trend in 1929, but then reversed it in 1931. Eighteen states followed 
the opposite trend (private relief exceeding public): Pennsylvania, Ohio, Mis-
souri, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Ari-
zona, and Washington. New Hampshire, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, and 
Oregon initially showed more aid from private agencies in 1929, but reversed 
two years later. Colorado’s, Nebraska’s, and South Dakota’s figures were com-
paratively equal for both years.14 Little uniformity existed in the reliance on 
either public or private welfare.
 Urban areas tended to have centralized fund-raising mechanisms such as 
the community chests found in Marquette, Grand Rapids, Detroit, and the 
Saginaw Welfare League. Coordinated fund-raising organizations, like the 
chests, began in Cleveland in 1913, and expanded to most cities by 1929.15 
Saginaw’s Welfare League organized in 1920, and Marquette’s dated to 1924; 
Detroit’s community fund arose out of World War I.16 All faced budget prob-
lems and were forced to extend fund-raising drives and reduce budgets of 
member agencies to adjust for the decline in contributions in the early Depres-
sion years. Of the four counties in this study, Detroit had the largest coopera-
tive fund-raising budget, but the city faced its own crisis of fund-raising in the 
early years of the Depression. Efforts to encourage greater contributions by the 
 14. Relief Expenditures, table II, 19–25; and David Joseph Maurer, “Public Relief Programs 
in Ohio, 1929–1939” (PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1962), 7–9. 
 15. Judith Ann Trolander, Settlement Houses and the Great Depression (Detroit: Wayne 
State University, 1975), 26–27, 59; Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal, 27–28.
 16. Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 204.
table	2.1
expendItureS	for	publIc	and	prIvate	relIef	(%)
city
 
public
 
private
 
public
 
private
– 
public
– 
public
Detroit 93 7 98.8 1.2 95 5
grand rapids 76 24 92 8 90 10
flint 62 38 90 10 80 20
Saginaw 84 16 95 5 86 14
Source: Relief Expenditures by Governmental and Private Organizations, 1929 and 1931 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1932), 30; Emma a. Winslow, Trends in Different 
Types of Public and Private Relief in Urban Areas, 1929–1935, U.S. Children’s bureau Publica-
tion no. 237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1937), 77.
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wealthy yielded dismal results and fell far short of goals.17 The spring of 1930 
brought what one publication called “the most serious problem in our history.” 
By October, the organization faced a deficit of $125,000.18 Both Saginaw and 
Marquette faced difficulties meeting their goals, and eventually drastically cut 
budgets of their member agencies, thus reducing their annual fund-raising 
goals. The winter campaigns of 1932–1933 across the United States were the 
“supreme and final effort of the private agencies to carry a substantial share of 
the costs of unemployment relief.”19 Private relief expenditures reached their 
peak that year, but still failed to cover even 20 percent of the total cost of relief. 
This trend was mirrored around the state and nation. Many chests followed 
the path of Detroit, Marquette, and Saginaw: reducing budgets of all agencies, 
and shifting more funds to those organizations which provided relief to meet 
the rising demand.20 Private agencies’ declining budgets further limited their 
ability to provide relief. This shifted even more of the relief burden to local 
public relief.
 Counties and cities responded to the economic crisis with a variety of pro-
grams to reduce the need for relief: unemployment committees and bureaus, 
work-relief programs, city-owned stores and fuel centers, bond proposals, and 
efforts to remove “unwanted” workers, including Mexicans and other foreign-
born residents. Most efforts were limited in effectiveness, in part because of 
a lack of funds to address the severity of the unemployment problem. Fiscal 
localism prompted many government and community leaders to look to the 
private sector to provide employment. The firm belief that welfare was a local 
problem, demanding local solutions, is hard to overstate, despite the reality 
that relief had never been a private endeavor in the state. Fiscal localism nar-
rowed the possible solutions, and solidified resistance to federal aid. Michigan 
was not alone in this opposition to federal and state intrusion into relief.
 Emphasis on private solutions, even in states where public taxes financed 
welfare, can be explained in part by the widespread antitax sentiment in this 
period. David Beito argues that the 1929 stock market crash galvanized oppo-
sition to increased taxes, resulting in a series of laws limiting tax rates. In 
1932 and 1933, sixteen states, including Michigan, enacted property tax limi-
tations. Farmers and rural areas led the fight for a fifteen-mill tax limit that 
was approved through a state constitutional amendment in November 1932. 
 17. Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920–1933 (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1960), 300; Richard T. Ortquist, Depression Politics in Michigan, 1929–
1933 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982), 148, 153–54.
 18. Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 204.
 19. Brown, Public Relief, 131.
 20. Ibid., 131–32.
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This trend illustrates residents’ resistance to higher taxes, regardless of their 
purpose, a resistance that made it more difficult for local and state officials to 
fund relief programs. Antitax sentiment was a part of the political reality of the 
1930s.21 Confronted with declining revenues and high relief costs, elected offi-
cials operated in an atmosphere very hostile to new taxes and with legal limits 
on what they could levy. Michael Brown argues that considering the issue of 
taxation and who will benefit from social programs is critical in the study of 
public policy: “Since policy makers must worry as much about who will feel 
the tax bite as who will benefit from a new social policy, they are motivated to 
finance the welfare state with taxes that minimize taxpayer resistance.”22
 Under the amendment approved in Michigan, the collective taxes imposed 
on property owners—including school, township, and county—could not 
exceed fifteen mills, unless approved by a majority of voters for up to a total 
of fifty mills. Cities and villages were exempt only if other maximum rates 
were established through their city charters or general laws, although some 
voluntarily opted to hold themselves to the fifteen-mill limit.23 The limit, in 
conjunction with alarmingly high tax-delinquency rates, meant that most 
counties had to economize operations to keep their taxes within the consti-
tutional limit. The decline in revenues hurt all counties, as well as the state of 
Michigan. Relief programs proved to be difficult to finance throughout the 
1930s, regardless of the need of residents.
 Another component of this resistance was a county’s political affiliation. 
Michigan was firmly Republican, and from 1896 to 1932, with just one excep-
tion, supported the Republican presidential candidate; during the 1920s the 
state legislature was overwhelmingly Republican, often with no Democrats 
serving in either the senate or the house.24 Just three of the state’s eighty-three 
counties supported Democratic candidates as late as 1930.25 The commitment 
to local and private welfare also remained strong at the national and state 
 21. David T. Beito, Taxpayers in Revolt: Tax Resistance during the Great Depression (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 14–15, 141; Michael K. Brown, Race, Money, 
and the American Welfare State (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 37.
 22. Brown, Race, Money, and the American Welfare State, 6.
 23. Claude R. Tharp, A Manual of City Government in Michigan (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1951), 113–14; Dean L. Berry, The Powers of Local Government in Michigan 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1961), 5, 32, 52, 77; and Fine, Frank Murphy: The New 
Deal Years, 263.
 24. James K. Pollock and Samuel J. Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition: An Areal 
Study of Voting Trends in the Last Decade, University of Michigan Governmental Studies No. 
10 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942), 4. Michigan gave its votes to Theodore 
Roosevelt, who ran as a Progressive, in 1912.
 25. Pollock and Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition, 14; Samuel T. McSeveney, “The 
Michigan Gubernatorial Campaign of 1938,” Michigan History 45 (June 1961): 119.
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levels, as well as in local communities, and was personified in President Her-
bert Hoover.26 The 1932 election proved to be the turning point, with forty-
seven counties supporting Democrat William Comstock for governor and 
Democratic majorities in both state houses; the state also voted for Franklin 
Roosevelt for president.27 Although just eleven counties voted Democratic in 
1934 (most supported Republican Governor Frank Fitzgerald), Republican 
dominance of Michigan politics was on the wane.
 Van Buren County, which was the most resistant to state and federal intru-
sion on relief, remained fiercely Republican throughout the 1930s. A 1942 
study of Michigan’s politics listed Van Buren County among fourteen “safe” 
Republican strongholds, many of which were rural and in the Lower Penin-
sula.28 Republicans also dominated local politics, even as the financial situation 
of the county steadily worsened in the early Depression years.29 In contrast, 
Wayne County was considered a strong Democratic county, and Marquette 
and Saginaw were among those counties that shifted to the Democrat camp 
sometime in the 1930s: Saginaw in 1932 and Marquette in 1936. Marquette 
had one of the greatest voting shifts of any of the counties, and also the high-
est increase in voter participation. Marquette would remain in the Democrat 
column throughout the decade, although Saginaw would revert to the Repub-
lican camp in 1940.30 The shifts would also appear in local elections.31 All 
counties and cities faced serious funding constraints during these years, but 
Van Buren County, the most firmly Republican, was also the most resistant to 
federal control.
local	uneMployMent	prograMS
The creation of unemployment committees to assess the unemployment prob-
lem and explore solutions was the first step for many communities. Register-
 26. William E. Leuchtenberg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–1932 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), 252; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 287–88; and Singleton, The American 
Dole, 93–96.
 27. Pollock and Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition, 10–14; McSeveney, “The Michi-
gan Gubernational Campaign,” 119.
 28. Pollock and Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition, 35, 70.
 29. “19 County Supervisors Reelected,” Hartford Day Spring, April 5, 1933; “Hoffman 
Defeats Foulkes by 8,000: Republicans Make Sweep of Van Buren County Offices,” Hartford 
Day Spring, November 7, 1934; and “Republicans Victors in VB,” Hartford Day Spring, April 3, 
1935.
 30. Pollock and Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition, 14, 29, 69.
 31. “Marquette County Is Republican,” Daily Mining Journal, November 9, 1932; “Eight 
Offices in County Won by Republican,” Daily Mining Journal, November 8, 1934; and “Repub-
licans Lose,” Saginaw Daily News, November 9, 1932.
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ing the unemployed for placement on public work projects or referrals for 
employment thus topped the agenda of many of these committees. Commit-
tees extended beyond the local level to the regional and state levels. The Upper 
Peninsula coordinated its own unemployment committee, working with state 
and county officials, as well as with the state highway department.32 Detroit 
Mayor Frank Murphy, with the help of Dr. William Haber, an economics pro-
fessor who would later head the state’s Emergency Relief Administration, cre-
ated the Mayor’s unemployment committee in the fall of 1930. As with many 
such committees, the Detroit group’s work was limited by funding. The trend 
appeared again in 1931–32, when the Emergency Fund Committee sought to 
raise private funds for relief through the DPW. Its initial goal of $3.5 million 
decreased repeatedly, and the committee eventually raised about $645,000. 
The shortfall again points to the limited ability of the private sector to fund 
relief.33
 Registering and securing jobs for the unemployed was a priority in both 
Wayne and Saginaw counties.34 Saginaw’s League of Women Voters organized 
neighborhood groups to find odd jobs for the unemployed. The program 
sought to get a “two-hour pledge” from as many Saginaw households as pos-
sible—to agree to provide employment for a man for two hours per week. The 
hope was to secure twenty to forty hours of work each week for each unem-
ployed worker. Another project under way was to have men sell apples on the 
street as a means of employment, a practice also found in Detroit.35 Detroit 
undertook more-extensive efforts to find jobs, although they did ask home 
owners to provide odd jobs.36 Murphy pushed for a public works program, but 
Detroit’s severe financial crisis limited his efforts. The committee established 
the Free Employment Bureau, which aided workers in their search for jobs, a 
 32. Marquette and Manistee counties also appointed unemployment committees. See 
“Proceedings, Board of Supervisors, Marquette County,” vol. 7, November 12, 1931, 77; “Pro-
ceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Manistee County,” vol. 12, October 14, 1931, 421, vol. 13, 
October 21, 1932, 73–74; and “Unemployment Committee to Assemble Here,” Daily Mining 
Journal, November 29, 1932, 2.
 33. Fine, Frank Murphy, 335–37.
 34. Proceedings of the Council and Boards of the City of Saginaw, November 25, 1930, 
691–692; “Mayor Calls Unemployment Conference: Group of 58 Citizens Asked to Study Plan,” 
Saginaw Daily News, November 9, 1930, 1, 5; “Mayor’s Committee Moves to Aid Jobless: Reg-
istration of Idle Will Be Initial Step,” Saginaw Daily News, November 13, 1930, 1–2; “Complete 
Registry of Jobless Sought,” Saginaw Daily News, November 22, 1930, 1–2; and “Board Studies 
Roster of Idle,” Saginaw Daily News, November 26, 1930, 1–2.
 35. Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 268–69; “Odd Job Program Launched to Pro-
vide Work for Unemployed,” Saginaw Daily News, November 23, 1930, 4; “Apple Sale Offers 
Unemployment Aid,” Saginaw Daily News, November 21, 1930, 2; and “13 Apple Salesmen 
Quickly Bought Out,” Saginaw Daily News, November 22, 1930, 1–2.
 36. Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 268.
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practice also found in Saginaw.37 Saginaw’s committee also organized distribu-
tion of food and clothing, donated by individuals and businesses, through the 
city’s canteen.38
 Saginaw County’s unemployment committee provided lists of eligible 
workers for state highway projects.39 Under the state plan, local unemploy-
ment committees would certify the workers for the work projects—a plan 
again directed at men.40 As in Detroit, though, establishing public works proj-
ects was severely hampered by a lack of funds. Tax delinquencies were running 
around 25 percent, and city officials believed securing voter approval for the 
sale of bonds was not feasible.41 Marquette County’s supervisors worked with 
the road commission and the poor commission to develop lists of eligible men 
and available projects. The supervisors then appointed the poor-commission 
members and road-commission representatives to the unemployment com-
mittee to continue their efforts.42
 In retrospect, such efforts seem futile, but they underscore the entrenched 
fiscal localism operating behind such programs, including looking to the pri-
vate sector to provide employment. Many people hoped that the unemploy-
ment problem was short-term, and that economic recovery would be soon to 
arrive. Most communities sought to provide work-relief programs, rather than 
direct relief or “the dole,” and although they got the return of work on their 
poor-fund dollars, they still faced the reality of limited funds and taxpayer 
opposition.43 Work-relief programs cost money, and many county and city 
governments could support such programs only for a short time.
 Work-relief projects before the New Deal targeted men, particularly white 
male citizens, almost exclusively. The goal was to provide work for male heads 
 37. Ibid., 268–69; Ortquist, Depression Politics in Michigan, 149–54;
 38. “Jobs Committee to Discontinue,” Saginaw Daily News, May 14, 1931.
 39. Joanna C. Colcord, Emergency Work Relief (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1932), 
254.
 40. “Meeting Called to Plan Aid for Jobless,” Saginaw Daily News, October 17, 1931; “Group 
of 10 Selected for Jobs Committee,” Saginaw Daily News, October 22, 1931. Manistee County 
registered 1,137 men for work relief and found jobs in the summer of 1932 for 470; expansion of 
the work-relief program was a key recommendation of the county’s unemployment committee. 
See “Proceedings, Manistee County,” vol. 13, October 21, 1932, 73–74. 
 41. “Public Works Demanded of Council,” Saginaw Daily News, December 1, 1931, 1–2; 
“Money Lack Held Bar to City Job Program,” Saginaw Daily News, December 2, 1931, 1–2; and 
“No Job Relief, Council Holds,” Saginaw Daily News, December 8 1931, 1–2.
 42. “Reach Peak Employment on County Roads,” Daily Mining Journal, November 12, 
1931; “Board Names Committee on Unemployment,” Daily Mining Journal, November 13, 
1931; and “Proceedings, Marquette County,” vol. 7, May 18, 1932, 87–88. Van Buren County 
also provided lists of unemployed, through the township supervisors, for road projects. “Pro-
ceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” January 5, 1932, 63.
 43. Ortquist, Depression Politics in Michigan, 149–52.
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of household who could work on public works projects repairing roads and 
bridges, digging new sewer lines, and woodcutting. Men of color faced lim-
ited opportunities on the early road projects, and thus had to rely on odd jobs 
or relief from a public or private welfare agency. Women had no work-relief 
possibilities in these communities before 1933. Government officials viewed 
their communities through the lens of the family wage, whether such a reality 
existed or not in all households. Such an ideology also permeated New Deal 
work projects, which have since been criticized for their lack of attention to 
women workers in need of jobs. But New Deal programs, although limited by 
ideas about gender, race, and class, did offer some opportunities for women, 
unlike the local work-relief programs before 1933.44
eScalatIng	relIef	coStS
Because work-relief projects were mostly small-scale, Michigan’s counties and 
cities faced their growing unemployment problem in the context of dramati-
cally rising relief costs. In all four counties, the expenditures of the poor fund 
and of mothers’ pensions wreaked havoc on county and city budgets. Property 
taxes funded the bulk of local government, and the combination of rising relief 
costs, high tax-delinquency rates, and thus decreased revenues, prompted 
local governments to examine their own poor-relief practices and programs, 
resulting in budget cuts in other areas, including reductions in wages and ser-
vices. Detroit’s rising relief costs compounded an already dismal debt problem, 
exacerbated by tax-delinquency rates as high as 25 percent. Wayne County 
also faced increasing welfare costs, largely related to its institutional programs. 
Marquette and Saginaw both turned to bond proposals to raise funds for work 
and direct relief, but Van Buren—the most fiscally conservative of the four 
counties—resisted increased debt, instead seeking to further discourage relief 
applications and to force the state to pay tax monies owed to the county. All 
counties faced an uphill battle as the Depression worsened and more and more 
people sought relief.
 Detroit confronted the starkest financial crisis, both in unemployment 
rates and relief costs. As noted earlier, the city funded its relief almost exclu-
sively with public funds, and its unemployment rates were high because of its 
 44. Martha Swain argues, in Ellen S. Woodward: New Deal Advocate for Women (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1995), that although Woodward was criticized for the limited 
nature of work programs for women, it is amazing what Woodward was able to accomplish. See 
also Susan Ware, Holding Their Own: American Women in the 1930s (Boston: Twayne Publish-
ers, 1982), especially chapter 3 on women and work.
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dependence on the auto industry. The city’s dismal financial situation resulted 
in efforts to economize its operations. Rooted in the large percentage of its 
tax levy that went to debt service, the city’s budget underwent severe cuts in 
the early Depression years. In the 1931–32 budget, city workers suffered sig-
nificant pay cuts, up to 10 percent and higher, and layoffs were widespread. 
Several thousand city employees lost jobs, adding to the existing unemploy-
ment problem in the city, and virtually every part of Detroit government was 
affected, including the Department of Public Welfare.45
 The city’s DPW was crumbling under the escalating caseloads. A case-
load of about 15,000 in August 1930 jumped to more than 50,000 families by 
the following February. Caseworkers could not keep up with the increasing 
numbers, and investigations became cursory at best; most semblance of pro-
fessional social work practice was gone.46 Reversing the caseload’s relentless 
increase was the only feasible way to contain the escalating costs. Members of 
the Public Welfare Commission sought the removal of 15,000 families from 
the relief rolls in July 1931. By July 17, the department successfully eliminated 
more than 6,000 families, including those who had some income, even if it was 
only $2 for domestic work. Relief supervisors told the commission that more 
than 2,600 of the cuts were arbitrary. Some of the families cut had children, 
and few had resources, but they had been dropped to meet the quota. District 
superintendents protested the cuts, and opposed further reductions in the 
caseload: “Feeling that the Commission will ask us to make further reduc-
tion we want to go on record here that we feel we have reached absolute bed 
rock as far as reducing families with intelligence, justice, or consideration . . . 
We naturally oppose this earnestly and wish to advise you that we will not 
accept further responsibility or the consequences.” But cuts continued, and by 
the end of the month more than 18,000 families had been removed from the 
caseload.47
 By early 1931, poor-fund costs in Saginaw and Marquette counties also 
reached a critical point, although on a smaller scale than Detroit. The city of 
Saginaw’s budget deficits prompted suggestions of staff cuts and 20 percent 
wage cuts for city employees.48 Few departments survived with their budgets 
intact, and the poor-fund appropriation went from $121,000 to $109,000, 
 45. Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 317–25.
 46. Ibid., 303–4.
 47. Minutes, Detroit Public Welfare Commission, vol. 7, July 17, 1931, 61, Burton Histori-
cal Collection (hereafter cited as BHC); Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 326–27.
 48. “20% Wage Cuts Urged as Council Attacks Budget,” Saginaw Daily News, April 13, 
1931, 1–2.
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despite having spent far more than that the previous year.49 Marquette County 
did pass a bond proposal to fund relief. Relief costs began to rise in early 1930 
in Marquette County, and county overdrafts on the poor fund in October 
1930 necessitated increased appropriations.50 The county set a new record 
high for poor relief in January 1931. Relief county-wide was running more 
than $10,000 per month, with expectations that it would increase.51
 Van Buren County, the county that best illustrates the power of fiscal local-
ism, ultimately ceased financing both poor relief and mothers’ pensions. Poor-
relief funds accounted for the largest line item in Van Buren County’s 1931 
budget, with the poor fund at $50,000 and mothers’ pensions at $20,000—after 
the board reduced the requested appropriation for poor relief by $10,000.52 
Poor-relief costs reached a record level by May 1, 1932.53 The deficit grew at a 
rate of $8,000 to $10,000 per month.54 Van Buren County supervisors refused 
to go further into debt to address the financial problems. Its board of supervi-
sors was also committed to reducing taxes, as were other counties, in light of 
the fifteen-mill tax limitation and the economic burden its residents faced; 
economy and tax relief provided the basis of most of the board’s actions. Tax 
relief for property owners was an entitlement, while poor relief was most cer-
tainly not, in the eyes of Van Buren’s supervisors.55
 Rising relief costs prompted virtually all public relief officials to ensure 
that only those who needed and deserved relief received it. Some counties 
reorganized programs; others sought ways to discourage relief or, in the case of 
Van Buren County, simply eliminated poor relief altogether. After yet another 
need to transfer $36,450 to the poor department in May 1931, Saginaw Mayor 
 49. “1931 City Budget Climbs near Taxation Limit,” Saginaw Daily News, April 14, 1931, 1; 
“Estimators’ Axe Cuts $82,800 from Budget,” Saginaw Daily News, May 5, 1931, 1, 10.
 50. “$63,000 Boost in County Tax Budget Voted,” Daily Mining Journal, October 14, 1930, 
2; “Proceedings, Marquette County,” vol. 7, October 13, 1930, 24.
 51. “County’s Poor Relief Fund Is Fading Rapidly,” Daily Mining Journal, February 20, 1931, 
3; “Proceedings of the Board of Superintendents of the Poor, Marquette County,” October 22, 
1931; and “County’s Tax Bill Is Reduced $37,000: Budget Cut Is Made despite Heavy Demands,” 
Daily Mining Journal, October 6, 1931, 1.
 52. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County, Michigan,” October 26, 
1931, 46–47; “County Solons Cut $28,727.49 off the Budget,” Hartford Day Spring, October 28, 
1931, 1, 8.
 53. “Supervisors Order Audit of County Books,” Hartford Day Spring, January 18, 1933, 1.
 54. “County Solons Meet to Face Money Tangle,” Hartford Day Spring, April 12, 1933, 
1–2.
 55. Karen Miller argues that taxpaying became a central component of citizenship, in-
tersecting with race, in Detroit in the 1930s. Her argument resonates throughout the state, 
although race was not the central factor in other areas, including Van Buren County. Karen R. 
Miller, “The Color of Citizenship: Race and Politics in Detroit, 1916–1940” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 2003), 200–201.
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George Phoenix launched efforts to reexamine the department.56 Phoenix vis-
ited Grand Rapids, among other cities, to study its programs before drafting 
his own. Grand Rapids implemented a controversial program to address its 
poor-relief problem, and other Michigan cities and counties, including Sagi-
naw, looked to the city as a model of how to address the rising costs of poor 
relief.57
 Grand Rapids’ financial problems reached a crisis months before the stock 
market crash, following a slump in the furniture industry. The numbers of 
people seeking aid from the city’s relief program in 1929 jumped drastically, 
from about two hundred to thousands.58 After severely cutting the city budget 
and foregoing his own salary, city manager George Welsh balanced the city’s 
budget by September 1929. Like many, Welsh also opposed the practice of 
“the dole,” or giving aid to able-bodied workers. Instead, he instituted a work-
relief system, targeted almost exclusively at male workers.59 The controversy 
centered on the use of scrip, redeemable for groceries at the local commissary, 
to pay workers. The commissary, which bought food in bulk, could offer better 
prices for food than local grocers, and thus save scrip workers money on their 
food budgets. Welsh expanded the program over the next two years to include 
many major city projects, including city sewer work, and again invited the 
anger of some business owners, who argued that such programs denied their 
employees work.60 The system prompted a large debate, with criticism coming 
from all political fronts in the city. The scrip system eventually disappeared, 
and the city switched to cash payments in November 1932.61
 Other Michigan counties implemented various programs to address the 
rising relief problem. Saginaw Mayor Phoenix advocated requiring all relief 
recipients to work for their aid. Workers were paid with grocery orders, redeem-
 56. “Mayor Will Ask Transfer of Funds,” Saginaw Daily News, May 12, 1931, 1; “Better 
Inquiry Asked by Board,” Saginaw Daily News, May 14, 1931, 1–2; and Proceedings, City of 
Saginaw, May 12, 1931, 335–36; June 16, 1931, 375–76.
 57. Ann Arbor also instituted a scrip payment program for work-relief recipients. Other 
communities followed the work-relief model, but few incorporated scrip payments into their 
systems. David Katzman, “Ann Arbor: Depression City,” Michigan History 50 (December 1966): 
314–17. Joanna Colcord criticized the Grand Rapids program in her guide to work-relief pro-
grams. See Colcord, Emergency Work Relief, 85–90, 245–46.
 58. Richard H. Harms, “Paid in Scrip,” Michigan History 75 (January/February 1991): 
38–39.
 59. Workers removed snow from sidewalks and roads, and more than 650 men applied at 
the first call for workers. Other projects included highway work for the state, city sewer work, 
and running the commissary itself. Harms, “Paid in Scrip,” 39.
 60. Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed, 60–61; Harms, “Paid in Scrip,” 38–41; and Julius 
H. Amberg, “Scrip-Wise and Pound Foolish,” Survey, November 15, 1932, 596, copy in National 
Social Workers’ Association Records, SWHA, Box 5, Folder 42.
 61. Amberg, “Scrip-Wise and Pound Foolish,” 596–97; Harms, “Paid in Scrip,” 42–43.
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able at local grocery stores, rather than with scrip. Phoenix’s plan sought to 
achieve the same dual purpose as in Grand Rapids: providing material help 
for those in need while also completing necessary work projects in the city.62 
Again, the project clearly targeted men with families.63 By mid-August, 160 
men were employed on the work projects, including water main work, ditch 
cleaning, and woodcutting.64
 Rising relief costs prompted Marquette County to seek ways to econo-
mize all areas of its operations. Criticisms of the poor commission’s practices 
prompted supervisors to improve investigative methods to ensure that all who 
received relief needed it. The committee recommended reinvestigation of all 
cases of mothers’ pensions to ensure that recipients who received cash relief 
in this form were spending it well. About 20 percent of the cases were either 
transferred to poor relief or had their grants reduced.65 Supervisors, in a move 
that would reappear throughout the state in the coming years, hired a busi-
ness executive from the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company, rather than a social 
worker, to administer the poor department, hoping that such an investment 
would help stretch the county’s shrinking poor fund. They also rejected the 
idea of a county store or commissary, because of the stigma attached to a com-
missary.66
 Van Buren County supervisors, who ultimately eliminated poor relief, 
sought to discourage people from seeking relief. Some supervisors warned 
residents that relief could not be relied upon during the upcoming winter, 
urging people to “work now to eat next winter.” The warning, posted in the 
supervisors’ districts and published in the Hartford Day Spring, stated that 
aside from care in the county infirmary and outdoor relief for “a few old peo-
ple outside the infirmary,” poor relief was not available. Supervisors advised 
frugality and industry; they suggested raising large gardens and canning all 
surpluses, rather than selling them for immediate cash. They also encouraged 
 62. “Phoenix to Inspect Poor Departments,” Saginaw Daily News, June 4, 1931, 1; “Mayor 
Launches Plan to End Dole System,” Saginaw Daily News, June 17, 1931, 1, 5.
 63. “Mayor Launches Plan to End Dole System,” Saginaw Daily News, June 17, 1931, 1, 5; 
“Estimators Hold Up Poor Fund Proposal,” Saginaw Daily News, July 7, 1931, 1–2; and “Board 
Allows Half of Poor Relief Fund,” Saginaw Daily News, July 9, 1931, 1–2.
 64. “Dole List Workers Now Number 160,” Saginaw Daily News, August 20, 1931, 9.
 65. “Supervisors Okeh [sic] Report of Special Budget Committee,” Daily Mining Journal, 
July 28, 1932, 1, 7; “Supervisors Okeh [sic] Final Report of Budget Committee,” Daily Mining 
Journal, October 11, 1932; and “Proceedings, Marquette County,” 7, May 18, 1932, 86–87; July 
27, 1932, 94–99.
 66. “Supervisors Okeh [sic] Report of Special Budget Committee” and “Text of Committee’s 
Report to Supervisors on Tax Investigation,” Daily Mining Journal, July 28, 1932, 1, 7; “Wood-
Chopping and Gardening Are Essential,” Daily Mining Journal, April 20, 1933, 2; and “Proceed-
ings, Marquette County,” vol. 7, July 27, 1932, 96–97, 104–5; October 10, 1932, 122.
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paying for winter coal before the snow flew “instead of joyriding or going to 
shows.”67 The supervisors believed that some poor-relief recipients were not 
doing all they could to prevent their need for relief.
 The Hartford newspaper supported the supervisors’ efforts to provide tax 
relief to residents as early as 1931, although cost increases limited their ability 
to do so. Taxes were a product of the residents’ demands, the editorial contin-
ued, and thus residents had to share the blame for the escalating costs.68 Eigh-
teen months later the newspaper’s editorial page reiterated its position when 
it identified the poor-relief situation as the problem, noting that “the county 
is the beneficent stepdaddy to more unfortunate families than ever before.”69 
The idea that relief recipients were somehow deficient, in part because of their 
dependency, operated in this county and others, despite the extent of the eco-
nomic crisis.
 Fiscal localism was the key ideology evident in Van Buren County’s actions. 
Its budget cuts were a financial necessity in the supervisors’ eyes, but they left 
area residents in need of aid with few options. With poor-relief funds virtually 
gone, residents had to look to township supervisors, who probably had little 
to offer, or to private agencies, such as the county’s Social Service Bureau or 
the American Red Cross. These agencies likely had little left to give, either. If 
family members were unable to help, then, the needy had nowhere else to turn. 
Verifying need among recipients was a strategy employed by all four counties 
in their efforts to reduce relief costs, but Van Buren was the only one to cut off 
relief funds. Van Buren County officials would return to this position in the 
ensuing years, resisting any and all efforts to sacrifice fiscal economy to the 
relief needs of their residents. Poor relief was not an entitlement but a service 
provided only when the county could afford to do so.
MotherS’	penSIonS
Mothers’ pension programs were a casualty of budget cuts in many Michigan 
counties during the Depression, but not all local officials agreed to such cuts 
quietly. In some cases, debates over mothers’ pensions proved to be a contest 
between local officials, with judicial authority again playing a key role. By 
 67. “Editorial: Idle Warned to Work Now to Eat Next Winter,” Hartford Day Spring, May 
10, 1933, 1.
 68. “Supervisors Made Honest Effort to Cut Taxes,” Hartford Day Spring, November 4, 
1931.
 69. “County Solons Meet to Face Money Tangle,” Hartford Day Spring, April 12, 1933, 
1–2.
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1934, thirty-four of the state’s eighty-three counties had eliminated mothers’ 
pensions.70 Saginaw County engaged in a vigorous debate over the funding of 
mothers’ pensions in the early Depression years. The city of Saginaw operated 
a poor department separate from the county, but Saginaw County adminis-
tered mothers’ pensions for all county residents. Saginaw County faced its own 
poor-fund problems, which began to appear by mid-1931, as well as difficul-
ties financing mothers’ pensions. By 1933 funding for mothers’ pensions was 
in serious jeopardy, prompting a heated power struggle between supervisors 
and the local probate judge. Saginaw County’s experience highlights the fund-
ing disputes between local officials, and the operation of judicial authority. It 
also illustrates the continued debate over whether mothers’ pensions were, in 
fact, poor relief. 
 Probate Judge John Murphy used his judicial authority to defend and save 
the program. Already short of funds by October of 1933, Murphy requested an 
additional $25,000 to fund pensions until the end of the year.71 But two weeks 
later, the board voted unanimously to deny the request, and told Murphy to 
cease taking applications for mothers’ pensions. The question of whether the 
state law regarding mothers’ pensions was voluntary or mandatory was crucial 
in this conflict.72 The county’s prosecuting attorney issued a legal opinion that 
“the matter of mothers’ pensions is wholly within the discretion of the probate 
court, over which the county board of supervisors and the board of county 
auditors have no control.” In response, Murphy announced that he would con-
tinue to issue orders to recipients who, after investigation, were found eligible 
for the pensions. If the county refused to pay, he stated, he would not initi-
ate any legal action, but recipients certainly could do so.73 When the final 
vote came for the budget two days later, the entire appropriation for mothers’ 
pensions was nearly cut; Charles Bois, Birch Run Township supervisor and 
longtime opponent of mothers’ pensions, advocated eliminating the program 
and adding $50,000 to the poor fund; recipients of mothers’ aid could seek 
poor-relief aid. Bois’ motion to eliminate the appropriation from the budget 
 70. Harris, Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan, 1.
 71. “Mothers Fund Plea before Supervisors,” Saginaw Daily News, October 9, 1933, 1, 8; 
“Supervisors Waver on Demand for Fund,” Saginaw Daily News, October 10, 1933, 1–2; Official 
Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Saginaw County, October 9, 1933, 2–3.
 72. “Deny Mothers Pension Fund Plea: Supervisors Flout Provisions of Law,” Saginaw Daily 
News, October 24, 1933, 1–2; Proceedings, Saginaw County, October 23, 1933, 105. Marquette 
County’s supervisors also believed that the law required counties to fund mothers’ pensions if 
funds were available and thus continued to do so well into the Depression. See “Officials Say 
Aid to Mothers Is Mandatory,” Daily Mining Journal, October 25, 1933, 3.
 73. “Mothers Aid Will Continue,” Saginaw Daily News, October 25, 1933, 1–2; Proceedings, 
Saginaw County, October 25, 1933, 115.
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failed by just one vote; even still, the board ignored Murphy’s request for an 
additional $25,000.74 Thus mothers’ pensions ceased and did not resume again 
until February of 1934.75
 Murphy continued to advocate for the program, arguing that it was a 
legal and moral duty to provide for all needy children in the county.76 In the 
meantime, recipients of mothers’ pensions received letters explaining the fund 
problem and instructing them to seek aid from their city or township.77 Two 
local attorneys donated their services in a court challenge to the supervisors’ 
decision, arguing that mothers’ pensions were mandatory.78 The county super-
visors argued in response that the funds were not there, and that the court had 
no authority over the board of supervisors.79 Proponents of mothers’ pensions 
lost the fight when the court ruled that the county lacked the funds to pro-
vide further for mothers’ pensions that year; the responsibility rested with the 
townships and the city, or with the newly formed welfare-relief commission 
under the Federal Emergency Relief Act, to provide aid until the 1934 appro-
priation began.80 
 Not all counties had probate judges who exerted this effort on behalf of the 
mothers’ pension program, but the situation in Saginaw shows that, under the 
law, they could. The “cult of judicial personality” worked in favor of recipients 
of mothers’ pensions in Saginaw County. In this case, Murphy was able to 
preserve much-needed aid for Saginaw’s poor mothers for the following year, 
although pensions ceased for the rest of 1933.81 Van Buren County was one of 
the thirty-four counties to end mothers’ pensions, as well as poor relief, before 
the New Deal. The only welfare funds in the budget were for institutional care, 
 74. “$522,319 Tax Total Voted by Supervisors: Approve 1934 Budget, Slash General Fund,” 
Saginaw Daily News, October 27, 1933, 1–2; “Mothers Pension Fund Put in Budget,” Saginaw 
Daily News, October 27, 1933, 1, 10; and Proceedings, Saginaw County, October 26, 1933, 
131–32.
 75. “Resumes Paying Mother Pensions,” Saginaw Daily News, February 1, 1934. The pro-
secuting attorney’s duties under Michigan law included providing legal advice and opinions 
to county officials. Bromage and Reed, Organization and Cost of County and Township Govern-
ment, 63.
 76. “To Ask Judge Explain Views,” Saginaw Daily News, November 3, 1933; “Mother Fund 
$10,000 in Red,” Saginaw Daily News, November 4, 1933; and Proceedings, Saginaw County, 
November 3, 1933, 159.
 77. “Mothers Apply to City for Help,” Saginaw Daily News, November 6, 1933; “City to Aid 
Needy Widows,” Saginaw Daily News, November 9, 1933. 
 78. “Suit May Force Mothers’ Pension Payments,” Saginaw Daily News, November 7, 1933; 
“Pension Case Order Signed,” Saginaw Daily News, November 8, 1933.
 79. “Defend Position on Mothers’ Pensions,” Saginaw Daily News, November 13, 1933; 
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 80. “Points Way to Relief for Needy Mothers,” Saginaw Daily News, November 18, 1933.
 81. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience; see chapter 7, “The Cult of Judicial Person-
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hospitalization costs, and soldiers’ and sailors’ relief. Supervisors ordered Pro-
bate Judge Merle Young to pay any remaining outstanding pensions, but then 
stop once these had been paid. Supervisors had already reduced the program 
from twenty-two thousand dollars to twelve thousand dollars in 1932.82 Young 
did not publicly protest the cuts, as Saginaw’s Murphy did, and Van Buren 
officials did not see mothers’ pensions as mandatory under the law. Again, the 
funds were not there and thus they could not provide aid, a position Young 
apparently agreed with, as he undertook no public efforts to reinstate the pen-
sions. Probate judges could either serve as advocates for the program, and 
defend it during difficult budget times, or let supervisors eliminate it. Again, 
local authority was important, and fiscal localism often served as a key limit-
ing factor in efforts to advocate for the poor.
repatrIatIon
Economic hard times often reinforce already existing hierarchies and dis-
crimination, and the Depression years were no exception. People of color and 
noncitizens were among the first fired from jobs as unemployment rose, and 
they faced much higher rates of unemployment than white native-born work-
ers. In their efforts to control relief costs, some public agencies, in conjunction 
with the state welfare department and the Michigan legislature, denied aid and 
employment to noncitizens. This trend culminated in repatriation programs 
funded by the state welfare department and local governments. Although 
repatriation was often defined as “voluntary,” historians have criticized tak-
ing the term at face value. Coercive methods often encouraged noncitizens 
to return to their native countries as a means to reduce unemployment and 
relief costs.83 Mexicans and Mexican-Americans are the most well-known tar-
gets of repatriation efforts, but Michigan’s program returned noncitizens from 
many countries to their homeland. In contrast to other regions of the country, 
repatriation in Michigan and the Midwest was a function of social welfare, 
rather than immigration, policy.84 In the 1930s, economic conditions com-
bined with racism and nativist views to render citizenship a defining category 
in the administration of social welfare.
 82. “Supervisors End October Session: Look for Spots to Further Cut County Budget,” 
Hartford Day Spring, October 25, 1933, 1, 8; “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van 
Buren County,” October 19, 1933, 58–59; October 20, 1933, 60.
 83. Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation 
Pressures, 1929–1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 24–25. 
 84. Valdes, Barrios Nortenos, 125–26.
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 Western states, in particular California, are much more known for these 
programs, but the Midwestern states also instituted repatriation programs. 
Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana had just 3.6 percent of the nation’s Mexi-
can population, but accounted for about 10 percent of repatriated Mexi-
cans.85 Sixty-four percent of all Mexicans in the Midwest were repatriated, 
and populations in all major cities, including Detroit and Chicago, declined 
significantly.86 Michigan’s commitment to repatriation began in 1932, under 
Governor Wilber Brucker, and continued throughout the decade. The state 
welfare department worked with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
in addition to Mexican consular officials, to institute the later repatriation 
program. The state legislature appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars in 
the fiscal years 1935–36 and 1936–37 to pay transportation costs, with the 
expectation that far more would be saved in relief costs.87
 Shifting racial categories in the U.S. Bureau of the Census have made it 
difficult to gauge exact population growths for some foreign-born popula-
tions in the United States, a trend that is particularly true for Mexicans. The 
1920 census, for instance, included Mexicans in the white population. In 1930 
a separate category was created, but in 1940 Mexicans were again defined as 
white.88 According to the 1930 census, Mexicans accounted for just 0.3 percent 
of Michigan’s total population.89 More than half of the state’s 13,336 Mexicans 
counted in the 1930 census resided in Wayne County (most in the city of 
Detroit); Saginaw County had the next highest portion at 17 percent of the 
overall Mexican population in the state.90
 85. By the end of 1932, between 1,100 and 1,500 Mexicans had left Michigan to return 
to Mexico under the repatriation program. Norman D. Humphrey, “The Migration and Settle-
ment of Detroit Mexicans,” Economic Geography 19 (October 1943): 360; Hoffman, Unwanted 
Mexican Americans, 121; and Juan R. Garcia, Mexicans in the Midwest, 1900–1932 (Tucson: 
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December 18, 1932, 5.
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migrant Labor in the United States, 1900–1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 56.
 89. Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, 14; and Fifteenth Census of the United States: 
1930, Vol. I, Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), 1115.
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 The fluidity of racial categories reflects larger debates over race and citi-
zenship. Immigration restrictions in the 1920s legislated beliefs about which 
groups were white and able to become full American citizens, and a significant 
component of the debate centered on moral character linked to racial “fit-
ness.” Mexican immigration actually received little public attention before the 
1921 and 1924 immigration laws, which did not include Mexicans or Canadi-
ans in immigration quotas.91 But those who supported more relaxed Mexican 
immigration laws did so because they valued Mexicans as cheap laborers, not 
because they saw them as a desirable group for American citizenship. Mexi-
cans remained outside the category of “white” while other immigrants, includ-
ing those from European countries, gained the legal status of white citizens.92
 Mexicans and other foreign-born populations faced limited job oppor-
tunities even before the Depression. Mexicans tended to be concentrated in 
the unskilled, least desirable jobs, and enjoyed little upward mobility. Before 
the Great Depression, they were recruited to fill U.S. labor needs. Faced with 
reduced European immigration because of restrictions during World War I 
and the restrictive National Origins Act of 1924, agricultural employers sought 
a new, unrestricted labor pool.93 The sugar beet industry had shifted to a pre-
dominantly Mexican labor force around World War I, when labor agents 
began to recruit Mexicans and Mexican-Americans from Texas to work in the 
sugar beet fields of mid-Michigan as well as in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, 
and Ohio.94 The seasonal work prompted some Mexicans to return to Texas, 
but many more went to the cities, including Detroit and Saginaw, to seek work 
percent) of its overall population in 1930. Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Vol. I, 
Population, 1152. Genesee County (particularly the city of Flint) and St. Clair County north of 
Wayne County had the next largest numbers of Mexicans, but they were only a fraction of those 
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Debates of the 1920s,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21 (Spring 2002): 4–5; Desmond 
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bridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 233; and Roger Daniels, Coming to America: A History 
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Immigrant’ Working Class,” Journal of American Ethnic History 16.3 (1997): 9–10; King, Making 
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 94. The Michigan Sugar Beet Company recruited its first Mexican workers in 1915, begin-
ning an annual migration of about two thousand workers for the next fourteen years. By 1922 
Mexicans were 33 percent of the state’s beet-worker population, and that figure rose to 75 
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in the growing factories. By the 1920s, historians document a major shift to 
factory employment among Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.95
 Mexican workers in the United States faced two major obstacles to contin-
ued employment in the 1920s and 1930s: their race and their Mexican citizen-
ship.96 Even during the 1920s, auto workers, and particularly Mexicans, did 
not enjoy full-time, year-round work, but as companies experienced economic 
downturns and layoffs, Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, African-Americans, 
and noncitizens were among the first targets. Between 1929 and 1931, 1,027 
Mexicans, or 40 percent of those employed by Ford, lost their jobs. Restrictive 
hiring practices also increased, as signs stating “Only White Labor Employed” 
became more common, even in the sugar beet industry. Companies, encour-
aged by government officials at all levels, replaced Mexican workers with 
whites, particularly with whites who were American citizens.97 Restrictive hir-
ing practices soon extended to all noncitizens. Wayne County instituted a 
policy in 1930 that all workers on county projects must have been citizens 
and residents of Detroit for at least two years.98 In 1931 Michigan passed the 
short-lived Spolansky Act, which required all noncitizens to register and verify 
their legal immigration status before they could “reside, sojourn, engage in 
business, or work in Michigan.”99 Many work projects under the New Deal, 
including the Works Progress Administration, hired only citizens, and indus-
tries were slow to reverse their hiring practices even after defense work began 
in 1941.100 Such action was a combination of American nativism and racism, 
targeting those not seen as American by virtue of either their birth or skin 
color, or both in the case of Mexicans.
 Mexicans were often among those who did not seek citizenship, or did 
not want to renounce their native citizenship. In 1930 about 28.6 percent of 
the foreign-born population in Michigan had not sought citizenship status.101 
 95. Vargas, Proletarians of the North, 50–52; Garcia, Mexicans in the Midwest, 1900–1932, 
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Much of the discrimination and racism Mexicans faced before the Depres-
sion was connected to their race, and not their citizenship status. They faced 
segregation in housing and general derision because of stereotypes about 
Mexicans.102 Prior to the Depression, citizenship affected their ability to find 
employment of some kind only minimally, as most were recruited to the area 
for their labor. Many Mexicans saw racism, not their foreign-born status, as 
the key reason for their limited opportunities and choices. Many Mexicans 
hoped to return to Mexico eventually. The Mexican consulate also worked to 
limit the Americanization of Mexicans, including discouraging their adoption 
of U.S. citizenship.103
 As employment opportunities became more and more linked to citizen-
ship in the 1930s, and thus more Mexican immigrants likely considered citi-
zenship for themselves, particularly if their children were American-born, the 
process of obtaining U.S. citizenship became much more difficult. Changes in 
the immigration law in 1929 created new obstacles to naturalization, includ-
ing a 300 percent increase in fees to become a citizen. Social workers in both 
Saginaw and Wayne counties often helped Mexicans and other noncitizens 
navigate the naturalization process, but public funds for fees were not avail-
able. During a time of economic hardship, such an increase made citizenship 
effectively impossible for many immigrants, Mexican or otherwise. Education 
requirements, with English literacy rates low among Mexican immigrants, also 
proved an impediment to citizenship.104 Just as the motivation for citizenship 
likely increased with the link between naturalization and employment, the 
barriers to obtain citizenship also strengthened.
 Discrimination against noncitizens culminated in efforts to return them 
to their native countries. The first efforts to remove Mexicans from the Michi-
gan population actually occurred in the 1920–21 depression, when Mexican 
workers appeared to threaten American jobs.105 The city of Detroit and Wayne 
County reported all Mexican relief applicants to the Immigration Bureau, 
 102. Valdes, Barrios Nortenos, 44–46; Sheridan, “Contested Citizenship,” 4.
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making them targets for deportation. Saginaw officials refused aid to Mexican 
workers outright, arguing that they had come to the area voluntarily or at the 
instigation of the beet companies, and were not the government’s responsi-
bility. The city repatriated two hundred Mexican beet workers to Mexico in 
February 1921.106 Inaction by the federal government prompted local officials 
to use repatriation to alleviate local unemployment and relief problems even 
before the Great Depression, yet another manifestation of fiscal localism.
 Saginaw, Flint, Port Huron, Mount Pleasant, and Detroit all participated 
in the repatriation efforts of the 1930s. Michigan newspapers carried reports 
of Mexicans returning to Mexico in 1931 and 1932. The first in Saginaw 
occurred in September 1931, when the Saginaw Daily News reported that “the 
first combined voluntary and involuntary deportation ever undertaken in the 
United States for a large group of aliens” began with sixty-eight Mexicans, 
thirty-seven of whom had entered the country illegally and thus were being 
deported. The rest of the group comprised family members or other Mexicans 
who had been on poor relief and were returning voluntarily to their native 
country. State welfare department supervisor Earl White worked with local 
officials to coordinate the deportation, and told those gathered that all but 
five of the people leaving had been on the city poor lists; the cost of moving 
them was far less than continuing to support them in Saginaw.107 The group 
then went to Detroit, where it was joined by a group of Hindus, Chinese, and 
Mexicans also leaving the United States.108 Three such trainloads left Saginaw 
and other cities that fall, and another round took place the following year.
 State welfare official Arthur Webster approached the Saginaw City Coun-
cil in October of 1932 for five thousand dollars to cover the transportation 
costs of ninety-eight Mexican families who were willing to return to Mexico. 
Webster argued that although these families were not yet on poor relief, they 
likely soon would be. If they were employed, he continued, their jobs should 
go to Saginaw citizens.109 The council eventually appropriated the five thou-
sand dollars.110 Detroit Mexican Consul Ignaxio Batiza warned Mexicans in 
Saginaw that conditions in the United States would only worsen, with few job 
opportunities, and thus they should return to Mexico “and become good citi-
 106. Vargas, Proletarians of the North, 83; and Valdes, Barrios Nortenos, 94–95.
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zens there.”111 About four thousand Mexicans in the state were repatriated in 
1932, including several trainloads from Saginaw.112 Most newspaper accounts 
in Saginaw presented a picture of Mexicans happy to be returning home, and 
described them as a “merry throng” and a “happy lot.” The accounts clearly 
depicted the Mexicans as foreigners, not as Americans, portraying them as 
“dusky skinned fathers and mothers, black-haired babies” who were joined by 
Mexicans of other areas, their “compatriots,” who were heading to “the land 
below the Rio Grande.”113 The travelers were always represented as voluntary 
participants, and were promised land upon their arrival in Mexico, but one 
article noted that ten potential travelers changed their minds at the last min-
ute. They left the train, abandoning their baggage, to remain in Saginaw, rather 
than return to Mexico.114
 By the Depression, Michigan’s welfare department began to work for 
the repatriation of other foreign-born residents as well. Repatriation efforts 
extended to European and African immigrants, both in Michigan and the 
rest of the nation. In 1934 Mexicans comprised the largest group of those 
repatriated nationally but were just 16 percent of the total number of people 
repatriated that year.115 In 1933 about 330 families had left Detroit for “vari-
ous British possessions,” and the Department of Public Welfare planned to 
return a large number of Turkish people to their homeland as well.116 In a 1936 
report, the Michigan State Welfare Department argued that immigrants had 
few resources and little family to turn to in times of need, while in their native 
country they could find both.117 The report did not acknowledge that non-
citizens were excluded from many kinds of employment, and usually were the 
first fired if they did obtain work. It also ignored the exclusion of noncitizens 
from work-relief programs.118
 Transports to Europe were scheduled approximately every four weeks, and 
repatriates traveled by rail and then steamship to their homeland. During the 
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eighteen-month period of the study, 219 applications were received; of these 
130 were completed, involving 232 people.119 According to the report, 20 were 
residents of institutions, and 56 families had received relief for more than two 
years. The repatriates headed for numerous countries in this period. The larg-
est number (51) returned to England; the next largest group (40), to Mexico. 
Other countries of destination were Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, Holland, 
and Yugoslavia.120 These efforts occurred after the largest number of repatria-
tions took place. Repatriation declined after states began to receive federal aid 
for relief in 1932 and 1933. Federal funds could not be used for repatriation 
programs, thus reducing the incentive to return noncitizens to their native 
countries.121
 Historian Juan Garcia disputes the argument that Mexicans posed a sig-
nificant relief burden, arguing that “a substantial body of evidence contradicts 
this premise.”122 Mexican workers were reluctant to seek public assistance for a 
variety of reasons, according to Garcia. For many, accepting public aid was too 
humiliating; instead, they sought aid from community mutual-aid societies.123 
Those Mexicans who entered the United States illegally, at a time when labor 
demands relaxed immigration practices on the southern border, feared depor-
tation if they sought public aid. Some public agencies would aid only those 
Mexicans who agreed to repatriation, or would have agency officials use coer-
cive methods to prompt Mexicans to “choose” repatriation. Detroit officials in 
the Department of Public Welfare encouraged Mexicans to leave the city by 
requiring them to take their meals in the department “restaurants,” rather than 
issuing a grocery order or cash relief. The food was poor and did not follow 
Mexican cooking habits, and the program carried a significant stigma in the 
community. One caseworker noted that a “‘family is contemplating returning 
to Mexico and the caseworker feels they might return more quickly if they are 
kept on a cafeteria list rather than be given a grocery order.’”124 Agencies also 
sometimes refused aid altogether or withdrew aid, including rent support, if 
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a family would not accept repatriation.125 The practice extended to Mexican-
Americans, as well as to Mexicans with children born in the United States. 
Garcia argues that the relief problem did not decline significantly after repa-
triation, lending little credence to the argument that the Mexican population 
had constituted a large portion of the relief problem in the Midwest.
 The numbers in Michigan validate Garcia’s argument. While repatriations 
represented a significant movement, particularly in the Mexican communi-
ties of Detroit and Saginaw, numerically they were not a sizeable portion of 
the overall relief situation. In 1936, 5,018 noncitizens were on the relief rolls, 
a small part of the state total.126 But the context in which the repatriations 
occurred is noteworthy. Detroit’s Department of Public Welfare underwent its 
most extreme budget crisis in 1931, and a considerable part of its expenditures 
went for relief. Caseloads reached more than 50,000 in February and dropped 
to 32,000 in June. The city spent more than $14 million on relief in that fiscal 
year, and saw deep and brutal cuts in relief rolls to accommodate the declin-
ing budget. The department was forced to cut its rolls in half, from 32,000 to 
16,000.127 About 4,000 Mexican nationals left Detroit in 1932. The number 
was a minor fraction of the relief load for the city, and there is no evidence 
that a substantial number of those who left Detroit were receiving relief. Offi-
cials, however, assumed they were, and believed their departure to be a means 
of reducing welfare costs. In Detroit, officials were desperate to reduce relief 
costs (or to appear to), and noncitizens, especially Mexicans, were politically 
popular targets.
the	State	of	MIchIgan
Michigan, like many states, was slow to participate financially in the relief 
crisis. Commissions and committees were the first step, but few states fol-
lowed those efforts with any funds to help local governments; the concept 
that relief was a local issue demanding local solutions was widespread.128 
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Michigan Governor Wilber Brucker appointed a state unemployment com-
mission in 1931 to coordinate all relief activities in the state and to work with 
local committees to develop work-relief projects. Comprised of 105 members 
and led by a 15-member executive committee, the commission coordinated 
with churches, labor unions, and other local organizations to avoid duplica-
tion of relief services. It was a central clearinghouse for local and county relief 
information, but encouraged local control and decentralization. The state 
commission also attempted to encourage people and the economy with cheer-
ful advice and witty slogans, although historian Richard Ortquist argues that 
it accomplished little and soon found that “words and catchy phrases would 
not win the war against want.” He maintains that the committee was different 
from those of other states, such as New York and Illinois, in that it did little to 
address the relief problem in any practical way.129
 Part of the reason for the lack of financial help was that the state govern-
ment had little money to allocate. A majority of the state’s revenues came from 
property taxes, but as with the counties, the state faced the fifteen-mill limita-
tion and rising tax-delinquency rates; too many people simply were unable 
to pay their property taxes. State legislators sought to alleviate the property 
tax burden, given the high rates of tax delinquency. They postponed the sales 
tax and canceled many tax penalties. The passage of the fifteen-mill limit in 
1932 had prompted the state to enact its first sales tax in 1933. The 3 percent 
tax was to replace the property tax revenues, which now funded local govern-
ments.130 But sales tax revenues were difficult to project and unstable, depen-
dent upon the status of the state’s economy. The state had no income tax, as 
voters had repeatedly rejected constitutional amendments on that issue.131 The 
state released twelve million dollars in highway funds to be used by local agen-
cies for relief in 1931. County and city unemployment commissions used the 
funds in part for local work-relief projects. The state also received four million 
dollars from the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. In 1932 Michigan authorized 
the distribution of a portion of the gasoline-tax revenues, amounting to about 
nine million dollars annually. Although they were not direct relief funds, the 
money did help local budget problems. But none of the appropriations repre-
sented additional expenditures and only advanced the distribution date of the 
funds.132
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 Many states, including Michigan, did not immediately push for federal 
funds for relief, seeking every alternative before relinquishing the concept of 
localism in relief administration.133 Michigan’s governor and state legislature 
adopted a “do it ourselves” approach until as late as 1932. Indeed, many states 
were optimistic that they could handle the relief and unemployment prob-
lems in their states, despite evidence to the contrary, and preferred not to 
invite federal intervention.134 Michigan Governor Fred Green opposed the cre-
ation of an unemployment commission in late 1930 because he thought that 
“such a move would only emphasize the problem.” Green did attempt to secure 
early release of highway funds so that the state could extend its highway proj-
ects, but was not successful.135 His successor, Governor Brucker, also opposed 
federal aid for relief. Brucker telegraphed President Hoover on August 21, 
1931, stating that “the people of Michigan will take care of their own prob-
lem.” In his view, one shared by many officials, relief was the arena of private 
charity and local government, which had not yet been proven incapable of 
handling the load.136 The reluctance of Michigan, and other states, to provide 
funds for relief also was linked both to the resistance to taxes and to fiscal 
conservatism.
 Not all officials in Michigan shared Brucker’s assessment. Just one month 
before, Detroit Mayor Frank Murphy, along with representatives from numer-
ous other municipalities and labor organizations, had petitioned Hoover to 
call a special session to approve loans to the states for relief purposes. Murphy, 
who would be elected Michigan’s governor in 1936, told Hoover that Detroit 
had already expended large sums on relief, and could not do more: “The immi-
nence of another winter of unprecedented deprivation through unemploy-
ment finds Detroit as determined as ever that no man, woman or child shall 
lack the elemental needs of food, clothing and shelter, but also finds the City 
less able than before to provide these necessities.”137 He and other Michigan 
municipal leaders had already sought state aid for unemployment relief, but 
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with little success, thus prompting them to turn to Washington DC.138 Murphy 
galvanized the state’s mayors in a special conference in 1932 to seek federal aid 
for relief. The seventeen mayors and city managers in attendance unanimously 
endorsed the bid for more federal aid on behalf of the unemployed.139 By the 
fall of 1932, according to historian Irving Bernstein, “municipal relief . . . was 
bankrupt in virtually every city in the United States.”140
 Michigan did enact an old-age pension law in 1933, two years before the 
federal Social Security Act, to aid the state’s elderly poor. The Depression’s 
severity fueled approval for old-age pensions in Michigan and elsewhere in 
the country, but the initial old-age pension laws resulted in few pensions. More 
Americans began to support the idea of old-age pensions as the Depression 
worsened. By 1930, ten states had old-age pension programs and the issue 
was becoming a hot political issue in elections.141 Michigan’s law created an 
old-age pension bureau in the state welfare department. County agents, also 
responsible for the investigations for the probate court, were designated as the 
investigating officials. Administration was again local, through county old-
age pension boards comprised of the county agent, probate judge, and “one 
woman” appointed by the county board of supervisors.142 In contrast to moth-
ers’ pensions, the law provided state funding for the old-age pension program. 
Legislators finally agreed to a two-dollar head tax on all persons more than 
twenty-one years of age, to be placed in the old-age pension fund; failure to 
pay the tax was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or 
ninety days in the county jail.143
 To be eligible for an old-age pension, one had to be seventy years old and 
a continuous resident of Michigan for the past ten years. Anyone guilty of 
deserting a spouse or failing to support a child was ineligible. The law spe-
cifically excluded noncitizens and required at least fifteen years of citizenship. 
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This effectively excluded all immigrants who had not secured naturalization 
papers by 1918. Under the poor laws of Michigan, it also excluded anyone with 
family who was legally responsible for his or her care and support.144 Although 
called a pension, the law provided assistance for the aged based on need. As 
with mothers’ pensions, framers of the law sought to reduce the stigma of 
public aid. The legislative language would cause much confusion for both this 
law and the Old Age Assistance law later passed in conformity with the federal 
Social Security Act of 1935.
 A key difference from mothers’ pensions was the inclusion of state funding, 
however flawed it would prove to be. The state sought to raise funds through 
the head tax specifically for old-age pensions. Governor William Comstock 
said in 1933 that old-age pension laws, then in existence in twenty-eight states, 
had “‘proved themselves the most economical and self-respecting method of 
caring for the aged.’”145 In fact, some people hoped that a full system of old-
age pensions would eliminate the need for county infirmaries, except for the 
very ill. Other elderly people, still able to care for themselves, would be able to 
remain in their homes, living off an old-age pension, which would be much 
less costly for the state than supporting them in a public institution. By 1934, 
twenty-eight states had old-age pension laws, but also faced criticism. Many 
of the main problems were also found in Michigan’s 1933 law: the age require-
ment restricted aid only to those at least seventy years of age, and the pension 
grants were entirely inadequate. Critics also disliked the controversial head tax 
and the citizenship requirement.146
 Furthermore, the law paid few actual pensions in its first years. It did not 
include any mechanism for collecting the head tax, and only $5,500 had been 
collected by August of 1933, far short of the cost of pensions, estimated at 
$60,000. Many counties had a collection rate of just 3 percent, and the collec-
tion during the program’s life was a mere 7 percent.147 The state received 42,000 
applications from October 1933 to December 1934, but only 2,660 elderly 
received grants in that time. Another 6,575 applications were approved, and 
the rest were awaiting investigation.148 The Hartford newspaper questioned 
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whether the law was a “hoax,” and criticized legislators for raising the hopes 
of needy elderly people. The newspaper also charged that the entire process 
was merely a “vote-getting” campaign.149 Investigations did not keep pace with 
applications, and in October 1935, Van Buren County was still investigating 
applications from 1933 and 1934.150 Delays often meant that applicants, who 
often were ill in addition to being elderly, died before their cases were ever 
investigated. Cindy Early, for instance, applied for a grant November 27, 1933, 
but died the following March before her case was investigated, and her exam-
ple is not unique.151 Sarah Goodman, a widow living in Detroit, applied for an 
old-age grant in late 1933, but her case was never investigated until 1936. Her 
grant was finally approved in February 1936.152 Before 1935, old-age pensions 
remained a rarity in Michigan. Old-age assistance did not reach a significant 
number of Michigan’s elderly citizens until the state became eligible for federal 
grants under the Social Security Act in 1936.
 Requirements within the law also slowed the investigation process, 
or prompted some to withdraw their applications. A number of applicants 
believed the program was a pension, and not public assistance—an entitle-
ment to them in their old age regardless of their financial circumstances. Some 
immediately withdrew their applications when they realized it was “welfare,” 
or when their children assumed their care. A requirement of the 1933 program 
was that recipients sign their property to the state in return for assistance. 
Many were reluctant to do so, as they wanted their homes or property to go 
to their children (and some adult children also resisted this requirement). 
Others opposed the responsible-relative part of the law; either parents refused 
to provide information that would allow their children’s ability to help to be 
investigated, or children themselves refused to cooperate. About 10 percent 
of all applications reviewed in Wayne County fell under the latter two catego-
ries.153 
 Efforts to address the unemployment and relief problems of the Depres-
sion occurred at all levels of government, as well as in the private sector. The 
problem was too extensive for most communities, private organizations, and 
even the state government; it required the participation of the federal govern-
ment. Calls for private solutions, particularly in the funding of welfare, did not 
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mesh with the reality that Michigan’s welfare system was locally administered 
and publicly funded, both before and during the Great Depression and New 
Deal years. The resistance to state and federal intrusion into the administra-
tion of relief foreshadowed the conflicts that would erupt with the New Deal 
programs, and the backlash that followed these conflicts. Local officials wel-
comed the federal funds, but also rejected the requirements attached to the 
money they so desperately needed. They continued to want “to take care of 
their own problem” as they saw fit.
 van buRen county’S supervisors were less than enthusiastic about the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, despite the county’s acute financial 
crisis. The minutes of the Van Buren County Board of Supervisors reveal a 
pattern of inattention, if not contempt, for the new program. They approved 
the use of office equipment by the Welfare Relief Commission, but tabled 
“until some future time” a request to use highway funds for a work-relief 
project, likely because the project fell under WRC supervision.1 Numerous 
other communications regarding the WRC were also tabled, with no discus-
sion or description in the minutes, including a letter from Governor William 
Comstock.2 Comstock’s letter requested that the supervisors contribute the 
county’s share of gasoline-tax money (eleven thousand dollars) to emergency 
relief. Although the minutes record no formal action, the Hartford Day Spring 
reported that the supervisors refused to comply with the request. One supervi-
sor called the governor’s proposal an “insult to every board of supervisors in 
the state.”3
 Van Buren County, although among the most resistant to FERA, was not 
 1. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” October 10, 1933, 
34–35. 
 2. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” October 10, 1933, 34; 
January 8, 1934, 74.
 3. “Solons Refuse Cash to Governor: County Not to Yield Gas Tax to Relief Fund,” Hart-
ford Day Spring, January 10, 1934, 1.
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alone. Franklin Roosevelt’s administration greatly expanded federal interven-
tion with the New Deal. FERA prompted the creation of a mass of state and 
local agencies to administer the new programs. Success demanded cooperation 
between local, state, and federal governments. The state’s extreme financial 
need clashed with the ideologies of many local officials. Federal intervention 
in relief threatened the long tradition of local control of relief programs. Home 
rule, fiscal localism, and the role of professional social work were the core 
issues of conflict in the early days of FERA.
 Fiscal localism, coupled with home rule—minimizing expenditures and 
maximizing tax relief, and the belief that local administrative control was best, 
regardless of who provided funding—was at the center of the conflicts over 
FERA. But while local officials defended home rule, political scientists and 
policy makers criticized the organization of local government and the state’s 
cumbersome structure of the township system. Local government was often 
comprised of multiple and, at times, overlapping units. Tax revenues in many 
cases were not enough to provide for basic services, including poor relief.4 
The authors of a 1933 study pointed to the cost and inefficiency of the town-
ship system, and recommended consolidation in the counties and reorganiza-
tion of county government.5 The stress of the Depression, and its escalating 
relief costs, eventually strained and, in some cases, broke the local system in 
place. A key problem was that while American society and its economy had 
changed profoundly since the eighteenth century, poor law had not.6 Resis-
tance to change was significant, but given the conditions of the 1930s, “Con-
frontation with the idea of local responsibility as understood in America was 
inevitable.”7 
 The increasingly desperate financial situation of most local governments 
fueled support for federal aid from some governors, state legislators, munici-
pal leaders, and social work professionals.8 A survey of local Michigan agen-
cies conducted by the American Association of Public Welfare Officials found 
that areas around Detroit, Grand Rapids, and the Upper Peninsula were in 
need of either state or federal help. The report noted that Upper Peninsula 
counties faced “much distress and practically no financial resources.”9 Some 
 4. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal, 51–56.
 5. Bromage and Reed, Organization and Cost of County and Township Government, 75, 
125–26.
 6. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal, 76–77.
 7. Ibid., 83.
 8. Brown, Public Relief, 107–8.
 9. Report of Steering Committee, “A Social Work Study of Federal Aid for Unemployment 
Relief,” January 1932, 10; National Association of Social Work Records, Box 18, Folder 195, 
SWHA; and Bernstein, The Lean Years, 462–63.
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social workers supported federal aid by the spring of 1932, although the Amer-
ican Association of Social Workers did not endorse federal aid until January 
1933.10 
 The growing demands resulted in the passage, in July 1932, of the Emer-
gency Relief and Construction Act, which authorized the distribution of $300 
million through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Federal funds were 
to be loans paid off by a state’s federal highway funds. RFC funds became 
grants-in-aid to the states, but government officials did not know that in 
1932.11 Eventually about 60 percent of the total appropriation went to seven 
states, including Michigan, California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin.12 Michigan received $21.8 million, a portion of which was 
spent on highway construction. The remainder was distributed to local pub-
lic welfare agencies through the state unemployment commission. But RFC 
funds were not enough to alleviate the extreme financial problems facing local 
governments. Fiscal localism again emerged, as both state and local officials 
balked at the “loans,” fearing to commit themselves to further debt when their 
coffers were so empty.
 Roosevelt’s administration greatly expanded the federal government’s role 
in social welfare. The most critical New Deal relief programs were the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act, the Civil Works Administration, and, later, the Works 
Progress Administration. All three dealt with relief in some form, and FERA 
and WPA also used investigative social work methods to determine eligibility. 
FERA included an appropriation of $500 million and had a two-year limit. 
FERA provided grants-in-aid to the states for both direct and work relief, with 
the amount received by the state related to the amount the state expended for 
relief and work relief.13 The goal of the grants was to stimulate states to appro-
priate funds that could then be supplemented with federal monies; FERA was 
to establish a federal-state partnership to address the relief problem.14
 FERA provided aid in two major forms: work relief and direct relief. The 
plan was for local governments and schools to create work-relief projects in 
their communities to employ local residents. Local funds provided the materi-
 10. Resolution in favor of federal aid for relief, American Association of Social Workers, 
NASW Records, Box 18, Folder 196.
 11. Hopkins, Spending to Save, 90–91; Brown, Public Relief, 124–25; Coll, Safety Net, 10–11; 
and Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 36.
 12. Brown, Public Relief, 126.
 13. Dorothy Carothers, Chronology of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, May 
12, 1933, to December 31, 1935, WPA Research Monograph VI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1937), 1–3; Nancy Rose, Put to Work: Relief Programs of the Great Depres-
sion (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), 29–30. 
 14. Coll, Safety Net, 25.
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als, and federal funds furnished the payroll. Direct relief, or “the dole” in its 
derogatory terminology, was for those people and families who had no one 
employable to work on a project, or for whom no work was available. Direct 
relief was actually cheaper to provide than work relief, which required funds 
for project materials in addition to payroll, but public opinion, as well as most 
policy makers, favored work relief. Work relief reduced the stigma of welfare 
for recipients and provided some concrete product in return—either improved 
roads, buildings, or other public improvement, or else goods to be distributed 
to relief recipients: clothing, canned goods, or bedding.15
 The federal programs targeted employable people, or those who could 
work but were unable to find work. Unemployable individuals, unable to work 
because of age, health, disability, or family responsibilities, were confined to 
the local relief programs. Regulations specified that federal funds were not to 
finance mothers’ or old-age pensions, hospital care, or institutional (including 
infirmary) care; local governments were to continue to fund those services.16 
Nationally, unemployables made up 20 percent of relief recipients, and in 
Michigan that number ranged from 17 to 24 percent in FERA’s second year.17 
The distinction between employable and unemployable was made along gen-
der lines, and also considered age as a factor. Many women, for instance, able 
to work but with children to care for, were classified as unemployable. Moth-
ers’ pensions were meant to care for those women and their families, but more 
than thirty counties discontinued mothers’ pensions by 1934. Both Saginaw 
and Van Buren counties halted mothers’ pensions in October 1933 because of 
budget constraints.18 Furthermore, Michigan’s flawed old-age pension law of 
1933 proved woefully inadequate and did little to alleviate the poverty of older 
Michigan residents. Thus FERA, through the local welfare-relief commission, 
often cared for unemployables prior to the Social Security Act in 1935. In 
states with no public welfare program before the New Deal, FERA instituted 
the creation of one.19
 15. Brown, Public Relief, 150–51, 158; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and 
Economic Security, 241–42; and Rose, Put to Work, 30, 37–38.
 16. Carothers, Chronology, 8; and Brown, Public Relief, 237.
 17. Rose, Put to Work, 32; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic 
Security, 57–58. 
 18. “Report on Mothers’ Pensions for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1934 to June 30, 1935,” Michi-
gan State Welfare Department, WRSC Records, RG 35 Archives of Michigan, Lansing Box 
14, Folder 5, 2; “Michigan, December 1933 Report of Counties Now Paying Mothers’ Pension 
Grants,” 1, Children’s Fund of Michigan Papers, State Emergency Relief 1934 Folder, Bentley 
Historical Library.
 19. The New Deal’s federal funds prompted both states and municipalities to create welfare 
agencies, usually the local emergency-relief commission. See Jo Ann E. Argersinger, Toward a 
New Deal in Baltimore: People and Government in the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University 
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 FERA’s funds, and later the Works Progress Administration, came with 
strings attached; states were allowed to set up their own commissions and 
emergency-relief administrations to administer the federal program, but had 
to operate within federal guidelines. The federal authority extended to funds 
contributed by local and state governments: “When these powers of control 
are considered, it is clear that the FERA constituted not only a source of finan-
cial aid to the state, but also a very definite and powerful authority over relief 
activities in each state which received Federal funds.”20 States that refused to 
conform to federal rules and regulations over grants—including Kentucky 
and Ohio—faced federal officials assuming control of their state emergency-
relief programs. Although Michigan governors and legislatures certainly had 
conflicts with FERA officials during this period, they never lost control of the 
state emergency-relief administration.21 The state’s reluctance and some local 
governments’ unwillingness to allocate funds for relief frustrated federal offi-
cials, but such conflicts never reached the crises found in other states.22
 Michigan enacted enabling legislation for FERA on June 28, 1933, and 
appropriated twelve million dollars for relief. No funds were distributed, how-
ever, until August 3.23 The law established a State Emergency Welfare Relief 
Commission (SEWRC) to set policy for the State Emergency Relief Admin-
istration (SERA), and also established a welfare-relief commission (WRC) in 
each county. State-commission members were appointed by the governor, and 
county commissions, comprised of three county residents, were appointed by 
the state commission and approved by the governor. All communications with 
FERA went through the state administration, which also distributed federal 
funds to the counties.24 It was the state commission’s responsibility to ensure 
of North Carolina Press), 30–32; Ronald L. Heinemann, Depression and New Deal in Virginia: 
The Enduring Dominion (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983), 155–56; and 
Smith, The New Deal in the Urban South, 62–64.
 20. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 39.
 21. Ibid., 4. Federal officials stepped in to administer federal relief in Georgia, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma. See Brown, Public Relief, 209; Edward 
Ainsworth Williams, Federal Aid for Relief (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 
176–78; Patterson, The New Deal and the States, 65–73; Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New 
Deal, 184; and George T. Blakey, Hard Times and New Deal in Kentucky, 1929–1939 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 51–52. Blanche Coll argues that in states which did face 
federal takeovers, such as in Ohio, FERA “left a legacy ranging from discontent to resentment 
of the heavy federal hand” (Coll, Safety Net, 29). 
 22. Patterson, The New Deal and the States, 66–67; Michigan report by Howard Hunter, De-
cember 1933, FERA-WPA Narrative Field Reports, Michigan, Box 58, Harry Hopkins Papers, 
FDR Library. 
 23. Russell H. Kurtz, “On the Governor’s Doorstep,” Survey 69 (October 1933): 344; 
Sullivan, “On the Dole,” 131.
 24. Public Act 201 of 1933, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan 
(Lansing: Franklin DeKleine Company, 1933), 303–7; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment 
A Contest for Home Rule  |  
that county personnel were qualified under federal regulations, and that the 
operation of the emergency-relief administration remained nonpartisan and 
free from the interference of local government officials.25 
 The inclusion of a commission member and administrators with social 
work backgrounds contributed to the state commission’s willingness to accept 
FERA policies. Michigan’s commission appointed Fred Johnson of Detroit, 
who was secretary of the Michigan’s Children’s Aid Society and a recognized 
social work professional, as administrator of SERA. William Haber, an associ-
ate professor of economics at the University of Michigan who would succeed 
Johnson as administrator one year later, was appointed a field supervisor.26 
State-commission members included Will Norton of Detroit. Norton headed 
the Children’s Fund of Michigan and also led the Detroit Community Fund 
(later the United Way) from 1917 to 1930.27 Johnson, Haber, and Norton shared 
the social work philosophy behind FERA, and sought to enforce FERA poli-
cies at the local level, rather than allowing local officials free rein. Although 
staffing and distance limited the state’s ability to enforce federal guidelines, 
they were willing to do so. FERA officials often complimented Michigan’s 
state commission, which appointed able commissions and administrators, 
and enforced federal policies. Howard Hunter, a FERA field representative, 
reported in 1934 that Michigan was “one of the best operated State Commis-
sions in the country.”28
 William Haber, who served as administrator from 1934 until he resigned 
in 1937, was a critical force in SERA. He also served as deputy director of the 
state’s WPA program. Haber, who had been born in Romania and had come to 
the United States at the age of ten, served on the Mayor’s unemployment com-
mittee in Detroit and the state unemployment commission in the early years 
and Relief in Michigan, 44–48.
 25. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 44.
 26. Minutes of the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Box 2, Folder 1: July 7, 
1933; “State Organization for Public Welfare in Michigan,” WRSC Report, WRSC Records, Box 
5, Folder 4, 184. Haber’s successor, George Granger, shared his social work background. He had 
a bachelor’s degree from the University of Syracuse, had taken graduate courses in social work 
at the University of Michigan, and was a member of the National Association of Social Workers. 
NASW Records, Box 6, Folder 56, Membership Listing, 1936.
 27. Norton also was chair of Detroit’s Emergency Relief Committee in 1931. Other com-
mission members were Charles Bender, a banker from Grand Rapids, and Earnest Brooks, who 
worked in insurance, of Holland. Sullivan, “On the Dole,” 87; Ortquist, Depression Politics in 
Michigan, 153. See SEWRC Minutes, July 7, 1933; The William Haber Oral Biography Project: 
Edited Transcripts, Tape X, “Michigan in the Thirties,” 201; Holland City Directory (Detroit: R. 
C. Polk & Co., 1936), 68. 
 28. Michigan reports by Howard Hunter, March 25, 1935, 1; August 13, 1934, 1; February 
12, 1934, 1; FERA-WPA Narrative Field Reports, Michigan, Box 58, Harry Hopkins Papers, 
FDR Library.
  |  Chapter Three
of the Depression. Besides teaching economics at the University of Michigan, 
he also taught in the university’s Institute of the Health and Social Sciences, 
which housed its first social work curriculum.29 He published widely on relief 
and unemployment issues, and his articles appeared in a range of publications, 
including social work journals. He earned a national reputation for his admin-
istrative abilities. The New York Times called Haber an “uncrackable nut” when 
it came to contests with local officials over relief.30 Federal officials admired 
his willingness to tackle difficult problems, and he became to many the face of 
FERA in the state.31 He would become a central target during the reorganiza-
tion debates.
 SERA’s power to appoint county welfare-relief commission members and 
relief administrators would take center stage in the conflicts with local officials 
over relief that followed, but also would earn the praise of federal officials. 
Home rule ideology was at the heart of these debates. County WRCs were 
comprised of three residents of the county, and no supervisor could serve 
either as a commission member or as administrator.32 FERA officials hoped to 
remove politics from relief by requiring trained workers, if possible, or at least 
supervision over the workers by professional social workers. They also sought 
to minimize the granting of jobs as political gifts and to ensure that relief cases 
were adequately investigated by professionals. The exclusion of supervisors 
from this process alienated many supervisors from the WRC even before it 
began work. Long responsible for relief, many supervisors greatly resented the 
loss of administrative control. Although caseworkers often consulted supervi-
sors on recipients in their townships or cities, supervisors were on the outside 
looking in and most did not like it.33
 The state commission also approved the appointments of county admin-
istrators, who were to handle the daily administration of the programs, 
including the hiring of staff, with the county WRC providing guidance and 
 29. Who’s Who in Michigan, ed. Herbert S. Case (Munising, MI: 1936), 158; Sam Howe Ver-
hover, “William Haber, Who Directed Aid to Jewish Refugees, Is Dead at 89,” New York Times, 
January 3, 1989, D17.
 30. “Spoilsmen Foiled by Relief Head,” New York Times, August 15, 1937, 38.
 31. Michigan report by Howard Hunter, June 1, 1934, FERA Michigan Field Reports, Box 
138, Folder 2, National Archives.
 32. By October, sixty-nine of Michigan’s eighty-three counties had established welfare-
relief commissions. Minutes of the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Box 2, Folder 
1: July 17, July 28, August 11, and October 13, 1933. Studies of both Illinois and Ohio reveal 
similar views; both states adhered to the concept that local officials, and not social workers, 
should administer relief. See Maurer, “Public Relief Programs in Ohio, 1929–1939,” 77; Cole, 
“The Relief Crisis in Illinois during the Depression, 1930–1940,” 285–91. 
 33. Brown, Public Relief, 274–76; Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal, 184.
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supervision.34 Each county agency had to have one “trained and experienced 
investigator” and also at least one supervisor who was “trained and experi-
enced in the essential elements of family case work and relief administra-
tion.”35 Administrators were not always social workers, but investigators were 
to be, if possible.36
 The establishment of the county WRC did not entirely exclude township 
supervisors and superintendents of the poor from the relief process. In many 
counties, township supervisors continued to be consulted on most cases, par-
ticularly those in rural areas. WRC workers in Van Buren County often con-
sulted local township supervisors as one of three required reference checks on 
new applications, and usually followed their lead. WRC workers also sought 
suggestions from township supervisors on long-term cases, and informed 
officials regarding who was on relief in their county. Both WRC staff and 
township supervisors in Marquette County saw the supervisor as a part of the 
investigation process.37 Township supervisors were consulted on a less sys-
tematic basis in Saginaw County, although they were permitted to write relief 
orders on cases approved by the ERA.38 Such attitudes are less overt in records 
after the Social Security Act was implemented in Michigan, but remained a 
part of the case-file records in the earlier days of the New Deal.
 The size of relief grants varied from county to county, and most increased 
during the second year of FERA. The average grant in the state for the first 
fiscal year of FERA (ending June 30, 1934) was $5.18 per month for an indi-
vidual, and $21.22 for a family. That average increased to $9.14 per person the 
following year (ending June 30, 1935) and $32.79 per family.39 The average 
grant per family nationally in May 1933, two months before FERA was imple-
mented, was $15.15; that figure rose to $24.53 one year later—slightly more 
than Michigan’s average grant. By May 1935, the national average was $29.33, 
less than Michigan’s average grant.40
 34. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 44–46.
 35. Carothers, Chronology, FERA Rules and Regulations No. 3, 7.
 36. Brown, Public Relief, 274–76.
 37. “Welfare Activities in Counties—Survey Report,” Van Buren County, October 15, 1936, 
WRSC Records, Box 15, Folder 3, 1; “Proceedings, Marquette County Supervisors,” November 
13, 1935, 335. ERA case files clearly document the consultation by ERA workers with township 
officials on the worthiness of applicants’ requests for aid.
 38. “Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies,” Saginaw County, WRSC Records, Box 7, 
Folder 7. Wayne County did not permit its rural supervisors to write emergency-relief orders. 
Report dated November 18, 1936, WRSC Records, Box 15, Folder 3.
 39. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, Appendix, table 3; Haber 
and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, figure 11, 42; table 16, 84; and 
Appendix, table VIII.
 40. Brown, Public Relief, 249.
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 Despite nondiscrimination requirements, studies found racial disparities 
in grant amounts, and such variations were not confined to the South. Relief 
grants in Detroit in 1935 averaged $39.42 for all family recipients, but the aver-
age for whites was $40.90 while grants to black families averaged $35.13. Such 
disparities were found in numerous cities throughout the United States, with 
average grants for blacks at $24.18, while whites received $29.05. Explanations 
for the differential included smaller case sizes or the lack of an employable 
household member in black cases. In the latter instance, blacks would then 
be ineligible for work relief, which paid higher benefits.41 Many historians 
have documented the effects of local administration under federal guidelines 
in New Deal programs, and in areas with minimal state and federal interfer-
ence, administration of the programs often replicated discriminatory practices 
already in place. In some cases, different budget formulas were used for the 
two groups. Most studies find that minorities gained much greater access to 
public relief programs, particularly in the South, but such access was by no 
means equal.42
 Breakdowns by counties reveal greater variation in the amounts of grants. 
Although the average grants in all counties increased from the first year to 
the next, significant differences between counties remained. Van Buren and 
Saginaw had the lowest average grants, while Wayne County’s remained the 
highest in the state for both years (see table 3.1). Many of the counties paying 
the lowest grants were in Michigan’s southern agricultural region, including 
Van Buren.43
 Variations in grants stemmed from numerous factors, including the cost 
of living and poor-relief traditions; areas that had formerly paid low relief 
rates tended to continue that trend. The climate and the availability of work, 
including seasonal agricultural work, also affected the size of grants. Fuel costs 
were much higher in Marquette County than in Van Buren County, and the 
ability of a family to raise food in a garden or to earn supplemental income in 
the agricultural season was much higher in the latter county.44 Gardens were 
 41. Enid Baird, Average General Relief Benefits, 1933–1938 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1940), 31–32.
 42. Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White (New York: Norton, 2005), 37–38; 
Karen Ferguson, Black Politics in New Deal Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2002), 74–80; Jack Irby Hayes Jr., South Carolina and the New Deal (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 2001), 47–50; and Richard Lowitt, The New Deal and the West (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 22–24.
 43. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, figure 11, 42–
43.
 44. Similar arguments can be made about variations in grants among states. Contributions 
by states to relief funds were a major reason for discrepancies in grants. See Patterson, The New 
Deal and the States, 54–55.
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expected of people in areas with suitable soil and climate, and relief could 
be refused if space was available and applicants failed to attempt to raise a 
garden.45 Agricultural areas, like Van Buren County, also reduced relief rolls 
during the planting and harvest seasons, as officials believed ample work was 
available with local farmers.46
 Rural parts of Saginaw also had agricultural employment available, partic­
ularly in the sugar beet industry. Relief clients were expected to accept work if 
it was available, but only at a “living wage.” When sugar beet company officials 
asked the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission to deny aid to those 
families who refused employment in the sugar beet fields, the commission 
would not, “as the amount of wages is not such as will enable [relief clients] 
to provide for themselves without the aid of relief agencies.” It is not clear 
whether cases received supplementation from the WRC or if relief recipients 
were empowered to refuse sugar beet employment altogether. The SEWRC 
 45. Carothers, Chronology, 41, 51; SERA Letter #7, 1934, Michigan State Emergency Wel­
fare Relief Commission Papers, 1934–1939, Box 1, Folder January to June 1934; and “Ask Relief 
Clients for 1,000 Gardens,” Hartford Day Spring, April 24, 1935, 1. 
 46. State Emergency Relief Administration Letters #353 dated May 1, 1935, and #579, dated 
May 18, 1936, reminded county administrators to review relief cases for those who could take 
temporary work. See SERA Letters #353 and #579, SEWRC Records, Box 1; see also Devra 
Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 130.
Source:  Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, Appendix, table 3 and 
figure 19; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief and Economic Security, figure 11, p. 
43, table 16, p. 84, and Appendix, table VIII. Grants listed under 1934 refer to average grants 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1934, and grants from 1935 refer to average grants for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1935.
Table 3.1
average monThly granTs for 1934 and 1935
1934 1935
County
Average 
Family 
Grant
Average 
Individual 
Grant
Ranking 
in State
Average 
Family 
Grant
Average 
Individual 
Grant
Ranking 
in State
Kent $20.57 $4.87 11 $29.43 $8.23 17
Marquette $21.01 $4.43 7 $31.62 $8.56 10
Saginaw $13.85 $3.71 48 $26.14 $6.06 33
Van Buren $10.17 $2.62 79 $16.86 $6.36 79
Wayne $28.64 $6.69 1 $43.47 $11.72 1
State of Michigan $21.22 $5.18 6 $32.79 $9.14 10
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did rule that “where a living wage is offered for an honest day’s work,” families 
refusing such employment should be removed from the relief rolls.47 When 
sugar beet representatives renewed their request just two weeks later, the com-
mission reiterated its earlier stand, noting “that they deemed it their duty in 
the interest of humanity to see that labor is decently paid,” and asked admin-
istrator Fred Johnson to inform people “that the Commission was not going 
to be an instrument in forcing labor into the sugar beet fields at a starvation 
wage.”48 Farmers in Manistee County also complained of an inability to secure 
workers for their fields, but WRC administrator Louise Armstrong argued that 
they paid “disgracefully low wages, if they paid cash wages at all.” Some farm-
ers paid their workers only with goods, and sometimes at prices far inflated 
above the market value. Some workers also received no wages until the farmer 
sold the crop.49
 Conflict over relief grants and the availability of low-wage labor occurred 
throughout the country in the implementation of New Deal relief programs. 
Local demographics determined what groups were the targets of efforts to pre-
serve low-wage workers. Critics charged that relief grants encouraged workers 
to reject low-wage employment, including agricultural work in Michigan. The 
issue was particularly significant in the South, where local and state officials 
resisted attempts to disrupt the low-wage labor supply, thus explaining in part 
the lack of access blacks had to direct and work relief. When access to relief 
was granted to blacks, it was granted partially to ensure that they did not leave 
the area, which would preserve their availability to work during planting and 
harvesting seasons. Devra Weber found a similar trend in California, where 
growers protested the granting of relief to migrant workers, either through 
direct relief or the transient program, arguing that it cost them workers. As in 
Michigan’s sugar beet fields, California’s growers found that their wages were 
far less than relief grants, which were already meager enough. The availability 
of relief instituted a “de facto minimum wage,” Weber contends, and enabled 
agricultural workers to bargain for better wages.50
 The SEWRC ruled that wages for agricultural work had to equal minimum 
 47. Minutes of the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Box 2, Folder 1: May 23, 
1934.
 48. Minutes of the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Box 2, Folder 1: June 6, 
1934.
 49. Louise Armstrong, We Too Are the People (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1938), 
130–31.
 50. Hayes, South Carolina and the New Deal, 165–66; Katznelson, When Affirmative Action 
Was White, 39–41; Heinemann, Depression and New Deal in Virginia, 82–84; Lowitt, The New 
Deal and the West, 16–17; and Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold, 127–28.
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relief grants.51 The SEWRC rulings, however, did not preclude local agencies 
from implementing different policies until state or federal officials became 
aware of them. Other local discriminatory practices certainly existed, despite 
federal regulations, including the denial of benefits to people of color and 
to noncitizens. As with other regulations, federal supervision was not thor-
ough enough to prevent suffering by specific groups. The problem occurred 
throughout the country, although its specifics varied with local demographics 
and practices. Ultimately, supervision of WRC policies, including relief for 
migrant and agricultural workers, diminished with the demise of FERA.
conflIctS	over	local	contrIbutIonS
A key factor in the size of grants was the amount of federal and state funds 
available. Estimated ahead of time, grants could prove inadequate if relief 
rolls increased more than anticipated, thus causing the reduction of all grants 
because of fund shortages.52 Often the problem stemmed from a lack of local 
contribution to emergency-relief funds; once federal funds were exhausted, 
the expected share of local monies was intended to fund relief. But in counties 
that rarely provided funds, such as Van Buren and Manistee counties, grants 
were reduced and sometimes eliminated. This was especially true by late 1935, 
when SERA and FERA officials began to withdraw state and federal funds 
from counties that refused to provide local matching funds. The conflicts 
centered not only on whether the county could pay, but also on who (often 
state-appointed social workers) was administering the funds; county officials 
were often reluctant to provide money over which they had no administrative 
control.
 During the first year of FERA, Michigan counties contributed varied 
amounts to the local county WRC, with the state average at a low 6.18 percent. 
The availability of funds was a key reason, but the county officials’ attitude 
toward SERA and the relief program also played a role. Counties like Van 
Buren and Manistee, which had major conflicts with SERA, contributed the 
least. Saginaw and Marquette, whose relationships with SERA were more ami-
able, were among those counties contributing the highest percentage of relief 
funds statewide (see table 3.2).53 Overall for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
 51. The Commission also agreed that relief clients refusing agricultural work at a living 
wage would be refused relief. Minutes of the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Box 
2, Folder 1: May 23, 1934. For California, see Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold, 127–28.
 52. Brown, Public Relief, 233, 249–51.
 53. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, figure 12.
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1934, local funds accounted for slightly more than 10 percent of all relief funds 
expended, while state dollars contributed 22 percent and the rest—more than 
two-thirds—came from federal dollars.54 No county was able to contribute 
more than 38 percent of relief costs in the program’s first year, in part because 
few counties had the money available.55 Contributions from most counties 
increased in the second year, but Van Buren was one of the few counties to 
actually contribute a smaller share the second year, when just three counties 
provided a smaller percentage of relief funds than Van Buren.56
 Contributions varied depending on the economies of the counties involved; 
the major industrial counties tended to contribute much higher amounts to 
relief than agricultural, mining, or lumbering counties. Wayne County and the 
other ten largest industrial counties contributed 90 percent of all local relief 
dollars in the state in 1937–38.57 Michigan’s problem of changing econom-
ics—and the decline of mining and timber industries with no viable replace-
ment industries—translated into the inability of some counties to finance their 
 54. Ibid., figure 9.
 55. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 54.
 56. Ibid., figure 12; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 
figure 8, 35.
 57. George F. Granger and Lawrence R. Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 1933–1939 
(Lansing: State of Michigan, 1939), 53.
table	3.2
percentage	of	relIef	fundS	froM	countIeS
1934 1935
county
percent of 
local Funds 
for emergency 
Relief, Fy
Ranking  
in State
percent of 
local Funds 
for emergency 
Relief, Fy 
Ranking  
in State
kent 1.69 64 9.06 70
Manistee 0.03 78 3.19 82
Marquette 23.64 8 23.35 15
Saginaw 27.86 3 27.05 9
van buren 4.96 45 3.65 80
Wayne 3.96 50 11.32 56
State average 6.18 43 13.42 50
Source: haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, figure 12, appendix, 
table 3; haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief and Economic Security, figure 8, p. 35.
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share of relief. As industrial counties increased their contributions, other areas 
decreased. Counties with high relief rates tended to have the lowest contribu-
tions.58 In a report to Harry Hopkins, Howard Hunter expressed frustration 
with Michigan’s refusal to appropriate funds for relief: “These people have 
been mollycoddled by the Federal government for over a year.” Hunter did not 
fault the state commission, but rather local and state officials, who “believe that 
Santa Claus will keep on coming down the chimney no matter how bad they 
are.”59 But all three state reports on emergency relief recognized the inability 
of some counties to finance even a small portion of relief. Conflicts arose with 
counties that the state believed could do more, including Van Buren County.
 Local governments contributed more to work-relief projects. Contribu-
tions tended to center on materials for the projects; local units, for instance, 
provided more than 60 percent of all materials and equipment on the projects. 
Overall, a 1935 report showed that local funds provided about 24 percent of 
the costs of projects, while nearly 71 percent was from federal ERA mon-
ies.60 Counties were more likely to contribute to work relief than direct relief; 
this was particularly true after the WPA began in 1935. A 1939 report states 
that contributions to the WPA came at the expense of emergency relief. By 
1937–38, counties were contributing $4 million more dollars to WPA than to 
emergency relief, with local contributions for direct relief at about $11.7 mil-
lion, as opposed to $15.5 million for the WPA.61
 Conflict in the projects centered on administrative control and on deter-
mining who would work on the projects, rather than on the contributions 
themselves. Under the FERA and WPA programs, all workers were certified 
through the relief agencies, thus eliminating local county and city officials 
from the process. (Under the Civil Works Administration, the predecessor 
of FERA, workers did not apply through relief agencies, nor did they have to 
prove need. About half of Michigan’s workers in the first year came from the 
relief rolls; others were simply unemployed.)62 Home rule again appears. Van 
Buren County supervisors were among the most opposed to federal work-
relief programs. Federal supervision left local officials little say in who was 
hired on those projects. Before the New Deal, supervisors had recommended 
 58. Granger and Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 1933–1939, 53–54.
 59. Michigan report by Howard Hunter, December 1933, Box 58, FERA-WPA Narrative 
Reports.
 60. 50,000 Men: Report of the Work Division of the Michigan Emergency Welfare Relief Com-
mission (Lansing: 1935), 29.
 61. Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 1933–1939 (Lansing: 1939), 56–58.
 62. Bonnie Fox Schwartz, The Civil Works Administration, 1933–1934: The Business of 
Emergency Employment in the New Deal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 42–43; 
Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 130–31.
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men from their own townships to work programs using county funds or state 
highway funds. Work projects now fell under the county WRC, which coordi-
nated work assignments. Some supervisors resented the loss of that authority, 
again believing they knew best who needed and deserved aid.63 They also 
disliked the project application process, arguing that “CWA projects were 
obtained only by pilgrimages to Lansing.”64
 County administrators and WRC members played a crucial role in the 
negotiations for local contributions, and in relations between SERA and local 
officials. They were expected to provide detailed information about the relief 
efforts, including costs, caseload information, and the status of work projects. 
They were told to use the threat of withdrawal of federal and state funds as 
leverage in the negotiations of local-fund contributions. But they also were 
allowed to use their judgments in situations where counties or cities could 
not afford the expected one-third. County administrators were told not to 
wait for local officials to come to them, but to initiate contact before annual 
budget meetings, usually held in October.65 By the second year of FERA, they 
also were expected to help “sell” the ERA structure, and to persuade local offi-
cials that a professionally run social work agency was preferable to, and more 
efficient than, the old poor-relief system.66 This effort to promote the ERA 
structure became particularly important as Michigan entered its welfare-reor-
ganization debates following passage of the Social Security Act in 1935. Van 
Buren County’s WRC had six different administrators in three years, an indi-
cation of the county’s rocky relationship with SERA.67 In recalling those years, 
Haber remembered the conflicts with state and local officials over the relief 
administration under FERA, and the need to persuade them of its merits. “It 
was not well received, because even in those days there was still a prevailing, a 
widely held point of view, that people on relief didn’t want to work,” he recalled 
forty years later.68
 63. “Hartford Will Have Share in Road ‘Relief,’” Hartford Day Spring, November 4, 1931, 1, 
6; “Solons Refuse Cash to Governor,” Hartford Day Spring, January 10, 1934, 1.
 64. “Solons Refuse Cash to Governor,” Hartford Day Spring, January 10, 1934, 1.
 65. SERA Letter #173, October 5, 1934, SEWRC Records, Box 1, Folder October–December 
1934; SERA Letter #360, May 10, 1935, Folder April–June 1935; and Letter from SERA Ad-
ministrator William Haber to all county boards of supervisors, dated October 1, 1935, Folder 
October–December 1935.
 66. SERA Letter #468, October 7, 1935, and SERA Letter, November 11, 1935, SEWRC 
Records, Box 1, Folder October to December 1935; and SERA Letter #544, March 31, 1936, 
Folder January–March 1936.
 67. Ernest B. Harper and Duane L. Gibson, Reorganization of Public Welfare in Michigan: 
A Study of Transformation of a Social Institution (East Lansing: Michigan State College, 1942), 
27.
 68. William Haber Oral Biography Project, transcripts, 205.
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 Conflicts often revolved around how much counties could contribute to 
relief. Fiscal localism and home rule are interconnected in this issue; local 
officials were reluctant to expend funds over which they had little control. The 
Hartford Day Spring reported “murmurs of dissatisfaction with the manner in 
which county welfare relief is to be administered” under the new program. A 
key criticism was that the new administrative setup would not provide much 
financial relief for the county or its taxpayers. Supervisors argued that not only 
were they required to fund one-third of the new relief program, under federal 
law, but also they retained financial responsibility for mothers’ pensions, the 
county infirmary, and hospitalization costs. Van Buren County believed those 
obligations should be considered relief contributions, while state and federal 
policies did not include them.69
 Fiscal localism was central in Van Buren County. County officials were 
unwilling to provide the one-third requested by state officials in January 
1934 when federal funds ran out; relief recipients faced large cuts in grants. 
Supervisors eventually agreed to a contribution of $1,568.45. Given that SERA 
expended more than $311,000 in the first year in the county, the amount 
offered was hardly enough to solve the relief-fund crisis.70 The state again 
requested a one-third contribution from the county in October. The supervi-
sors did adopt a resolution agreeing to partial payment of the funds it owed 
“insofar as funds are available,” but only after the year’s tax rolls were col-
lected.71 The county would not commit funds to relief until other obligations 
were met and its revenues were collected.
 Inextricably linked to the issue of local contributions was home rule: who 
would administer those funds and what expertise was needed in that admin-
istration. Van Buren officials agreed to contribute their share, but only if the 
“county ‘dads’ would handle [the] relief funds.”72 This paternalistic attitude was 
directed not only at the relief recipients but also at those involved in the state 
relief administration. The county supervisors extended this offer to the state:
Resolved, that the board of supervisors of Van Buren county offered their 
services to the state welfare commission as so-called case workers in their 
respective townships at no expense to the commission, displacing present 
 69. “Supervisors End October Session: Look for Spots to Further Cut County Budget,” 
Hartford Day Spring, October 25, 1933, 1.
 70. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” February 16, 1934, 92; 
“County Welfare Costs $311,502.17,” Hartford Day Spring, October 17, 1934, 1.
 71. “County Budget Totals $136,793.76,” Hartford Day Spring, October 24, 1934, 1.
 72. “County ‘Dads’ Would Handle Relief Funds,” Hartford Day Spring, February 21, 1934, 
1, 5; “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” February 16, 1934, 92.
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case workers, and that the county pledges itself to contribute one-third 
of the total expense of the class of relief handled by the county commis-
sion, provided above offer is accepted and complied with, and in case this 
county receives its full quota of relief from state and federal funds.73
Supervisors sought to regain control of relief administration, suggesting that 
they replace “so-called case workers,” which they clearly did not see as better 
able to administer poor relief. Van Buren’s supervisors argued that supervisors 
would perform their relief duties as part of the job of supervisor, thus saving 
the county the cost of professional social workers. The supervisors believed 
that they were more qualified to administer relief, an argument that would 
recur in the 1937 and 1938 debates.
 Some counties used their existing poor-fund allocations, if any were left, to 
provide their share of WRC costs. Both Saginaw and Marquette counties con-
tributed a fair proportion of funds, but the effort came at a cost to services and 
salaries. There was little opposition to participating in the federal program, 
and initially local control was not an issue vocalized a great deal. In Saginaw, 
city officials opposed a county-wide tax because city residents already paid 
taxes for the poor commission, whose funds had been previously pledged, in 
large measure, to the county WRC.74 The county had stopped funding moth-
ers’ pensions the month before, forcing those women to seek aid from the poor 
commission or their township supervisors. Instead, the county voted to con-
tribute ten thousand dollars of the county’s poor fund, to be placed in reserve 
with the county treasurer for the WRC to draw upon for administrative costs.75 
Marquette County also used its poor-fund budget to contribute to the WRC. 
Marquette County’s supervisors’ main conflict with SERA stemmed from their 
belief that while they had shouldered their share—and more—of the relief 
problem, other counties had not: “It might also be pointed out,” the Marquette 
County board writes, “that there are only three counties in northern Michigan 
that have apparently played ball with the state ERA.” Marquette was one of 
them.76
 73. “County ‘Dads’ Would Handle Relief Funds,” Hartford Day Spring, February 21, 1934.
 74. “Supervisors Debate Relief Fund Request,” Saginaw Daily News, October 14, 1933, 1, 
3; “Welfare Fund Need Explained,” Saginaw Daily News, October 16, 1933, 1–2; “Pledge Relief 
Cooperation,” Saginaw Daily News, October 17, 1933, 1, 9; and Official Proceedings of the Board 
of Supervisors of Saginaw County, Michigan, October 13, 1933, 82–83; October 14, 1933, 87.
 75. “Relief Board Asks $10,000,” Saginaw Daily News, October 18, 1933, 1–2; “Favor Relief 
Fund Request,” Saginaw Daily News, October 21, 1933, 1; and Official Proceedings of the Board 
of Supervisors of Saginaw County, Michigan, October 18, 1933, 95–96; October 23, 1933, 107.
 76. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Marquette County,” vol. 8, February 15, 1939, 
59.
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 Marquette officials saw the creation of the WRC as a way to share the work 
and financial burden of relief. Although the surviving records are not clear on 
the relationship between the WRC and the county’s decision to create, and 
then eliminate, the office of poor director, the two events seem connected. 
The county supervisors unanimously voted to eliminate the position just a 
few months after hiring a mining executive in August of 1933.77 It seems likely 
that the supervisors believed that the newly created WRC could coordinate the 
relief programs in the county, thus eliminating the need for the four-thousand-
dollar appropriation for the director position.78 The WRC took over investi-
gating cases of emergency and work relief, but the poor commission continued 
to investigate requests for medical care and unemployable cases. They also 
worked with the WRC on a work-relief project to repair the county infirmary, 
with the cost of materials for the project taken from the poor-fund budget.79
 The cost of staff and administration was a widespread criticism of the 
SERA. SERA issued a report in 1935 to counter those charges, and reported 
that 91.4 cents of each dollar went for relief, with just 8.6 cents spent on 
administration. Van Buren County administrative costs were about 8.29 per-
cent of the total amount spent on relief. The greater amount of the cost rested 
in the salaries of staff, including caseworkers. The report defended these costs, 
despite the fact that they were much higher than pre-Depression days, and 
argued that in some areas, staffs were not adequate to fully investigate their 
cases. Careful investigations resulted in fewer people being able to “cheat” the 
system, the report argued.80
 State officials eventually took a more punitive stance toward counties 
unwilling to pay their share. Manistee County’s relief program closed briefly 
in 1934 over disagreements about the county’s contribution.81 Allegan County, 
immediately north of Van Buren County, experienced this in December 1935, 
when the state ERA cut off state and federal funds to the county because its 
board refused to appropriate twenty-four thousand dollars for relief needs. The 
county offices were closed, and at the same time state officials announced the 
 77. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Marquette County,” August 30, 1933; 
“Proceedings of the Board of the Superintendents of the Poor, Marquette County,” April 21, 
1933. 
 78. “Making Progress Backward,” Daily Mining Journal, September 6, 1933, 4.
 79. “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Marquette County,” October 8, 1934, 229.
 80. Michigan State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Cost of Administration in the 
Emergency Relief Program (Lansing, 1935), 3, 7.
 81. Armstrong, We Too Are the People, 284–86; “Demand Appropriation for Welfare Pur-
poses,” Manistee Examiner, November 1, 1934, clipping in Armstrong papers, Box 1, Reviews 
Folder 3; “$5,000 Welfare Fund Turned Down,” Manistee News-Advocate, November 6, 1934; 
and “Relief Is Ordered Resumed,” Manistee News-Advocate, November 26, 1934.
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start of an investigation into Van Buren County, which also had not contrib-
uted relief dollars to its budget. Van Buren officials argued that their share was 
covered through hospitalization costs, as well as through poor relief adminis-
tered through the county poor commission, which still operated.82 The board 
of supervisors voted fifteen to five to provide for relief at the rate of two thou-
sand dollars per month until the April elections, when the new board could 
tackle the issue that had perplexed local officials for more than five years.83 No 
county appropriation was forthcoming after April 1, and funds were exhausted 
by mid-June. County administrator Harold Humphrey reported in June that 
despite reductions in the relief load, funds would be gone before more state 
funds were forthcoming on July 1, 1936. And a shortage of funds had already 
resulted in reduced budgets and denials of aid, further resulting in “insuffi-
cient relief and suffering.”84
 Recipients approved for emergency relief had to seek out their local super-
visor for assistance when the WRC ran out of funds. Jerry Brewster, a thirty-
year-old farmer afflicted with inflammatory rheumatism, was approved for aid 
in April 1936. He and his wife, Lillian, sought a few grocery orders to carry 
them until he had recovered enough to resume farming. They were readily 
approved, and the caseworker approved aid for a longer period of time, as 
she believed he would need longer to recover. The WRC covered the grocery 
orders until mid-May, but then Brewster had to seek help from the township 
supervisor because the WRC offices were not able to extend aid until June 1.85 
The records do not indicate whether he was successful. Other recipients faced 
similar problems, at a time when townships had little money and mothers’ 
pensions were no longer funded. Options for relief were few when the WRC 
could not help.
 The rural character of a county played a role in its relationship with 
SERA, even within counties such as Saginaw, which was both urban and 
rural. Saginaw County operated under the township system; townships were 
charged individually for their share of relief costs, and the county allocated no 
direct funds for emergency relief.86 Opposition to the WRC allocation of ten 
 82. Allegan County was also a rural, agricultural county and one that remained loyal to 
the Republican Party throughout the 1930s. “State Probes County’s ERA Funds,” Hartford Day 
Spring, Dec. 11, 1935.
 83. “Solons Vote $2,000 Month Relief Fund,” Hartford Day Spring, January 15, 1936, 1; “Pro-
ceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” January 10, 1936, 84.
 84. “Administrator Gives Figures on Van Buren County Relief,” Hartford Day Spring, June 
17, 1936, 1; “Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” April 14, 1936, 4.
 85. Case #5217, Van Buren County ERA Records (hereafter VB ERA), Box 1, Folder B.
 86. Proceedings of the Council and Boards of the City of Saginaw, October 31, 1933; 
November 7, 1933.
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thousand dollars in Saginaw County came from sixteen supervisors, many 
representing the rural townships.87 The core of the opposition centered on 
the equitable distribution of the relief burden among townships, as well as 
on the issue of home rule. As with Van Buren County, some Saginaw County 
supervisors believed they could more efficiently administer relief than the 
WRC. Although the administrative costs were funded by the county, the local 
shares of relief costs were to be paid individually by the townships and the city 
of Saginaw. The WRC paid the bills and then charged the local costs back to 
the township, while the city provided its poor-relief funds and then was later 
reimbursed by the WRC. The townships eventually paid the share not cov-
ered by the state ERA.88 Over the next three years, twenty-four of Saginaw’s 
twenty-seven townships opted to participate with the WRC. The three town-
ships that did not declined because their officials believed they were “able to 
look after [their] own.” Saginaw Township initially participated, but was cut 
off for six months until it paid the eleven hundred dollars it owed the WRC.89 
Rural opposition was rooted in a desire for control over the administration of 
those funds, and a desire to minimize the taxes imposed on county residents. 
The antitax sentiments of the period fueled ideas about home rule and fiscal 
localism.
 Wayne County, and the city of Detroit, faced such serious financial dif-
ficulties over relief funding that conflict with SERA was not an issue. DPW 
head John Ballenger had a friendly relationship with Fred Johnson, the first 
administrator.90 State officials did order an investigation into the disbursement 
of relief checks in 1934, and a state auditor handled the relief payrolls during 
that investigation.91 SERA prompted the department to improve its accounting 
and administrative practices, and Howard Hunter was particularly critical of 
the administration in Detroit. He believed that Ballenger was spread too thin 
and that the commission was susceptible to political influence.92 Conflicts 
 87.  Official Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors of Saginaw County, Michigan, October 
23, 1933, 107.
 88. The city of Saginaw’s poor department investigated emergency-relief cases for the WRC 
and was reimbursed by the county for two-thirds of the funds expended. The other third was 
their share of the relief burden. WRSC Records, Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies, 
1936, Box 7, Folder 6; “Relief Board Asks $10,000,” Saginaw Daily News, October 18, 1933, 1–2; 
and Proceedings of the Council and Boards of the City of Saginaw, October 31, 1933, 367.
 89. WRSC Records, Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies, 1936, Box 7, Folder 7, Sagi-
naw County.
 90. “Proceedings of the Public Welfare Commission,” Detroit, July 18, 1933, 150–51.
 91. SEWRC Minutes, April 18, 1934.
 92. Joanna C. Colcord, Cash Relief (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1936), 87; Sullivan, 
“On the Dole,” 131–34, 139; and Report from Howard Hunter to Harry Hopkins, dated August 
13, 1934, 1–2; June 1, 1934, 3–4; Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 58, Folder Michigan.
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between Wayne County and SERA would escalate in the latter part of the 
decade, but remained cooperative in the early years of the program.
 Fiscal localism and home rule worked in tandem in the early negotiations 
between officials in the administration of relief. While the issues were more 
muted in some counties, such as Saginaw and Wayne, in the early years, they 
emerged as strong from the start in Van Buren County. The difficulties of this 
era highlight the issues that came to the forefront in the debates over welfare 
reorganization. But the New Deal programs played a significant role in allevi-
ating the hardship of the Depression, as well as in enabling local communities 
to improve public facilities and the state to improve its infrastructure. The next 
chapter turns to that story.
 “what we need in Hillsdale is a federal officer to investigate the con-
dition of the unemployed,” wrote Pearl Gibbon to Franklin Roosevelt in July 
1933. “We have families who are starving. The fathers are willing to work, but 
they have no work and no help from the welfare. When they ask for help, the 
county officers reply, ‘there are no funds, the county is broke.’ Can you help us 
out? We need help at once for these poor people.”1 Jack Tatro of Marine City 
also wrote Roosevelt about the poor-relief situation in his city at about the 
same time. Tatro noted that relief orders were inadequate to feed the families, 
clothing was impossible to procure, and “consequently children are practically 
naked as are their parents in some cases.” Efforts to gain clothing or shoes 
meant being “sent from Supervisor to Supt of Poor and each refers them to 
one another, without results from either.” As in Gibbon’s case, county officials 
told Tatro that there was no money for help.2 Tatro wrote that he was not 
complaining, but simply stating the facts: “The people of this county are true 
 1. Letter from Pearl Gibbon of Hillsdale, dated July 29, 1933, to FDR, FERA State Series, 
Michigan Complaints, RG 69, Box 141, Folder G–H. Hillsdale is a small town located in Hills-
dale County in the southern agricultural section of Michigan.
 2. Letter from Jack Tatro of Marine City to Franklin Roosevelt, dated July 31, 1933, FERA 
State Series, Michigan Complaints, RG 69, Box 141, Folder T–Z. Marine City, located in St. Clair 
County, is on the eastern shore of Michigan north of Detroit.
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Americans and are not wont to complain.”3 Both letters show a very different 
perspective from that of local officials. The Federal Emergency Relief Act had 
become law less than two months earlier and was in the formative adminis-
tration stages in most Michigan counties. FERA, in conjunction with other 
programs such as the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conserva-
tion Corps, and the National Youth Administration, brought significant help 
to Michigan residents.
 Both direct- and work-relief programs injected millions of dollars into 
Michigan’s economy, providing invaluable aid to residents in desperate need. 
During the six years of emergency relief, nearly $242 million was spent on all 
relief programs, with the state contributing more than $84 million (34.7 per-
cent) and local governments nearly $47 million (19.4 percent).4 Michigan and 
the federal government endeavored to provide work, rather than simply direct 
relief, for as many of the unemployed as possible. Work relief, as well as pro-
grams such as the CCC and NYA, provided wages for the unemployed. First, 
through the Civil Works Administration, the programs channeled millions of 
dollars in wages to families and thus to their communities. The key problem 
with the work programs was that they discriminated by race, citizenship, gen-
der, and age, providing employment largely for white men. Many groups had 
limited work options under those programs, and family remained at the center 
of administration. Policies were predicated on the idea of a family as a unit for 
relief, and virtually all programs viewed recipients through that lens.
dIrect	relIef
Direct relief served more residents than work relief in the Depression years, 
and Michigan’s economic problems led to high demand for relief. The percent-
age of Michigan families receiving relief during the first year of FERA ranged 
from a high of 16.8 percent to a low of 9.6 percent. By 1933 the worst of the 
relief problem was concentrated in the Upper Peninsula, including Marquette 
County, rather than in the industrial cities, which faced their most difficult 
times in the first years of the Depression (see table 4.1). The continued decline 
of the lumbering and mining industries, which in turn affected the railroad 
and retail industries, was the biggest factor in high relief rates in the Lower 
Peninsula. Poor-quality farmland, in addition to a pool of inexperienced farm-
ers, also contributed to the problem. Saginaw and Van Buren counties were 
 3. Letter from Tatro to Roosevelt, July 31, 1933.
 4. Granger and Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 1933–1939, 50–51.
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among those with the lightest relief load; both were in areas—the “thumb area,” 
on the east side of the state, near Saginaw Bay and the southern agricultural 
counties—that tended to be the lowest in relief numbers. Agricultural coun-
ties in southern Michigan generally had lower relief rates than other areas, as 
residents could rely on subsistence farming even if they could not produce a 
cash crop. The state’s industrial counties often had lower percentages of relief 
rates but, given their higher populations, had the greater number of people 
receiving relief.5
 Relief generally was extended to families, rather than individuals, although 
the types of families varied. The average monthly caseload of families receiv-
ing relief during FERA’s first year included about 13 percent of Michigan’s 
population, and that number rose to 14.6 percent during the second year.6 
The largest age group receiving relief was made up of children under sixteen. 
In the first year of FERA, 41 percent of all relief recipients were children, or 
about one-sixth of the state’s population in that age group. About 15 per-
cent of recipients were ages sixteen to twenty-four, and about a quarter were 
ages twenty-five to forty-four. Cases that involved single persons comprised 
 5. William Haber and Paul L. Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan (Lansing: 
Franklin DeKleine Company, 1935), figure 3, 9, 11–12; Appendix, table 7; Michigan reports by 
Howard Hunter, August 13, 1934, 3; FERA-WPA Narrative Field Reports, Michigan, Box 58, 
Harry Hopkins Papers, FDR Library.
 6. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 65; Haber and Stanch-
field, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 19.
table	4.1
percentage	of	reSIdentS	on	relIef
county
% Relief 
Recipients 
in highest 
Month, 
% Relief 
Recipients 
in highest 
Month, 
Monthly 
average, 

Monthly 
average, 

Marquette 57.4 (July) 32.9 (Dec.) 34.1 29.3
Saginaw 11.9 (Dec.) 12.6 (feb.) 8.4 10.3
van buren 13.2 (Dec.) 17.7 (feb.) 7.1 13.3
Wayne 16.0 (Dec.) 15.3 (Dec.) 10.9 11.1
State of Michigan 16.8 (nov.) 17.8 (Dec.) 12.9 14.6
Source: years in the table refer to the first two fiscal years of fEra. Thus 1934 refers to July 
1933 to June 1934, and 1935 refers to July 1934 to June 1935. haber and Stanchfield, Unem-
ployment and Relief in Michigan, appendix, table 7; haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, 
Relief and Economic Security, 304–5.
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just 12.6 percent of all cases the first year, and increased to 14.6 the second 
year.7
 Case-file analysis confirms that most recipients were in families, although 
that is less true for OAA recipients. Eighteen percent of Marquette County’s 
OAA recipients, about 20 percent of Saginaw County’s OAA recipients, and 
23 percent of those in Wayne County had no children. Many did not live 
with their children, even if they had them. The absence of children eliminated 
a major source of support for older people, and the numbers of recipients 
with no children on the relief rolls is not surprising. Needless to say, all ADC 
recipients had children, although about 12 percent of Saginaw’s recipients and 
5 percent of Wayne County’s recipients received aid for relatives, including 
nieces, nephews, siblings, and grandchildren. Just 15 percent of Van Buren 
County’s emergency-relief recipients had no children.
 Race also affected who received relief, although opinions on why varied.8 
In general, the percentage of African-Americans receiving relief was larger 
than their share of the population in Michigan. Most African-Americans 
who received relief were in urban areas with populations of more than 2,500. 
Blacks accounted for 8 percent of all relief recipients, but about 29 percent of 
all blacks in the state received relief. Whites comprised 91.4 percent of relief 
recipients, which was about 12 percent of the total white population in 1930; 
other nonwhite people, including Mexicans, accounted for the remaining 0.6 
percent. Overall, about 15 percent of the state’s 1930 nonwhite population 
received relief.9 Both Marquette and Van Buren counties were almost entirely 
white; Van Buren County’s 1930 census, for instance, listed just 1.4 percent 
of the population as black, and Marquette had no nonwhite relief recipients 
among the case files analyzed. Just one of Van Buren County’s cases before 1940 
involved an African-American family. In Saginaw County, blacks accounted 
for 70 percent of the minorities in the sample, while Mexicans or Mexican-
Americans comprised 23 percent. The remainder were Native Americans.10 
 7. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 66; Haber and Stanch-
field, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 77.
 8. Harvard Sitkoff argues that decentralized administration of many of the New Deal 
programs translated into severe discriminatory practices, particularly in the South. Harvard 
Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 46–52; Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: 
Black Women, Work, and the Family, from Slavery to the Present (New York: Vintage, 1985), 217, 
223–24.
 9. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 77–80.
 10. In Saginaw County, people of color were 10 percent of the case files analyzed for both 
ADC and OAA (N = 593). They comprised a larger share of the ADC files (13.5 percent) as 
compared to the OAA files (3.5 percent). In Wayne County, people of color comprised 185 of 
the cases sampled (N = 605). They also comprised a larger share of the ADC files (29 percent) 
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Wayne County’s nonwhite recipients were almost entirely black; just one of 
the cases involved a Mexican family. Nonwhites were not represented in two 
of the counties (Marquette and Van Buren), but likely had greater need than 
demonstrated by those numbers (see table 4.2). People of color had fewer job 
opportunities in the labor market and thus were concentrated in low-wage, 
unskilled occupations. They were among the first laid off or fired during eco-
nomic downturns and were therefore among the first to suffer unemploy-
ment when the Depression began. Caseworkers themselves commented on 
the limited employment opportunities available both to people of color and 
to noncitizens.11
 Foreign-born residents, both citizens and noncitizens, also tended to receive 
relief in greater numbers than their share of the population. A SERA study of 
Detroit relief rolls found that foreign-born whites comprised 43 percent of the 
heads of families receiving relief, although the 1930 census reported 39 per-
cent of family heads as foreign-born. Native-born whites, by way of compari-
son, represented 31 percent of all heads of families receiving relief, but were 
53 percent of family heads in the 1930 census.12 Although statewide figures are 
not available, similar trends can be seen in Marquette, Saginaw, Van Buren, 
and Wayne counties (see table 4.3). Figures for the foreign-born among the 
case-file recipients demonstrate that non-native-born residents sought relief 
in larger numbers than their population.13 Foreign-born residents may have 
faced more discrimination in hiring, particularly if they were not citizens, as 
as compared to the OAA files (12.3 percent). 
 11. SERA reports acknowledged that unequal job opportunities were a large reason for the 
racial differences among relief numbers in Michigan. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, 
Relief, and Economic Security, 77–80. 
 12. Ibid., 80–81. The Detroit study, based on one month of relief in 1934, is the only statistic 
available on citizenship and nativity on Michigan relief rolls.
 13. Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1931), 1138–40.
county % nonwhite, 0 census % nonwhite case-File Samples
Marquette 0.4 0.0
Saginaw 5.8 10
van buren 1.4 0.0
Wayne 7.37 21
State of Michigan 3.8 na
table	4.2
percentage	of	nonwhIte	relIef	recIpIentS
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described in chapter 2. They also may have had fewer family members to turn 
to in need, and thus may have sought relief more often.
work	relIef
Work relief proved a more politically popular solution to the Depression’s 
unemployment problems, and the numbers show the critical importance of 
these programs in the state’s economy and in the larger relief effort. By June 
31, 1934, nearly $19 million had been spent on work relief in the state. About 
30 percent of families on relief were on work relief, and nearly 40 percent 
of all relief expenditures went to work relief.14 In the second year, the state 
spent almost $34 million on work-relief projects, of which more than $27 
million was for wages. Those numbers accounted for 44 percent of all expen-
ditures for work and general relief, and 34 percent of all relief costs, including 
administration, in the state.15 Through the six years of emergency relief, work 
relief accounted for 16.5 percent of all cases in an average month in 1933–34, 
50.1 percent in 1936–37, and 43.8 percent in 1937–38.16 In total, the WPA 
expended more than $441 million until its demise in 1943.17 The goal, fol-
lowing Michigan’s responsible-relative laws, was to provide aid for families 
 14. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 92–93.
 15. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 238.
 16. Granger and Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 1933–1939, 41.
 17. Final Report on the WPA Program (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1948), 120.
table	4.3
percentage	of	foreIgn-born	recIpIentS
county
% Foreign-
born, 0 
census
% Foreign-
born, 0 
census
% Foreign-
born, case 
File Sample
% Foreign-born 
who were u.S. 
citizens
Marquette 22.8 15.8 59 81
Saginaw 9.1 9.7 27 68.5
van buren 10 9.1 13 68
Wayne 25.3 18.6 35 62.7
Source: Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: U.S. govern-
ment Printing Office, 1931), 1138–40; Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Vol. II, 
Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1943), 787–88.
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through employable household members. Male heads of household were the 
first choice.
 Early works programs originated through the Public Works Administra-
tion and FERA, and then through the Civil Works Administration. The early 
FERA projects were largely continuations of locally funded projects, but with 
federal money.18 The need for a more expansive works program prompted the 
creation of the Civil Works Administration in November 1933. A part of the 
National Recovery Act, the CWA had a crucial difference from FERA work 
projects, and later from the Works Progress Administration: proving need 
was not a requirement for employment. Any unemployed worker was eligible 
(see figure 4.1). Applicants did not have to undergo the intrusive investigation 
that relief recipients experienced; unemployment demonstrated need. While 
some CWA workers were approved relief cases, not all were, nor did they 
need to be. They also were under different wage rates than FERA workers 
and thus earned higher wages and were not limited in the hours they worked. 
CWA did not carry the stigma or the intrusion that FERA and, later, the WPA 
did, but it also operated for less than six months.19 Certification for virtually 
all works programs, except the CWA, was through the county welfare-relief 
commission.
 The Works Progress Administration (later the Works Projects Administra-
tion) was intended to provide work relief for employable residents, and thus 
remove those individuals from direct relief. It was a reaction against “the dole,” 
and its inauguration coincided with the demise of FERA and the passage of the 
Social Security Act in 1935. The WPA would provide employment for those 
able to work, and the SSA would provide help for the unemployable. Direct 
relief would no longer be the center of the federal relief program. The National 
Youth Administration, a part of the WPA, provided jobs for young people to 
enable them to continue their educations.20
 Work-relief projects improved roads and bridges, and also built or repaired 
buildings and schools. The majority of projects focused on repairs and con-
struction, including sewers, airports, and bridges. In FERA’s first year, 26 
percent of projects highlighted building and school repairs and new construc-
tions, and another 13.7 percent went to street and road repairs (figure 4.2).21 
Thousands of miles of roads were built or improved, and crews constructed 
 18. Rose, Put to Work, 38.
 19. Rose, Put to Work, 45–47; Swain, Ellen S. Woodward, 45–46.
 20. Rose, Put to Work, 94–95; Granger and Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 1933–1939, 
5–6.
 21. 50,000 Men: Report of the Work Division of the Michigan Emergency Welfare Relief Com-
mission (Lansing: 1935), 30.
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thirty-seven new schools and repaired more than eighteen hundred others. 
They erected fifty-five municipal garages and twenty-three county and city 
halls, and built or repaired eighty-two bridges. Other projects spotlighted con-
servation programs and improvements to recreational facilities. Projects also 
employed white-collar workers in its educational and recreational programs. 
Workers also produced goods, from canned food to mattresses and clothing, 
which were distributed to relief families.22 Work relief not only brought wages 
to families and injected money into local economies, but also resulted in vis-
ible improvements to local communities.
 While racial discrimination did exist on job assignments, despite federal 
regulations to the contrary, historian Harvard Sitkoff argues that federal pro-
grams, in spite of their shortcomings, made a real difference in the lives of 
blacks, especially by 1936. Regulations against discrimination became more 
stringent, although never totally effective, but the numbers of blacks employed 
 22.  Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 229–238; WPA 
Projects (Works Progress Administration, 1937), 55; and Employment on Projects in March 1936, 
WPA Including NYA (Works Progress Administration, 1936), 59.
Figure . Participants in an aviation ground-school program offered through fEra and 
held at the rEO Car Company Club house in lansing. Photo courtesy archives of Michigan. 
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by New Deal work-relief agencies increased significantly by President Roos-
evelt’s second term. African-Americans were able to secure jobs through the 
CWA, CCC, WPA, and NYA, and some were reluctant to accept employment 
in private industry because of the lack of discrimination on work projects.23 
A 1937 report on the projects of Michigan’s National Youth Administration 
lauded the number (ninety-three total) of projects that included black youth. 
The projects, the report continued, included a variety of training opportuni-
ties, especially in Detroit, although whites benefited from training programs 
more than blacks. In August 1939, the majority of projects for blacks were in 
 23. Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks, 51, 69–72, 74–75.
Figure . Workers on a Manistee County skidway project. Photo from louise armstrong 
Collection, courtesy of bentley historical library, University of Michigan, box 1, Photo-
graphs folder.
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recreation, library, gardening, clerical, health and hospitals, and construction 
and wood shops. They existed in nineteen counties, including Genesee, Kent, 
Saginaw, and Wayne, and employed 648 blacks among 5,093 total young peo-
ple.24 But the larger problem, according to the report, was that “after receiving 
this wonderful training, there are very few outlets for this training.” Few places 
would hire blacks, despite their skills, leaving the youth no better off in terms 
of employment.25
 Nonwhites did obtain work relief in Michigan. In Wayne County’s sample, 
18 percent of all nonwhite ADC recipients had at least one family member 
assigned to a WPA job, compared to 15 percent among whites. In Saginaw 
County more than 20 percent of all nonwhite ADC recipients had a family 
assignment to WPA, compared to nearly 14 percent for whites. Rates for the 
National Youth Administration were highest for nonwhites in Wayne County, 
where nearly 10 percent of all ADC cases had a student assigned to NYA, 
compared to 3 percent for whites. Saginaw’s rate for whites and nonwhites was 
3 and 2 percent, respectively.26 
 The Civilian Conservation Corps provided employment for young men, 
most between the ages of seventeen and twenty-three. The program’s goal 
was to provide training and education for young men who could help sup-
port their families through CCC work. Although segregated, the CCC did 
offer some opportunities for nonwhites. Men worked in camps on a variety of 
conservation projects in forests, parks, and other public areas.27 Michigan had 
more than 102,000 men in fifty-seven camps. The programs also reduced relief 
expenses for states and local governments. Enrollees sent more than twenty 
million dollars in wages to families, thus reducing their need for relief.28 The 
assignments were predicated on aid for the family; the WPA, CCC and NYA 
wages were intended to help support the individual’s family, whether the indi-
vidual was the parent, sibling, or child.
 Michigan’s CCC program’s first priority was to combat the threat of for-
est fires. In the first two years, crews constructed 3,050 miles of truck trails 
 24. “Work Report by Districts and Counties,” August 16, 1939, NYA, from John B. Kirby, 
ed., The New Deal and Black America (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 
1984, microfilm), reel 6. This collection (hereafter cited as NDBA) contains twenty-five reels of 
microfilmed documents related to African-Americans and the New Deal agencies. 
 25. Letter dated August 27, 1937, from C. R. Bradshaw, acting director of the NYA in 
Michigan, to Richard Brown, deputy executive director of the NYA, NYA (Record Group 119), 
NDBA, reel 4, 1–2.
 26. Virtually no OAA cases in any county had work-relief assignments, due to the unem-
ployability of the recipients. Few also had family to support them.
 27. John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933–1942 (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1967), 30.
 28. Roger Rosentreter, “Roosevelt’s Tree Army: Michigan’s Civilian Conservation Corps,” 
Michigan History 70.3 (May/June 1986): 22–23.
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and 600 miles of firebreaks, as well as new fire towers. Men also worked on 
fish hatcheries and dams, and conducted lake surveys.29 Bridges spanning the 
Muskegon and Manistique rivers (103 and 170 feet long, respectively) were 
completed, and crews improved miles of streams and planted more than sev-
enty-five million fish into the state’s waterways. They also established the 
Seney National Wildlife Refuge and Isle Royale National Park in the Upper 
Peninsula. In addition, the CCC was also a key part of firefighting efforts in 
the state, including stopping a fire on Isle Royale that burned 35,000 of the 
island’s 132,000 acres.30 The CCC left a significant legacy in the state’s recre-
ational and conservation systems.
 Although many of the camps were segregated, they did provide black youth 
with employment (see figure 4.3). By 1940 the South contained ninety-three 
segregated camps and another sixty-eight were found throughout the country. 
Three camps were in Michigan, one of which was in the Manistee National 
Forest.31 The state also included a camp for Native Americans in the eastern 
Upper Peninsula.32 Blacks comprised about 3.5 percent of the state’s popula-
tion, but by 1941 held about 7.2 percent of the placements. Clearly black young 
men sought these positions, and at one point the Detroit Department of Public 
Welfare found itself with an inadequate number of places for blacks. Openings 
did exist for whites, but segregation prevented assigning blacks to those slots. 
Efforts to secure another Michigan camp for blacks failed, as federal officials 
believed that other states were in greater need of additional camps for blacks.33 
Assignment rates for the Civilian Conservation Corps were comparable for 
both whites and nonwhites in the Wayne County case sample: about 3 percent. 
But nonwhites in Saginaw County had more than 9 percent in the CCC, while 
whites had about 4 percent. As with other programs, the goal was to provide 
aid for the family. Enrollees were paid thirty dollars, twenty-two to twenty-five 
of which had to be sent home to dependents.34 About ninety-two million dol-
lars was spent on the CCC in the state during the program’s history, and more 
 29. G. A. Young, “Michigan State Civilian Conservation Corps, July 1, 1933, to July 1, 1939,” 
CCC Records, Department of Conservation, Box 1, 5, 7–10, State Archives of Michigan.
 30. Rosentreter, “Roosevelt’s Tree Army,” 17–18.
 31. Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks, 51, 74–75; Rosentreter, “Roosevelt’s Tree Army,” 21; “The 
CCC and Colored Youth,” CCC (Record Group 35), Division of Planning and Public Relations, 
reel 8, 2; and “Negro CCC Camps,” April 1940, NDBA, reel 8. 
 32. Rosentreter, “Roosevelt’s Tree Army,” 21.
 33. Letter from Charles Taylor, Asst. Director, CCC, to G. R. Harris, Director of Detroit 
DPW, April 21, 1941, NDBA, reel 9. Harris argued that one reason for the decrease in white 
applicants was the renewal of industrial employment, which was open to whites but not blacks. 
See letter from Harris to H. J. Rigterink, CCC Selection, State Welfare Commission, March 9, 
1941, NDBA, reel 9.
 34. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 30.
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than twenty-one million of that was sent home to a camp enrollee’s family.35 
While the benefits of the program were many, not all young men wanted to 
work in remote areas supporting their families, a trend explored more fully in 
chapter 6.
 While the benefits of the projects were visible and many, the WPA and 
other work-relief programs were not without conflict. Local officials criticized 
the programs, but work-relief recipients also had complaints. Michigan was 
the site of significant organizing of the unemployed, including WPA workers, 
during the 1930s. Such activism was found throughout the state, including 
the Upper Peninsula. In the WPA, workers formed the WPA Project Workers’ 
Union. Allied initially with the American Federation of Labor, the WPA union 
suffered from accusations of Communism, but even though such red-bait-
ing hurt the alliance with the AFL, the union still expanded.36 The state saw 
 35. Second Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1940–June 1942 
(Lansing: December 1942), 20.
 36. James J. Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed: Community and Union Activists in 
the Industrial Heartland (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 108–9. Lorence 
provides the most in-depth analysis of the organizing efforts of the unemployed throughout the 
1930s.
Figure . Enrollees in the CCC camp library in bitely. Photo courtesy archives of Michigan.
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thirty-four strikes between 1935 and 1937, and issues ranged from wages and 
basic working conditions to union recognition, hours, and the quality of the 
projects created under the WPA. WPA administrators, including State Direc-
tor A. D. Hall, largely dismissed workers’ complaints, blaming the discontent 
on a handful of agitators. Historian James Lorence argues that the workers did 
have legitimate issues that warranted attention. Despite the lackluster admin-
istrative reaction, at both the state and local levels, the unions achieved some 
success, including increased wages in1936. Such successes only fueled workers 
to join the union. The union also sought expanded projects and employment 
in 1938.37
 Most work projects, including those in the pre–New Deal years as well 
as the CCC, the WPA, the CWA, and most FERA projects, were directed at 
male heads of household or older sons. In fact, the CWA included primarily 
construction work, which eliminated employment for women. In response to 
demands for employment for women, Harry Hopkins, whose lack of concern 
for women’s employment has been documented, created the Civil Works Ser-
vice.38 The CWS included some white-collar work projects and also produc-
tion-for-use programs, which employed women in canning, sewing, and other 
projects (see figure 4.4). But the CWS fell under FERA, and thus included both 
the means test and lower-wage rates and hours in contrast to the CWA pro-
gram.39 Work programs for women also employed only a fraction—perhaps 
10 percent—of the total numbers of relief workers in Michigan. The number 
of women employed on the CWA, CWS, and education programs seldom sur-
passed 5,000 in the state in early 1934, and decreased further when the CWA 
ended.40 In contrast, monthly numbers of workers peaked at more than 60,000 
in November 1933, and again surpassed that figure in June 1934. A total of 
475,669 relief workers were tallied from July 1933 to June 1934; women com-
prised only a small fraction of that total.41 Expenditures for women’s work 
projects totaled $1.8 million—just a small part of the $27 million spent in the 
second year of the work programs.42
 The trend continued under the WPA, with its emphasis on construction 
and public works improvement projects. Employment was not restricted to 
men only, but the goal was to employ male heads of household, if possible, to 
protect their authority in the family. This included putting “some brake upon 
 37. Ibid., 109–12, 117–20, 180.
 38. Rose, Put to Work, 94–98; and Rose, Workfare or Fair Work, 39–41.
 39. Rose, Put to Work, 47–48; Swain, Ellen S. Woodward, 44–45.
 40. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 119.
 41. Ibid., 97.
 42. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 244; 50,000 Men, 
42.
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women’s eagerness to be the family breadwinner, wage recipient, and control-
ler of the family pocketbook.”43 Married women were given WPA assignments, 
as in the case of Mabel Stevenson, who previously had worked as a domes-
tic worker and as a packer at a celery plant. She and her husband, Henry, 
were both employable, but she was assigned to a Van Buren County recreation 
project in June of 1938. Henry, a day laborer, was having difficulty finding 
work, and apparently no appropriate assignment was available for him, and 
caseworkers accepted Mabel’s request for employment. That ended eighteen 
months later, when Mabel was to be recertified. She was rejected “on the basis 
that the logical head of the family is not being certified.”44 The caseworker had 
bent the rules apparently, but the WPA supervisor rejected the certification.
 Women with small children were also not perceived as “eligible” for WPA 
employment, although regulations did not directly exclude them. SERA’s pol-
icy relating to women who received mothers’ pensions and also supplemental 
relief from the WRC permitted certifying a son or daughter, if old enough, 
for WPA, in order to support the family. The policy specifically advised not 
certifying the mother for WPA unless there was another older person able to 
care for the children: “We do not want to defeat the purpose of the pension 
 43. Quoted in Rose, Workfare or Fair Work, 40.
 44. Letter dated January 25, 1940, from Earl Scott, chief, intake and certification, Case 
#18155, VB ERA Records, Box 3, Folder 4.
Figure . Women working on a WPa sewing project in Manistee County. Photo courtesy 
archives of Michigan.
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law by stimulating those mothers to work outside the home.”45 WPA redefined 
“eligible worker” in its manual and included all women who were able to work, 
and did not specifically exclude mothers with home responsibilities. In the 
bulletin alerting county administrators to this change, SERA administrator 
Haber cautioned about applying the new rule to mothers: “It is not the intent 
to stimulate employment outside the home of women who have not previously 
sought such employment.”46 Some confusion seemingly followed, as Haber 
clarified the ruling a few weeks later, firmly stating that the new ruling did not 
mean that all women, “particularly those with small children,” were required 
to be certified for WPA, unless they requested it and were willing to accept 
full-time work.47
 In practice, caseworkers went further than simply not encouraging women 
with children to seek employment; eligibility for ADC could exclude women 
from certification for a WPA project, or eventually cause them to be removed 
from their assignment. Mary Linderson, a divorced mother of two children, 
ages fourteen and sixteen, was a supervisor for a WPA sewing project in Sagi-
naw. She began receiving ADC in mid-1937, and supplemented her grant with 
income from boarders. In 1938 she asked to be recertified for WPA, but case-
workers told her that they could not because she was eligible for ADC.48
 Women who were eligible for ADC but employed on WPA projects lost 
their assignments as the decade waned. Although some wanted to work rather 
than receive ADC, they had no choice. Hannah Justin lived with her two sons, 
ages eight and fifteen, in Saginaw. She also was employed on WPA but was 
removed in January 1939 because she was eligible for ADC. She applied for 
ADC that month. Justin faced difficulty finding private employment because 
she was separated from her husband but not divorced. She told her caseworker 
that she had been supporting and caring for her family on WPA before this, 
but had been given no choice in the change: “She feels that it is up to us to 
take care of her,” wrote her caseworker, “and in a way that is true.”49 Even the 
caseworker acknowledged the agency’s responsibility in this woman’s unem-
ployment problem. Justin eventually borrowed the money for a divorce and 
secured a factory job in December 1940. Gertrude Schneider faced a similar 
situation; a WPA employee from 1936 to 1939, she lost her assignment because 
 45. SERA Letter #445, August 30, 1935, SEWRC Records, Box 1, Folder July–September 
1935.
 46. SERA Letter #472, October 11, 1935, SEWRC Records, Box 1, Folder October–Decem-
ber 1935.
 47. SERA Letter #485, November 1, 1935, SEWRC Records, Box 1, Folder October–De-
cember 1935.
 48. Case C7300203, reel 4534, Saginaw ADC, case history, October 27, 1938.
 49. Case C7300100, reel 4532, Saginaw ADC records, case history, April 19, 1939.
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of her eligibility for ADC. She had seven children, four of whom still lived at 
home, ranging in age from six to fifteen. Divorced in 1938, Schneider faced 
the foreclosure of her home because she could not keep up the house payments 
and taxes. She supplemented her grant with income from doing laundry and 
watching her older daughter’s children, but did not leave the relief roll until 
her son secured a full-time job in 1942.50 Thus women who had supported 
families with WPA income were removed from their jobs to receive ADC. The 
grants, which barely covered their children’s needs, required supplementation 
through odd jobs, including doing laundry, taking in boarders, or providing 
child care. ADC recipients were not eligible for WPA jobs until 1942.51
 The WPA union provided support when a group of Detroit mothers 
employed on WPA projects successfully protested such efforts, staging a sit-in 
strike to protest announced layoffs of all workers eligible for ADC. They did 
not want to exchange their monthly wages of eighty-six dollars (or more) for 
ADC grants that would provide just eighteen dollars per month for the first 
child and twelve dollars for each additional child: “For this group of women 
the Social Security Act became a threat to their minimum standard of living.”52 
Two days of occupation, with the support and aid of the Wayne County Fed-
eration of Labor, the United Auto Workers, and the WPA union, yielded an 
exemption for the projects from Harry Hopkins in Washington DC, allowing 
the mothers to keep their jobs.53
 Not all women, however, were unhappy to leave WPA jobs to remain home 
full-time to care for their children. Rachel Raney, an African-American mother 
of three children whose father had deserted the family in 1932, supported her 
family with day work and later a WPA sewing job, in 1938. She was laid off 
WPA in early 1939, but welcomed the chance to stay home. She believed her 
fifteen-year-old daughter needed her. She supplemented her grant with day 
work, and was admired by her caseworker, who believed she had done a good 
job keeping her family together despite the absence of her husband.54
 Another criticism of the women’s work projects was their emphasis on 
unskilled work, particularly in the case of sewing and domestic work, the 
 50. Case C7300239, reel 4535, Saginaw ADC records.
 51. Case C7300215, reel 4534, Saginaw ADC records.
 52. Arthur L. Stone and Martin Kahn, “Detroit Sits Down to Work,” Social Work Today 4.8 
(May 1937): 14.
 53. Ibid., 15.
 54. Case C7300279, reel 4536, Saginaw ADC records; Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow, 
224–25. Jones argues that for some black women, particularly in the urban North, “New Deal 
welfare programs afforded an opportunity to place family considerations over the demands of 
white employers.”
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“dumping ground” for women relief workers.55 Few work-relief projects, in 
fact, except those targeting white-collar workers, translated into skills that 
would be marketable in private employment at reasonable wages. White-col-
lar workers had the skills before the Depression, and such projects offered no 
training. Unskilled work for women did not command the wages for unskilled 
work for men, of course, and thus few women who needed long-term work 
advanced their position in the labor market. An undated press release, “The 
Negro and the WPA,” boasted that those black women who participated in 
the household training programs not only secured jobs after completing the 
programs, but also received higher wages than they would have earned other-
wise.56 Such training programs hoped to raise the status of domestic work by 
“professionalizing” it through training and standards, but they proved ineffec-
tive.57 In many cases, such programs trained women to take low-wage, low-
skill jobs in their local communities, particularly in areas with a high demand 
for domestic or agricultural labor. Women of color were aided the least by the 
work-relief projects, and were even referred to as the “problem children” in the 
program. Speaking in part of their disadvantaged opportunities and training, 
the term also connotes paternalism, and is suggestive of blame on the part of 
black women. The women—in this formulation—were the problem, not the 
labor market or the work projects.58
 Noncitizens suffered from the drive to provide employment only to citi-
zens, whether in the private sector or in work-relief programs.59 The WPA and 
private employers often refused jobs to noncitizens, fueling the belief that if 
they would leave, there would be enough jobs for Americans. Twenty-year-old 
Maria Gortez supported her entire family—her widowed mother and four sib-
lings—with a WPA job in Saginaw, although her mother also received a small 
ADC grant to supplement Maria’s earnings. Caseworkers noted that support-
ing the entire family “was too much to be expected of her.” But she later lost 
her WPA job because she was not a citizen, and also could not obtain factory 
employment without having her first papers, which could take up to a year to 
 55. Argersinger, Toward a New Deal in Baltimore, 72; Blanche Weisen Cook, Eleanor Roos-
evelt, 1933–1938, Volume II (New York: Viking, 1999), 87–88.
 56. “The Negro and the WPA,” WPA (Record Group 69), NDBA, reel 21, 6.
 57. Alfred Edgar Smith, “Negro Project Workers: 1937 Annual Report,” WPA, NDBA, 
reel 21, 2; Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow, 205–6, 218; and Cook, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
1933–1938, 261–62.
 58. “Narrative Report,” Division of Women’s and Professional Projects, January 1937, Press 
release, NDBA, reel 21.
 59. Cases appear in Saginaw and Wayne regarding noncitizens denied employment either 
by private businesses or WPA. See also Argersinger, Toward a New Deal in Baltimore, 75–76; 
and Julia Kirk Blackwelder, Women of the Depression: Caste and Culture in San Antonio, 1929–
1939 (College Station: Texas A&M University, 1984), 128–29.
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obtain.60 Caseworkers had no choice but to increase the ADC grant to make 
up for Maria’s lost wages.
 Social workers also criticized the overall limited effects of WPA, in particu-
lar with respect to its gender and age discrimination, but paid little attention to 
the discrimination against people of color and the foreign-born. County WRC 
administrator Louise Armstrong lamented the lack of employment for women 
in general in Manistee County, and recognized that the work-relief programs 
did little to add to those opportunities.61 Gertrude Springer, author of the Miss 
Bailey series in the Survey, agreed, noting that projects rarely taught actual 
skills, nor, for those women who had never worked outside the home, did the 
projects instruct workers in how to function in a wage environment. Springer 
used Miss Bailey in the articles to illustrate issues prevalent in the adminis-
tration of relief. In one article, Miss Bailey believes that the programs can do 
much more: “It seems to me we are missing a chance in not using projects to 
give these women something that industry or business is likely to want and 
that might rescue them from being last hired and first fired.”62 The tendency 
toward public works projects excluded not only women but also older men. 
Many could no longer do the heavy work such projects required, but were 
able to work in a different capacity.63 WPA was simply not enough; it was 
only for the best of the unemployed. And the WPA could not even serve all 
those eligible for work. The numbers of WPA jobs in no way kept pace with 
the number of employable people on the relief rolls. In July 1938, employable 
cases accounted for 40 percent of the direct relief caseload, but only if the 
WPA employment slots had been increased from 40,000 to 175,000 could 
that number have been reduced to 25 percent. The WPA was simply not large 
enough to address the employment needs of all those able to work.64
 Both direct and work relief provided significant aid to Michigan’s unem-
ployed. Millions of dollars came to the state and helped to alleviate the con-
siderable hardship of the Depression. Families were the target, usually through 
the men in the household. But such aid was not without conflict, even within 
families. Caseworkers—those who sought to “professionalize” public wel-
fare—were at the center of the administration of relief. The development of 
social work in public welfare, and the conflicts that occurred during that pro-
cess, add another layer in the relief negotiations of the 1930s.
 60. Case C7300120, Saginaw ADC Records, reel 4533, case history from August 4, 1937, 
and September 20, 1937.
 61. Armstrong, We Too Are the People, 304. See chapter 10, “Women and Creeds and Christ-
mas Toys.”
 62. Gertrude Springer, “Border Lines and Gaps,” Survey 71 (November 1935): 333.
 63. Ibid., 332.
 64. Granger and Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan, 88–89.
 in noveMbeR , just weeks after county emergency-relief offices 
opened, E. M. Zuver, chairperson of the Van Buren County Welfare Relief 
Commission, issued a statement refuting information that WRC employees 
earned nine hundred dollars for two weeks of work. A neighboring county’s 
newspaper had just published salary figures inflated by as much as three or 
four times.1 The incident was not uncommon. A major criticism of the emer-
gency-relief system centered on administrative costs, particularly the salaries 
of clerical workers, caseworkers, and supervisors employed in the relief agen-
cies. Local officials believed they could do the work more economically than 
“these so-called case workers,” and SERA issued more than one report defend-
ing its administrative expenses.2 Critics included local officials, community 
members, and some recipients who compared their meager grants to the sala-
ries paid caseworkers. Low salaries angered relief workers and social workers, 
supposed professionals who, in their eyes, were not paid as such. The events 
of the 1930s prompted significant debates about professional social welfare, 
both within and outside the profession. Contrasting ideas of what expertise 
was needed to administer relief, rooted in the gendered nature of profession-
alization, were one of the focal points of debate about welfare reorganization 
 1. “Denies Report of Expense of County Welfare Commission,” Hartford Day Spring, 
November 15, 1933, 1.
 2. Quote from Van Buren County Board of Supervisors’ resolution, “Proceedings of the 
Board of Supervisors, Van Buren County,” February 16, 1934, 92.
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in Michigan. Two visions of professionalism—one from the social work camp 
and the other from local officials—clashed in these debates.
 The Great Depression and the New Deal changed social work permanently, 
despite the continuities in policy before and after the Great Depression. A 
relatively new profession, social work was still engaged in defining its profes-
sional identity when its services were in demand as never before. Social work-
ers and social work organizations participated in public policy development 
during the Depression and eventually the New Deal.3 The profession faced a 
huge influx of new relief workers, few with formal training, hired to staff the 
emergency-relief agencies around the country. The 1930s saw the rise of the 
“new social worker”: usually a young person, often female, with some college 
education but little or no formal social work training. The profession greatly 
expanded, both in numbers and in influence, as social workers entered the 
public welfare arena to a much greater degree. The United States was estimated 
to have about 30,500 social workers in 1930, largely employed by private agen-
cies; their ranks doubled by the time Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated in 
1933.4
 By the 1920s, social work developed the tenets of a profession. No social 
work schools existed in the United States in 1898, but the United States and 
Canada together had forty by 1928.5 The Charity Organization movement 
organized in the National Board of Corrections and Charities in 1874—and 
would reorganize as the National Association of Social Work in 1917. The 
American Association of Social Workers, established in 1921, published its 
own professional journal, the Compass, later Social Work.6 Another major pro-
fessional social work journal was the Survey, published by the Russell Sage 
Foundation and considered to be the voice for all social workers, rather than 
for a specific professional organization.7 By the 1920s, the AASW represented 
 3. The Family Welfare Association began as the National Association of Societies for 
Organizing Charities in 1911. It changed its name to the FWA just before the Great Depression 
and became the Family Service Association in 1946. See Peter Romanofsky and Clarke Cham-
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 37–38.
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 7. James Leiby, A History of Social Welfare and Social Work in the United States (New 
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between 15 and 20 percent of professional social workers. Usually members 
were the “elite” among social workers, often executives of private agencies or 
higher-salaried caseworkers.8 The 1936 AASW directory included primarily 
social workers from private agencies.9 The majority of relief workers were 
not AASW members, and their inability and, in some cases, unwillingness to 
attain “professional” standards would fuel the union movement among social 
workers.
 Casework formed the core curriculum for the new social work schools that 
emerged by the 1930s. The use of volunteers as the backbone of social welfare 
agencies declined further.10 A social worker was no longer a friendly visitor or 
volunteer Lady Bountiful, but instead was “the ‘scientific’ Miss Case-Worker, 
an ‘objective’ social investigator.”11 Social workers were to help clients deal with 
York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 120. The Survey was first published in 1909 and was 
connected to several other publications, including Charities and Commons. Between 1923 and 
1948 the Survey had two publications, the Midmonthly, directed at professional social workers, 
and the Graphic, for a wider audience. See Clarke A. Chambers, Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey: 
Voices for Social Welfare and Social Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 
7; Daniel J. Walkowitz, Working with Class: Social Workers and the Politics of Middle-Class Ident-
ity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 224–25.
 8. Walkowitz, “The Making of a Feminine Professional Identity,” 1054. Membership in the 
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issues of social adjustment that obstructed their ability to function in society 
as needed, but the “objective” part was important; moral judgments were not 
to be a part of the diagnosis.12 Social workers diagnosed the problems only “to 
indicate limits and possibilities in a systematic way, to point toward a reasoned 
plan of action,”13 not to judge.
 One significant continuity existed in the profession: Lady Bountiful and 
Miss Case-Worker were women, and the image of a social worker remained 
female throughout this era of professionalization.14 Social workers were 
employed largely by private agencies before 1930, and in 1920 about 60 per-
cent were women. A decade later, 79 percent were female. Only the teaching 
profession had a higher percentage of women.15 Detroit’s social work staff was 
87 percent female and also 94 percent white in 1936.16 Whether the fact that 
the profession was dominated by women was the “cause” of the low status, or 
if the low status and low pay deterred men from entering the profession, was 
debated.17
 Feminized professions not only were numerically dominated by women, 
but also practiced professional values different from the more traditional 
(often male) professions.18 Historian Robyn Muncy argues that gender was 
often a key reason for differences in the professionalization process and its 
definition.19 Muncy connects the values these professionals espoused and 
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practiced to gender, rooted in beliefs about the natural abilities of women and 
men. Male professional values centered on efficiency, expertise, competition, 
education, and research. Female professions tended to emphasize popularizing 
expert knowledge, an extension of the notion of women as educators, and ser-
vice.20 Female professions, like social work, nursing, and teaching, capitalized 
on beliefs about the nurturing abilities of women. Muncy ties this to the need 
to justify women’s professional role in the context of traditional notions of 
what was appropriate behavior for women. A 1982 essay also argues that femi-
nization occurred in professions “because there was a ‘fit’ between economic 
need and cultural conceptions of gender roles.”21 As social work developed as 
a profession, social workers sought to distance their work from notions about 
natural abilities based on gender. Regina Kunzel argues that the social work 
profession, in its efforts to distinguish itself from the friendly visitors and vol-
unteers of the earlier era, was distancing itself from such beliefs about natural 
abilities and social work. Social work was a profession, and not a “natural” 
occupation for women, but it was a difficult image to erase.22
 These contrasting professional values, rooted in gender stereotypes, 
emerge vividly in the welfare-reorganization debates of the 1930s. The debate 
was a clash between professional social workers and local officials, two groups 
with very different ideas of precisely what expertise welfare administration 
required. Social workers sought to shed the notion that their field was a “natu-
ral” one for women, and abandoned such arguments by the 1930s.23 The values 
embedded in the two kinds of professionalization Muncy describes surfaced 
the Development of Higher Education in America (New York: Norton, 1976), 86–92. Bledstein’s 
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in the welfare debates in Michigan. Local officials argued that business and 
efficiency, the male professional qualities described by Muncy, were critical to 
relief work; they accused professional social workers of coddling relief recipi-
ents. Such values were not connected to the sex of professionals, but rather to 
the ideologies they espoused. Local officials adopted, however unintended, the 
gendered language of professionalism in their efforts to retain control of relief 
administration, rejecting the belief that social work education was necessary.
 Michigan’s experience in the 1930s highlights the narrow definition of 
social worker in standard histories of the profession. One scholar argues that 
“it was the county agents, all males, who were the first true social workers 
in Michigan.”24 Michigan’s public welfare system—staffed by county agents 
who administered child welfare and, at times, mothers’ pensions; township 
supervisors; and superintendents of the poor, who administered relief funded 
by county dollars—was the dominant welfare system in Michigan prior to 
the 1930s. And it was a system dominated primarily by men. Michigan’s State 
Board of Corrections and Charities directed that agents be men “who were 
regarded as successful, knowledgeable, and moral.” Women were excluded. 
Most of these early relief workers were of middle-class backgrounds and began 
to see themselves as a “new occupational group” by 1900.25 Poor commis-
sioners and superintendents of the poor, also predominantly men, were part 
of this group of early social workers. They never referred to themselves as 
social workers, but they did create their own sense of professional or occu-
pational identity. They formed their own professional organizations, such as 
the Association of Superintendents of the Poor and the State Association of 
Supervisors, and held annual meetings addressing their shared problems and 
concerns. They sought to contrast their ideologies and practices with that of 
the professional social worker, building on the nineteenth-century legacy of 
county agents and poor officials.
 Social work’s professional status was uncertain, and local officials did not 
see the profession as central to relief administration. One critic argued that 
social work required “no specialized skills; it was a mediating occupation 
without final authority.”26 Many of Michigan’s local officials, on the other hand, 
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“These So-Called Case Workers”  |  
did see a place for social workers, just not in public relief work. Local officials 
saw relief work as a business enterprise requiring business expertise, and their 
viewpoint directly collided with that of professional social work in the 1930s. 
The debate about professionalism, and the anxiety that accompanied it, took 
place within and outside of social work circles, and gender was very much 
at the center of debates about Michigan’s welfare-reorganization laws in the 
1930s.27
 Although such conflict was not universal, Michigan was certainly not 
alone in its battles over the role of professional social work in public relief. 
Susan Traverso argues that Boston’s relief staff became more male-dominated 
in the 1920s, and more men sought relief. The rise of mothers’ pensions, and 
investigations by women, fostered resentment among those male workers. “In 
short, new standards, new practices, and new female social workers challenged 
the tradition of poor relief in Boston, a system long administered by a staff 
of man with the sole prerogative to determine the needs of poor families.”28 
Several groups in Illinois, including unemployment organizations, the press, 
and legislative groups, found social workers to be “snoopy” and arrogant. One 
senator called the emergency-relief workers “an oligarchy whose methods they 
assume to be above impeachment.”29 Some local officials in West Virginia saw 
social workers as “outsiders,” unfamiliar with local residents or needs. Gender 
was a fundamental point of disagreement in West Virginia, and in one case 
police were called in to protect a female relief administrator.30
 Like many other professions, social work was one segregated by race both 
in education and employment. Nonwhite social work professionals gener-
ally worked in agencies that served their own communities, particularly the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National 
Urban League. Aspiring black social workers could attend most schools of 
social work in the North, but education in the South remained segregated. 
This trend prompted the creation of separate schools of social work for 
blacks.31 Beulah Whitby, educated at Oberlin College, was the first African-
 27. Walkowitz, Working with Class, 48–51, 60–62; Walkowitz, “The Making of a Feminine 
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American supervisor in the Detroit Department of Public Welfare, in 1941, 
ten years after the department initially hired her. She was first a caseworker 
and then a supervisor in the Alfred District, which was almost entirely black. 
But she did not visit white clients, even if they were down the street from 
other families she visited: “There would be two workers on the same district 
which was very wasteful . . . And it definitely was segregated.”32 Whitby also 
served the city’s Muslim community, “because they didn’t know what to do 
with them.”33 Before working for the DPW, Whitby worked for the YWCA, but 
in a segregated branch. She was among the few black caseworkers in Detroit’s 
DPW. Only a small number of African-Americans, Hispanics, or other people 
of color entered the mainstream profession on a large scale until the 1960s, 
particularly in the South.34
 Professional organizations were a key part of controlling the profession.35 
To control the education standards and institutions of the profession is, accord-
ing to sociologist Magali Sarfatti Larson, to control the knowledge base of the 
field, and the training also serves as “a most powerful generator of deeply 
shared cultural assumptions.”36 Professionals, by definition in their ideal form, 
have autonomy in their place of work and field: “In part, professionals live 
within ideologies of their own creation, which they present to the outside as 
the most valid definitions of specific spheres of social reality.”37 A part of the 
process of professionalization is exclusion, often through requirements for 
membership. In 1921 AASW required just four years of experience in the field 
of social work, reflecting in part the varied educational backgrounds of practic-
ing social workers. By 1929, however, full membership required some college 
education in social work, with specified numbers of courses from accredited 
schools of social work.38 The profession’s goal was to require a master’s degree 
in social work. Formal education was to be the means to entrance into the pro-
fession by 1932, as for law and medicine. In effect, the stringent requirements 
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excluded many social work practitioners from joining the professional organi-
zation.39 Older social workers who had social work experience but no formal 
social work education were eligible for membership only if they had belonged 
to the AASW before the requirements changed. New relief workers, hired only 
because they had some formal education, were often not eligible. These stan-
dards also excluded virtually all local relief officials, including county agents, 
township supervisors, superintendents of the poor, and poor commissioners.
 Professional organizations like the Family Welfare Association (later the 
Family Service Association) determined what agencies could be recognized 
as “accredited” in the social work profession. Member agencies engaged in 
family social work, largely through private social work agencies. The FWA 
provided field-service visits to assist agencies in social work practice and to 
ensure that social work methods met their standards. Annual regional, state, 
and national conferences provided members with opportunities to learn new 
developments. The FWA also helped agencies develop training programs and 
published the journal The Family.40 Individuals could become FWA members 
if they were AASW members and had one year of field experience in family 
social work. To accommodate agency board or committee members, the FWA 
offered associate memberships.41
 Assessing the membership of the FWA points to changes in public welfare 
prompted by FERA. Both public and private agencies were eligible for mem-
bership in the FWA, although the majority of member agencies were private. 
Membership opened to public agencies in 1921, but a lack of trained social 
work personnel usually excluded them.42 By 1931, just eight public agencies 
nationwide belonged to the FWA.43 Interest in developing professional social 
work in public agencies grew during the Depression years, when public agency 
membership increased in the FWA and similar organizations. FERA’s goal to 
separate politics from relief administration included staffing emergency-relief 
 39. Walkowitz, Working with Class, 90.
 40. “New Frontiers in Family Social Work, FWA, Its Purpose, Services, and Membership,” 
1933, FSA, Box 17, Membership before 1946, 2–4.
 41. “New Frontiers in Family Social Work,” 1933, FSA, Box 17, Membership before 1946, 
6–7.
 42. Brown, Public Relief, 54; Memo by Joanna Colcord dated November 11, 1940, FSA, Box 
17, Folder Membership Public Departments. Josephine Brown argues that professional social 
work organizations, like the FWA, established their membership requirements for agencies in 
a way that excluded public welfare departments. Colcord is critical of Brown’s assessment of 
the FWA’s involvement with public agencies. Brown argues that the FWA did not admit public 
agencies until 1926, while Colcord notes it was five years earlier.
 43. Memo to membership committee, dated March 22, 1931, FSA Records, Box 17, Folder 
Membership—Public Departments. Agencies were in Denver, CO; Jacksonville and Orlando, 
FL; Chicago, IL; Clarkston, SC; Nashville, TN; Fort Worth, TX; and Madison, WI.
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agencies with trained social workers. Gauging the interest and success of pub-
lic agencies seeking FWA membership in the 1930s is one way to assess the 
degree to which professional social work operated in public social welfare.
 Before the 1930s, Michigan’s public relief agencies employed almost no 
professional social workers, and most relief workers were men. A 1917 study 
found county agents to be older men with almost no social work experience. 
Their occupations ranged from physician to mechanic, and in rural areas farm-
ers often served in that position.44 A 1936 study commission on welfare issues 
found that most of the local poor-relief administrators—township supervi-
sors, county agents, investigators of mothers’ pensions, superintendents of the 
poor, or welfare directors—had no training in social work and were simply the 
elected official or employee assigned to the task.45 The study also noted that 
most superintendents of the poor were more than forty. Investigators found 
superintendents beyond the age of sixty in the seventeen counties surveyed. 
Probate judges tended to be younger, but some were past the age of fifty. The 
report acknowledged that while these members thus had experience, they also 
were not at the peak of their abilities.46 Education was a concern as well, since 
few officials had even a high school diploma. Probate judges, elected to their 
positions, were not required to have any specific training, and some serving 
on the bench had less than an eighth-grade education.47 Saginaw County’s pro-
bate judge, John Murphy, was a candidate for his second term on the Demo-
cratic ticket in 1936. He had served as court register for eighteen years, but 
had no formal legal training and was “sensitive about it.”48 County agents, 
often responsible for mothers’ and old-age pensions, also were found want-
ing: “County agents present a discouraging picture of grade school education, 
short service and lack of training and experience.”49
 FERA welcomed professional social workers into its relief agencies, but 
finding trained workers to staff its agencies was difficult. Administrators often 
 44. Ellis, “Juvenile Courts and Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan,” 8–9. The report was con-
ducted for the state’s Child Welfare Commission and included analysis of thirty-three counties. 
Brown is extremely critical of the county agents and the fee schedule under which they operate. 
See Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 19–22, 38.
 45. “Local Public Welfare,” WRSC Records, Box 5, Folder 10, chapter V, “Present Public 
Welfare Organization,” 81. A study of Flint’s social services (Genesee County) found that Flint’s 
Division of the Poor—later dissolved under FERA—had eighteen employees, none of whom 
had training or education in social work. “The Development of Community Resources in Flint, 
Michigan, during Depression Years,” Prepared by A. C. Findlay (Flint Institute of Research and 
Planning: October 1938), 6–7. 
 46. “Local Public Welfare,” 81.
 47. Ibid.
 48. “Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies, 1936,” WRSC Records, Box 6, Folder 7, 
Saginaw, Probate Judge.
 49. “Local Public Welfare,” 82. 
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simply hired the more educated applicants. Rural areas, in particular, had few 
trained social workers on staff in emergency-relief agencies.50 In 1936, ERA 
staff were more educated than poor-relief officials, but not necessarily in social 
work. Eleven of the sixteen county administrators surveyed had some college 
education, and five had college degrees. Among casework supervisors, the 
numbers were eleven and eight, respectively. Seven had social work experi-
ence, three were teachers, and the rest had business experience.51 Manistee and 
Van Buren counties both hired staff with college educations of some sort, but 
only Manistee’s Louise Armstrong had formal social work experience. Detroit’s 
case was similar; a 1936 survey found that about 80 percent of the staff had 
some college education, but only 2.4 percent had undergraduate certification 
in social work, and only 1.6 percent had a graduate degree.52 Marquette and 
Saginaw counties also hired relief workers with college educations.
 To address this problem, FERA and social work organizations offered 
training in social work methods to new relief workers. Time precluded gradu-
ate degrees in social work, so FERA officials sent workers to summer institutes 
for short courses and provided semester leaves for staff to attend college. Agen-
cies trained staff using in-house programs, office libraries, and subscriptions 
to professional journals. Summer institutes provided intense training for relief 
workers.53 The University of Michigan also offered some courses, both on and 
off campus. Institutes at what was then Michigan State College dated to the 
mid-1920s, but served many emergency-relief workers once the Depression 
hit and FERA began. The emphasis was on social casework and investigations. 
More than five hundred workers attended the 1934 institute.54
 FERA provided grants to states to send social workers to schools of social 
work for a semester of study.55 One thousand students attended more than 
twenty different professional schools in 1934–1935.56 Officials targeted states 
with particularly low numbers of trained social workers, and eleven states 
 50. Ehrenreich, The Altruistic Imagination, 107–8; Brown, Public Relief, 277–79; Koch, “The 
Development of Public Relief Programs in Minnesota, 1929–1941,” 71–72; and Walkowitz, 
Working with Class, 126–28. 
 51. “Local Public Welfare,” WRSC Records, 82.
 52. Sullivan, “‘On the Dole,’” 180; Whalen, Tenure, Training, and Compensation of Detroit, 14.
 53. Whalen, Tenure, Training, and Compensation, 12–13; “Seventh Annual Institute for 
Social Workers,” Michigan State College, July 15–19, 1935; and Josephine Brown, “Brief Sum-
mary of the Experience of the FERA with Summer Institutes, ‘In-Service’ Training and Training 
in Schools of Social Work,” FERA Records, Social Service Training (hereafter cited as FERA 
SST), Box 1, Folder 2.
 54. SERA Letter #374, June 5, 1935, SEWRC Papers, Box 1, Folder April to June 1935; 
SERA Letter # 590, June 4, 1936, SEWRC Papers, Box 1, Folder April to June 1936.
 55. Letter dated September 18, 1934, from Josephine Brown to the Rev. Joseph Husslein, 
Dean, St. Louis School of Social Work; FERA SST, Social Work, Box 71, Folder J–Z.
 56. Brown, Public Relief, 282.
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never participated. Only schools that were members of the Association of 
Schools of Social Work were acceptable sites of study, because of the lack of 
time to ensure that other programs were of the appropriate quality.57 Maintain-
ing professional social work standards was a key reason behind the limited 
number of schools eligible to participate. Many state schools had social work 
courses in their departments of sociology, or began new programs, with the 
rising demand for social workers, but were not able to participate in the FERA 
training program. Attendance at all programs of social work increased during 
the 1930s.58
 Professional social work education, fueled by the demand for social work-
ers, made significant strides in Michigan during the 1930s. The growing 
programs also had ties to the emergency-relief personnel at the state level; 
SERA administrators later took teaching positions at the major social work 
programs in Michigan, and schools worked with state officials in developing 
a social work curriculum. A 1938 Michigan State College report noted that 
“this department is becoming a potent force in the Welfare activities of the 
State of Michigan.”59 The University of Michigan offered courses in the 1920s, 
and began issuing certificates in social work in 1927. The school created its 
Institute for Health and Social Sciences in Detroit in 1935, offering a two-year 
master’s program.60 Wayne University began offering courses in social work 
in Detroit in 1930; this evolved into a school of public affairs and social work 
in 1935, when it granted its first degrees.61 Michigan State College offered 
summer institutes and courses through its sociology department in the 1930s. 
Demand for social work education led to a one-year social work certification 
program in 1940.62 Michigan’s universities responded to the demand for social 
workers by working quickly to offer programs to educate workers.
 Despite the obvious benefits of these programs, they served only a frac-
tion of relief workers. Surveys of students reported that the education focused 
on urban social work; rural workers received little help in adapting urban 
 57. Ibid., 282–83. The states that did not participate included Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio.
 58. Ibid., 283.
 59. Report of the Dean of Liberal Arts, Seventy-seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of 
the Board of Agriculture (Lansing: 1938), 77; Wilfred B. Shaw, ed., The University of Michigan: 
An Encyclopedic Survey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1941), 259–60. http://www.
hti.umich.edu/u/umsurvey/.
 60. Shaw, The University of Michigan, 259–60.
 61. Whalen, Tenure, Training, and Compensation, 13; Leslie L. Hanawalt, A Place of Light: 
The History of Wayne State University (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968), 238.
 62. Report of the Dean of Liberal Arts, Seventy-ninth Annual Report of the Secretary of the 
Board of Agriculture (Lansing: 1940), 85. All three schools were accredited with the American 
Association of Schools of Social Work: University of Michigan in 1927, Wayne State in 1941, 
and MSC in 1952.
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casework practices to their rural agencies. Some graduate social work pro-
grams emphasized private social work. Relief workers, however, needed fur-
ther training in public, emergency-relief work, and in the specific policies and 
regulations that work entailed.63 For workers in the northern part of the state 
and the Upper Peninsula, travel to programs such as those at MSC was not 
necessarily practical. (A social worker in Marquette faced a four-hundred-mile 
drive to East Lansing to attend an institute.)64
 Relief workers gained most of their training in their own offices, from 
their supervisors. Programs ranged in formality from a deliberate set of train-
ing steps, including supervised fieldwork and competency examinations, to 
informal staff meetings that addressed policies, case practices, and social 
work. Wayne County provided a series of thirty orientation classes to new 
workers in 1934. Staff met weekly in small groups for further discussion and 
training.65 By mid-1935, Kent County had a training schedule for all new 
workers. In addition to an office library and training manual, the staff devel-
oped a series of lectures by supervisors, covering a range of topics in social 
work. Some focused specifically on emergency-relief practices while others 
centered on general social work methods, including interviews, psychiatry in 
social work, rural problems, and ethics. The course’s final stage was a written 
examination. Kent County’s WRC also conducted a rural institute, bringing 
in outside speakers to cover rural social work.66 A published staff bulletin, 
weekly staff meetings, and district conferences provided an ongoing training 
system for all relief workers. Kent County’s WRC also sought to familiarize its 
workers with the community’s resources and businesses through tours of local 
industries, businesses, and community agencies.67 Weekly meetings included 
practical casework discussions with active case files. Staff members also took a 
 63. Brown, Public Relief, 289–290. State officials also warned staff about unaccredited cor-
respondence courses for social work. One was advertised through a Washington DC office, but 
SERA warned relief workers that it was not connected to FERA and was not an appropriate way 
to secure additional training. SERA Letter #350, April 30, 1935, SEWRC Records, Box 1, Folder 
April to June 1935.
 64. Social workers in the Upper Peninsula also did not have the Mackinac Bridge (com-
pleted in 1957) connecting the upper and lower peninsulas of Michigan; instead, travelers had 
to rely on car ferries to cross the five-mile span of water.
 65. Suzanne Copland, “Detroit’s In-Service Training Program,” Social Work Today 7.5 (Feb-
ruary 1940): 19.
 66. “Training Program of the Social Services Division,” Kent County Welfare Relief Com-
mission, May 1935; FERA SST, Box 1, Folder Michigan; “Outline for Agency Self-Evaluation,” 
August 1934, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, Box 58, Grand Rapids Folder.
 67. “Training Program,” Kent County, FERA SST, Box 1, Folder Michigan. The city of 
Detroit and Wayne County also had formal training programs for their relief workers, covering 
many of the same topics. Wayne County also dealt with the rural or out-county aspects of relief 
work. “Intake Outline,” City of Detroit ERA, and “Wayne County—Rural and Suburban Divi-
sion,” FERA SST, Box 1, Folder Michigan.
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seventeen-week course in family casework at the University of Michigan 
through an extension program.68
 Although county agencies sought to provide education for new relief 
workers, inadequate training was a continued problem for Detroit’s DPW 
in the 1930s. A lack of training facilities was cited as a key concern in 1933 
by the FWA, although staff were able to attend periodic seminars as well as 
state conferences and institutes to further their social work education. The 
DPW established a training center by 1937 to provide in-service instruction 
for DPW employees, and also to make fieldwork available for college students 
of social work, who were largely from the University of Michigan and Wayne 
University. DPW employees pursuing college degrees in social work could do 
their fieldwork in the Detroit agency or a private agency. Major obstacles to 
the continued training of social workers were funding, facilities, and a lack of 
support from DPW superintendents and the city government.69
 Some Michigan counties embraced, albeit briefly, the professional prac-
tices and values of social work. Professional social workers, either on the Wel-
fare Relief Commission or in the relief agency, were central to these efforts. 
Two Michigan counties earned membership in the FWA. Kent County was 
the first WRC in 1934; Detroit’s DPW (operating as the Wayne County WRC) 
became a member in 1935.70 Oakland County, in southeastern Michigan, 
sought membership in late 1935, but little action is recorded in the surviv-
ing files. Bay and Midland counties both began inquiries in 1939, but a car 
accident that seriously injured the women pushing for it stalled those efforts.71 
Genesee County sought membership in 1933, through the WRC chairperson 
and city manager, John Barringer. Barringer was active in the local community 
chest and anxious to have the newly created public department adopt social 
work practices. He disagreed with the director of public welfare, Milton Van 
Geison, a former clerk with the Buick personnel department and ardent home 
rule proponent. Van Geison argued that investigators were to be detectives 
and that relief “should be made hard for the families . . . in order to encourage 
them to be self-supporting.” He held great disdain for professional social work 
 68. “Training Program,” Kent County, FERA SST, Box 1, Folder Michigan.
 69. Rose Porter, Memo dated July 1933, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, Box 57, 
Detroit Folder 1929–1934; Questionnaire, April 21, 1937, 4, Detroit Folder, 1936–37; Rosemary 
Reynolds, Field Visit, Oct. 16–20, 1939, 4, FSA Records, Detroit Folder, 1938–39.
 70. Memo dated January 19, 1937, FSA Records, Membership Folder. Seventeen public 
agencies held full membership in the FSA by 1936.
 71. Rosemary Reynolds, Memo dated June 21, 1939, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, 
Box 57, Bay City Folder; Rosemary Reynolds, Extra Mural Conference, June 21, 1939, FSA 
Correspondence, FSA Records, Box 58, Midland Folder.
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in relief administration.72 The two men’s views again illustrate the divide over 
the question of who should administer relief. Three years later the agency still 
had not gained membership, although it was recognized by the FWA as one of 
Michigan’s highest-quality public agencies.73
 Social workers in Detroit’s Department of Public Welfare first inquired 
about membership in 1924, although the DPW was divided on its commit-
ment to professional social work and casework.74 In 1929 the FWA sponsored 
a two-week educational institute on casework principles for DPW staff; DPW 
Superintendent Thomas Dolan supported professionalizing the department, 
although he had no formal training in social work. The revised city charter 
in 1918 granted the department the power to do so, but it remained largely a 
relief-giving agency.75 The reality of the budget crises of 1930 and 1931 placed 
professionalization of the department, and membership in the FWA, on hold. 
Caseloads were running as high as 300 to 400 per worker, and morale was 
low. “[DPW social workers] said quite regretfully that each winter saw them 
plunged into a similar emergency situation and that the period between the 
emergency situations was spent chiefly in recuperating from the emergency 
before.”76 Professional social work practices were a luxury the DPW could not 
afford in the early Depression crisis. But by 1935 caseloads had dropped to 
between 80 and 125, and the department had established a training program 
for its staff. The FWA granted the DPW membership in June 1935.77
 Federal officials recognized Kent County as having one of the best Michi-
gan county agencies.78 The agency first inquired about membership in Febru-
ary 1934, and seven months later the agency became an FWA member. Quick 
 72. Consultation Visit, Rose Porter, April 28 to May 11, 1933, 3, FSA Correspondence, FSA 
Records, Box 58, Flint Folder. Van Geison was a formidable opponent and would lead the fight 
to preserve local control of welfare—and its punitive nature—in the battle over welfare reorga-
nization later in the decade.
 73. FWA field investigators were doubtful about the motives for membership. They re-
ported that the county WRC wanted the benefits of membership but was not eager to assume 
its responsibilities. Consultation Visit, F. R. Day, December 10, 1936, FSA Correspondence, FSA 
Records, Box 58, Flint Folder.
 74. Consultations, David Holbrook, December 15, 1924, FSA Correspondence, FSA Re-
cords, Box 57, Michigan Prior to 1928 Folder.
 75. Consultations, Ella M. Weinfurther, May 2, 1930, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, 
Box 57, Detroit 1928–1935 Folder.
 76. Ibid., 7–9.
 77. Consultation Visit, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, Box 57, Detroit 1931–35 
Folder.
 78. Memo from field representative Howard Hunter to Harry Hopkins, June 1, 1934; Harry 
Hopkins Papers, Box 58, FERA-WPA Narrative Field Reports, Michigan, 7. Hunter reported 
to Hopkins that Kent County’s relief organization was “one of the best in the state” and credits 
social welfare activism with leading “an uprising of citizens,” resulting in a new city council.
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granting of membership likely arose in part from the casework supervisor, 
Alice Yonkman, who had both public and private social work experience. Yon-
kman had worked with the public agency in the early 1920s before moving to 
the Red Cross. The Family Service Association, a private agency and member 
of the FWA, hired her in 1929.79 FWA field visitors commended Yonkman’s 
direct manner and the quality of her case records, which showed “increasing 
case work treatment and more thoughtful work, and real participation on the 
part of the client.”80 By 1933 she had the support of Howard Hunter, head of 
the community chest, to lead the local WRC. Yonkman later left the FSA to 
work in the WRC.81 New staff members had formal social work training, and 
Yonkman was committed to professional social work standards in the agency.82 
The proliferation of caseloads, which ranged from 187 to 230 per caseworker, 
was a concern of the FWA. But membership was recommended and the Kent 
County WRC joined the FWA.83
 A county WRC board sympathetic to social work was critical in the pro-
fessionalization of local agencies. All three men—a business executive, an 
attorney, and a township trustee—on Kent County’s commission supported 
professional social work ideals and took an active and positive interest in its 
development in the public agency. When the commission changed under the 
revised administrative rules in early 1936, support for a social work organiza-
tion continued under Probate Judge Clark Higbee, a member of the Welfare 
and Relief Study Commission.84 Detroit’s Public Welfare Commission (PWC) 
and the Wayne County WRC included some members who had backgrounds 
in social work and social work education, and who were active in either public 
or private welfare work in the city. James Fitzgerald, who was PWC chair-
person for several years, was executive secretary of the city’s St. Vincent de 
Paul Society. Other members had affiliations with the Jewish Social Service 
Bureau, the Council of Social Agencies, and the city’s medical community. 
 79. Polk’s Grand Rapids City Directory (Grand Rapids: Grand Rapids Directory Company, 
1922), 907. From 1922 to 1925 Yonkman was listed as a social service worker, but with no place 
of employment specified. By 1926 she was a supervisor with the city social service department 
and in 1929 began working for the FSA. She disappeared from the city directory in 1935.
 80. E. M. Weinfurther, “Summary of Contacts,” March 19, 1931, FSA Records, Box 58, 
Grand Rapids folder.
 81. Consultation Visit, Rose Porter, July 17–18, 1933, 4–6; Consultation Visit, Rose Porter, 
June 13–14, 1934, 4, FSA Records, Box 58, Grand Rapids Folder.
 82. Rose Porter, Consultation Visit, June 16, 1934, 4, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, 
Box 58, Grand Rapids Folder.
 83. Consultation Visit, Margaret Wead, October 1934, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, 
Box 58, Grand Rapids Folder.
 84. Consultation Visit, Rosemary Reynolds, November 9 and 12, 1937, FSA Correspon-
dence, FSA Records, Box 58, Grand Rapids Folder.
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Fitzgerald also served as chair of the county’s WRC. Other members included 
Frederic Siedenburg, a Catholic priest active in the Council of Social Agencies, 
and Ruth Whipple. Whipple served on the Plymouth City Commission and 
also was active in the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the League of 
Women Voters, and the Business and Professional Women’s Club.85 City offi-
cials were often hostile to social work in the administration of public welfare, 
but the social work background of commission members helped to counter 
their opposition.
 The FWA was willing to work with those public agencies that chose to 
instill professional social work into their programs. But such efforts were not 
very successful during the 1930s. Just two of Michigan’s eighty-three counties 
actually gained membership, and only a handful more sought FWA support. 
Thus the active drive for professionalization was small and brief, as events 
would further reinforce by the decade’s end. Most county agencies profession-
alized only to secure federal and state funds, and resisted even that.
the	realIty	of	relIef	work
The rhetoric of professionalization rang hollow for some relief workers, and 
speaks further to the competing visions of professionalization in this period, 
even within the profession. College-educated but untrained in professional 
social work, these workers were at the heart of debates about the definition 
of social work and the expertise needed for welfare administration. Low sala-
ries continued to be one of several issues relief workers—experienced and 
not—faced in the emergency-relief period, and yet their salaries were the focus 
of criticism regarding SERA’s administrative costs. Relief workers, however, 
saw their wages and working conditions as grievances to be addressed. The 
contest over professional standards and labor issues prompted some new relief 
workers to pursue union organization as a means to gain higher wages and job 
security. These relief workers did not entirely reject professionalization but, 
rather, used it to further their cause. The union movement met opposition 
within the profession, and social work union activists faced reprisals for their 
outspoken advocacy on behalf of themselves and their clients.
 Despite the rhetoric of professionalization, relief workers did not earn a 
professional wage, even before the 1930s. Salaries among the “elite psychi-
atric and medical case workers” in urban areas were about $150 per month 
 85. Consultation Visit, Florence Day, FSA Correspondence, FSA Records, Box 57, Folder 
Detroit 1936–37; Herbert S. Case, ed., Who’s Who in Michigan (Munsing: 1936), 357, 423.
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($1800 per year), while most social workers, concentrated largely in family- 
and child-welfare agencies, earned between $90 and $125. Wages for social 
workers increased just 3 percent from 1913 to 1926, and most social workers 
earned slightly less than skilled industrial workers. Daniel Walkowitz argues 
that a wage of $1,800 in the 1920s earned social workers a “bare existence.” 
Few social workers earned a middle-class standard of living.86 This continued 
to be true in the 1930s, when wages rose little and SERA constantly faced criti-
cism about administrative costs and high salaries. The average caseworker sal-
ary in 1936 was $1,573, a monthly salary of about $131. But 20 percent of the 
welfare department in Detroit earned more than $2,500 per year, “nearly twice 
as much as the average auto worker.”87 This group likely included administra-
tors and supervisors. The average relief worker earned much less.
 According to SERA, Michigan’s casework supervisors earned an average 
monthly salary of $127.93, while caseworkers and investigators earned an 
average monthly salary of $89.31 in the first year of SERA’s operations. The 
average salary for other workers, largely clerical and office staff, was $85.97.88 
Investigators, home visitors, and aides were paid between $70 and $90; the 
positions required a high school education and a “desire to learn to do social 
work.” Caseworkers earned between $90 and $105 and were required either 
to be a college graduate with a year of social work experience, or to have 
two or more years of experience in a related field along with a year of formal 
social work training. Senior caseworkers earned between $105 and $130 and 
had to be eligible for junior membership in the AASW; their responsibili-
ties included supervision of other caseworkers. Supervisors earned from $120 
to $175. Administrators’ salaries depended on the county’s population, with 
larger counties having higher-paid administrators. Monthly salaries ranged 
from $90 to $300. Clerical workers were paid from $60 to $100, depending on 
the level of responsibility.89 Van Buren County’s administrator received $140 
per month ($1,680 per year) in October 1934, while the deputy administrator 
and supervisor each received $130 per month. Caseworkers received $80 per 
month and the stenographer’s monthly salary was $70.90
 86. Walkowitz, Working with Class, 100; Walker, “Privately Supported Social Work,” 1191.
 87. Sullivan, “‘On the Dole,’” 180, footnote 68; see Whalen, Tenure, Training, and Compen-
sation, 35, 51. Sullivan mistakenly quotes that annual median income is $1,673.
 88. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 61.
 89. SERA Letter #188, October 16, 1934, FERA SST, Box 4, Michigan—Personnel Folder. 
Van Buren and Marquette fell in the second-tier salary schedule, while Saginaw was in the third 
tier and Wayne County in the fifth tier. Placement was based on population.
 90. State Personnel Dept., Salary Schedule, Van Buren County, October 25, 1934; Records 
of Van Buren County Emergency Welfare Relief Commission (hereafter cited as VB EWRC 
Records), Archives and Regional History Collections, Western Michigan University, Box 1, 
Folder 23.
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 To refute the charges of waste and excessive spending, SERA published the 
report Cost of Administration in the Emergency Relief Program in 1935, and 
also addressed the issue in its first two annual reports. The reports state that 
SERA’s administrative costs were just 8.5 percent of first-year expenditures, 
and 9.4 percent the second year.91 SERA also reported that 6.7 cents of each 
dollar spent went to pay salaries of employees in the first year (the rest paid 
for travel, office supplies, and rent), or about 8 percent of the total cost of relief 
programs.92
 To limit relief spending and to refute charges of wasteful spending, SERA 
regularly ordered reinvestigations to ensure that people receiving relief 
remained in need.93 Such reinvestigations were another issue of contention 
for relief workers. Public criticism regarding the number of “chiselers” on the 
relief rolls prompted SERA to undertake a major reevaluation of its caseload 
in December 1934. Every head of household on relief received a letter stat-
ing that their case would be closed; if the family was still in need they had to 
reapply. Each letter included a two-week grocery order, which would allow 
the family “that length of time to make other plans.” When possible, a differ-
ent caseworker was assigned to those people who did reapply, to avoid any 
preconceptions about the family.94 Van Buren County’s acting administrator, 
M. D. Cook, announced the program in a front-page article in the Hartford 
Day Spring in February of 1935, and new caseworkers were hired to help. 
The WRC dropped between forty and fifty cases each week.95 Cook advised 
that the WRC was not seeking to deny relief to anyone in need, but wrote 
that “the burden of proof for such need will rest entirely with the applicant 
. . . Applicants who have not proven the need for relief will be rejected and so 
informed.”96
 Some welfare-relief commissions sought the assistance of local citizens 
to uncover anyone cheating the system, a practice not endorsed by SERA but 
 91. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 60; Haber and Stanch-
field, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security (Lansing: 1936), 27; and Michigan State 
Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, Cost of Administration in the Emergency Relief Program 
(Lansing, 1935), 7. The latter publication found that administrative costs were just 8.14 percent 
in the first three months of FERA.
 92. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment and Relief in Michigan, 61. Comparable figures 
are not available for the second year.
 93. SERA Letter #156, September 20, 1934, SEWRC Papers, Box 1, Folder July to Septem-
ber 1934; SERA Letter #352, May 1, 1935, SEWRC Papers, Box 1, Folder April to June 1935.
 94. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 219.
 95. M. D. Cook, “Welfare Rolls in Van Buren to Be Revised,” Hartford Day Spring, February 
6, 1935, 8. 
 96. Cook, “Welfare Rolls,” 1.
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nevertheless implemented by some agencies.97 The use of “gossip” in welfare 
investigation was not new, and is a significant continuity in relief work. In some 
cases, agencies invited “spying” by residents, and fostered the assumption that 
relief recipients were likely dishonest.98 Manistee County, which undertook 
its own reinvestigation independent of the WRC in November of 1934, also 
sought information provided by residents. The Manistee News-Advocate ran 
front-page forms for residents to use to report so-called “chiselers” (see figure 
5.1). The cases were then reinvestigated by a special committee appointed by 
the mayor.99 Clients had to prove their need and agencies encouraged citizens 
to inform on their neighbors and fellow residents. Although administrators 
rejected the notion that they asked their workers to be detectives, some did 
pressure caseworkers to do so.100
 Reinvestigations did reduce the relief rolls. SERA reported that about 15 
percent of cases in some counties remained closed, although reports noted that 
increased employment opportunities in industry and agriculture explained 
some of the decline in need. SERA found that between 5 and 7 percent of 
relief recipients were not entitled to aid.101 Van Buren closed 213 cases (more 
than 30 percent of the caseload) in the first three months of its reinvestigation. 
Two-thirds of those dropped never reapplied for relief, and apparently either 
had the resources to manage or simply did not want to endure the extensive 
reinvestigation. Most of the remaining cases simply had “adequate resources,” 
according to the WRC report.102
 97. Cook, “Welfare Rolls,” 8; Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic 
Security, 219–20. Haber and Stanchfield do not discuss using residents to report on relief 
recipients in their coverage of this program. See “Anti-Chiseling Group Carries on with Work,” 
Manistee News-Advocate, November 22, 1934, 1, 8; copy in Armstrong Papers, Box 1, Reviews 
Folder.
 98. Margaret Hillyard Little, “‘He Said, She Said’: The Role of Gossip in Determining Single 
Mothers’ Eligibility for Welfare,” Journal of Policy History 11.4 (1999): 434, 442–43, 446; Little 
documents the use of welfare hotlines in more-contemporary welfare administration in Canada. 
Melanie Tebbutt, Women’s Talk? A Social History of “Gossip” in Working-Class Neighborhoods, 
1880–1960 (Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1995), 1–2. Tebbut’s work is on working-
class women in Great Britain. Few scholars have directly considered gossip in the administrative 
operation of American social welfare.
 99. “Welfare Group Issues Complaint Call,” Manistee News-Advocate, November 15, 1934; 
Edward W. Pfeiffer, “Your Cooperation Is Needed! Please Help,” Manistee News-Advocate, 
November 22, 1934. Pfeiffer was the editor of the Manistee News-Advocate.
 100. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public 
Welfare, Rev. Ed. (New York: Vintage, 1993), 177. The authors argue that professionalism in 
social work did little to improve the dispensing of relief, and they assert that although social 
work was to make the process more humane, the results were not that different from those of 
poor-relief methods.
 101. Haber and Stanchfield, Unemployment, Relief, and Economic Security, 220.
 102. “Van Buren Cuts 213 Families off Its Relief Rolls,” Hartford Day Spring, May 8, 1935, 
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 Detroit also underwent several investigations to purge the relief rolls, 
particularly under the leadership of conservative mayors intent on removing 
chiselers. Richard Reading, elected mayor in 1937, specifically targeted the 
city DPW’s practice of allowing the United Auto Workers to investigate mem-
bers seeking relief. Reading used police officers to investigate current welfare 
recipients’ cases. He also sought to have all relief applicants sign a “notarized 
affidavit attesting to their financial status and need.” Having such a document 
would make it easier to prosecute relief recipients who defrauded the DPW. 
He “urged that a program be worked out whereby the so-called chiselers and 
drones would be entirely eliminated from relief rolls.”103 Professional social 
workers harshly criticized Reading’s plans, but to little avail. His crusade did 
result in closed cases, but found fraud in just one in three hundred cases, 
and restitution agreements brought in just under twenty-four thousand dol-
lars—far less than the cost of the investigation to the department.104
 Despite efforts to reduce the number of relief recipients, caseloads for 
relief workers remained high. Social work guidelines warned against more 
than 150 cases for each public relief investigator. However, only twenty-six of 
Michigan’s eighty-three counties had caseloads below 150 in January 1935; the 
 103. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 472–73; Detroit Public Welfare Commission 
minutes, February 15, 1938, 143.
 104. Sullivan, “‘On the Dole,’” 205, 207–11; Detroit Public Welfare Commission minutes, 
January 11, 13, 18, 28, 1938, 118–19, 122–24, 130.
figure	5.1 form published on the front page of the Manistee News-
Advocate, november 15, 1934, seeking information on welfare fraud.
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state average, excluding Wayne County, was actually 175. Forty-two counties 
had caseloads between 150 and 250 and thirteen counties averaged more than 
250 cases per investigator.105 In December of 1936, Van Buren County’s WRC 
reported that its caseload was 285, not including service-only cases, which 
were about fourteen per investigator.106 The problem persisted throughout the 
emergency-relief years. When SERA told the Van Buren County WRC that 
staff numbers had to be cut in 1939, administrator Louise Wilkinson argued 
that any reductions in investigators and caseworkers were impossible. Case-
loads were already as high as seven hundred, and a resolution by the county’s 
WRC reiterated her position.107 Such high caseloads placed incredible pressure 
on relief workers who sought to investigate that many families properly.
 Autonomy and control over daily tasks are key to the definition of a profes-
sion.108 Relief workers did have some measure of control over their workday, 
although high caseloads and limited budgets placed great strain on maintain-
ing a forty-hour workweek. Clerks prepared work schedules for social workers 
to enable caseworkers to leave the office shortly after reporting for work. In 
a two-week cycle, relief workers spent eight days in the field, visiting families 
and conducting home visits. Caseworkers returned to the office in the early 
afternoon to dictate case histories and submit relief requisitions for that day. 
They had one day each week in the office for appointments (for families they 
had difficulty finding at home or for complaints), and used their remaining 
time after field visits for emergency requests and work on new cases.109
 The day of a caseworker was thus controlled in some measure by the office, 
but caseworkers determined what families to visit and set appointments and 
office visits. They were not confined to the office and determined their day 
within the larger time frame of field and office work. Clerical staff provided 
 105. SEWRC, Cost of Administration, 10. The SERA study included data for only eighty-one 
of the state’s eighty-three counties. A study by Social Work Today found that the average case-
load in twenty-three agencies was 129. Caseloads ranged from 80 in New York City to 250 in 
Milwaukee. Ten of the public agencies surveyed were in the Midwest, although the study does 
not list which cities were included; Detroit likely was one. George Hedin, “Salaries and Working 
Conditions in Public Relief Agencies,” Social Work Today, 2.6 (May 1935): 12.
 106. Letter from Van Buren WRC to Helen Daley, Field Case Representative, December 
30, 1936; VB EWRC Records, Box 1, Folder 10. Service-only cases were those that received no 
material relief but were eligible for surplus commodities and clothing; clients under the WPA 
and Rural Resettlement programs were among those classed as “service only.”
 107. Letter from Helen Daley to George Granger, December 30, 1936; VB EWRC Records, 
Box 1, Folder 10.
 108. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, xii, 182–87. Larson defines social work as an orga-
nizational profession, dependent on the state’s expansion of social services. “True” professions 
(she cites the example of the medical profession) have complete control over their workday, with 
no outside interference.
 109. Report by Irene Murphy, supervisor of casework for Detroit Department of Public 
Welfare, 1935; FSA Correspondence, Wayne County folder; FSA Records.
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support by typing case histories and correspondence, and preparing checks 
and relief requisitions, but a typical relief worker faced long and hectic days 
trying to successfully serve the high caseload assigned. Each case, when first 
investigated, required significant document collection and verification, includ-
ing financial information, birth and marriage documents, medical statements 
(if applicable), residence verification, and employment checks. In Detroit, a 
caseworker might visit fifteen families on a given day.110 Home visits were the 
primary contact with clients, although how often caseworkers visited families 
depended on their caseload, since on a given day they also may have had 
to contact other individuals or agencies, including schools, private welfare 
agencies, and businesses, to investigate a child’s school attendance, other aid 
received, or the employment status of a member of the household. Cases that 
involved questions about eligibility or suspicion of the validity of a client’s 
claims demanded much more time and attention. Caseworkers faced hostility 
and distrust on many visits, and often were the targets of verbal abuse from 
recipients, at times for issues beyond their control. It is easy to envision the 
harried nature of such work and the frustrations of high caseloads with too 
little time to complete the work.
unIonIzIng	relIef	workerS
Low salaries and high caseloads were among the issues that fueled the rise of 
the union movement, known as the rank and file movement, in the 1920s and 
1930s. Social workers employed in private agencies in New York City were the 
original organizers of the movement,111 which spread outside of New York by 
1932; the following year it had thirteen organizations in private agencies in 
eight cities, including Detroit. In 1934 unions began to enter public agencies, 
but remained concentrated in the largest American cities, including Chicago, 
Detroit, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and New York City.112 The movement’s 
leadership began publishing Social Work Today, the journal dedicated to trade 
unionism and the rank and file movement, in 1934, and held its first national 
conference in 1936.113
 110. Report by Irene Murphy, 1935.
 111. Rick Spano, The Rank and File Movement (Washington, D.C.: University Press of 
America, 1982), 45–47; Walkowitz, Working with Class, 122–25.
 112. Rick Spano, The Rank and File Movement, 68–69; Koch, “The Development of Public 
Relief Programs in Minnesota,” 264–65; and “Rank and File: Detroit and Cleveland,” Social 
Work Today 1.2 (May–June 1934): 23.
 113. Leslie Alexander, “Organizing the Professional Social Worker: Union Development in 
Voluntary Social Work, 1930–1950,” (PhD dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, Graduate School 
of Social Work, 1976), 84, 86–87.
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 The influx of new relief workers was one factor in the growth of social work 
unionism in the 1930s.114 Rank and file members challenged the AASW’s stan-
dards, and offered an alternate vision of professionalization.115 Many of these 
workers could not meet AASW professional guidelines; the shift in emphasis 
to formal education placed professional recognition farther out of reach for 
most relief workers. Low salaries, long hours, poor working conditions, a lack 
of grievance procedures, and little job security were the chief concerns of relief 
workers. Public agency workers faced the worst conditions. Many of them 
had the highest caseloads and the poorest working conditions of any social 
workers. Because professional organizations were not at their disposal, some 
turned to unions to address their problems.116 But union members did not 
entirely reject professionalization; many employed professional language and 
credentials in their negotiations on behalf of themselves and their clients.117
 Michigan’s social work union movement originated in Detroit, and 
expanded to include four other counties and cities as well as a statewide orga-
nization by the decade’s end (see map 5.1). The Wayne County Social Workers’ 
Association formed in 1934 and, like many public agency groups, affiliated 
with the Congress of Industrial Organization, in 1937, as Local 79, under the 
State, County and Municipal Workers of America.118 Some unions, includ-
ing the Detroit group, represented not only caseworkers but also clerks and 
Detroit Receiving Hospital support staff.119
 114. Jacob Fisher, “Trade Unionism in Social Work,” Social Work Year Book, 1937 (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1937), 502.
 115. Leslie Leighninger, Social Work: Search for Identity (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1987), 39–42.
 116. Alexander, “Organizing the Professional Social Worker,” 64–67; Walkowitz, Working 
with Class, 83–85, 136–40. Walkowitz assesses the involvement of the AASW in grievance pro-
cedures for caseworkers, illustrating that some relief workers did not share the AASW’s vision 
of social work.
 117. For a discussion of language and professionalization, see JoAnne Brown, “Professional 
Language: Words That Succeed,” Radical History Review 34 (1986): 33–51.
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Social Work Today 2.3 (January 1935): 31. “A Budget for Human Needs: Analysis of the 
Department of Public Welfare Budget, 1940–1941,” Research and Standards Committee, Local 
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59, Folder: Public Welfare—1940s, 34. Local 79 represented only city workers; county workers 
organized in Local 116 of the SCMWA. Most public social workers who unionized organized 
within the SCMWA, the American Federation of Labor’s AFSCME. Social workers in private 
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with the CIO. Alexander, “Organizing the Professional Social Worker,” 136; Walkowitz, Working 
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 119. Sharon Hartman Strom argues that social service employee unions—often comprised 
largely of women—tended to include clerks and other support staff in their groups. She also 
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 No details of Local 79’s membership are available, but a 1938 study of 
Detroit social workers found that the DPW’s social workers were 87 percent 
female and 94 percent white.120 Clerical workers were also largely female by 
the Depression years, and thus women likely made up a major portion of 
the union’s potential membership.121 Although concentrated in a minority of 
argues that the Congress of Industrial Organizations gave little support or encouragement to its 
government employee unions (United Federal Workers; State, County, and Municipal Workers 
of America; and the United Office and Professional Workers of America). In addition, their 
options were more limited because they could not strike, which also would have gone against 
the rank and file movement’s dual purpose of aiding both workers and clients. Sharon Hart-
man Strom, “‘We’re no Kitty Foyles’: Organizing Office Workers for the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, 1937–1950,” in Women, Work, and Protest: A Century of US Women’s Labor His-
tory, ed. Ruth Milkman (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 212–15; Strom, “Challenging 
‘Woman’s Place’: Feminism, the Left, and Industrial Unionism in the 1930s,” Feminist Studies 9 
(Summer 1983): 371–72.
 120. They were also relatively well educated, with just 14 percent with no college credits. 
Whalen, Tenure, Training, and Compensation, 3, 55, 57.
 121. Mark McColloch, White Collar Workers in Transition: The Boom Years, 1940–1970 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 21; Strom, “‘We’re No Kitty Foyles,’” 212–15; and Strom, 
Map	5.1 rank and file unions, 1934–40
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public agencies, the union movement nonetheless is significant for the issues it 
raised and for its involvement in cases that attracted the attention of labor and 
civil rights groups. The movement first appeared at the Michigan State Confer-
ences of Social Work in December 1935. Reports in Social Work Today noted 
that the rank and file sessions attracted “real if somewhat skeptical interest” 
and that the final session was attended by more than fifty social workers.122
 One result of the state conference was the formation of a Michigan State 
Coordinating Committee of Rank and File Groups to serve as a centralized 
state network of rank and file groups, and to assist other local groups in orga-
nizing. The state committee participated in national rank and file conferences, 
giving Michigan social workers a voice in the national movement.123 It evolved 
into the Michigan Federation of Social Agency Employees, organized at a state 
rank and file conference in January 1936, becoming one of just three state 
organizations in the rank and file movement.124 Twenty-three county public 
agencies and twelve private groups sent delegations, and membership in the 
state organization was open to all employees in social agencies in Michigan.125 
Formal unions organized in Washtenaw County (centered in Ann Arbor) in 
1935, and caseworkers in Kalamazoo and St. Clair counties organized rank 
and file groups in 1936. Agency workers in Dearborn, also in southeastern 
Michigan, organized in 1939.126 (See map 5.1.)
 Union representatives’ negotiations with their respective agencies reflected 
the dual purpose of the organized social work movement: to ensure that social 
services provided adequately for clients’ needs while also addressing the labor 
and professional issues important to the caseworkers. Union members believed 
their two goals were connected: only a trained, professional staff, in conjunc-
tion with adequate relief budgets, could make certain that clients received the 
“Challenging ‘Women’s Place,’” 371–72. Historians have documented the feminization of 
clerical work in several works, including Margery W. Davies, Woman’s Place Is at the Typewriter 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), and Lisa M. Fine, The Souls of the Skyscrapers: 
Female Clerical Workers in Chicago, 1870–1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).
 122. See telegram regarding rank and file movement and the Michigan Conference of Social 
work, October 24, 1935, FERA State Series, Michigan, Box 140, Complaints, Folder T–Z; and 
“Detroit Salutes the Conference,” Social Work Today, 5.2 (November 1937): 27. The Wayne 
County Social Workers Association sponsored a lecture at the conference by Dr. Tucker Smith, 
President of Brookwood Labor College, in 1937.
 123. “Rank and File: At State Conferences,” Social Work Today 3.3 (December 1935): 26; 
“Relief; Work; Staff: Where Workers in Public Agencies Stand,” Social Work Today 3.4 (January 
1936): 11–12.
 124. Others formed in Ohio and Pennsylvania. See “Directory of Rank and File Organiza-
tions,” Social Work Today 3.1 (October 1935): 31.
 125. “From the Field,” Social Work Today 3.6 (March 1936): 26.
 126. “From the Field,” Social Work Today 4.1 (October 1936): 26; “Trade Unions in Social 
Work,” Social Work Today 6.9 (June 1939): 40.
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services and assistance they needed.127 The constitution for the Kalamazoo 
County Federation of Social Workers “provide[d] for the protection of the 
interest of both employees and clients,” and St. Clair County workers called 
for “collective action for client and worker security.”128 Detroit social work-
ers aimed to “further cooperative action and mutual understanding between 
the various divisions within the Department of Public Welfare . . . and to 
improve the professional standards of its members.”129 Unions sought to work 
for improvement of larger social services, such as the expansion of the provi-
sions of the Social Security Act. They protested cuts in travel allowances and 
pushed for grievance procedures; they also fought for more-adequate food 
budgets for clients when food costs rose steeply.130
 Perhaps the most visible role for the unions was defending the right of 
social workers both to organize themselves and to participate in the orga-
nization of their clients. Union activity could have severe consequences for 
relief workers, regardless of their experience or ability. Caseworkers in both 
Wayne and Washtenaw counties were fired or demoted because of organi-
zational activities. Wayne County’s Local 79 did not appear before Detroit’s 
Public Welfare Commission or Common Council until 1937, when it mobi-
lized to protest the suspension of several employees, including Rachel Norber, 
a founding member of Local 79, for alleged inefficiency. The case galvanized 
the union around the right of employees to a fair hearing before discharge and 
the right to unionize. Unionization was recognized as a means not only to 
protect professional workers’ rights as employees, but also to safeguard profes-
sional standards for those workers.131 Norber eventually regained her job five 
months after her discharge, when the Civil Service Commission ordered the 
PWC to reinstate her and to pay her for the time off, and she lost no seniority 
 127. Walkowitz, Working with Class, 124–25; Alexander, “Organizing the Professional Social 
Worker,” 10, 50, 64–67.
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SCMWA. See Alexander Taylor, “State, County Union Lists Important Gains,” Michigan CIO 
News, September 25, 1939.
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or vacation credit.132 In addition, the union gained the PWC pledge to allow 
all employees a hearing before the commission considered their discharge.133 
Several months after the Norber case was decided, the commission revisited 
the issue of discharging and suspending employees, adopting a formal four-
step process. The revised policy again guaranteed employees a hearing before 
either a discharge or a suspension.134 The union would use the strength it 
gained from this battle to defend the rights of both union members and relief 
recipients.
 In this case, Local 79 defended professional status as it fought for Norber’s 
job and union rights. Norber had received no advance notice of her suspen-
sion or her discharge. Following critical reports by the director of personnel 
at a special public welfare commission meeting, with the support of Super-
intendent Gerald Harris, the commission voted to discharge Norber in June 
of 1937.135 In response to the charges, one month later Norber argued that 
she had lost her job because of her union activism, and not because of inef-
ficiency, a stance supported by the national rank and file journal Social Work 
Today.136 She based her defense on her abilities as a trained social worker. Hired 
in 1930 as a family investigator, Norber had passed the civil service examina-
tion in 1935 and had then been promoted to student caseworker.137 She was 
working on her bachelor’s degree in social work from Wayne University, and 
had received at least one educational leave in 1936 to pursue that goal.138 Nor-
ber questioned the validity of the report on her inefficiency because it was 
drafted by the Field Work Observation Bureau, an agency, she charged, that 
knew little about social work or casework practices or DPW policy. She was a 
professional social worker, even though she did not yet have her degree, and 
was judged, she argued, by those who did not have the appropriate credentials. 
Their information, subjectively and inaccurately presented, was then used by 
 132. Numerous other organizations joined to support Norber and the union’s cause, 
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 134. “Proceedings of the Public Welfare Commission,” vol. 12, October 25, 1938, 30.
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her supervisors to obtain her discharge.139 Her professional status, even though 
she had not completed her formal study, was the cornerstone of her defense.
 In contrast, the union apparently remained silent about the removal of 
the family investigators, or those untrained relief workers hired in 1930 and 
1931—like Norber—to help with rising caseloads. The 1937–38 reclassifica-
tion plan eliminated that job category; most family investigators who had not 
been promoted as Norber had faced either dismissal or demotion. The group 
argued that their six to seven years of service qualified them as profession-
als. They had attended conferences and professional training programs, and 
often worked overtime with no additional compensation because they had 
been told they were professionals.140 Significantly, the group did not use the 
union, either Local 79 or any other employee organization, to pursue its case. 
The union’s silence on this issue, just a few months before Norber’s situation, 
illuminates its commitment to a trained, professional staff that employed pro-
fessionalization as a means to further unionization.
 Washtenaw County’s social workers engaged in a similar battle with 
their supervisors. Milton Kemnitz, a supervisor, was demoted to caseworker, 
because, co-workers alleged, of Kemnitz’s efforts to organize the unemployed 
and relief clients.141 Henry Meyer, an agency caseworker, was fired for pro-
testing Kemnitz’s demotion. The WRC issued a statement shortly after the 
incidents, outlining policies prohibiting employees, both on and off work, 
from engaging in organizational activities that “might lead to controversial 
discussions regarding relief policies of the organization, or which might lead 
to criticism from the general public.” The commission also stated, however, 
that it was “not opposed to the organization of case workers or other employ-
ees.”142 
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 The case attracted the attention of labor and civil liberties groups, includ-
ing the Detroit and Wayne County Federation of Labor, as well as several other 
rank and file groups. An investigation by state and federal officials, working 
with the Conference for the Protection of Civil Rights in Detroit and an Ann 
Arbor civil liberties group (both of which were active in defense of the case-
workers), found that the WRC had “acted in anger” and without the knowl-
edge or approval of the casework supervisor.143 At a review of Kemnitz’s case, 
clients and caseworkers supported his work, while public officials, includ-
ing local mayors, spoke against his performance.144 Meyer was reinstated as a 
caseworker, but was transferred to Battle Creek.145 The resolution of Kemnitz’s 
case is unclear regarding his demotion, but he apparently did not leave the 
agency.146
 The position of the State Emergency Relief Administration on unioniza-
tion is not clear. SERA administrator William Haber believed in the right of 
social workers “to organize into a union for the purpose of improving their 
own condition.” Haber did not take a public stand on the issue, but did tell 
union members that they “may rest assured that the entire matter will be pre-
sented very sympathetically to the State Relief Commission.”147 He did not 
support “active participation in the organization of clients by the case worker,” 
but left the final decision to the state commission.148 But while Haber opposed 
the alliance of caseworkers with their clients, he did back the right of social 
workers to organize, particularly to address issues such as low salaries.149
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 The rank and file movement remained concentrated in large cities but 
had organizations in fifteen states, including Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois, by 
1938. Public agency organizations tended to affiliate with the State, County 
and Municipal Workers of America while private agency groups were affiliated 
with the United Office and Professional Workers of America, both a part of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations.150 Active in four counties and one city 
in Michigan, the rank and file movement did strike a chord with social work-
ers, particularly those in public agencies. An important question is why social 
workers organized in those counties but not in others, including Marquette, 
Saginaw, and Van Buren. The lack of organization in Saginaw County is the 
most puzzling, as the area already had a union presence in the auto-related 
factories and was also the site of organized protests by work-relief recipients. 
But no evidence of an organization of relief workers is evident. Regional rep-
resentatives were able to minimize the influence and appeal of the rank and 
file movement, but it is likely that many relief workers shared the frustrations 
and concerns articulated by the rank and file movement.151
 Roadblocks to social work unions in general were significant, including 
ideological conflicts between labor organizing and professions, the high turn-
over in relief-agency staff, and regional hostility to unions. As a profession, 
social work seemed to some to be in direct conflict with labor organizing. 
Unions were for workers, not professionals. The rank and file movement sought 
to reconcile those apparent contradictions, creating a new social worker iden-
tity, which Daniel Walkowitz calls “The Professional Worker.”152 Many AASW 
members viewed unions with hostility, and while some AASW chapters made 
efforts to build relationships with the unions, the issue of membership stan-
dards continued to preclude unity.153
 Unions organizing relief workers often dealt with people who did not have 
a long-term commitment to the field. Many relief workers, often white and 
middle-class, were teachers or nurses, and thus returned to their own fields 
when those job prospects improved. The elimination of federal funds for relief 
in 1936 also resulted in cuts in staff. Civil service merit requirements, insti-
tuted in 1936, gave rise to qualifying examinations for all relief employees. 
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About 12 percent of those examined failed to qualify for their positions, and 
thus lost their jobs, adding to the turnover in relief workers.154 A majority of 
relief workers were women, and thus arguments related to the difficulty in 
organizing women workers and the problems women faced in unions are sig-
nificant.155 The demographics of relief workers, then, played a role in limiting 
union development.
 Regional hostility to unions and to social workers further complicated 
social work organizing. Some regions of Michigan, such as the mining district 
of the Upper Peninsula, which included Marquette County, and also south-
west Michigan, including Kent County, were hostile to labor organizations in 
general. While Detroit had an active labor movement on several fronts, Grand 
Rapids and Marquette did not.156 A final factor with respect to restricted union 
development was the hostility toward professional social work, which the rank 
and file movement was allied to some degree. At the same time that relief 
workers argued for higher salaries as professionals, opponents advocated the 
removal of social work from relief administration entirely, because of what 
they viewed as the high salaries. New Deal measures protecting labor unions 
and workers, and the successful sit-down strikes in Flint against General 
Motors, only heightened animosity and exacerbated fears about Communists 
in unions.157 While no direct accusations about Communism appear in the 
surviving records, it is not difficult to imagine the link made by critics. Accu-
sations of Communism in the WPA unions likely touched relief workers seek-
ing better aid for their clients. Given the barriers to social work organization 
in Michigan and elsewhere, individuals willing to risk their jobs in uncertain 
economic times were probably the exception rather than the rule. 
 Some recipients of relief had little sympathy for caseworkers, deeming 
them to be overpaid, nosey investigators and, like other critics of the program, 
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not seeing the need for “professional” workers. Historian James Lorence argues 
that protests by Houghton County’s relief recipients “revealed deep worker 
resentment against welfare bureaucrats whom they perceived to be hostile 
towards the clients they served.”158 Some recipients also resented the income 
caseworkers earned in comparison to relief grants. Jobs with the county emer-
gency-relief agencies were not categorized as work relief, and thus were not 
open to those most in need unless the applicant was qualified for the posi-
tion. Some Houghton County residents saw the money paid in salaries to 
caseworkers and clerical employees as money diverted from direct or work 
relief, arguing that the $65 monthly salary earned by ten welfare investigators 
could be better spent on clothing for relief recipients.159 Another common 
complaint was that while a work-relief recipient’s earnings might be cut from 
$44 to $22, the office workers continued to draw their full pay. Salaries for 
relief workers averaged $1,573 in 1936, more than four times the relief grant 
awarded a family of four.160 In the case of women’s work, little enough money 
was spent on projects for women, compounding the problem. The minimal 
requirements for a caseworker—a high school education and preferably col-
lege and some social work experience—excluded many relief applicants. While 
the requirements for clerical workers were less tied to formal education, few 
women outside the white middle class held the skills necessary to obtain a job 
as a stenographer or bookkeeper, let alone an investigator or caseworker.
 Amanda Lorenson held a particularly hostile view of the emergency-relief 
agency. Lorenson, a divorced mother of six children, two of whom lived at 
home, was a constant critic of the Saginaw County social welfare programs. 
She wrote numerous letters complaining about the size of her grants, her ex-
husband’s failure to pay court-ordered alimony, and the personnel in the social 
welfare agency. Several of the caseworkers assigned to her reported that their 
visits consisted of “continuous complaints.”161 They argued that she often with-
held information about income or alimony when it was received, and few of 
the caseworkers trusted her. She received relief beginning in 1933, supple-
menting the earnings of her older children. Most had left home, and she was 
dependent upon public aid. A college graduate who had taught elementary 
education for three years, she was later a file clerk in the county’s WRC, but 
was discharged in 1936. Lorenson maintained it was because she was eligible 
for Aid to Dependent Children; agency officials, however, stated that she was 
 158. Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed, 86.
 159. Letter from Emil Kangas to Harry Hopkins, dated December 20, 1934, FERA State 
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unable to do the job.162 She complained to several officials, including the gov-
ernor. She wrote that she had been given high praise for her earlier work, 
and couldn’t understand “why [county administrator] Mr. Howlett should 
lay me off and keep on his negroes, it is more than I can account for.”163 As a 
white woman, she believed she deserved first consideration for employment. 
As an educated woman, she would have been an attractive candidate as a relief 
worker, let alone a file clerk, but clearly the WRC staff did not agree.
 Lorenson also criticized the young women who worked in the office, and 
had nothing good to say about any of the caseworkers she encountered in 
the five years she received aid. Her experience, age, and education placed her 
above these young women, in her view, and she deeply resented that they had 
such control over her life through the relief program, first under the WRC 
and later through ADC: “It would be impossible to state on paper the suffer-
ing I have undergone at the hands of young girls who have no interest in older 
people. A girl who is single and spends most of their time smoking cigarettes 
in a rest room has no right to dictate to older people who have a college edu-
cation.”164 It was her belief that the relief workers did not need these jobs, 
and were indeed working for amusement, with no children to support: “I was 
given a pension of $32.97 to care for two children and myself for one month, 
while [they] draw no less than $80 for pin money.”165 Lorenson wanted a job, 
preferably with the WRC, or a larger grant, and wrote that she would not take 
anything less simply “because of some young girl’s whims.”166 She did not see 
caseworkers as women with families to support, but as single young women 
benefiting from employment in a “poor man’s institution” at the expense of 
those in need.167
 Gender factored into other recipients’ outlooks as well. Martin Sheets, 
a Van Buren County applicant, wrote several letters to Michigan Governor 
Frank Fitzgerald because he had no patience or use for the women in the WRC 
office. Caseworkers approved a grocery order of $1 per week, the amount 
allowed for single men. He had received $650 in compensation for an ampu-
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tated arm, and also had a son in Chicago with whom he could live. Sheets told 
the caseworker, a woman, that the WRC needed to pay his room and board 
and food until he was eligible for an old-age pension. He was refused and the 
case rejected because he would not accept the aid offered.168
 Sheets first contacted SERA and Fitzgerald about his need before he 
applied for relief, according to the WRC. He told Fitzgerald that he was not 
able to work and that he was entitled to relief: “Now I can’t live on snow balls 
or grass.”169 He claimed that he had no money left from his arm-injury award: 
“I am not begging, never did, never stole a cent.”170 He was an honest laborer, 
he insisted, who had earned help. He refused to take no for an answer, and the 
office workers also would not budge, even when his son wrote that he could 
not support his father.171 Caseworkers believed he was trying to get something 
for nothing, and that he should still have insurance money to live on or that 
he could go and live with his son; the people he listed as references reported 
that he should have money left. Sheets wrote Fitzgerald: “Beg I never will. It 
would [please] this lipstick and powder puff office here to [sic] well.”172 A for-
mer salesman who had divorced twice, Sheets believed the women in the office 
were the problem. Thus he turned to male “higher authorities,” although it did 
him little good.
 The profession of social work faced contention on many fronts in the 1930s. 
They sought to differentiate their status from that of the earlier social workers, 
many of whom were the most vocal critics of professional social work, while 
also protecting their status from untrained relief workers within their own 
ranks. Relief workers were not full members of the profession in which they 
worked. For many, true membership in the profession was a college degree out 
of reach. Engaged in a debate over the definition of social worker, and what 
qualifications were needed for that job, many relief workers were likely look-
ing for meaningful work at a decent pay. Some probably shared the concerns 
of one anonymous critic of the relief worker’s position, who signed an article 
of complaint “by a white collar worker who is getting a trifle hot under the col-
lar.”173 The 1930s witnessed a debate over not only welfare policy in Michigan, 
but also who should administer that policy. There was also a dispute over the 
very notion of social worker identity, both within and outside the profession.
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 RecipientS oF RelieF in Michigan in the 1930s faced a welfare land-
scape different from the old system, but with some familiar landmarks. The 
expansion of federal and state involvement in welfare opened new avenues for 
appeal and protest. Emergency-relief programs provided many families and 
individuals with much-needed assistance at a time when their own resources 
were exhausted.1 Michigan recipients welcomed the programs initiated by the 
federal government, but not all agreed with the programs’ policies. The pro-
cess of applying for relief entailed a maze of interactions on the part of both 
recipients and caseworkers. Casework was an interactive process, driven by 
negotiations between recipients and their caseworkers. But these negotiations 
also included other community agencies and professionals, such as police, the 
courts, the schools, physicians, private welfare agency personnel, public offi-
cials, and family members outside the immediate household. Neighbors and 
those in contact with the recipients also injected their views at times through 
informal communication networks. At the center of these negotiations was 
the family and expectations of how families should behave, which were rooted 
in legal expectations of relatives’ obligations to support one another. Behavior 
that was rendered a private concern for those not in need became a public 
 1. Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled, 138–39, 294; Cohen, Making a New Deal, 252–53; and 
Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus, 142–43, 149–51.
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issue for those receiving public assistance. These negotiations operated in the 
realm of a welfare discourse different from the dominant narrative, and spot-
lighted questions about why welfare recipients acted as they did.
 Under Michigan law, families were legally required to support one 
another. This responsible-relative clause represents an important continuity 
in Michigan social welfare policy and was also used to contest the meaning 
of responsibility with respect to race, gender, family, and finances. Its very 
existence highlights the integral role that notions of family played in welfare 
administration in America. This rule mandated that parents, spouses, adult 
children, and grandparents were legally responsible for family support. In 
practice, the responsible-relative clause prompted significant conflict between 
social workers and welfare recipients, and also between recipients and other 
family members. Social workers were not looking for a specific family type 
or organization, such as two-parent families with a male breadwinner and a 
mother as caretaker. Rather, it was the dynamics in those families—whatever 
their makeup—that interested them. Much like child and spousal support, the 
responsible-relative rule was a means to minimize the financial burden the 
needy placed on the state.2 The responsible-relative clause was a key way in 
which welfare administration regulated families receiving relief.
 While some historians argue that the stigma against “the dole” declined 
during the New Deal years, applying for relief was not easy for many people 
in the Great Depression.3 Instead of seeking aid from a township supervisor 
or superintendent of the poor, applicants went to the office of the county wel-
fare-relief commission. The process of applying for relief required providing 
information about property ownership, bank-account listings, and debts, as 
well as verifying birth and citizenship records; the latter were critical for the 
Aid to Dependent Children and Old Age Assistance programs. Caseworkers 
computed a monthly budget (including shelter, clothing, food, and utilities) to 
determine the amount of relief needed, which was then offset by any income 
sources the family had. Caseworkers also verified wages of any employed 
household members.4 Noninstitutional medical care could be included, but 
hospitalization was a local welfare obligation.5 Thus applicants sometimes 
 2. Willrich, “Home Slackers,” 463; Igra, Wives without Husbands, 86–87.
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dealt with both the WRC offices and local poor-relief officials, and perhaps 
private agencies as well, to gain the help they needed.
 Case files generally contained at least one application form on which case-
workers recorded the home condition, family background and education, 
statements about household members and relatives, employment history, and 
health status, as well as whether the family attended church. Some workers 
encouraged applicants to develop the best plan for themselves, particularly in 
the ADC and OAA cases later in the decades. Emergency-relief caseworkers 
recorded a report on collateral information: what did the applicant’s refer-
ences, often a township supervisor or poor official, say about his or her need 
for relief? The goal of casework was to analyze the family’s information in 
order to attempt to address any larger problems, beyond unemployment, that 
had prompted the family or individual to seek relief in the first place.6 The 
caseworker was to present a composite picture of the family, and then to deter-
mine the best course of action, ideally with the recipients’ input.
 Case-file records from the early years of Michigan’s categorical-aid pro-
grams offer an opportunity to assess an alternate welfare discourse: why relief 
recipients circumvented the system. Cases generally originated in the New 
Deal years, and were among those eventually transferred to either the Old 
Age Assistance or the Aid to Dependent Children programs in the late 1930s. 
Case records are inherently subjective, as virtually all information, except for 
correspondence directly from the recipient, is filtered through a caseworker’s 
perspective and bias.7 Despite these limitations, case-file records also are rich 
sources of information about the daily administration of welfare, and offer a 
window into the power relations between recipient and caseworker, or “the 
ways in which state power infiltrated civil society.”8 Case records provide an 
opportunity to analyze the discourses and practices of welfare administra-
tion, including those employed by caseworkers and policy makers, as well as 
by recipients.9 The exchange of information rendered casework a negotiation 
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throughout the process. Recipients told caseworkers only the information that 
they wanted to share, and framed their narratives in ways they thought might 
best result in aid. Caseworkers also sifted the information with their own 
perspective, and their case histories—supposedly containing objective facts 
important in the diagnosis of the family’s problem or need—included many 
personal assessments. Many social workers, for instance, commented on the 
lack of education or desire to work on the part of clients and on the intellectual 
or psychological abilities of recipients or members of their families, even after 
one brief visit. Racial, ethnic, and class biases were also evident. Social workers 
often found it impossible to remove their own judgments from their work.10 
 Investigations involved gathering information through informal commu-
nications, including gossip, and this method was key in enforcing family sup-
port. Gossip reinforced family support by providing information that could 
lead to obtaining additional family financial assistance. The provenance of the 
gossip might be a letter or telephone call, or the result of a conversation with 
a neighbor. Caseworkers might seek information from the local grocer, school 
personnel, a police officer, a landlord, or another family member. Caseworkers 
might hear about an ex-husband who was employed and could afford child 
support, or about a son or a daughter who had a job and thus could con-
tribute to the family income. The content of these informal communications 
rested almost exclusively on the two issues of morals and money. Accusations 
of immoral behavior, including sexual relationships or consumption of alco-
hol, or the misuse of agency funds, including hiding income, employment, or 
assets, were the most common. Regardless of the content of the accusation, 
one nearly universal outcome was increased scrutiny on the case and efforts 
to secure information about other sources. Caseworkers and policy makers 
focused primarily on rooting out those who broke the rules rather than on 
interrogating why recipients did so, in large part because of the dominant 
discourse about welfare. This discourse, evident in casework practice, ste-
reotyped the welfare recipient as one who lacked moral character instead of 
questioning the structural problems in the program’s administration and the 
economy in which recipients lived.11 Many recipients who operated outside 
the boundaries of agency regulation generally felt compelled to because they 
Signs 19.2 (Winter 1994): 368–404.
 10. Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls, 137–39; Gordon, Heroes of their Own Lives, 
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needed to support their children, but this experience was a much less recog-
nized welfare discourse in this period.12
 Most scholars define gossip as information that is shared informally 
between people who often know each other. Margaret Little, who argues that 
welfare administration is an arena in which gossip is used in the public sphere, 
rather than in private communications, broadens the definition of gossip to “a 
form of communication exchanged about other people’s activities and behav-
iors that may or may not be substantiated.”13 Gossip is often used to control or 
change the behavior of individuals in the community, or to ensure that com-
munity mores are followed. In the case of welfare administration, its persis-
tence as an investigative tool rests in part on its effectiveness. Unsubstantiated 
gossip and informal communications that would not be admitted as evidence 
in a court of law enabled caseworkers to discover information about recipients 
they might otherwise not obtain. Informal communication was an effective 
investigative tool that prompted caseworkers to focus on individual behaviors 
rather than larger contextual issues, including limited employment opportuni-
ties, budget shortfalls, and family conflict.
 The position of the recipient in American society played a significant role 
in justifying the use of informal communications in these investigations. As a 
condition of receiving aid, recipients signed away their right to privacy regard-
ing virtually all aspects of their lives. They were no longer full, independent 
citizens within the welfare system. Actions by those with financial means that 
might have been accepted, or at least not investigated, by public officials were 
subject to criticism and censure when a person asked for public assistance. 
Moral issues intersected with fiscal concerns, as agencies sought to enforce 
behavior deemed acceptable by larger community customs, a part of the big-
ger goal of limiting welfare costs. The New Deal was the period in which the 
link between welfare and dependency solidified, but Nancy Fraser and Linda 
Gordon also argue that “this use of the term [dependency] was fundamen-
tally ambiguous, slipping easily, and repeatedly, from an economic meaning 
to a moral/psychological meaning.”14 Economic need was still equated largely 
with individual failing, despite the widespread unemployment during the 
Great Depression, and the nineteenth-century goal of determining those who 
were “deserving” of aid continued. This effort required “constant vigilance 
. . . to ensure that [the undeserving] did not slip in, disguising themselves as 
 12. Canning, “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn,” 381–82.
 13. Little, “He Said, She Said,” 434; Tebbutt, Women’s Talk?, 1–2.
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deserving.”15 By the 1930s the ADC program, like other public assistance pro-
grams of the period, “continued the private charity tradition of searching out 
the deserving few among the many chiselers.”16 Gossip and anonymous tips 
were effective methods to do that, and their continued use reinforced the sta-
tus of welfare recipients in American society.
regulatIng	the	aMerIcan	faMIly
Social welfare programs were designed to provide aid only when all other ave-
nues, including family support, were exhausted. Caseworkers designed the aid 
a family received, whether it was ADC, OAA, or work relief, around the needs 
of the family, and not around the individuals within that family or household. 
Those who followed the “family ideal” of support received the compliments 
of caseworkers. In contrast, families who did not support one another were 
often seen as “problem cases,” usually because individuals within the family 
failed to fulfill their roles. In some cases, relatives would leave the household 
or community rather than conform to social welfare regulations, oftentimes 
allowing their family members to regain their relief benefits. In other cases, 
recipients of relief also used this provision to secure the aid of social work-
ers in enforcing their own authority in their families.17 The efforts to enforce 
support often yielded unintended results, including exacerbating family con-
flicts or prompting the departure of family members from the household. 
The responsible-relative clause resulted in negotiations, and sometimes heated 
conflicts, between caseworkers, recipients, and their families.
 Child support or alimony, usually from the fathers, was the major source 
of support checked for ADC recipients. Before caseworkers would even begin 
to investigate ADC applications, mothers who received no alimony or child 
support at the time of application had to file a complaint of nonsupport with 
their local prosecuting attorney. Enforcement by the prosecutor varied from 
county to county and case to case, but recipients had to initiate the process of 
securing alimony to receive ADC. If the court did not order alimony, or if an 
estranged or ex-husband did not pay it, the woman could receive ADC, but 
 15. Ibid., 320.
 16. Ibid., 321.
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  |  Chapter Six
she had to file the complaint. Sarah Forbes hoped to avoid the courts in getting 
her husband to support her, but when that failed, she filed a complaint so she 
could receive ADC. When her husband stopped paying alimony, caseworkers 
increased her grant to make up the difference.18 This case was typical of ADC 
cases of nonsupport.
 The enforcement of family support went far beyond spousal and child 
support to include other family members. Conflicts usually centered on the 
amount of a child’s wages that had to be budgeted as family income. When 
determining a recipient’s eligibility for aid, social workers computed a family 
budget based on the needs of all the household members. They then offset 
that amount with any other support the recipient had, such as income from a 
part-time job, boarders, alimony, or family earnings. For children and parents 
living in the same household, caseworkers considered 60 percent of each per-
son’s income from private employment as family resources, after deducting 
for employment and personal expenses.19 If a family member was employed 
on a public works job (such as the Works Progress Administration, the Civil-
ian Conservation Corps, or the National Youth Administration), casework-
ers considered 100 percent of the income as family resources, since a public 
works assignment was granted to provide for the support of the entire fam-
ily.20
 Adult employable children were often the targets of support-enforcement 
efforts. Marion Rose, of Saginaw, was widowed in 1929. She received a moth-
ers’ pension and emergency relief before qualifying for the ADC program in 
1936. Her son, Frank, helped his mother with work from the Civilian Conser-
vation Corps, the National Youth Administration, and later the WPA, before 
joining the army in 1941. At that point, a married daughter and her husband 
moved into the home, and their income fell under the responsible-relative 
clause. They asserted that they were not permanent members of the house-
hold, and the son-in-law told the caseworker “not to monkey around with 
his wages.” The caseworker allowed two weeks for them to move, but sent a 
wage-verification form to the son-in-law’s employer. Three weeks later, the 
couple was still there; the caseworker calculated their contribution to be sixty-
 18. Case C7300142, Saginaw ADC Records, reel 4533. 
 19. This policy remained until 1945, when the State Social Welfare Commission allowed 
adult children to pay a “going rate” for room and board, rather than 60 percent of their wages. 
Investigation by staff found that cost of the change was not that high (fifty thousand dollars 
statewide over a year, even if the caseload doubled), and commission members felt it would 
be more practical. State Social Welfare Commission Minutes, August 28, 1945, 16–17, Box 2, 
Folder 1.
 20. Donald S. Howard, The WPA and Federal Relief Policy (New York: Russell Sage Founda-
tion, 1943), 341–50, 381–82.
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two dollars per month, which covered the family budget. She did not close the 
case, although she told them she would. Instead, she held their checks at the 
welfare office. She hoped the threat to cancel the grant would prompt them to 
leave or accept their responsibility to help support the mother.21 The daughter 
protested in a letter to the State Department of Welfare, two months after 
the checks were held. She rejected the notion that she and her husband were 
financially responsible for her mother. “I think it is your place to wright [sic] 
and tell them to send checks immediately to my mother for when my husband 
married me he didn’t marry the whole fambley [sic].”22 They refused to support 
the mother, but did eventually move.
 When social workers enforced the responsible-relative clause, the recipi-
ent often paid the price, either through family unrest or financial hardship. 
Marion Rose was caught in the middle. According to the caseworker’s notes, 
she wanted her daughter to move out, but they would not leave. She lost her 
ADC grant but could not depend on her son-in-law to contribute. She pleaded 
with state officials to send a check, or “I will be out on the road bcuse [sic] I 
don’t got no muney [sic] to live on.”23 Rose sought the aid of the caseworker, 
who agreed to interview the son-in-law and other children. She did not have 
the power in her household to force her daughter and son-in-law to contrib-
ute or leave. Because she lacked that authority, the agency stepped in, at her 
request. The caseworker, by simply holding the checks rather than closing the 
case, saved Rose the time of reapplying, but she remained without support for 
months.
 Caseworkers determined aid based on the needs of the family, and at times 
agency workers used work relief to force children to support their parents. 
Donna Barker, a Van Buren County resident, was a divorced mother of two. She 
earned three dollars per week caring for her grandchildren while her daugh-
ter worked, and earned extra during the fruit season. These wages were not 
enough to support her, and her son, Frank, who was twenty-two, was unem-
ployed. She applied for emergency relief in December of 1937. Caseworkers 
reported that Barker “tried to impress worker with how badly she felt about 
applying for relief, and how she has always tried to keep off relief.” According 
to the township supervisor, “That boy is too lazy to do a thing.”24 Casework-
ers noted that Barker had no control over her son, and recommended work 
relief for the son. So while Barker had little authority over her son, the agency 
could attempt to control him by providing him with a public job to support his 
 21. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300218, quote from case history June 30, 1941.
 22. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300218, letter in file dated September 16, 1941.
 23. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300218, August 4, 1941.
 24. VB ERA Records, Case 5229.
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mother. Five months later, Barker was living with her daughter, and the case 
record ends there.
 Recipients at times encouraged caseworkers to enforce their children’s sup-
port, either through letters or visits from the agency. Barker’s voice is relatively 
silent in the case record, and it is not clear whether she supported the agency’s 
efforts to enforce her son’s responsibility to support her. But other recipients 
hoped that agency workers might influence relatives in ways that family mem-
bers could not.25 Soliciting the aid of the caseworker to enforce support, how-
ever, did not necessarily imply positive feelings toward the agency. Amanda 
Lorenson, first introduced in chapter 5, complained about the size of her grant 
and about the budgets relief workers calculated for her family. She also was 
upset that she herself was not hired as a caseworker, a job she sought on more 
than one occasion. The hostility evident in her interactions with the relief 
agency, however, did not prevent her from seeking the help of social work-
ers to enforce the support law. She turned to them to collect alimony, and 
also sought their aid in garnering support from her single son, Olsen. He was 
twenty-four years old and employed at Saginaw Auto Sales, earning twenty-
four dollars per week in May 1941. Lorenson told caseworkers that he spent 
his wages on his girlfriend, but she thought his money should be going to her, 
his mother. At her request, the social worker visited her son, who refused to 
help either parent. He agreed to provide support for his sister, Evelyn, but pre-
ferred to help her directly rather than through his mother. The social worker 
was able to negotiate with Olsen some support for the family, but not in the 
way that Lorenson had hoped.26
 The presence of employable adult children in a household receiving cat-
egorical aid (such as ADC) under the Social Security Act, as in Sandy Eckett’s 
case in St. Charles Township in Saginaw County, endangered the household’s 
grant. Eckett was a widow with six children, and her three eldest—all beyond 
the age of seventeen—were reluctant to take employment to help support the 
family. Walter had two WPA assignments, which helped cover the family’s 
budget, but the other two sons, and later an older daughter, were less coopera-
tive. Another son refused a CCC assignment in October 1940, and none made 
any effort to register at the local employment office. The caseworker pressured 
them to search for employment, and when they failed to make the effort, he 
canceled the ADC grant. He believed the sons “want[ed] to sit around and 
 25. Historians analyzing case-file records have found that the recipients of aid or regulation 
often employed those services in ways never intended by policy makers. See Odem, Delinquent 
Daughters, 49–52; Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives, 164–65, 234–35, 293–95. See also Ruth 
M. Alexander, The “Girl” Problem: Female Sexual Delinquency in New York, 1900–1930 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995).
 26. Saginaw County ADC Case C700045.
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live on [their] mother’s ADC grant.” The caseworker attempted to prevent 
the sons from living off money intended for the minor children.27 The family 
wrote a letter to the bureau supervisor, arguing that only one person was work-
ing (Walter on WPA), and that there was no work. Bureau supervisor Dora 
Heilman replied that the family had the WPA income, and that there was no 
evidence any of the children had seriously sought employment: “Your prob-
lem is really that they need work and we believe they can find it if they try.”28 
The bureau believed that three employable sons and one employable daughter 
could support the family of seven, particularly with a base income from WPA, 
and the case remained closed.
 Budgeting practices frustrated many recipients, who resorted to decep-
tion simply to make ends meet.29 Budgets computed for the program allowed 
for only a minimum standard of living. ADC was not a generous program. 
Grants were intended for children’s expenses, and federal guidelines did not 
include support for the parent.30 In 1938 a parent with one child was eli-
gible for a maximum grant of eighteen dollars per month; additional children 
garnered twelve dollars.31 Some counties, including Wayne County, supple-
mented federal grants with local and state funds, but not all counties did so. 
Barely enough to cover rent, let alone anything else, an ADC grant was indeed 
“partial support.”32 All women faced limited employment opportunities, but 
none more so than black women, who were largely confined to domestic 
work and who paid higher rents for poorer housing.33 Most ADC recipients 
 27. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300478, case history dated October 14, 1940.
 28. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300478, letter to recipient, October 18, 1940.
 29. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein discuss this trend in contemporary welfare programs in 
Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1997). See also Hays, Flat Broke with Children.
 30. Linda Gordon, “Putting Children First: Women, Maternalism, and Welfare in the Early 
Twentieth Century,” in U.S. History as Women’s History: New Feminist Essays, eds. Linda K. 
Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Kathryn Kish Sklar (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995), 81–82; Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal 
Public Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 138–39.
 31. Gordon, “Putting Children First,” 83; A Manual for Aid to Dependent Children (Lan-
sing: Michigan State Emergency Relief Commission, 1938), 1. By 1940 minimum grants had 
increased to twenty-four dollars and sixteen dollars. Michigan’s average grants tended to be 
higher than in some other states, especially in the South. Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the 
Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
126–28.
 32. Joanne Goodwin, “‘Employable Mothers’ and ‘Suitable’ Work: A Re-Evaluation of 
Welfare and Wage-Earning for Women in the Twentieth-Century United States,” Journal of 
Social History 29.2 (Winter 1995): 253–74; Goodwin, Gender and the Politics of Welfare Reform, 
172–74.
 33. See Wolcott, Remaking Respectability, 52, 60; Kevin Boyle, Arc of Justice: A Saga of Race, 
Civil Rights, and Murder in the Jazz Age (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 108–10.
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were single mothers who had to work any paid employment around their 
children. Critics argued that ADC rules discouraged employment. Casework-
ers deducted all employment income from the grant unless a budget deficit 
existed; thus for every dollar recipients earned, they lost a dollar from their 
respective grants.
 The agency’s budgeting system was not always the problem; rather, it 
was sometimes a caseworker’s overzealous interpretation of the budgeting 
practices.34 One Wayne County caseworker, for instance, received a report 
that Georgia Evans was employed at a local beer garden, and a check with 
the employer found that she had indeed worked there, briefly, and was paid 
one dollar. Despite the small amount of income (Evans paid rent of thirteen 
dollars per month for herself and her son), the caseworker admonished her 
that she had to report all income.35 Elizabeth Kurzawski denied any outside 
employment, and said she worked at the local farmer’s market on Saturdays for 
chicken and eggs. Her caseworker was unconvinced, even after a letter from 
the market stated that Kurzawski had received a dozen eggs. The caseworker 
deducted two dollars—the estimated value of the produce—from the woman’s 
budget.36 When Mary Stevens was confronted by her caseworker about the 
furniture she had purchased, she said that “she was tired of having her budget 
decreased . . . Each time she instructed her worker that she was working she 
would cut her budget.” She no longer told the agency when she earned extra 
income, because, she told the caseworker, “they don’t give you enough anyway 
and then they deduct what you make and you have to work very hard to earn 
this money.”37 When Norah Robbins’s case was closed in 1944, after her chil-
dren obtained employment, she admitted she had not always told caseworkers 
of her children’s earnings, or of her alimony, asserting that the “agency had 
always been so rigid in budgeting policies that this was the only way that she 
could manage.”38
 34. For a discussion of budget practices under the SEWRC, see A Manual for Suggested 
Policies and Procedures for Use by County Relief Administrators (Lansing: Michigan Welfare 
Emergency Relief Commission, 1938), 3–8.
 35. Wayne County ADC Case C8204988, case history from February 16, 1939. Neighbors 
also alleged that Mrs. Evans’ roomer was her common-law husband, but the charge was never 
proved. The case was closed two years later when her son, Melvin, entered the CCC and was no 
longer in the home.
 36. Wayne County ADC Case C8206148, case history from October 30, 1939; November 
3, 1939; November 9, 1939. The case was closed in early 1943 when Mrs. Kurzawski obtained 
employment at a local defense factory.
 37. Wayne County ADC Case C8202382, case history from May 22, 1942.
 38. Wayne County ADC Case C8203039, reel 4647, case history from May 9, 1944.
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decIdIng	to	leave
In some cases, state regulation of family responsibility prompted children 
to leave home. Some children accepted public employment but rejected the 
program’s rule that they relinquish all of their wages to the family, opting to 
move out or even leave the area. Frank Perelli, for example, moved in with his 
grandparents to escape the harassment of caseworkers and their insistence 
that he find work.39 Cynthia Wright’s son, Burton, refused to accept a WPA 
assignment if it meant supporting the entire family. He saw that income as his, 
regardless of the source, and refused to “work under those conditions.” He had 
had a previous WPA assignment, and resented his monthly wage of thirty-eight 
dollars going to the family. The caseworker informed him that if he refused 
the WPA job, he would be removed from the family’s food budget and receive 
no aid. He relented and agreed to be recertified. But one month later, Burton 
left the city before his recertification went through, and the caseworker had to 
increase Wright’s ADC grant to compensate for the lost wages.40
 Family members who secured private employment and lived in the house-
hold applying for aid did not face the same rules governing public employment. 
Their contribution was set at 60 percent of their income (after deductions and 
employment expenses). But some refused to do even that. Sarah Harding, a 
mother of two living in Detroit, began receiving an ADC grant in 1938. Hav-
ing been deserted by her husband the year before, Harding relied on ADC and 
on the earnings of her older daughter, Lilly, for support. But Lilly moved out in 
mid-1942 rather than support the family. Her mother sympathized with her, 
and refused to tell the caseworker where her daughter lived. The caseworker 
spent two months trying to locate Lilly, advising Harding that her case would 
be closed if Lilly did not come to the office. Eventually, Lilly did return home, 
and called in September to notify the caseworker that she would support the 
family.41
 Not all children, however, returned after leaving home. Rachel Raney, 
a black woman whose husband deserted the family in 1932, supported her 
three children with a WPA sewing job in Saginaw. She was cooperative, and 
caseworkers admired her efforts to keep her family together. When her WPA 
project ended in 1939, she applied for ADC because she wanted to stay home 
to supervise her teenage daughter. Her grant was reduced, however, when her 
 39. Marquette County ADC Case C5200174, case history from April 25, 1938. 
 40. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300200, case history from August 16, 1939; September 
18, 1939.
 41. Wayne County ADC Case C8205153, case history from July 12, 1942; August 27, 1942; 
September 26, 1942.
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son, Garland, entered the CCC. Later, a wage check found her son earning 
enough at a local factory to support the family. But Garland Raney refused 
those terms, and was gone a month later. When Rachel Raney finally received 
her grant in mid-October, she was trying to support her family with occasional 
housework, for which she earned $1.50 per day.42 Employment opportunities 
in Saginaw and other Michigan cities were scarce for black women such as 
Raney. Day work was among the few options.43 Limited in employment oppor-
tunities because of race and caught in the middle of the social agency’s bid to 
enforce family obligations, Raney and her two younger children struggled to 
make it in a labor market segregated by race and gender.
 Caseworkers, in their efforts to enforce family support, often expected 
the person with perhaps the least power—often the stay-at-home mother—to 
enforce that responsibility with her adult children, as in the case of Raney. 
But parents dependent on public aid likely carried little authority with their 
adult children, particularly their sons, who saw themselves as independent 
adults with a right to the money they earned. Parental efforts to enforce fam-
ily support, and later efforts to do so by the welfare agency, did worsen or 
rupture relationships. When Edith Walton of Detroit applied for ADC for her 
two young daughters in 1938, her son Clyde was working, and his brother 
Arthur was on WPA. Consequently, the application was denied. Two years 
later she reapplied, after Arthur had married. The caseworker again denied 
the application because Clyde was employed by Dodge and earning thirty-two 
dollars each week, 60 percent of which easily covered the family expenses. 
Clyde threatened to leave both the household and his mother with no support. 
But he also realized his mother was physically unable to work and thus Clyde 
stayed in the home.44
 Walton reapplied again five months later. Her son Clyde had become ver-
bally and physically abusive in the meantime. She preferred dependency on 
the state to her son’s behavior. The agency approved a small grant, but not 
enough to relieve Clyde of his obligations. A few months later, he married and 
moved out. He would not contribute anything to his family’s support, and the 
mother reported that they were barely speaking. She eventually found defense 
work in Detroit, and her case was closed in early 1943. The damage to her 
family’s relationship, however, had already been done.45 Although it is impos-
 42. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300279.
 43.  Wolcott, Remaking Respectability, 80–85, 231–39; Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the 
Urban Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 25.
 44. Wayne County ADC Case C8207798, case history from June 27, 1940; November 4, 
1940.
 45. Wayne County ADC Case C8207798, case history from April 23, 1941; February 11, 
1942; March 19, 1943.
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sible to know if the agency caused the problem, their zeal likely exacerbated 
the conflict. It placed the mother in an abusive situation, however unintended. 
This case also highlights the centrality of the family unit’s well-being over that 
of individual family members. The family dynamics, with a son providing sup-
port for his mother and siblings, overrode what might have been in the best 
interest of the mother, who was placed in a vulnerable position economically 
and forced to depend on a son reluctant to support her.
 Efforts to enforce a child’s responsibility prompted some parents to side 
with their children, opposing their children’s obligation to provide for the 
family. Betty Johnson, an African-American mother of two daughters, offers 
one such example. Widowed in 1938 after her husband died from tuberculosis, 
Johnson also had to cope with living with an arrested case of the disease her-
self, and her children were monitored because of their exposure.46 Early entries 
in the case record describe a family who lived in a nice residential district. The 
caseworker wrote that the “relationships within the family are excellent and 
it seems apparent that Mrs. [Johnson] is giving the children excellent care.”47 
Problems arose when the two daughters began working. Betty was employed 
at Ex-Cell-O Products, but her mother told the caseworker that “Betty was giv-
ing her too much now and it was none of the worker’s business how much she 
gave the family.” A wage check found that Betty was earning forty dollars per 
week, but planned to move, with the full support of her mother.48 She would 
rather have the case closed, she said, than allow caseworkers to intrude even 
further in her family’s life. The case was closed the next month.49
 The probate court was another avenue to enforce support. At times case-
workers encouraged family members to seek aid through the court system, if 
their efforts proved unsuccessful. The probate court had long been the agency 
to enforce support through court orders, as caseworkers could only threaten 
to end or refuse aid. When sixty-seven-year-old Diane Strand of Saginaw was 
referred to the Welfare Relief Commission for an OAA grant in late 1937, her 
son, David, lived with her and worked part-time at the local Chevrolet parts 
factory. His mother told the caseworker outright that he was irresponsible. 
Strand, a widow since 1926, was in poor health and suffered from asthma; she 
could no longer work as a domestic and laundress and relied on her son and 
 46. For the treatment of TB, see Barbara Bates, Bargaining for Life: A Social History of 
Tuberculosis, 1876–1938 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), and Georgina 
D. Feldberg, Disease and Class: Tuberculosis and the Shaping of Modern North American Society 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995).
 47. Wayne County ADC Case C8201132, case history from December 6, 1941.
 48. Wayne County ADC Case C8201132, case history from July 21, 1943.
 49. Wayne County ADC Case C8201132, case history from August 17, 1943.
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OAA for support.50 Her son’s arrest for lewdness a few months later involved 
the police, who asked the caseworker to stop Strand’s OAA grant, arguing that 
she used it for her son. Investigation found that David Strand earned more 
(fourteen dollars per week) than a WPA wage, although he was employed only 
part-time. He also had a car, and refused to get rid of it. The Strands were told 
the grant would be canceled, and returned later with an attorney, to no avail.51 
The caseworker consulted probate court officials, and all agreed it was better 
to enforce the son’s responsibility to support his mother. Diane Strand did not 
agree, and protested the closure in a letter to supervisor Dora Heilman. She 
had no money and questioned the power the caseworker and the agency held 
over her grant: were they “the judge and jury?” The caseworker apparently 
had told her that she had spoiled David, but Strand refuted this, writing that 
she had to leave him alone often after she was widowed to clean houses to 
earn a living. He had been forced to take care of himself, she wrote, at a very 
young age.52 Caseworkers did not reinstate her grant, but did secure a WPA 
assignment for David, and Strand later obtained full-time employment with 
Chevrolet in Saginaw.53
 Some recipients reluctantly sought help through the probate court. Joan 
Yates, a widow with four children, did file a support complaint. Yates, a sev-
enty-one-year-old native of Mississippi living in Saginaw County, was ini-
tially denied OAA in late 1936 because she had two employed men (a son 
and a son-in-law) living with her, and also because she lacked the proof of 
age and residency required for a grant. She applied again in 1937 and was 
approved. A 1939 investigation found a daughter, Leslie, and her husband 
and four children living with Yates, but these family members asserted they 
had enough resources only for themselves. Another son, Warren, also lived 
there, but told the agency he could not help his mother. He had debts to pay 
and was separated from his own wife. Agency supervisor Dora Heilman wrote 
that he would “never be responsible for his mother’s support.”54 Two years later 
another caseworker found Warren earning $190 per month; his contribution, 
using the agency’s formula, covered the budget deficit. The caseworker, after 
consulting with Heilman, closed the case and referred Yates to the probate 
court. Yates came to the office and told the caseworker that she could not 
 50. Saginaw County OAA Case A7302543, reel 3015, case history from November 18, 
1937.
 51. Saginaw County OAA Case A7302543, case history from March 21, 1938.
 52. Case A7302543, case history from April 26, 1938; letter from Strand to Heilman, dated 
June 1, 1938.
 53. Case A7302543, case history from June 23, 1938; December 9, 1938.
 54. Saginaw County OAA Case A7301193, reel 3003, case history, April 12, 1939; April 18, 
1939.
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take her son, whom she called “a whiskey head,” to court, and that it was not 
fair for “this agency to expect me to rely on him for support.” Warren again 
refused to help her, but her case remained closed. With no other options and 
no other children to help, Yates reluctantly filed a petition for support with the 
probate court. The court found that because of the shutdown of local factories 
employing the woman’s children, support could not be ordered.55 The woman 
reapplied, but died one month later before her case had been investigated. 
Because she had not been an approved OAA recipient, no burial allowance was 
permitted.56 In this case, the pursuit of court-ordered support caused much 
grief for the recipient with no resulting support.
 Combining court-ordered support with pressure from caseworkers also 
prompted children to leave home rather than support their parents. Pau-
line Ristav, a forty-five-year-old widow with six children, faced conflict with 
several of her children over their support for her and their younger siblings. 
Ristav, who was a recipient of an ADC grant before her husband’s death from 
tuberculosis, in late 1938, had her case closed at one point because of suf-
ficient income, likely from her older children. She invested her insurance 
money in a home. Her son Avery left home because of the amount he was 
expected to contribute. Ristav went through the probate court, which ordered 
Avery to pay three dollars’ support per week. She told the caseworker that the 
court-ordered support had soured her relationship with her son. Her eighteen-
year-old daughter, Laurie, who worked part-time and contributed four dollars 
per week in room and board, later balked at paying sixty dollars per month, 
which had been computed on the basis of her higher factory wages; Laurie was 
expected to contribute 60 percent. She would pay only eight dollars per week 
in room and board, however, and argued further that since her brothers did 
not pay, she would not.57 Laurie moved out rather than pay the ordered sup-
port, and her mother refused to go through the probate court again. Without a 
court order, Laurie was not obligated to pay the support. Caseworkers did not 
decrease Ristav’s grant for her younger children, ages six and ten, as she had 
endeavored to enforce support and other children were helping, most likely. 
But when the caseworker received word that Avery had claimed his mother as 
a dependent on his draft form, in the hopes of getting an exemption, Ristav’s 
ADC check was held, pending investigation. If the report were true that 
Avery claimed he was supporting Ristav for draft purposes, the agency would 
 55. Case A7301193, case history from August 11, 1941; August 24, 1941; November 24, 
1941; December 15, 1941.
 56. Case A7301193, case history from January 19, 1942 and February 20, 1942.
 57. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300548, reel 4540, case history from December 28, 1939, 
to February 4, 1942.
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eliminate the ADC. However, he had apparently not claimed her as a depen-
dent, and the state office, when asked, allowed the ADC to continue despite 
the ability of relatives to help, because they had been unsuccessful in enforcing 
support.58 Again, efforts to enforce support only increased family friction and 
resulted in Ristav losing what little help her children had provided.
 Some recipients simply refused to allow family members to be interviewed 
for support. This occurred in Sarah Harding’s case, described earlier, when 
she refused to tell caseworkers where her daughter, Lilly, lived. Another case 
involved James and Ellie Stern, who lived with their son, employed at the Sagi-
naw Foundry. They had deeded their home to him in exchange for support. 
The Sterns did receive a small Old Age Assistance grant, as their daughter-
in-law was an invalid and their son had large medical bills to pay.59 When the 
caseworker suggested contacting their daughter to see if she could help, the 
son refused. He would assume full support, despite the burden, rather than see 
her investigated. The case was closed, although the father wrote to Governor 
Murray Van Wagoner, pleading for his grant; his son could not do it all. State 
officials joined the negotiations when they requested a report from the Welfare 
Relief Commission, and also suggested a small grant. State officials backed off 
immediately when the local officials explained the case, and encouraged the 
family to allow the daughter to be contacted. They continued to refuse, and 
the case remained closed. State officials deferred to local caseworkers in this 
instance, as they had direct knowledge of the case and clearly were following 
agency regulations.
 Property ownership was a problem unique to OAA cases. Property trans-
fers to children were relatively common, and did not always remove eligibility, 
as in the Sterns’ case, depending on the income of the children who received 
the property. The property transfer usually was in exchange for continued 
housing and financial support. Carl Janetzka, for instance, a native of Czecho-
slovakia and a U.S. citizen, received a rather small OAA grant—just $2.50 per 
month—for clothing and incidentals. He had lived with his son and daughter-
in-law for more than a year, since his wife had died, and they got along well. 
But when the caseworker found that his grant was for “pocket” money, rather 
than essentials, and also found a deed transfer, she closed the case. Under the 
terms of the property transfer, it was up to the son to provide for his father, 
and he had sufficient means to do so.60 Janetzka was in the OAA office a few 
 58. Case C7300548, case history from March 16, 1942, to January 25, 1944.
 59. Saginaw County OAA Case A7301106, case history from July 30, 1936; April 14, 
1937.
 60. Saginaw County OAA, Case A7301375, reel 3005, case history from September 2, 1938; 
December 4, 1939; and May 1940.
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months later, seeking a WPA job, as he needed clothes and did not want to ask 
his son. The caseworker told him he had already paid for the clothes with his 
land, and that his son was legally obligated to provide for him.61
 Not all cases involving property transfers and parental support were so 
amiable. In the Janetzka case, the son did not protest his responsibility to his 
father, but others did, often exerting extreme stress and hardship on their par-
ents. John Arnold, who had farmed just west of Saginaw, began receiving aid in 
late 1935 because of ill health, and later was transferred to the OAA program. 
He lived with his son, George, a farmer. Arnold’s small grant covered clothing 
and medical care, as his son’s wife was rather ill and their income was limited. 
At that time his son did see his father’s care as his duty, and continued to 
provide for him, although the other children did not contribute.62 A year later, 
however, George asked his father to leave. Arnold planned to move in with 
his daughter, but later moved to Bay City to live with a brother. Prompted by 
a comment by the brother, the caseworker found that Arnold had deeded his 
property to his son, and that the terms of the agreement included a life lease, 
space for a garden, medical care, and burial. After consulting with the state 
office, the caseworker closed the case, since Arnold had never been entitled to 
the original grant.63 The son immediately protested, arguing that his father did 
not know what he was talking about, but was chagrined when the caseworker 
told him that his father had said nothing about the deed. The tragedy was that 
the son refused to take Arnold in again, and asked him to leave for good. The 
caseworker intended to visit the son, but nothing was recorded. Apparently 
Arnold stayed with his brother until his death, three years later, at the age of 
ninety.64
 Property requirements served as a deterrent to the OAA program. A sig-
nificant number of Wayne County’s recipients (nearly 7 percent) withdrew 
their applications before they were investigated, and the most common reason 
was a refusal to sign over their property to the state. Many opted to forego aid 
rather than sign that form. More than half were later approved for aid anyway, 
but the property requirement likely dissuaded some from applying. The 1947 
Recovery Act enabled the state and county to make a claim against a deceased 
recipient’s estate for OAA grants during his or her life.65 State officials saw an 
 61. Case A7301375, case history from August 9, 1940. The man died two years later.
 62. Saginaw County OAA, Case A7300761, reel 2998, case history from September 13, 
1938.
 63. Case A7300761, case history from July 19, 1939; July 25, 1939; September 5, 1939.
 64. Case A7300761, case history from September 11, 1939.
 65. Public Act 262 of 1947, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan 
(Lansing: Franklin, DeKleine Company, 1947), 393–94.
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immediate 3 percent increase in closings, which they attributed to the new 
law.66
 Caseworkers and policy makers were aware of the difficulties the enforce-
ment of relatives’ support had on families. They discussed how best to pursue 
such support, and some acknowledged that their efforts were “very apt to be 
harmful to the family relationship.”67 In 1946 the Michigan Social Welfare 
Commission recommended rethinking the budgeting of relatives’ contribu-
tions. Budgets should include only support that was actually received, rather 
than expected, because “many aged persons are barred from receiving assis-
tance, or are compelled to subsist on reduced payments” due to relatives refus-
ing to fulfill their responsibilities.68 But the commission’s overall support for 
the law remained and continued to be used to limit the state’s welfare costs.
the	Model	caSe
Families who conformed to welfare administration’s expectations of support 
earned the respect and compliments of caseworkers, and were often described 
as model cases for the program. What is most compelling about these trends is 
that the family structure or marital status of the ADC grant recipient was less 
significant than the dynamics operating within the family. In fact, the case-file 
sample shows that married or widowed recipients accounted for about half of 
all cases in both Saginaw and Wayne counties, even among ADC recipients 
(see table 6.1). Single women in Wayne County are the smallest group, but 22 
percent of Saginaw County’s cases were unmarried. The numbers reveal that 
although married and widowed women, long defined as the most “deserv-
ing” recipients of mothers’ pensions, comprise more than half of the Saginaw 
and Wayne ADC pool, nearly half were divorced, deserted, separated, or even 
never married.69 Men also accounted for some recipients in all counties: 36 
percent in Marquette County, just 2.3 percent in Saginaw County, and 7 per-
cent in Wayne County. Male recipients were found almost exclusively in the 
married or widower category in all three counties.
 66. Fifth Biennial Report of the Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1946–June 1948 
(Lansing: December 1948), 17–20.
 67. Field Report by Ella Lee Cowgill, Kent County, June 4, 1943, 1–2, Narrative Field Re-
ports, Archives of Michigan, Box 6, Folder 10.
 68. Fourth Biennial Report, 2–3.
 69. Linda Gordon analyzes the long-term stigma of single mothers of all types in welfare 
history and also documents the early bias against separated, divorced, deserted, and never-
married mothers. ADC’s early advocates remained silent about the latter groups of women, but 
in Michigan they did receive aid. Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled, 26–29, 105, 280–81.
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 The ADC program was far more inclusive racially in the sample than 
other studies have shown, particularly for Wayne County. One-third of Wayne 
County’s ADC recipients in the sample were nonwhite, far higher than their 
share of the population. Saginaw County’s sample included 10 percent that 
involved nonwhite recipients. But the sample also shows that while married 
and widowed recipients are a significant share, they are not a majority. Forty-
four percent of Saginaw’s nonwhite ADC recipients were either married or 
widowed. The rest were divorced, deserted, or separated. Just under 4 percent 
were unmarried, again the smallest group in the sample. For Wayne County’s 
nonwhite recipient population, 49 percent were widowed, and just a little more 
than 5 percent were married. Deserted, divorced, and separated recipients 
accounted for 43 percent of the cases, but unmarried women accounted for 
just 1 percent.
 Family dynamics were central to a caseworker’s perception of a case. Regina 
Schultz, a forty-one-year-old mother of four, began receiving a mothers’ pen-
sion from Saginaw County in 1931, after her husband died of a heart attack. 
Schultz’s youngest child was two, and she also cared for her elderly mother. 
She supplemented her mothers’ pension with domestic work and sewing, and 
fortunately had a place to stay in her mother’s home. Schultz’s case was trans-
ferred to ADC in 1936.70 She continued to receive ADC until 1947, but despite 
her lengthy partial dependence on public aid, caseworkers saw this case as a 
model that justified public social welfare programs.
 Caseworkers found Schultz to be an excellent housekeeper and mother. As 
her children grew older, they began to supplement her ADC grant with part-
time jobs. Her siblings also assisted with the care of her mother. Her children 
never balked at helping support their mother, and she eventually lived with 
one of her married children. The caseworker who closed the case in July of 
1947 wrote, “The situation in this home is one that is really beautiful. The 
 70. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300182,  reel 4534. 
table	6.1
MarItal	StatuS	of	adc	recIpIentS	(%)
county and 
program Married
divorced or 
deserted Separated Single widow widower
Marquette ADC 67 6 9 2 4 0
Saginaw aDC 18 21 21 22 37 1
Wayne aDC 13 31 10 1 42 3
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children are obviously fond of their mother and she of them. The grandmother 
is a welcome and loved member of the household.”71 Schultz’s case clearly fol-
lowed the “family ideal” of support: she raised her children to be independent 
but also accept their familial responsibility, and thus reduced her long-term 
dependence on the state.
 Case-file analysis also shows that race was not the determining factor in 
model cases. Families who worked together and accepted responsibility for 
other members were not only white, middle-class widows, as Schultz was. 
White widows often were portrayed as the most “deserving” of America’s poor, 
but women in other categories could also be a part of this model group. This is 
not to say that marital status, race, and class were irrelevant, but positive fam-
ily relations could, in some sense, overcome other factors that might have con-
tributed to a negative view of a case or family. Positive family relations—which 
followed the white, middle-class model—could result in what caseworkers 
termed a “high type” case. Divorce, desertion, or illegitimacy did not carry 
the stigma in 1930s Michigan social work that is found in earlier periods.72 
Minorities and noncitizens did receive aid from the state social welfare pro-
grams in the Depression, although not in proportion to their rates of unem-
ployment. Caseworkers entered homes of Mexicans, African-Americans, and 
the foreign-born with different expectations than in those of white homes. In 
a sense, minorities and lower-class whites had to “prove” their worth in ways 
that other families did not. But some were successful, and exhibiting family 
relations of harmony or unity was one such way.
 Marcella Hernandez of Saginaw was one case in point. A Mexican citizen 
with one daughter, Hernandez suffered from tuberculosis, the same disease 
that had killed her husband in 1930. She spent six years in the local sanitarium 
while her sister cared for her daughter, Beatrice. She was released in May 1938, 
although not fully cured, and applied for an ADC grant. From the start, she 
impressed the caseworker “as being exceptionally honest and trustworthy and 
was most anxious to cooperate.” She lived with her sister and brother, who had 
supported the family with a job at the Saginaw Foundry. He had been laid off, 
however, prompting her to seek ADC for her daughter.73 The application was 
approved, and Hernandez received aid for the next six years. The daughter 
earned excellent citizenship marks, and a caseworker in 1942 referred to her 
as “a high type Mexican girl.”74 The mother returned to the hospital briefly in 
1944, and again the sister cared for her child. When Hernandez was released, 
 71. Case C7300182, quote from case history from July 18, 1947.
 72. For a discussion of marital status, race, and welfare, see Mink, The Wages of Motherhood, 
36–41. 
 73. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300010, case history from May 5, 1938.
 74. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300010, case history from January 16, 1942.
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her daughter secured a part-time job to help her mother, who could also work 
only part-time. When Beatrice finished high school in 1947, she planned to 
secure full-time work and support her mother, whose health still precluded 
any job more than part-time. The social worker saw the Hernandez case as an 
exemplar, one that served as “a good advertisement for the ADC program.”75 
The lengthy partial reliance on public support was not a problem, and neither 
was the woman’s race or citizenship status. Rather, it was the family network 
and feeling of responsibility—illustrated through the sister and brother’s will-
ingness to help their sister with child care and financial support, and later her 
daughter’s assumption of part of that responsibility—that made this an ideal 
case. The ADC program enabled the mother to care for her daughter, who 
grew up to be a responsible and self-sufficient adult. Beatrice’s willingness to 
support her ill parent precluded other long-term support for her mother at 
that time.
 Rose Moore, a Detroit African-American mother of four, earned the praise 
of caseworkers for similar reasons. Her husband died in 1930, when her oldest 
child was eleven. She received a mothers’ pension before her case was moved 
to ADC, whereupon she supplemented that grant with day work. Her home 
was always neat and clean, and she lived in a “good negro district.”76 Her chil-
dren helped with part-time jobs as they grew older. By 1942 her son Fred, who 
was eighteen, was able to support the family on his income, and the case was 
closed.77
 Caseworkers also sometimes helped noncitizens who faced restricted 
employment opportunities. Hilda Weber was a divorced mother of a two-
year-old son when she applied for aid. A native of Germany, she had never 
obtained citizenship. Her ex-husband did not have a job, and thus she had no 
support. When she needed a tonsillectomy two years later, the county denied 
her, telling her to get a job. She would have to pay for child care, and only fac-
tory work paid enough. As a noncitizen, however, no one would hire her. Thus 
she was caught; she needed employment that paid enough to enable her to 
obtain care for her child, but had limited options because of her lack of citizen-
ship, circumstances that county officials failed to see. At the encouragement of 
her caseworker, she started the citizenship process, unsure whether she could 
afford the fees, but she eventually did and obtained factory work, leaving the 
ADC program.78
 75. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300010, case history from May 8, 1947.
 76. Wayne County ADC Case C8200720, reel 4630.
 77. Wayne County ADC Case C8200720, case history from January 10, 1941; September 
23, 1942.
 78. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300184, reel 4534, case history from July 13, 1939; Oc-
tober 1, 1941; August 20, 1942.
  |  Chapter Six
 When Juan Gortez, a Mexican citizen and sugar beet worker, was diag-
nosed with tuberculosis, in 1938, his family began receiving ADC while he 
recovered in the Saginaw County TB Hospital. His wife, a Mexican-Ameri-
can woman born in Texas, cared for their children on the ADC program and 
with domestic work until he recovered. But upon his release, he found himself 
unable to secure employment, as he had no citizenship papers. His caseworker, 
along with bureau supervisor Dora Heilman, contacted local churches and 
community members to help with the process. As a result, he became a citizen 
and found a good factory job that enabled him to support his family.79 The 
family was well liked by the entire community, as evidenced when their home 
burned down in 1943. All four children died in the fire, and a collection pro-
duced one thousand dollars for a new home for the couple. The caseworker 
recorded: “In spite of all the hardships they endured they held to their pur-
pose to rise above the level of itinerant beet worker and to make a place for 
themselves as respected citizens.” The caseworker classified the family as “high 
type,” again a model Mexican family who “disproved” the stereotypes so com-
mon among the agency staff.80
 In the case of Beulah Beloiz, a son faced marital troubles over the issue 
of helping his mother and siblings financially. Beulah Beloiz was widowed in 
1934. A naturalized citizen, she received a mothers’ pension and then ADC 
for her four children. Josef was the oldest, and, in 1940, had left his wife, in 
part over disputes about his financial support of his mother, who spoke little 
English and required Josef ’s help in order to navigate the language barriers. 
One caseworker commended the “strong feeling of family responsibility on the 
part of each to the group as a whole.” By October 1940, two daughters were 
employed, one on WPA and another at Dodge. Josef was divorcing his wife 
and planned to help as well, and the case was closed.81
 The case of Anthony Benilli is a unique one, in that a father was the recipi-
ent of ADC for his children. Left a widower in 1936, Benilli received ADC for 
his six children, the eldest of whom was born in Italy. His citizenship status 
made employment difficult for him and his eldest son; he was laid off WPA 
when rules precluded the hiring of noncitizens.82 Benilli also was a man of 
pride, and therefore did not always tell caseworkers when his children lost 
jobs; he made do rather than seek a higher grant. Caseworkers reported that 
 79. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300444, reel 4538, case history from April 3, 1939; Jan-
uary 10, 1940; December 10, 1940.
 80. Case C730044, case history summary from August 29, 1947.
 81. Wayne County ADC Case C8201050, reel 4633, case history from January 23, 1940; 
April 2, 1940; October 24, 1940.
 82. Wayne County ADC Case C8203480, reel 4650, case history from October 21, 1940.
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the children were always willing to help their father and siblings, and com-
mended the cooperative feeling they shared. By 1942, two of the children had 
steady employment. Benilli told the caseworker they no longer needed aid, 
although he gave no details, and the case was closed.83
 Efforts to enforce support were moderately successful, although many 
family members quietly did their part with no vocal objection to caseworkers. 
Fifteen percent left the Marquette County OAA program because they had the 
means to support themselves, either through family members or through the 
sale of assets, often a home or farm. Nine percent of Saginaw’s OAA recipi-
ents left the program when relatives were able to support them, and another 
4 percent found other means, often through the sale of assets, to regain their 
independence from government programs. Just 3 percent of Wayne County 
recipients, however, were able to leave the program through family support or 
other reasons. More than a third of the ADC cases in both Saginaw and Wayne 
counties were closed when a family member—either a parent or child—found 
employment sufficient to support the family.84 Thirteen percent in Saginaw 
found other sources of income, usually from more than one area, including 
alimony, part-time work, or a military allotment from a son or other relative. 
The war years saw an increase in cancellations due to family resources, since 
the war’s employment opportunities enabled more families to support their 
elderly parents.85 In 1940 and 1942, increased family resources accounted for 
about half of all ADC closures in the state.86
 Work-relief programs also proved to be an important means for people to 
leave the direct relief programs. Half of the Van Buren emergency-relief recipi-
ents found employment, either in the private sector or on a works program. 
Twenty-seven percent of the Van Buren cases listed private employment as 
the reason for closing the case; in one case a son secured a job to support the 
family. Another 3 percent found “unsteady” employment, but since their case 
was not reopened, someone in the family likely was able to find full-time work. 
Sixteen percent received WPA assignments, and in two of those cases it was 
for a son in the household. Three percent received assignments on a National 
 83. Wayne County ADC Case C8203480, case history from June 24, 1942.
 84. In Saginaw, 35 percent of the cases listed private employment as the reason for closing 
the case. Employment of children accounted for 15 percent, employment of the mother com-
prised another 15 percent, and in 5 percent of the cases a husband was again able to work. For 
Wayne County, mothers were employed in 8 percent of the cases while fathers accounted for 4.4 
percent. Children’s employment resulted in closure in 22 percent of the cases.
 85. Second Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1940–June 1942 
(Lansing: December 1942), 35.
 86. First Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1938–June 1940 (Lan-
sing: December 1940), 40; Second Biennial Report, 39.
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Youth Administration project (two were students), and one case included a 
CCC assignment for a son. The works programs proved critical for Van Buren 
residents, where 23 percent were able to leave the direct-relief rolls to secure 
some type of public work. For those recipients, work relief provided interim 
employment until a job could be found in the private sector.
 The categorical-aid programs of the Social Security Act also were impor-
tant to a significant portion of Van Buren’s relief population. Twenty-seven 
percent of the cases analyzed qualified for either OAA or ADC. The other 
3 percent received ADC (one moved as well), and two others likely received 
ADC, although it is not clear from the record. Thus about a quarter of the 
cases continued to receive aid under the Social Security Act, indicative of 
the entrenched welfare needs that became so evident during the Depression 
years.
 Studies of ADC often overshadow the OAA program, when the latter 
served far more Americans than ADC until the mid-1950s and was a critical 
force in reducing extreme poverty among the elderly. Nationally, more than 2 
million elderly received OAA in 1940, while just 131,000 received social secu-
rity benefits. OAA caseloads were twice that of ADC in 1940, and “even as late 
as 1949, Old Age Assistance beneficiaries outnumbered those of Social Secu-
rity by a third—2.49 to 1.67 million.”87 Long waiting periods for applicants was 
the norm in the first years of the program. Michigan had a backlog of 32,000 
cases in 1940 with a nineteen-month waiting period; by 1942 the backlog was 
just 3,151.88 By 1946, OAA served more than a quarter of all Michigan resi-
dents above the age of sixty-five, and 22 percent two years later.89 The OAA 
caseload peaked in Michigan at 100,000 cases in September 1950; that same 
year the ADC caseload was just over 27,000.90
 The records of the other three counties show stark differences in the two 
categorical-aid programs. Most OAA recipients received governmental help 
for the remainder of their lives. The chief reason for closing an OAA case was 
the death of a recipient: this was true in two-thirds of the Marquette County 
cases, 80 percent of the Saginaw cases, and 82 percent of Wayne County cases. 
Another 18 percent of Marquette County’s clients were institutionalized in 
 87. Katz, The Price of Citizenship, 4–5.
 88. Second Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1940–1942 (Lansing: 
December 1942), 33; Third Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1942–
1944 (Lansing: December 1944), 7–8.
 89. Fourth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1944–1946 (Lansing: 
December 1946), 20; Sixth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1948–
1950 (Lansing: December 1950), 11.
 90. Seventh Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1948–June 1950 
(Lansing: December 1950), 34–35, 47.
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a hospital until their deaths, while 7 percent in Saginaw and 5. 3 percent in 
Wayne County shared that fate. Statewide, death prompted the closure of at 
least half of the OAA caseload, and those numbers climbed to about 65 per-
cent by the 1950s.91
unSuItabIlIty
Part of enforcing family responsibility was ensuring an appropriate environ-
ment for children, a key goal of the ADC program, which called for a “suit-
able home with reasonable standards of care and health,” but it was up to 
local agencies to establish and enforce those standards. The 1938 program 
manual advised measuring the existing standards against available options: 
“This does not mean contentment with low living standards, but measurement 
in terms of alternatives.”92 Michigan’s suitable-home clause was approved by 
the Social Welfare Commission on April 22, 1940. An unsuitable home was 
defined as one in which children suffered from “indifference, ill health,” or a 
lack of material care (food, clothing, medical care, etc.). Parents were to see 
that their children attended school and were to provide a positive “example of 
socially desirable behavior.” They were also to make sure children were loved 
and wanted, and that they enjoyed both security and respect.93
 Unsuitability was not an issue in a lot of cases; less than 3 percent of the 
Saginaw cases and 3.4 percent of Wayne’s cases resulted in an unsuitable-home 
finding or the removal of children, either because of neglect or delinquency. 
The low numbers of cases closed for unsuitability is somewhat surprising, as 
the application of such regulations to police recipients is found in studies of 
later periods.94 This evidence points to a period in the program when the suit-
able-home provision was simply used less in the closure of cases. This obser-
vation does not mean, however, that caseworkers were not concerned with 
issues of morality. Moral issues—including promiscuity, prostitution, unmar-
 91. First Biennial Report, 35; Second Biennial Report, 35; Third Biennial Report, 11; Tenth 
Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1956–1958 (Lansing: December 
1958), 30.
 92. A Manual for Aid to Dependent Children (Lansing: Michigan State Emergency Welfare 
Relief Commission, 1938), 5.
 93. Minutes of State Social Welfare Commission, Box 1, Folder 1, April 22, 1940, Archives 
of Michigan.
 94. Scholars link the increased use of suitable-home provisions to the growing number of 
nonwhite and nonwidowed recipients in the program in the 1950s and 1960s. Winifred Bell, 
Aid to Dependent Children (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), 111–23; 
Mittelstadt, From Welfare to Workfare, 46, 86–87.
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ried cohabitation, and alcohol use—appeared in 4.4 percent of Saginaw’s cases, 
18 percent of Marquette’s cases, and 9 percent of Wayne County’s sample. 
Recipients both resented and denied many charges about morals issues, and 
experienced heightened inspection and attention, but few had their respective 
ADC cases closed in this period.
 The majority of morals concerns were related to sexuality. Recipients were 
often accused of cohabitation; a man was living in the house, and thus was 
suspected of providing economic support. Some recipients were accused of 
promiscuous behavior, particularly if they had illegitimate children while 
on ADC, and a few cases involved prostitution. Alcohol was also an issue, 
although often it was connected to another problem, as was neglect. Several of 
the recipients also were labeled “feeble-minded” or of “low intelligence.” Both 
black and white recipients endured such scrutiny, although black women did 
so in greater proportion than their share of the caseload. African-Americans 
assumed 35 percent of all morals cases in Wayne County, and more than 20 
percent in Saginaw County.
 Gossip was inextricably linked to the investigation of morals in these cases. 
Caseworkers often relied on reports from neighbors, landlords, and other fam-
ily members, in addition to their own surveillance. While few recipients lost 
aid because of such accusations, they did face increased scrutiny. Recipients 
tired of investigators’ intrusions and investigations, and many did not believe 
that their relief status warranted such intrusion. Jane Mansfield, an African-
American widow in Detroit, was a model recipient in her first years with the 
agency, but later came under intense investigation. She told the caseworker in 
1939 that she preferred not to work—although she had done day work in the 
past to supplement her mothers’ pension—because her children needed her 
at home (the youngest was ten). The caseworker reported that the home was 
suitable and that “no complaint has been received by our office.”95 Complaints 
began after Mansfield’s stepson left for the military. Neighbors reported alco-
hol use and loud parties and said a man, employed at Ford Motor Company, 
was living with her. The caseworker became concerned about the home’s suit-
ability and the woman’s honesty, despite the nine years of no complaints with 
the mothers’ pension program and no corroboration of the accusations. Man-
sfield denied the allegations, and told the caseworker she had already gone 
through this with the mothers’ pension department as well. She “talked at 
length concerning the fact that her case had been thoroughly investigated, why 
she did not know, and she was definitely tired of it.” She decided to seek pri-
vate employment, and told the caseworker that if the agency wanted to close 
 95. Wayne County ADC Case C8200569, case history from July 16, 1940.
“I Can’t Make a Go of It”  |  
the case, that was fine with her. Less than two weeks later, in September 1943, 
Mansfield called the office to report that she was employed at Ford Motor 
Company in defense work, earning eighty-five cents per hour, and wanted her 
case closed.96
 But rigorous inquiry like this was uneven. The accusation of a male living 
in a home did not guarantee such invasion. A Saginaw caseworker received a 
report of a man living with Sally Reynolds in 1938, but accepted that it was 
likely a rumor started by her estranged husband. Three years later she had a 
male roomer and his son living with her. The roomer paid rent, they shared 
child-care responsibilities, and he helped with home repairs. But again, case-
workers raised no questions about his status. The case was closed at Reynolds’s 
request when she secured employment at a local factory. She worked days, 
and the roomer worked nights.97 Other than the early report, which Reynolds 
attributed to her estranged husband, the case record has no hint of suspicion 
regarding the relationship. The case of Beulah Shoren, who was separated 
from her husband, was similar. Caseworkers found her relationship with her 
roomer questionable at one point, but did not pursue it.98 Both women were 
white, as opposed to Jane Mansfield, but it is hard to know if race was a deci-
sive factor, given the limited sample.
 At times caseworkers sought to avoid labeling some closures an unsuitable 
home, particularly if another reason existed. Local officials actually did not 
favor those laws in many instances, as recipients denied or cut off from ADC 
had to turn to local relief, which did not receive federal funds. Fiscal localism, 
and a desire to minimize the obligations to use local funds, again appears. 
Local officials also tended to see other alternatives, including removal of chil-
dren from homes, as expensive and not always warranted.99 Caseworkers, 
therefore, may have sought to appease these officials by avoiding such clas-
sifications. In one Wayne County case, caseworkers did not tell the mother 
the closure was for unsuitability, “given her [mental] instability.”100 At times, 
 96. Wayne County ADC Case C8200569, case history April 16, 1943; April 28, 1943; April 
30, 1943; September 17, 1943; September 30, 1943.
 97. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300054, case history March 21, 1939; February 29, 1940; 
October 8, 1941; March 4, 1943.
 98. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300135, case history from January 16, 1940.
 99. See Proceedings of the Annual Convention of State Association of County Social Welfare 
Boards and State Association of Supervisors, 1946, 15–26. A 1962 law required counties to 
provide direct relief when ADC was denied or ended because of an unsuitable home, but the 
law had little effect on the direct-relief caseloads. Thirteenth Biennial Report, Michigan Social 
Welfare Commission, July 1962–June 1964 (Lansing: December 1964), 17; Public Act 195 of 
1962, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan (Lansing: Speaker-Hines 
and Thomas, Inc, 1963), 432.
 100. Wayne County ADC Case C8204271, case history from February 23, 1942.
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they simply avoided the label for reasons specific to the case. Gossip alleged 
that Susan Morrow, an African-American recipient in Saginaw, was living 
with a man employed at a local factory, a situation confirmed by the man. 
Caseworkers found that the man had listed Morrow as a dependent on his 
draft application, and closed Morrow’s case because of sufficient income.101 
Another Saginaw case involved Erin Hartz, a white mother of two children 
who was unmarried. The probate court record criticized the lack of training 
and guidance Hartz had given her children, but Hartz was approved for an 
ADC grant in part because of a lack of alternatives. Caseworkers had reports 
of men in the house and neglect of the children, and Hartz became pregnant 
again. A psychiatric evaluation said she had “no moral sense,” and she also 
contracted gonorrhea. The case team—including the casework supervisor, 
Associated Charities staff, and probate court officials—agreed that the home 
was in no way suitable. Hartz eventually agreed to be sterilized after the child’s 
birth, and to have her children placed, and the case closed. The reason listed, 
however, was not an unsuitable home, but “receipt of other public or private 
aid.”102
 To caseworkers, ADC was one of several options for a child’s care, and, in 
some cases, the preferred one, because the family’s status as ADC recipients 
allowed caseworkers to supervise the household beyond its financial needs. 
Such was the case for James Bellwood, one of the few fathers in the ADC 
records. A resident of Saginaw and father of six, he had one son living with 
him in 1939. He worked irregularly due to arthritis and a nervous disorder, 
which doctors attributed to his service in World War I. Neighbors complained 
of his drinking and violent behavior. He had a housekeeper, who also received 
ADC for her daughter, to help with his son’s care, and they planned to marry 
once her divorce was finalized. Caseworkers were concerned with the safety 
of both children in the home, but did not want to close the case because of 
unsuitability without an alternate plan for the children. A married daughter, 
who was caring for two of her older sisters, agreed to take the son into her 
home, but before that could occur, Bellwood received a veteran’s pension and 
asked that his case be closed.103 Caseworkers clearly did not think the home 
was suitable, but with the removal of Bellwood’s financial need, they lost the 
ability to monitor the case. They did not officially close the case, in the hope 
 101. Saginaw County Case C7300379, case history from January 8, 1941; March 5, 1942; 
March 9, 1942; March 12, 1942.
 102. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300630, case history from February 26, 1940; October 
4, 1940; October 15, 1940; November 14, 1940; November 12, 1940; November 19, 1940.
 103. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300017, case history from April 14, 1939; May 13, 1939; 
February 16, 1940; March 29, 1940.
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that they could still have some influence, but Bellwood then retrieved his 
daughter from the older daughter’s home. While caseworkers could not pre-
vent this, they referred the matter to the probate court. What makes this case 
interesting is that caseworkers clearly ignored the “woman in the house,” the 
housekeeper. Their relationship was not simply employer and housekeeper, 
given their intention to marry, but the caseworkers did not even allude to it. 
This could point to the gender double standard, in what they expected of their 
female recipients in contrast to the men, whose numbers were much smaller. 
The safety of the children in the house likely overrode the moral concerns, 
in part because the housekeeper provided Daniel’s care, serving as a buffer 
between him and his father. Again, no better alternative existed, in the eyes of 
caseworkers, who thus adjusted their expectations.
 Trying to provide what was best for the child within ADC guidelines 
emerges in another Saginaw County case. Rose Garner was a long-term recipi-
ent about whom caseworkers had very little positive to say. They criticized 
the family’s intelligence, labeling most “feeble-minded,” and had numerous 
conflicts with the older son, Warner, about his financial contributions to the 
family. Anonymous letters told caseworkers of men living in the home and 
unexplained luxuries not possible on the family’s reported income. Several 
of the children had conflicts with the law, and more than one spent time in 
juvenile detention homes. Budget cuts, however, prevented the court from 
removing the children entirely as long as ADC was allowed. The case was the 
subject of a staff conference, but caseworkers agreed that ending ADC with no 
other plan was not in the children’s interest, since the receipt of ADC allowed 
caseworkers to supervise the family. Although caseworkers clearly believed the 
home was unsuitable, the ADC grant continued.104
 Recipients could protest decisions by the agency via requesting a fair hear-
ing, which involved a state field representative, as well as the county adminis-
trator, case supervisor, and caseworkers.105 A transcript of the hearing was then 
sent to the state office, which either upheld or reversed the agency’s action. 
Generally a copy of the case history was also enclosed—a vivid example of 
when caseworkers were under scrutiny for their handling of a case. Very few 
recipients in the sample requested fair hearings: less than 1 percent in both 
Saginaw and Wayne counties, and none in the Marquette County sample. 
Recipients requesting one of the three hearings in the Wayne sample, and 
one of the five in Saginaw County, withdrew their respective requests before a 
hearing was held. What made the fair hearings unique were both the chance 
 104. Case C7300003, case history dated February 8, 1940; February 23, 1940; April 9, 1940; 
April 11, 1940; May 1, 1940; May 2, 1940.
 105. A Manual for Aid to Dependent Children, 16.
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for the recipient’s view to be recorded unfiltered through the caseworker—the 
transcript was to be verbatim—and the type of evidence considered. Weight 
was generally given to either direct observations of caseworkers or evidence 
presented by either the courts or the police; gossip from neighbors, landlords, 
or family members was not given the credence it might have been in an inves-
tigation.
 The sample is small enough to render broad generalizations difficult, but 
the reasons for the hearings are illuminating. All three cases in Wayne County 
were categorized as unsuitable homes, while just one of five in Saginaw County 
dealt with an unsuitable home. Two of the three in Wayne involved black 
women, while just one of the five in Saginaw was black, but that case also 
involved issues of morality and unsuitability. The more common reason in 
Saginaw was budgetary; either recipients contested the budget allotted them or 
disputed the closure of cases based on sufficient income. Here the fair-hearing 
process intersects with the enforcement of family support. Recipients used the 
fair hearing, at times, to contest the responsibility of their children to support 
the family.106
 Questions of morality were central to the fair hearings in Wayne County. 
The case involving the withdrawn request focused on the mental stability of 
the mother, who was deemed of “low intelligence.” Caseworkers believed her 
mental health precluded her employment, and the case record documents 
caseworkers’ concerns about the son’s lack of attendance at school and the 
care his mother provided. The case was closed and referred to the DPW with 
a suggestion to remove the child.107
 Court findings concerning accusations of running a house of prostitu-
tion proved key in the state’s validation of the agency’s closure in the case of 
Tammy Dunbar, an African-American. The Department of Public Welfare 
record contains several references to such accusations, although the ADC 
caseworker in this instance noted that he had seen nothing to indicate pros-
titution. A court case involving a paternity suit filed by a woman who said 
she had conceived the child in that house prompted the case closure. Again, 
the caseworker wrote that he had seen nothing, and that Dunbar denied the 
allegations, but the case was nevertheless closed. The state based its deci-
sion on the court record, finding the court testimony compelling, despite the 
caseworker’s comments. Dunbar may have been guilty, but also may have been 
 106. A 1954 law allowed recipients to request a review, through the probate court, of the 
contributions expected of relatives. The contribution would not be budgeted until the court 
review was complete. Eighth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1952–
June1954 (Lansing: December 1954), 15.
 107. Wayne County ADC Case C8204271, case history from May 31, 1940; February 23, 
1940; April 20, 1942.
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the victim of a racist court system, which provided the basis for the closure of 
her case.108
 Carol Barnes, an African-American ADC grant recipient in Saginaw, 
endured similar charges and also had her case closed because of unsuitability. 
In her case, the testimony of a black police officer was central to the state’s 
decision. The officer believed she was running a “sporting house” and testi-
fied that the red light and jukebox in her apartment were evidence enough. 
According to the caseworker, Barnes had also posed as the wife of her boy-
friend on more than one occasion. The state supervisor criticized much of the 
information presented by the caseworkers, finding it largely hearsay, circum-
stantial in nature, but he did find the police officer’s “evidence” compelling. He 
upheld the agency’s decision.109
 The alternate discourse of welfare emerges vividly in these cases. Labeled 
immoral and unsuitable by caseworkers, these women saw themselves in a dif-
ferent light. Dunbar and Barnes likely were engaging in what Victoria Wolcott 
describes as illicit leisure businesses, which included liquor trafficking, buffet 
flats, and houses of prostitution. (Barnes had served jail time in Georgia for 
alcohol violations before moving to Michigan.)110 But Wolcott argues that such 
businesses were a means to fight the low wages and high rents endured by 
black women; Dunbar and Barnes rejected day work, the most common occu-
pation open to black women, and sought different and more lucrative means 
to support their children. Such entrepreneurial efforts, however, contradicted 
the goals of respectability set forth by black reformers, including the Detroit 
Urban League, as well as by the public welfare system.111 Thus both women 
ultimately lost their aid.
 Another fair hearing involving Martha White, also a black recipient, 
resulted in the reversal of the agency’s decision. Caseworkers asserted that 
White had hidden income and also had represented herself as the wife of her 
boyfriend on more than one occasion, once to an agency employee. The hear-
ing transcript unfortunately did not survive, so we do not know the basis for 
the state’s reversal, but clearly they found some error in the county agency’s 
policy. White was reinstated to the ADC program, and no further morality 
issues appear in the record.112 In this instance, she pushed her case and won.
 108. Wayne County ADC Case C8210470. Virginia Wolcott documents the racist bias in 
the court and police system in Detroit in the interwar period. Wolcott, Remaking Respectability, 
103–5.
 109. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300312, case history from January 8, 1942; January 15, 
1942; hearing transcript.
 110. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300312, case history from March 7, 1940.
 111. Wolcott, chapter 3, “The Informal Economy, Leisure Workers, and Economic National-
ism in the 1920s.”
 112. Wayne County ADC Case C8205611.
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 Financial issues were at the center of some hearings, and while not all 
recipients were reinstated, their suits did prompt some behind-the-scenes 
action. The effects of the responsible-relative clause, and the flexibility within 
that policy, appear in Rachel Wood’s case. When Wood’s son, Donald, quit the 
WPA, in early 1939, caseworkers removed him from the family budget and 
reduced the grant; this decision was the final straw for the Saginaw widow, 
who was already upset at the small grant she was receiving, and blamed her 
son’s convictions for stealing on the agency’s expectations that he support the 
family.113 Caseworkers did allow Donald to keep twelve dollars of his monthly 
fifty-dollar WPA wage, which contrasted the usual practice of having the 
entire salary go to the family. Because of the son’s history, the caseworker 
clearly felt this might appease him. It did not, and he came to the office to 
confront the caseworker. His mother backed him; it was not Donald’s respon-
sibility, she contended, to support the other children, three of whom were only 
his half siblings. The caseworker suggested that she request a fair hearing, and 
she did.114 The state agency upheld the budget decision, and Wood continued 
to receive ADC. But in the hearing summary—although not in the letter to 
Wood—Philip Schafer, director of social services, questioned the caseworker’s 
attitude and handling of the case. He directed the field representative to look 
into the situation “relative to the adequacy of this worker to deal with prob-
lem cases.” Although it did Wood no good in her situation, she did succeed in 
raising questions about the caseworker’s actions. Unfortunately, Wood died a 
year later from a severe heart attack, at the age of forty-five, and her children 
became wards of the state, as no relatives could take them.115
 Recipients sought to maintain an active role in the planning of their cases. 
They spoke out when they felt wronged, and often rejected the caseworker’s 
or the agency’s assessment of their need, or lack of it. They did not see them-
selves as dependents spreading their disease in American society, and many 
believed that their own circumstances or behavior entitled them to state aid. 
While they exhibited a range of reactions to the relief process, and put forth a 
variety of justifications for aid, they were agents in that process. They took full 
advantage of new avenues of appeals, including petitioning officials in state 
and federal agencies. The recipients’ narratives of relief contrast markedly with 
the picture painted by local officials, a situation described in the next chapter. 
Local officials depicted state and federal regulations, including the hiring of 
 113. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300354.
 114.  Saginaw County ADC Case C7300354, case history from February 21, 1939; March 14, 
1939.
 115. Saginaw County ADC Case C7300354. Hearing summary dated May 16, 1939; case 
history from May 27, 1940.
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professional social workers, as the key problems with emergency relief; they 
were inefficient and fostered dependence, these officials maintained. County 
supervisors, superintendents of the poor, and other proponents of home rule 
saw themselves as the last defense against a monster centralized government 
intent on subverting the democratic process and local autonomy. Only in 
defeating the monster, in their eyes, could home rule advocates prevent the 
spread of dependence, and they mobilized effectively in the late 1930s to do 
just that.
 “we have not shirked our responsibility,” E. H. Hoddenott of Lenawee 
County told the Welfare and Relief Study Commission in 1936. “We want 
that which the constitution of this nation says we could have, the right to rule 
ourselves, and will fight for it . . . That is the feeling of the people, and I know 
it is intense because we went along with the set-up for four or five years, but 
we feel the emergency is over.”1 Applause greeted Hoddenott’s remarks at the 
November 10, 1936, hearing of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission.
 His views represented the most vocal opinions of local officials of the wel-
fare debates in the 1930s. These debates focused on competing narratives, at 
the center of which were basic philosophical differences about which level of 
government should administer relief (and how) and what training or experi-
ence was needed. The two visions of professionalization clashed during these 
final debates. Fears of the centralization of government and a loss of electoral 
representation fueled the conflicts. Rhetoric often focused on the invasion of 
local communities by the federal and state governments, and key players in 
that invasion were social workers. A coalition of township supervisors, county 
officials, and superintendents of the poor, and the organizations that repre-
sented them, successfully fought efforts to remake general relief from a local to 
 1. Minutes of November 10, 1936, hearing in Lansing, Welfare and Relief Study Com-
mission Minutes, Box 1, Folder 9, 62.
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a state program run by professional social workers. Reorganization of welfare 
proved limited in Michigan, as the ideology of home rule prevailed. By 1940 
social workers primarily administered the categorical aid programs under the 
Social Security Act: Aid to Dependent Children, Old Age Assistance, and Aid 
to the Blind. General-relief programs, the third track of welfare that emerges 
in this period, generally returned to local control and pre–New Deal relief 
methods.
 The end of FERA, in December 1935, signaled a shift in welfare policy in 
Michigan and other states. Federal funding for direct relief ceased when FERA 
shut down, but relief continued with local and state monies.2 With the federal 
government out of the general-relief picture, the landscape changed markedly. 
Michigan’s State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission began to give town-
ship, city, and county officials more say in the administration of relief. Federal 
money funded only the categorical-aid programs of the Social Security Act 
(ADC, OAA, and AB), and thus SEWRC had to have local contributions for 
general-relief programs. SEWRC no longer could use federal funds to ensure 
local government cooperation with its programs, and lost its major bargaining 
chip in negotiations for relief contributions. Change occurred on two levels: 
the first centered on the immediate need to adjust relief with the end of FERA, 
and the second—the appointment of the Welfare and Relief Study Commis-
sion—addressed long-range welfare reform in Michigan.
 Governor Frank Fitzgerald, elected in 1934, worked with local officials 
to reshape relief after the demise of FERA. He was critical of the emergency-
relief system and favored greater local control.3 He appointed the WRSC in 
April of 1936, but local officials demanded immediate change. By June of that 
year, the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission, working with Fitzger-
ald, revised the composition of county welfare-relief commissions. SEWRC 
appointed only one of the three members of the county’s welfare-relief com-
mission; county supervisors selected the other two. A major goal of the shift 
was “to secure greater public support and interest in the administration of 
relief.”4 Governor Fitzgerald, through an executive order, created a civil service 
merit system for employees and a qualifying examination for all current WRC 
employees. Fitzgerald and proponents of the change hoped to keep politics out 
 2. Brown, Public Relief, 301. FERA officially ended December 31, 1935.
 3. Michigan Field Report from Howard Hunter to Hopkins, January 20, 1935, 1–2, FERA 
Michigan Field Reports, National Archives, Box 138, Folder 2; “Relief Power Return Asked,” 
Lansing State Journal, April 30, 1936, 1–2; and WRSC Report, “State Organization for Public 
Welfare in Michigan,” March 1937, 186–87, WRSC Records, Box 5, Folder 4.
 4. SERA Letter #589, June 4, 1936; SEWRC Papers, Box 1, Folder April to June 1936; 
“State Organization for Public Welfare in Michigan,” 186–87.
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of relief, which was a goal of FERA, but Fitzgerald also supported a greater 
local role in relief administration.5 Eventually he would be a vocal advocate 
of home rule, campaigning on that issue in 1938.6 Michigan was not alone in 
its actions following the demise of FERA. Other states also strengthened local 
control, often returning control of relief to local officials to an even greater 
extent than Michigan.7
 Although temporary measures to administer categorical-aid grants were 
approved, Michigan still faced the task of complying with the provisions of 
the Social Security Act on a long-term basis. Efforts in 1935 to reform welfare 
stalled when the legislature failed to pass either of the two major bills intro-
duced,8 a situation that led to Governor Fitzgerald’s creation of the Welfare 
and Relief Study Commission in April of the following year. The WRSC’s task 
was to recommend how to reorganize Michigan’s welfare programs, “as well 
as to give greater service to the indigent and needy persons in the state.” The 
Social Security Act also necessitated administrative changes if the state was to 
qualify for categorical-aid grants to help dependent mothers, the blind, and 
the aged.9 The commission’s report and the reaction to its findings framed the 
final welfare-reform debates of the decade.
 The commission’s eighteen members, two of whom were women, repre-
sented a range of occupations and perspectives on social welfare. The group 
included four local officials (both city and county), three business owners, 
three members of the state’s existing welfare commissions, four current state 
officials, one attorney, and two physicians. Key local officials on the com-
mission were Kent County Probate Judge Clark E. Higbee, Marquette Mayor 
Arthur Jacques, who also would chair the county’s WRC in 1937, Oakland 
County supervisor Oliver Gibbs, and William Thomas, Kent County super-
intendent of the poor. Important state officials included SERA administra-
tor William Haber, State Welfare Department Director Fred Woodworth, and 
William Norton, chair of the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission. 
 5. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 408–9; George Granger and Lawrence R. 
Klein, Emergency Relief in Michigan (Lansing: May 1939), 11–12.
 6. “Fitzgerald Lashes at Centralization,” Lansing State Journal, July 29, 1938, 14; “Fitzger-
ald Heads the Speakers Scoring Present Laws,” Evening News, July 29, 1938, 1, 10; and Fine, 
Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 484–85.
 7. Cole, “The Relief Crisis in Illinois,” 267–68; Anthony Badger, North Carolina and the 
New Deal (Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History, 1981), 48; and Thomas, 
An Appalachian New Deal, 153–54.
 8. Arthur Dunham, “Public Welfare and the Referendum in Michigan,” Social Service 
Review 12 (September 1938): 418. 
 9. Minutes of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission, April 20, 1936, 4; WRSC Re-
cords, Membership list; Box 1, Folder 1, and Box 9, Folder 1; Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal 
Years, 411–12.
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Harold Smith, executive director of the Michigan Municipal League and state 
budget director, was chair of the commission.10 Arthur Dunham, a professor 
of social work at the University of Michigan, was secretary and eventually 
directed the commission’s study.11
 The 1936 commission was not the first to evaluate the state’s welfare system. 
Two commissions—the Commission on Public Relief and Care and the Child 
Welfare Commission—had been established in 1917. Both recommended 
sweeping changes in local welfare administration, including the abolition of 
the superintendents of the poor. The reports’ criticisms were similar to those 
found in later commissions, including the WRSC: local officials were often 
untrained political appointees who made only superficial efforts to investigate 
relief applications or coordinate aid with other agencies.12 Opal Matson, in her 
1933 report, Local Relief to Dependents, recommended a county unit because 
most relief activities, including mothers’ pensions, county infirmaries, and 
juvenile programs, were organized on that basis. She also questioned the peo-
ple employed to administer that relief: “There seems little reason to make the 
most serious and most costly service a local matter administered by untrained 
and often uninterested persons.” She recommended the abolishment of super-
intendents of the poor and the removal of all welfare administration “from the 
hands of the supervisors and city welfare directors.”13 Commissions to study 
welfare in Michigan were not new, but action following them was rare. The 
1936 commission would be different.
 The WRSC quickly hired a staff and undertook a thorough study of all 
aspects of Michigan’s welfare system, including SERA, the crippled-children 
commission, and the OAA Bureau, as well as a detailed study of local welfare 
services in seventeen counties in Michigan. The commission also held four 
public hearings in Lansing, Detroit, and Muskegon to gain input from local 
officials and other interested people, and met with state officials in charge of 
the various departments related to welfare.14 Once the commission had an 
 10. Smith was a Republican but was known to have voted for Eugene Debs in 1920 and 
Roosevelt in 1936. He later was appointed head of the federal Bureau of the Budget by Roos-
evelt. See Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 269.
 11. Dunham, “Public Welfare and Referendum in Michigan,” 420. 
 12. “Preliminary Report of Commission to Investigate Public Relief,” February 22, 1917, 
copy in WRSC Records, Box 3, Folder 8; Emma O. Lundberg, State Commissions for the Study 
and Revision of Child-Welfare Laws, U.S. Children’s Bureau Publication No. 131 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1924), 47–49.
 13. Matson, Local Relief to Dependents, 69. 
 14. Dunham, “Public Welfare and Referendum in Michigan,” 420–21; WRSC Minutes, 
April to December 1936, WRSC Records, Boxes 1 and 2. Counties included Gogebic and Delta, 
in the Upper Peninsula; Hillsdale and Eaton, representing diversified agriculture; Kalamazoo 
and Jackson, for diversified industry; Isabella and Montcalm, oil resources; Kalkaska and 
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understanding of the current welfare system, members began to debate how 
best to improve it.
 A multitude of overlapping agencies characterized Michigan’s welfare sys-
tem prior to its 1939 reorganization. Michigan had nine state agencies, includ-
ing the State Emergency Welfare Relief Commission and SERA, established in 
1933. The state welfare department, created in 1921, had a director and deputy 
director, and three commissions, all served by nonsalaried members: the cor-
rections commission, the welfare commission, and the institute commission. 
The director of welfare also oversaw the old-age pensions (and later the OAA 
program) before the 1939 law. Michigan also had a crippled-children com-
mission, State Department of Corrections, state hospital commission, and the 
Michigan Child Guidance Institute.15 Local welfare systems contained another 
nine agencies, including the county superintendents of the poor, which over-
saw the county infirmary; township supervisors, who administered outdoor 
relief; probate courts (responsible for mothers’ pensions, dependent/neglected/
delinquent children, and hospitalization); and county welfare-relief commis-
sions. Some counties had relief commissions for soldiers and sailors, and juve-
nile detention homes as well. The WRSC study found a total of 1,976 state and 
local agencies involved in public welfare administration in Michigan’s eighty-
three counties.16
 Consolidation was the key goal, and the WRSC argued largely between two 
possible administrative structures at the state: one department (including pris-
ons and mental hospitals) or three separate departments (mental hygiene, cor-
rections, and public assistance).17 The commission eventually recommended 
three commissions and departments.18 The report also recommended state 
supervision of local agencies, through the state department of public welfare, 
arguing that “sound statewide programs require statewide minimum stan-
dards and a blending of state leadership with local autonomy and initiative.” 
Federal regulations for the Social Security Act’s grants (ADC, OAA, and AB) 
Montmorency, for cut-over-recreation; Saginaw and Oakland, high urbanization; Mason and 
Oceana, fruit; and also Allegan, Genesee, and Ingham. “Local Public Welfare,” n.d., WRSC 
Records, Box 5, Folder 10, 18–20.
 15. Arthur Dunham, The Michigan Welfare Reorganization Act: An Analysis (Lansing: Mich-
igan Conference of Social Work, October 1939), 10; “State Organization,” chapter 1, WRSC 
Records, Box 5, Folder 4, 36.
 16. Dunham, The Michigan Welfare Reorganization Act, 12; “State Organization,” 16; 
Dunham, “Public Welfare and Referendum in Michigan,” 421–23.
 17. “Michigan’s Organizations for Public Welfare Services,” WRSC Records, Box 3, Folder 
8, 2.
 18. “State Welfare Organization,” 271; WRSC Minutes, July 10, 1936, Box 1, Folder 2; 
Report of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission (Lansing, December 1936), 7, 12–17.
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also required state supervision if the state was to qualify for funds.19 The hiring 
of qualified personnel, through a civil service merit system, was recommended 
for all state welfare employees.20
 The WRSC staff, led by Secretary Arthur Dunham, undertook extensive 
investigation of local and state welfare programs and ultimately recommended 
a wholesale reorganization of the welfare system.21 In addition to accumulating 
reports on state institutions and departments, staff members conducted inter-
views with local officials and visited the agencies in the seventeen counties; 
they read minutes from boards of supervisors and reviewed annual budgets. 
The WRSC staff report recommended consolidating all welfare programs, 
including ADC, OAA, direct relief, medical and hospitalization, institutional 
care, and relief for soldiers and sailors into a single county agency subject to 
state supervision. The key recommendations centered on hiring trained social 
workers, using professional social welfare practices, and coordinating social 
welfare programs. The authors rejected the argument that local officials, as 
residents, knew their fellow citizens better than did outsiders and could best 
assess their needs; that argument simply was not enough, as “too often famil-
iarity breeds contempt.”22
 The report ultimately recommended a single, integrated county depart-
ment of public welfare, governed by a three-member board: one member 
appointed by the state and the other two by the county board of supervisors, 
modeled after SERA’s administrative revisions in mid-1936. The county board 
of supervisors could opt to appoint a member of their board, if they wished.23 
The county DPW would oversee all aspects of welfare, including the county 
infirmary, categorical-aid programs (ADC, OAA, and AB), medical care, hos-
pitalization, and direct relief. A welfare director would administer the depart-
ment, and also serve as secretary to the county social welfare board. The plan 
abolished the emergency-relief commission, soldiers’ and sailors’ relief com-
mission, county old-age assistance board and investigator, and the offices of 
the superintendents of the poor and the county agents.24 Personnel would 
be selected through a civil service merit system. The report argued that the 
problems with the existing system were the training and qualifications of the 
personnel running it, not “the indifference or insincerity on the part of the 
 19. Report of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission, 23.
 20. Report of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission, 24; Fine, Frank Murphy: The New 
Deal Years, 412–13.
 21. WRSC Records, “Local Public Welfare,” Box 5, Folder 10, 22.
 22. WRSC Records, “Local Public Welfare,” 181–82.
 23. Report of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission, 25–26.
 24. Ibid., 8.
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individuals.”25 The report’s language sought to soften the blow to township 
supervisors and county superintendents of the poor, who had administered 
relief in Michigan for decades. But the report’s recommendations rejected the 
home rule position, including the pre–New Deal model of relief administra-
tion, in favor of the position advocated by professional social workers and 
FERA.
 WRSC member William Thomas, a superintendent of the poor, attacked 
the local report on more than one occasion, disputing its portrayal of the old 
relief and demanding to see details about the criticisms. He likely felt person-
ally challenged by criticism of the existing system and of his colleagues. He 
refused to accept the possibility that perhaps not all poor-relief administrators 
were like he was, as suggested by other commission members. Staff did out-
line in their reports specifically which county official generated which criti-
cism, but Thomas rejected the evidence presented: “You can’t tell me that in 
those counties where the superintendents of the poor or other agencies have 
worked they haven’t been conscientious and haven’t done remarkably good 
work.”26
 Thomas and Fred Woodworth, state welfare department director, were 
the vocal proponents of home rule on the WRSC. From the first meeting they 
advocated allowing local governments the right to determine their welfare 
administration. Woodworth believed that “people of the counties should have 
the type of government they want,” a view that Thomas shared.27 Woodworth 
argued that the old system had served Michigan’s welfare needs for a hundred 
years, and thus could certainly continue to do so.28 Throughout the commis-
sion’s six months of meetings, Thomas consistently maintained that welfare 
“can best be administered, in my mind, as it is now efficiently and economi-
cally.”29 He was openly critical of SERA administrator William Haber, another 
member of the commission, and insisted that local officials could have done 
the same job more effectively with one-half to one-third the cost.30 Thomas 
 25. Ibid., 27–30, quotation from p. 34.
 26. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 9, November 20, 1936, 61. In addition, records related 
to the county superintendent of the poor in Marquette, Saginaw, and Van Buren counties 
show dissension and a lack of harmony related to poor relief. See “County Poor Fund Quiz 
Looms before Board,” Saginaw Daily News, October 24, 1931; “Poor Fund Inquiry Left Up to 
Prosecutor,” Saginaw Daily News, October 27, 1931; “Stewart Resigns as Poor Director,” Sagi-
naw Daily News, July 19, 1931; and Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Saginaw County, 
Michigan, January 11, 1933, 52–64.
 27. WRSC Minutes, August 21, 1936, 48–49.
 28. WRSC Minutes, September 18, 1936, 12.
 29. WRSC Minutes, August 21, 1936, 47.
 30. WRSC Minutes, August 21, 1936, 50.
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also criticized civil service exams, calling them a “damn fool lot of questions.”31 
By the end, he was critical of the commission itself, often asserting that a few 
members decided issues for the whole.32
 Thomas pushed early and hard for public hearings on reorganization, and 
the commission held four: two in Lansing, one in Muskegon, and another in 
Detroit. Hearings were conducted only in the southern part of Michigan for 
the most part, thus limiting the numbers of county officials who could easily 
attend; none were convened in the Upper Peninsula. The Muskegon hearing 
coincided with a meeting of the Michigan Municipal League. The November 
10, 1936, hearing in Lansing coincided with the State Association of Supervi-
sors’ meeting to allow any county with representatives attending that organi-
zation’s meeting an opportunity to present its viewpoint. Although Thomas 
characterized local officials as overwhelmingly in support of local control and 
the old system, the hearings’ minutes reveal a different picture.33
 The hearings reflected a more diverse opinion on relief administration 
than the ideas articulated by the most ardent home rule advocates or by the 
“sanctioned” positions of the local officials’ organizations. Twenty-six people 
representing seventeen of Michigan’s eighty-three counties spoke at the hear-
ings held October 22, 1936 (Detroit), and the following day in Lansing. Just 
eight of those (31 percent) voiced complete opposition to change, in agree-
ment with Thomas and Woodworth. Sixteen (61 percent) wanted a system that 
blended the emergency program and local control. Some advocated continu-
ing the communication between caseworkers and supervisors, whose knowl-
edge of their residents could be tapped on a case-by-case basis. While many 
voiced certain objections to aspects of SERA’s administration, some also saw 
positive changes occurring. Four people (15 percent) favored consolidation of 
some kind, but did not necessarily reject the old system’s staffing, including 
the superintendents of the poor. None spoke specifically against consolida-
tion into a county unit.34 The hearing held with members of the supervisors’ 
association is also revealing. Although the association went on record in stark 
opposition to a more centralized system, just one-third of those supervisors 
 31. WRSC Minutes, November 20, 1936, 24, 75; Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 
379–80.
 32. The commission voted on various aspects of the report when a quorum was present. 
A majority of those members present, but not necessarily a majority of the entire commission, 
was needed to approve specific recommendations. Thomas often argued that a majority of the 
full commission should be necessary to pass any recommendations.
 33. Hearing transcripts survived only for the two held in Lansing and the Detroit hearing; 
the Muskegon minutes are not available.
 34. WRSC Minutes, Hearings held October 22, 1936, and October 23, 1936; Box 1, Folder 
8. 
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who testified (six of eighteen) advocated a wholesale return to the old system, 
a percentage similar to the earlier hearings. Ten (55 percent) favored a new 
system that blended local and state control and supervision. Some argued that 
if counties were to accept state and federal funds for welfare, they needed to 
accept some supervision and control. Statements against SERA and for local 
control tended to generate applause during the hearings, but in actuality many 
participants did not share the extreme negative views voiced by Thomas and 
Woodworth. Some appreciated SERA’s efforts to remove politics from relief, 
and believed that parts of the system had worked well.35
 The members of the State Association of Supervisors’ committee on wel-
fare were ardent supporters of home rule and strongly opposed any loss of 
local control of relief. Soon after the hearings, the association presented to the 
WRSC, through Thomas, a resolution that put forth its own vision of welfare 
reorganization. The resolution called for a merging of the emergency-relief 
commission with the state welfare department to eliminate duplication, with a 
local relief commission of three to five members, appointed by the supervisors, 
to oversee all aspects of relief. The local relief commission would handle all 
hiring and fix salaries, with minimal state supervision. The association’s posi-
tion followed that of the home rule advocates, siding against the centralization 
of relief.36
 Key targets of home rule advocates were SERA’s administrative structure 
and the “expensive” caseworkers the organization hired. These criticisms hear-
kened to the early days of federal relief, reflecting feelings of anti-intellec-
tualism and opposition to university-trained officials (and social workers), 
including William Haber.37 Woodworth saw caseworkers as too interfering 
and noted “that unless we watch, social service workers will supervise the lives 
of those people after they get their pensions.”38 He argued that people were 
more able and willing to fool caseworkers, because the caseworkers did not 
know the residents well. Instead, he maintained, the supervisors were the ones 
to do the job: “I am convinced that at least one third of the welfare recipients 
wouldn’t have the nerve to tell him the ‘cock and bull’ story they would tell the 
Emergency Relief Administration.”39 Critics of social work believed that expe-
rienced local officials were better qualified than “immature and inexperienced 
students of sociology and psychology” and “‘young folks fresh from school’ 
 35. WRSC Minutes, Hearing held November 10, 1936, Lansing; Box 1, Folder 9.
 36. WRSC Minutes, November 20, 1936, WRSC Records, Box 1, Folder 10.
 37. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 417. 
 38. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 6, September 18, 1936, 17. Woodworth referred to OAA 
recipients in this statement.
 39. WRSC Minutes, Box 2, Folder 1, December 16, 1936, 47–48.
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who lacked the experience and ‘mental reserve’ to resist the appeals of the 
undeserving poor.”40 Thomas commented in one meeting that he “would like 
to see the person educated at the University of Michigan who can take over 
the duties [of superintendents of the poor and supervisors] . . . You would only 
have an administration building filled with employees.”41 Thomas directed 
those comments at Haber and Dunham, both of whom were on the University 
of Michigan’s faculty. He asserted that social work would only create a large, 
expensive system to administer relief, a system that would be rooted in aca-
demics at the expense of local officials. Another supervisor agreed, arguing 
that the demands for professional social workers were intended “to keep the 
parasitical social workers in jobs and build up a huge bureaucracy.”42
 The preference for business expertise, rather than professional social work, 
highlights the contrasting views of what training and background were needed 
for relief administration. Home rule advocates largely rejected social work 
in public relief. Social workers, many critics claimed, were too “soft” in their 
administration of relief, and were unable to spot people seeking help when 
none was needed. Business expertise was key, local officials reasoned, because 
welfare administration was a business. A social worker’s role was not in the 
administration of relief, according to Milton Van Geison, president of the 
State Association of Superintendents of the Poor.43 Van Geison believed social 
work should be confined to the “problem families in the localities . . . to work 
amongst those problem families and try to build their morale, rehabilitate 
them, and do whatever work becomes necessary in the social line.” Welfare 
administration, then, should be along business standards, and Van Geison 
“firmly believe[d] in [his] opinion that the social worker should not be given 
one dime of money in the administration of that department.”44
 Anti-Semitism also appeared in the larger debates, when one supervisor 
commented that “a bunch of kike social workers . . . will be coming up her[e] 
. . . and telling us how to run our own affairs.”45 Anti-intellectual, antiuni-
versity, and anti-Semitic views also were voiced by legislators who criticized 
Haber in particular, and social workers in general, during the debates over 
the WRSC bills in 1937. Sidney Fine argues that such views also appeared in 
 40. Quoted in Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 416.
 41. WRSC Minutes, August 21, 1936, WRSC Records, Box 1, Folder 5, 48, 54. 
 42. Quoted in Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 417.
 43. Milton Van Geison worked as a city poor commissioner in Flint in 1932, was secretary 
of the poor commission in 1935, and was secretary of the poor commission in 1938 and 1939. 
He would be named to the new County Social Welfare Board by 1941. See Polk’s Flint City 
Directory (Detroit: Polk & Company, 1932), 668; 1935, 770; 1938, 24; 1941, 22.
 44. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 8, October 22, 1936, 24.
 45. Quoted in Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 417.
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earlier debates about civil service reform and unemployment insurance, and 
were directed at the most feared Jewish social worker, William Haber, who was 
a key player in those issues as well. (Ironically, Haber was not a social work 
professional, but a professor of economics.)46 This hostility toward Haber and 
educated social workers is hard to overstate.
 Officials expressed similar criticisms in their interviews with WRSC staff 
for the local report. Overall cost and duplication of services were the key 
problems for one Saginaw Township supervisor, who was one of several Sagi-
naw County officials interviewed by WRSC staff. He also echoed the views of 
Woodworth and Thomas when he said that social workers were overgenerous, 
and “took in everyone.” As representatives of the poor department, he said, 
“We have to be harsh with some.” The latter sentiment was shared by a farmer 
who had led the Kochville Township board for thirteen years. His first words 
to the investigator were that “he wished welfare was out of existence.” He also 
believed the WRC took on cases for which he would not have elected to pro-
vide relief.47
 Many critics of the centralization of relief and the New Deal programs 
lamented the effects of emergency-relief programs on the American values of 
self-support and independence. Integral to concerns about a growing prefer-
ence for relief over work was the fear of a contagion of dependence. Both direct 
and work relief came under attack by critics of the emergency-relief programs. 
According to the critics, emergency-relief programs fostered dependency 
among Michigan residents, with too little emphasis on helping the unem-
ployed become self-sufficient.48 Opponents tended to favor more-traditional 
relief practices—often more-punitive methods—to ensure that “the dole” did 
not become a habit. Woodworth argued that people lost the ability to support 
themselves through the Works Progress Administration, and now needed to 
be retrained to work: “We cannot give them jobs where they stand and lean 
on their shovels.”49 Woodworth further likened the WPA and other federal 
relief programs to a narcotic or an addiction, insisting, “We had better put in 
a little cure.”50 Relief prompted people to say “‘give, give, give,’ and [relief] is 
spoiling the morale of a great many of the people, knocking the self-reliance 
 46. Quoted in Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 417.
 47. WRSC Records, Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies, 1936, Box 7, Folder 7, Sagi-
naw County.
 48. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 416–17; Fraser and Gordon, “A Genealogy of 
Dependency,” 320–21. 
 49. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 6, September 18, 1936, 11.
 50. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 6, September 18, 1936, p. 11. Woodworth’s comments 
foreshadowed later emphasis on welfare dependency as an addiction, or “habit,” that needed 
treatment. See Fraser and Gordon, “A Genealogy of Dependence,” 325.
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completely out from under them,” according to a Midland County supervi-
sor.51 A Calhoun County supervisor lamented the demise of charitable dona-
tions and a willingness to contribute to private welfare programs and to help 
others; instead, former contributors told people to go to the state. The spirit 
of taking care of the community, he feared, was disappearing.52 Local officials 
were also there, the supervisor contended, to “grab all [they] could.”53
 Gender continues to operate as a subtext in these hearings and the debates 
over who could best administer welfare. Social work symbolized the federal 
and state interference in local relief, and to many, that social worker was a 
female, or espoused decidedly female professional values, as described in 
chapter 5. The divide between two visions of precisely what professional values 
were needed for relief work again emerged in the reorganization debates. Con-
flicts over gendered professional values were evident. Social work’s emphasis 
on service, compassion, and cooperation—largely female professional traits 
connected to feminized professions—ran counter to the male professional 
values articulated by many who opposed employing professional social work 
in the administration of relief. Social workers coddled relief recipients—in 
the male professional view—while local officials would not. Instead, in their 
narrative of relief, the male values of efficiency, individualism, and self-help 
were more appropriate for welfare administration.54 For local officials in the 
1930s, excluding women was not the goal, but the gendered values remained 
embodied, at least in the minds of proponents of home rule, in the ideals 
and practices of professional social work. They fought everyone—men and 
women—who practiced and advocated those values.55
 Home rule advocates sought a wholesale return of relief administration 
to local governments, with all social work excluded. A Van Buren County 
superintendent of the poor, who testified at the October 23, 1936, WRSC hear-
ing, claimed to speak for the county officials, saying “that they are standing 
 51. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 6, October 23, 1936, 106–7.
 52. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 9, November 10, 1936, 27–28.
 53. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 8, October 22, 1936, 113.
 54. Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 1890–1935, xiii–xiv, 8–10, 
68–70; Brumberg and Tomes, “Women in the Professions,” 283–84; and Fine, Frank Murphy: 
The New Deal Years, 416–17. Fine documents the negative views held by local officials of so-
cial workers, but he does not argue that a gender dimension existed in the arguments about 
economy and efficiency. 
 55. Gender signifies beliefs, practices, or values based on ideas about women and men that 
are often embedded in policy or institutions, beyond the interpersonal relationships between 
individuals. Socially constructed, such gendered meanings change over time and are powerful 
signifiers of power, according to Joan Scott, who has articulated the need for gender analysis at 
all levels of society including politics. See Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Analysis,” 
in Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 28–50.
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pat, that the administration of relief shall be returned to local authorities.”56 
He disputed earlier remarks by the county’s WRC chair that the county put 
no money into relief. Not only had the county contributed some to the ERA, 
he said, but it had also funded hospitalization, medical care, and the county 
poor farm and infirmary. He stated simply, “We are taking care of Van Buren 
County.”57 A Saginaw superintendent of the poor echoed statements that the 
emergency was over and that “all relief should be turned back to the supervi-
sors.”58 He shared Thomas’s negative view of the commission’s purpose and 
practices: “We are keeping up with this study of yours . . . we know all about 
what you are after and what will be recommended.”59
 Some local officials favored a limited role for county supervisors. Van 
Buren County’s WRC chairperson opposed the supervisors taking complete 
control of relief. Although he was careful in his criticism, he clearly did not 
think the supervisors capable of administering relief effectively.60 He saw the 
WRC as “a non-political organization which is trying to do a tough job in 
the most efficient possible manner.” Consolidation of all relief into a single 
county unit, he felt, would solve the key remaining problem of duplication.61 
A Saginaw County supervisor argued that supervisors already had power, and 
were “the king bee, I would call them, of the township. In other words, they 
write the orders, so there isn’t anyone that gets aid from 27 townships unless 
the supervisors write the order.” He didn’t see how they could wield any more 
power.62 He asserted that supervisors should continue to be involved in the 
administration of relief, largely through representation on the county welfare 
board.
 Some supervisors no longer wanted full responsibility for welfare adminis-
tration. Berrien County (southeast of Van Buren County) supervisors submitted 
a resolution making a case for just what the WRSC eventually recommended: 
county departments run by civil service staff under a state department of wel-
fare.63 A member of the Livingston County WRC believed that the key to bet-
ter administration was the caseworker: “The case worker . . . is the very genius 
of this new set-up, and ought to be continued at all possible extent.” It was time 
 56. WRSC Minutes, October 22, 1936 hearing, 124. The hearing transcript erroneously lists 
Scamehorn as Scamehauser.
 57. WRSC Minutes, October 22, 1936 hearing, 124.
 58. “Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies,” Box 6, Folder 7, Arthur Hauffe interview.
 59. “Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies,” Box 6, Folder 7, Arthur Hauffe interview. 
 60. WRSC Minutes, October 22, 1936 hearing, 117–18.
 61. WRSC Minutes, October 22, 1936 hearing, 119.
 62. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 9, November 10, 1936, 43. This supervisor also served 
on the county WRC, appointed the previous summer after the changes instituted by SERA.
 63. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 8, October 22, 1936, 141–43. 
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to end the superintendents-of-the-poor era, he argued, and to use the better 
investigation methods of the caseworker. A rural Wayne County supervisor 
and another from Saginaw County shared this viewpoint. The latter main-
tained that the new agency saved him a lot of work and time, and he voiced 
no complaints about its operation.64 These ideas were not widespread, but the 
hearing transcripts and WRSC interviews yield views different from those 
described by Thomas and Woodworth. County officials vehemently opposed 
to SERA and social work were vocal and visible, but were not the majority.65
 Thomas and Woodworth led the opposition to the WRSC’s final report, 
and Thomas announced his intention to author a minority report even before 
the commission had finalized the majority report, released in December 1936.66 
State funds appropriated for relief should be allocated to the counties to be 
“administered by responsible elective State and County officials,” according 
to Thomas’s minority viewpoint, and those funds would “be adequate when 
relieved of the burden of maintaining the tremendous and wasteful organiza-
tion now maintained by Emergency Relief.” Signatories of the minority report 
believed that local administration, without state supervision, would be far 
more economical.67 The minority report also advocated that the county wel-
fare commission, appointed by the county board of supervisors, would over-
see all aspects of relief, including the federal categorical aids, but that only 
those federal programs should be subject to state supervision. County officials 
would select and hire all staff, without a civil service merit system, and also fix 
their salaries.68
 The minority report was adopted by the State Association of Supervisors 
on January 27, 1937, at the organization’s annual meeting in Lansing, with 
only 2 of the 402 delegates dissenting. The resolution called for local control 
of relief and minimum state interference, and soundly rejected the philoso-
phy and specifics of the WRSC report.69 The ideology of home rule was evi-
dent. Centralized relief administration, the resolution counseled, was too far 
removed from elected officials, thus subverting the democratic process. The 
 64. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 8, October 22, 1936, 140; “Recommendations of Vari-
ous Local Officials,” 3 Box 7, Folder 6; Sampling Survey of Local Relief Agencies, 1936, WRSC 
Records, Box 7, Folder 6.
 65. This trend also is evident in the sampling surveys conducted in the case study counties 
by the WRSC staff. 
 66. WRSC Minutes, Box 1, Folder 12, December 3, 1936, 103; Report of the Welfare and 
Relief Study Commission. 
 67. “Minority Report,” Journal of the House, January 28, 1937, 136, in WRSC Records, Box 
13, Folder 7. 
 68. “Minority Report,” 137.
 69. “Supervisors Ask Tax Sale,” Lansing State Journal, January 29, 1937, 12.
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two reports set the stage for the passage of the 1937 welfare-reform legislation 
package, and the reaction against it.
 Just four of the eighteen commission members refused to sign the final 
report. Two of the four opponents were local officials: Thomas and county 
supervisor Oliver Gibbs. Fred Woodworth also signed the minority report. 
Dr. Stanley Insley, of Detroit, did not sign the majority report but also did not 
endorse the minority report. While he criticized the administrative structure, 
he was not as focused on full home rule. His disapproval centered more on 
medical relief.70 Two other key prominent local officials, Marquette Mayor 
Arthur Jacques and Kent County Probate Judge Clark Higbee, fully supported 
the final report. Jacques said, “It is certainly a wonderful step forward in the 
matter of handling welfare relief and humanitarian problems in this state.”71 
He firmly believed that state supervision was acceptable if state funds were 
involved, and neither he nor Higbee shared the extreme home rule views of 
Thomas and Woodworth.72 Both would play an active role in defending the 
welfare reorganization in the 1938 referendum.
 The WRSC report resulted in a new legislative package to reorganize 
Michigan’s welfare system. Both the incoming and the outgoing governor 
(Frank Murphy was elected governor in November 1936, defeating incumbent 
Frank Fitzgerald) indirectly endorsed the majority report in his respective 
speech at the inauguration.73 Legislation was jointly introduced by a Demo-
cratic and Republican senator, and eventually passed both the senate and the 
house, being signed by Governor Murphy in late July.74 Public Act 257 covered 
the state administrative structure, while Act 258 detailed the county organiza-
tion and the ADC provisions. Act 257 created a single state Department of 
Public Assistance, governed by a five-member commission and headed by a 
director and deputy director. Supervisory powers over county administra-
tion were limited to only those programs that received federal funds (ADC, 
OAA, and AB), a provision required to comply with the Social Security Act 
and thereby make the state eligible for federal grants.75 Act 258 called for 
a single county Department of Public Welfare governed by a board of three: 
one appointed by the state department and the other two by the board of 
 70. See Letter to Harold Smith from Stanley Insley, December 22, 1936, and February 13, 
1937, WRSC Records, Box 9, Folder 11.
 71. WRSC Records, Box 9, Folder 12, Letter from Jacques to Harold Smith, WRSC chair-
person, July 7, 1937.
 72. WRSC Minutes, August 21, 1936, Box 1, Folder 5, 45–47.
 73. Dunham, “Public Welfare and Referendum in Michigan,” 429.
 74. Ibid., 429–31.
 75. Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, 1937 (Lansing: Franklin 
DeKleine Company, 1937), 442–43, 445.
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supervisors. The county welfare board oversaw all aspects of welfare, from 
operating the county infirmary to administering the categorical aids.76 The 
act abolished most existing relief positions, including superintendents of the 
poor.
 Key differences between the WRSC’s recommendations and the 1937 law 
included the removal of the civil service provisions for staff of both the county 
and state departments (although state employees would be covered under the 
recently passed civil service law) and a reduction in state supervision, except 
in those programs under federal guidelines. The director of the county depart-
ment also had to be a three-year resident of the county.77 Another important 
change was the participation of supervisors. Boards of supervisors were pro-
hibited, under the law, from appointing fellow supervisors to the county social 
welfare board, a provision not recommended by the WRSC report. As with the 
early days of SERA, supervisors were cut out of the relief commission.78 The 
exclusion of supervisors from social welfare boards, despite the elimination of 
civil service requirements for local relief staff, only magnified local opposition 
to the bills.
the	referenduM
The two major organizations representing local officials, the State Association 
of Supervisors and the State Association of the Superintendents of the Poor, 
mobilized quickly and spearheaded a petition drive for a referendum vote.79 
The referendum focused on Act 257, which outlined the structure of the State 
Department of Public Assistance and its supervisory powers, which had been 
limited to the federally funded programs. The major opposition to the legisla-
tive package actually centered on Act 258, which specified the local adminis-
tration of relief, including the exclusion of supervisors from welfare boards. 
That act, however, included appropriations for relief and, under Michigan law, 
could therefore not be placed on a referendum. Since Act 258’s implementa-
tion was dependent on Act 257, opponents opted to place that act on the ballot 
instead. In this manner, if they managed to defeat that law, then they defeated 
 76. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 418, 421; Public Acts, 1937, 450–52. 
 77. Dunham, “Public Welfare and Referendum in Michigan,” 432–33; Fine, Frank Murphy: 
The New Deal Years, 418–19.
 78. Report of the Welfare and Relief Study Commission, 26.
 79. “County Poor Assail Welfare Law,” Manistee News Advocate, August 19, 1937, 1, 5; 
“Convention of County Poor Chiefs Ended,” Manistee News Advocate, August 20, 1937, 1, 4; 
and Letter from Milton Van Geison, President, Association of Superintendents of the Poor, to 
all superintendents of the poor, July 30, 1937, WRSC Records, Box 2, Folder 7.
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all of them. By October enough signatures had been gathered, and the issue 
was placed on the November 1938 ballot.80
 The next eleven months found both sides focusing on the referendum. 
Proponents organized a welfare-education committee, comprised of members 
of both political parties, in December 1937. They prohibited employees of 
relief agencies from actively participating in the campaign, which might be 
construed as self-interest on their part, a charge they made frequently against 
the superintendents of the poor. Their plans included promoting the law by 
distributing information through numerous organizations, including the Fed-
eration of Women’s Clubs, the Parent-Teacher Association, and fraternal, reli-
gious, and service groups.81 The committee published a pamphlet, The Truth 
about Michigan’s Welfare Referendum, seeking to counter what it saw as mis-
information circulated by the welfare-reform opponents.82 Members of the 
group included state and local officials and representatives of organizations 
such as the American Association of University Women and the State Federa-
tion of Women’s Clubs. Arthur Jacques, Marquette mayor and WRSC member, 
was on the state committee, along with Probate Judge Clark Higbee of Kent 
County, also a WRSC member.83
 Cities and municipalities—represented through the Michigan Munici-
pal League, which endorsed the law—tended to support the legislation, as it 
removed relief responsibility from their shoulders and made it a county con-
cern. Counties also could not charge relief costs back to the local units—cities 
and townships—as they had in the past.84 The city of Saginaw had already 
relinquished relief administration to the county in September 1936. The coun-
cil believed that its relief work duplicated that of the county and that overhead 
could be reduced through a single county agency. The city continued to con-
tribute relief funds, but no longer administered relief.85 The city council unani-
mously adopted a resolution six months later seeking a consolidated welfare 
 80. Dunham, “Public Welfare and Referendum in Michigan,” 434; Public Act 257 and 
Public Act 258, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of Michigan (Lansing: Franklin DeKleine 
Company, 1937), 442–63; and Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 418–20.
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Folder 7.
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Box 2, Folder 8.
 83. Welfare Education Committee letterhead, dated December 14, 1938, WRSC Records, 
Box 2, Folder 8; Ernest B. Harper and Duane L. Gibson, Reorganization of Public Welfare in 
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system under state authority, funded by the state sales tax. Relief had drained 
the city’s coffers for five years, and the city saw the state as the key means to 
secure financial help.86
 Counties were less unified in their position on the referendum. Marquette 
County’s board of supervisors took no formal stand on the referendum, and 
filed or tabled most communications from other counties seeking support for 
or against local control of relief.87 The board was not actively working against 
the new legislation, although as a body it did not support the legislation either. 
Wayne County supervisors voted ninety-seven to eighteen in support of the 
Welfare Reorganization Act less than a month before the election.88 Not sur-
prisingly, Van Buren County’s board of supervisors went on record endorsing 
the minority report early in 1937, although they took no formal action on 
the referendum.89 Saginaw County’s supervisors unanimously supported the 
home rule advocates.90 Overall, eleven counties statewide endorsed welfare 
consolidation, including seven in the Upper Peninsula and four urban coun-
ties in lower Michigan (Muskegon, Kent, Oakland, and Wayne).91
 The opposition’s rhetoric depicted the referendum as a war defending 
democracy against centralized government. While the new law only partially 
curtailed powers of the local supervisors, they argued, more restraints would 
likely follow. The organizations representing the supervisors and the super-
intendents of the poor met in Sault Ste. Marie in July of 1938 to mobilize the 
final stretch before the November election, and in a letter to all supervisors 
and superintendents of the poor, Van Geison encouraged them to send del-
egates to the convention:
This battle is in defense of local government . . . It will only be a short time 
until they will attempt to eliminate the Supervisors entirely, the same as 
they have the Superintendents of the Poor . . . Unless we take a definite 
stand and so decisively whip this attempt of encroachment upon local gov-
ernment, we will soon find all branches of local government under control 
of some State department. Therefore, it is your duty as public officials to 
protect the people at large who elect you to office.92
 86. Ibid., March 22, 1937, 51.
 87. “Board of Supervisors, Marquette County,” July 20, 1938, 13.
 88. Official Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Wayne County, 1938, October 18, 1938, 
904. Those voting against the resolution represented both township and city officials. Six of 
those voting against the act represented Detroit.
 89. Board of Supervisors, “Proceedings, Van Buren County,” March 23, 1937.
 90. Proceedings of the Boards of Supervisors, Saginaw County, June 29, 1938, 3.
 91. Harper and Gibson, Reorganization of Public Welfare in Michigan, 49–50, footnote 3.
 92. Letter from Milton Van Geison, president of the State Association of the Superinten-
dents of the Poor and chair of the State Referendum Committee of Flint, dated June 23, 1938, 
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The extreme rhetoric of war and defense, furthering the argument that the 
state was seeking to usurp local government and the democratic process, con-
tinued at the convention held in late July. Several speakers, including Van Gei-
son and William Thomas, assailed the new laws and the WRSC.93 They also 
spoke to local service clubs, demanding home rule for counties.94 Although 
officially a nonpartisan group, the associations’ members were largely Repub-
lican, and the meeting was a pro-Republican, anti-Murphy event. Fitzgerald, 
who later gained the nomination for governor and won the November elec-
tion, was a featured speaker at the convention, decisively condemning the 
legislation.95
 Opponents of the welfare laws ultimately prevailed when Michigan vot-
ers defeated the welfare legislation by a vote of 572,756 to 497,569—a margin 
of about 75,000 votes—in what the Detroit News called “the most hotly- 
contested” proposal on the ballot.96 The election attracted the largest number 
of Michigan voters in a nonpresidential election; about 53 percent of Michi-
gan voters cast ballots in 1938, as compared to 33 percent in 1930.97 The 1938 
election was hailed by many political experts as a test of the New Deal; if so, 
a majority of Michigan voters rejected it. They reelected Republican Frank 
Fitzgerald, governor from 1934 to 1936, ousting Democrat Frank Murphy, the 
former Detroit mayor who had defeated Fitzgerald two years earlier. Republi-
cans not only won the governorship, but also gained control of both the state 
senate and the house of representatives.98
 Just eleven of Michigan’s eighty-three counties approved the welfare laws. 
Seven of the eleven counties were in the Upper Peninsula and the other four 
were all urban counties (see table 7.1 and map 7.1). Marquette, Saginaw, and 
Van Buren all defeated the welfare legislation in their county votes, and only 
Marquette County’s vote favored Democratic governor Murphy. Local offices 
Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Saginaw County, June 27, 1938, 3.
 93. “Superintendents of Poor Declare War on Social Service Bill,” Evening News, July 27, 
1938, 5.
 94. “Would Scuttle Welfare Law of Michigan,” Evening News, July 27, 1938, 2.
 95. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 420–21, 484–85; “Fitzgerald Lashes at Cen-
tralization,” Lansing State Journal, July 29, 1938, 14; and “Fitzgerald Heads the Speakers Scoring 
Present Laws,” Evening News, July 29, 1938, 1, 10. 
 96. “Referendum on Act 257, P.A. 1937,” WRSC Records, Box 2, Folder 8; “Welfare Act 
Appears Lost,” Detroit News, November 9, 1938, 1.
 97. “Fitzgerald Lead Increasing with Third of Precincts In,” Detroit Free Press, November 
9, 1938, 1; Pollock and Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition, 23. Michigan voter participa-
tion; in 1932 it was 63.7 percent; in 1936 it was 67.4 percent; and in 1940 it was 73 percent. No 
statistics for 1934 are included.
 98. McSeveney, “The Michigan Gubernational Campaign of 1938,” 97–99; Pollock and 
Eldersveld, Michigan Politics in Transition, 4–8.
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also followed the state trends as well; all three counties elected Republicans to 
county offices and the state legislature.99
 Why the referendum failed is difficult to explain fully, although the fact 
that just 64 percent of voters casting ballots in the election opted to vote on it 
suggests that the issue was not all that important to many Michigan residents. 
Normally referendums attracted about three-quarters of voters who went to 
the polls, so the welfare count was lower than average.100 Sidney Fine argues 
that referendums, although intended to bring a greater voice to citizens on 
specific issues, often served special interest groups, “and [have] required vot-
ers to decide issues they only dimly comprehend, if they comprehend them 
at all.”101 Some believed the issue was too complicated for the average voter to 
understand, or care about, and felt that many voters probably cast uninformed 
ballots. Two Michigan State College professors argued that part of the problem 
was the information provided by the proponents of the law, the welfare-edu-
cation committee. The case the committee made was “too difficult for the 
average reader to comprehend, particularly in rural areas, but also and more 
important because it was not directed at underlying emotional beliefs, group 
 99. “Straight Vote Elects Van Buren Republicans,” Hartford Day Spring, November 9, 1938, 
1; “County Back in Republican Fold,” Saginaw Daily News, 1.
 100. Letter from WEC Executive Secretary John MacLellan to Harold Smith, December 14, 
1938, WRSC Records, Box 2, Folder 8; and Harper and Gibson, Reorganization of Public Welfare 
in Michigan, 49.
 101. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 423–24. A 1940 study of the initiative and 
referendum in Michigan concluded that ballot issues had increased voter education in govern-
ment. If such education was not adequate, report author James Pollock concludes, it “is not the 
fault of the initiative and referendum. It is largely the fault of public authorities for not having 
paid more attention to the problem of public education.” James K. Pollock, Direct Government 
in Michigan: The Initiative and Referendum (Bureau of Government: University of Michigan, 
1940). 18.
county yes no
kent 23,816 22,843
Marquette 4,275 5,655
Saginaw 9,737 13,643
van buren 2,706 5,371
Wayne 234,208 172,643
State Total 497,569 572,756
Source: “referendum on act 257, P.a. 1937.”
table	7.1
referenduM	reSultS
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ideas, and accepted values of the rural population.”102 The professors’ study 
of four counties during the referendum fight revealed that residents did not 
understand the emergency-relief programs even before the referendum, and 
thus supporters of the reorganization act faced an uphill battle to educate the 
public.103
 Home rule advocates used rhetoric and ideas familiar to many voters, par-
ticularly those in more-rural areas. While proponents of the welfare law did 
not speak to the beliefs and values of the Michigan residents, especially those 
in rural areas, their opponents did. The extreme rhetoric of opponents cer-
tainly did not match the facts in the issue, and actually distorted what would 
happen if the legislation were to stand.104 But in those distortions was a “mes-
sage of real meaning.”105 The extreme hostility evident in WRSC minutes and 
hearings, the legislative debates, and the subsequent 1938 referendum points 
 102. Harper and Gibson, Reorganization of Public Welfare in Michigan, 48–49.
 103. Ibid., 47–49.
 104. Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 420.
 105. Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 143.
Map . referendum results, 1938.
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to the entrenched belief in local government and the need to protect it. Fears 
about the centralization of the government were a critical part of the opposi-
tion’s views, as well as a belief in the sanctity of local power and the importance 
of the community. The faith in local relief administration—the responsibility 
to care for the needy as communities deemed appropriate—was a long-held 
principle of American society, and retaining that responsibility, and power, 
was to many local officials an “affirmation of the ideal of community.”106 
 Some proponents of home rule viewed the Social Security Act, even with 
the large amounts of money it would bring to the state and the burden it would 
lift from local communities for categorical relief, as further encroachment on 
local autonomy by the federal government, because of the strings attached to 
those funds, namely state supervision. In fact, both Thomas and Woodworth, 
the key proponents of home rule in the Welfare and Relief Study Commission, 
saw the act as unconstitutional, a violation of states’ rights in the regulations 
that accompanied the money. “I think the grant-in-aid principle is all right but 
a grant that produces the dictation to the state when you say you have got to 
do so and so, you are taking certain liberties that are reserved to the state by 
the constitution,” said Woodworth at one meeting.107 In his mind, Michigan’s 
compliance with the act’s regulations, even on a temporary basis—in order to 
receive ADC and OAA funds—was a betrayal to the constitutional rights of 
state and local governments: “We just recently adopted a policy of purchasing 
submission to the Federal regulations.”108 The expanded power of the federal 
government came at the expense of the state government, and proponents of 
home rule argued that it was only the first step in the continued demise of 
local control.
 But the claim that the election was a rejection of the New Deal masks the 
complexities at work. Many states saw election shifts in 1938, but for a vari-
ety of reasons. Although the Roosevelt administration and the Democratic 
Party suffered defeats throughout the country in the 1938 election, not all are 
explained by New Deal opposition. Jack Hayes maintains that voters in South 
Carolina did not reject the New Deal, which they generally supported, but 
did oppose issues that furthered black equality, including antilynching efforts 
and increasing blacks’ access to relief programs. Race was a central issue, but 
many South Carolina residents supported numerous New Deal programs.109 
Several issues came into play in the defeat of both Governor Murphy and the 
welfare-reform law. Issues of home rule and fiscal localism were chief; rather 
 106. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal, 44–45; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 144.
 107. WRSC Minutes, September 18, 1936, WRSC Records, Box 2, Folder 6, 6.
 108. WRSC Minutes, August 21, 1936, WRSC Records, Box 2, Folder 5, 50.
 109. Hayes, South Carolina and the New Deal, 156–57.
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than being altogether anti–New Deal, voters were rejecting the centralization 
of welfare, increased bureaucracy, and a loss of local autonomy. Taxpayers also 
continued to fight increased taxes and increased expenditures for relief. The 
emphasis on home rule and fiscal localism is particularly clear in the rural 
votes, which soundly denied the welfare law. Statewide, 52.5 percent of vot-
ers supported the law, but could not overcome the limited support (just 35.4 
percent) among rural voters.110 Throughout the state, support for Murphy, and 
for the welfare law, in urban areas could not overcome rural opposition.
 Governor Murphy’s role in the 1937 General Motors sit-down strike, and 
the rash of strikes that followed, played a role in his defeat. He was criticized 
for his failure to enforce the law and blamed for the labor unrest that fol-
lowed the strike, an issue that also played in elections in other states, includ-
ing South Carolina.111 The strike was connected to the issue of relief. Strikers 
were eligible for relief, and thus the state’s relief dollars supported the strike, 
much to the dismay of those opposed to both. Relief for striking workers was a 
contested issue throughout the decade, and never more so than in the General 
Motors strike. Murphy had long advocated providing aid to workers based on 
need, and not whether they were on strike. He had supported relief for strik-
ers in Detroit as mayor, and also made his stance clear in his 1936 campaign. 
William Haber, administrator of SERA, shared that view, although county 
relief-commission officials likely would have denied strikers relief grants.112 
Home rule and local control again appear in this issue. State support of relief 
for strikers provided a clear link between the increased centralization of wel-
fare and the strikes. Exacerbating this link were allegations of Communism in 
the strikes and labor organizations, both of which were intertwined with the 
issue of relief. Murphy’s support of the Workers’ Alliance—which sought to 
organize WPA workers and was alleged to have ties to the Communist Party, 
which was open in its backing of Murphy’s reelection113—and his advocacy for 
the expansion of the WPA hurt his cause.
 The WPA and politics, as well as accusations of using public programs for 
political patronage, were election issues in many states. Kentucky was among 
the most heated and visible. In that state, the New Deal was on trial, as inves-
tigations of using political favors in the funding and staffing of WPA projects 
became national news in the state’s primary election. Investigation found that 
 110. McSeveney, “The Michigan Gubernatorial Campaign of 1938,” 104–7. McSeveney ar-
gues that rural opposition to Murphy was linked to dislike of New Deal agricultural programs.
 111. McSeveney, “The Michigan Gubernatorial Campaign of 1938,” 108–11; Sidney Fine, 
Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936–1937 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1969), 336–37; and Hayes, South Carolina and the New Deal, 150.
 112. Fine, Sit-Down, 153–54, 202–4.
 113. Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed, 220–22; Fine, Sit-Down, 337–38.
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many local officials had used the WPA to secure votes.114 Patronage was par-
ticularly rampant not only in Kentucky but also in West Virginia, Pennsylva-
nia, Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Illinois.115 It emerged as an issue 
as well in the 1938 election in Michigan, although to a much lesser degree. 
Accusations of politics in relief appeared in an Upper Peninsula congressio-
nal election, where Republican challenger John Bennett accused Democrat 
incumbent Frank Hook of using relief and the WPA to gain votes. The charges 
were significant, as the WPA and relief were critical in repairing the Upper 
Peninsula’s dismal economy.116 Bennett lost the election, though, and patron-
age remained a backseat issue behind concerns about home rule and fiscal 
localism.
IMpleMentatIon	of	the	1939	law
The defeat of Act 257, and thus the entire welfare-reorganization package of 
1937, opened the door for home rule advocates to shape successive legislation. 
At the 1939 meeting of the State Association of Supervisors in January, newly 
elected governor Frank Fitzgerald promised an end to expensive social work 
theories, “which are impractical and are paid for at a high cost to the taxpay-
ers.”117 He did not entirely discount social workers, but maintained that “in the 
administration of welfare relief, more common sense and less socially minded 
ideas are needed.”118 Five months later the legislature approved Act 280 of 
1939, a compromise bill, which took effect in 1940.119
 The new commission was evidence of the partial shift in administration. 
Fitzgerald appointed key home rule advocates to the State Emergency Welfare 
Relief Commission, including Oliver Gibbs of the WRSC. The commission 
considered appointing Milton Van Geison, who had led the referendum fight, 
as SERA administrator, but instead retained George Granger as acting admin-
istrator.120 Haber had served as the state’s relief agency head until mid-1937, 
when he resigned to return to teaching at the University of Michigan. The 
 114. Blakey, Hard Times in Kentucky, 184–88; Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberal-
ism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933–1956 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 161–75.
 115. Thomas, An Appalachian New Deal, 137–41.
 116. Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed, 221–22.
 117. “Governor Pledges Localized Relief,” Lansing State Journal, January 25, 1939, 1.
 118. Address by Frank Fitzgerald, Proceedings of the Michigan State Association of Supervi-
sors, Annual Meeting, January 25, 1939, 34.
 119. Proceedings, Supervisors Annual Meeting, January 26, 1939, 49–50. SEWC Minutes, 
January 27, 1939, 1, Box 2, Folder 7.
 120. Harper and Gibson, Reorganization of Public Welfare in Michigan, 51–52.
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New York Times article announcing his resignation said he refused to “play 
ball” with local politicians, and had implemented a civil service merit sys-
tem—which the article equated with administrative efficiency—before the law 
required it.121 His successor, George F. Granger, was a member of the Ameri-
can Association of Social Workers—another administrator with strong social 
work ties.122 Like the welfare legislation passed in 1939, the state administra-
tion was a mix of ideologies.
 The new law offered counties administrative options regarding welfare 
administration, including full-time working social welfare boards or part-time 
boards with a full-time director. All counties were to have a county social 
welfare board, with two members appointed by the board of supervisors, and 
the third member by the state social welfare commission.123 Unlike the 1937 
law, the 1939 law allowed supervisors to serve on the social welfare board. 
The vital decision facing counties was whether to adopt the dual system or the 
unified system. The dual system allowed counties to create a two-part welfare 
administration: one executive or board would administer direct relief, funded 
by state and local funds, with only minimal state supervision, and another 
executive would head the Bureau of Social Aid, which administered the cat-
egorical-aid programs under the Social Security Act. The latter, on the other 
hand, was directly supervised by the state, and workers were state employees. 
While the dual system was largely controlled by local officials, who were not 
bound by civil service rules and were relatively free of state supervision, under 
the unified system, counties had an integrated department of welfare, which 
administered all relief—both direct and categorical aids. The department was 
to be headed by a director and staffed by people selected under the civil service 
merit system; state supervision extended to all forms of relief.124 The unified 
system followed the tenets of the 1937 law and the major recommendations of 
the WRSC, whereas the dual system exemplified the concept of home rule. 
 The law also allowed relief to be administered on a township basis, a prac-
tice one critic argued was a “relic of the poor laws and of horse and buggy 
days.”125 The State Association of Supervisors’ President Oliver Gibbs told 
members the welfare law was not perfect, but was better than the one they 
 121. “Spoilsmen Foiled by Relief Head,” New York Times, August 15, 1937, 38.
 122. Membership listing, Michigan, 1936, American Association of Social Workers Records, 
Box 6, Folder 56.
 123. Public Acts of Michigan, 1939, Act 280, Section 46, 527.
 124. “Supervisors to Name New Welfare Board,” Hartford Day Spring, October 11, 1939, 1, 
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helped to defeat, “because it places the administration of welfare in the hands 
of local officials who are in daily contact with the people and who know their 
needs better than any other group.”126 Michigan legislators created a dual sys-
tem of administration, and although the New Deal’s Social Security Act was a 
federal program—and many recipients saw a new ally in the federal govern-
ment—local officials retained a significant role in their administration, and 
mediated all aid distributed through those programs.127
 Most counties embraced the dual system, opting for a division between 
those services under direct state supervision and those with only minimal 
state involvement, which centered largely on direct relief. By February 1940, 
just fourteen of Michigan’s eighty-three counties had implemented even a 
partially integrated system.128 Most rejected state supervision coupled with 
civil service hiring systems and the use of trained, professional social workers. 
The minimum requirements for the social work administrator position under 
federal guidelines included at least four years of experience in social welfare, 
with at least one year in an administrative position. Administrators also had to 
have at least two years of college education, a portion of which was mandated 
to contain courses in social sciences. One report noted, “It is said on good 
authority in Lansing that not one county supervisor in Michigan could pos-
sibly qualify for the job of relief administrator.” The same report reasons that 
the selection of the dual system by a majority of counties was “inevitable” for 
that reason.129
 Michigan was not alone in its debate about the centralization of welfare, 
and was behind many states in its passage and implementation of welfare law 
to comply with the Social Security Act, in part because of the referendum 
debates. By January 1, 1939, a WPA study found that state supervision had 
expanded to include at least three types of relief in forty-five states, and about 
half of those states supervised five kinds of relief through a single agency. The 
increased state involvement in welfare was in part due to requirements under 
the Social Security Act, but two-thirds of the states played some supervisory 
role in general relief, the third track of welfare, and also provided funds for 
general relief, a significant change from pre-Depression years. But in at least 
ten states, general relief, although supervised by the states, remained under 
 126. “Welfare Law ‘Not Perfect,’” Lansing State Journal, January 23, 1940. 
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local control and included a return to poor law practices.130 West Virginia’s 
1936 law was among the first enacted after the Social Security Act, and inte-
grated all welfare functions into one state department, putting both the cat-
egorical-aid programs and general relief under the state’s umbrella.131 Illinois 
and Ohio both resisted the centralization of relief, and in the former state, 
local officials’ organizations played a key role in the opposition.132 Minne-
sota, like Michigan, separated general relief from the categorical aids, and it 
remained a local concern with minimal funding and no professional social 
workers as staff.133 Some states, such as Virginia, achieved change simply by 
creating a local network of agencies under FERA, and retaining those for the 
categorical-aid programs of the New Deal. Virginia’s 1938 Public Assistance 
Act included all programs under the Social Security Act. Although funding 
was limited and grants were below the maximum allowed, the new system rep-
resented an important change from before 1933.134 Historians Thomas Coode 
and John Bauman make a case that the changes in Pennsylvania, particularly 
for rural counties, were profound despite their continued mix of state and 
local involvement. A state department ran all welfare programs, including the 
categorical aids, but institutional care remained a local concern. Local boards 
continued to play a role in all welfare. Coode and Bauman contend that local 
values, including the emphasis on independence and work, continued in the 
administration of relief: “It was perhaps ironic that the modernization of the 
relief and welfare systems in Snyder County, rather than undermining local 
beliefs ultimately harnessed them to a more efficient and able system.”135
 In Michigan, the counties of Manistee, Marquette, Saginaw, and Wayne all 
decided on a dual system, while Van Buren County supervisors surprisingly 
voted for an integrated department, despite their opposition to state super-
vision. Van Buren’s decision came on a close thirteen to eight vote and was 
accompanied by a heated debate; one supervisor pointed out that the decision 
went directly against the home rule position the supervisors had defended for 
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so long.136 Neither the newspaper accounts nor the minutes record why sev-
eral supervisors reverted from their hard-line home rule stance. It is possible 
these supervisors feared that the dual system involved too much duplication 
of costs, and believed that the board’s role in administering relief would be 
strong enough to retain a local voice. Conflicts among supervisors, evidenced 
in the early emergency-relief years, diminished and thus opened the way for 
more acceptance of change.137 Marquette County’s welfare committee recom-
mended the dual system to supervisors because they believed the county’s size 
warranted two executives, between whom they would divide the tasks. The 
board of supervisors agreed unanimously.138
 Saginaw County—led by the vocal Charles Bois, an ardent opponent of 
the 1937 law and a vocal supporter of home rule—opted for the dual sys-
tem, but, in contrast to Van Buren and Marquette, voted to have a full-time 
working board, rather than a separate administrator.139 Saginaw County also 
appointed Bois, chairperson of the board of supervisors, as the member of the 
social welfare board to be endorsed by the state welfare commission.140 Wayne 
County also selected the dual system of administration. The law permitted 
larger cities to administer their own direct relief, separate from the county, 
and Detroit chose that system, while the county operated through the Wayne 
County Department of Social Welfare and the Wayne County Bureau of Social 
Aid. All categorical-aid recipients went through the latter agency.141 Wayne 
County’s social welfare commission was a policy-making board, with a full-
time director.142
 Business expertise, or pre–New Deal relief experience, again was the 
preferred background for relief administrators. Many counties, including 
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Marquette, Saginaw, and Van Buren, voted to hire nonprofessional social 
workers to head their county departments of public welfare. Marquette County 
hired a former poor-commission investigator as director of the County 
Department of Social Welfare in 1939. Marquette County did retain its WRC 
administrator on the DSW staff, in contrast to Saginaw County, but he had a 
business, and not a social work, background.143 In addition to Bois, Saginaw 
County’s board of supervisors appointed a former poor commissioner to the 
county social welfare board, instead of former WRC administrator Lucius 
Howlett.144 Van Buren County also did not appoint former members of the 
WRC to its new commission, nor did it hire former poor commissioners.145 
Van Buren’s social welfare board did retain its county administrator under the 
new system.146 Detroit’s Department of Public Welfare hired within its ranks, 
retaining Director G. R. Harris.147
 Kent County is the most telling example of the retreat from professional 
social work. Kent County’s WRC was once considered one of the most profes-
sional public agencies in the state, but looked to poor-relief officials to head its 
program in 1940. Supervisors appointed Ira Dean, a twenty-five-year super-
intendent of the poor, to the county social welfare board, and he also served 
as director of the social welfare department. Other board members included 
WRSC member and Superintendent of the Poor William Thomas, the most 
vocal of home rule advocates on the WRSC, and Probate Judge Clark Hig-
bee, a WRSC member who supported the proposed changes. The commission 
had no interest in Family Welfare Association membership or in professional 
social work, developed during the early WRC years, and informed the FWA, 
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for an integrated system, they had to select someone (like Wilkinson) qualified under state and 
federal guidelines. “Voted $500.00 for County Relief in August,” Courier-Northerner, August 
12, 1938; “Supervisors Met Tuesday; Vote January Relief,” Courier-Northerner, December 15, 
1939.
 147. The Department of Public Welfare, 1930–1940, 4; Polk’s Detroit (Wayne County) City Di-
rectory (Detroit: Polk Publishing, 1936); Polk’s Detroit (Wayne County) City Directory (Detroit: 
Polk Publishing, 1939); Polk’s Detroit (Wayne County) City Directory (Detroit: Polk Publishing, 
1940); and Polk’s Detroit (Wayne County) City Directory (Detroit: Polk Publishing, 1941).
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in late 1940, that it did not plan to pay dues or remain in the organization.148 
The FWA terminated Kent County’s membership, ending the public agency’s 
brief foray into professional social work.
 A study of three Michigan counties in 1940 underscored the limited 
changes in relief administration that resulted from the New Deal programs. 
Only one county had trained social workers in its county social welfare depart-
ment; the other two followed personnel guidelines only where they had to—in 
the categorical-aid programs of the Social Security Act, which had civil ser-
vice requirements and state and federal supervision.149 The study’s authors 
argued that in two of the counties general relief in the post-Depression era 
was “scarcely distinguishable from the traditional archaic and discredited poor 
relief system.”150 The study’s chief author was Arthur Dunham, a major framer 
of the WRSC report and the 1937 legislation; his criticisms of Michigan’s relief 
programs continued in this study, and he found the 1939 law to be the fore-
most problem.151
 Home rule advocates achieved their goal in fighting the referendum, 
thereby reshaping public welfare in their image. In rejecting professional social 
workers in welfare reorganization, county officials had rejected their meth-
ods and philosophy. Experiments in professionalizing public agencies, such as 
Kent County, did not last under the pressure of local officials. Fiscal localism 
also appears; supervisors wanted to be able to institute regulations to control 
costs so that relief did not become an out-of-control part of their budgets. 
Opposition to increased taxes, as well as the tax limitation of fifteen mills, was 
also a factor. Economy and efficiency, and not professional social work meth-
ods, were to define relief administration, and some counties, including Van 
Buren and Manistee, believed that relief needed to be stigmatized and punitive 
to discourage people from seeking it. Investigations were necessary for relief 
work, they acknowledged, but social workers did not need to be the people to 
do them. They also largely rejected women. Kent County was among the few 
that appointed a woman to its commission; most hired men, often with busi-
ness experience, to lead their county social welfare departments. Women in 
public welfare tended to work in the Social Service Bureau, the county division 
that administered the categorical-aid programs of the Social Security Act.
 148. Letter from Ira Dean to Margaret Wead, FWA, December 9, 1940, FSA Correspond-
ence, FSA Records, Grand Rapids Folder.
 149. Dunham et al., Public Relief, 92, 104, 274–75, 378–80, 400–409, 412–13.
 150. Ibid., 104. Dunham’s study is extremely critical of the new law and blames many of the 
relief-administration flaws on the law, and not the counties that administer it. 
 151. Ibid., 103–4. Raymond Koch states that such limited change also is evident in Minne-
sota’s revised welfare program. Koch, “The Development of Public Relief Programs,” 441–42.
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 Manistee County was a case in point. Manistee, like many counties, did not 
hire professional social workers to staff their agency. County relief administra-
tor Louise Armstrong resigned in 1936, declaring that she could not work with 
supervisors under the new guidelines. She was harshly critical of the super-
visors and the new appointees in her memoir.152 By 1940 the county social 
welfare board was comprised of a former poor commissioner, a local barber 
and former county clerk, and WRC administrator Ole Hanson, a local busi-
nessman. Manistee’s supervisors wanted control over relief; they wanted to be 
able to institute regulations—such as no aid for one who had a car—to control 
costs so that relief did not become an unmanageable portion of their budget. 
Manistee County officials rejected social workers, like Louise Armstrong, and 
the values they associated with both females and social work. Armstrong rep-
resented much of what supervisors loathed about emergency relief: trained, 
 152. Armstrong, We Too Are the People, 466–67; Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, 
407–8. Fine presents Armstrong’s viewpoint uncritically in his analysis.
Figure . Manistee County relief administrator louise armstrong with children of relief 
clients in Wellston. Photo from louise armstrong collection, courtesy bentley historical 
library, University of Michigan.
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college-educated, “professional” outsiders representing the state government 
and telling local officials how to administer relief to their residents (see figure 
7.1). The Manistee Examiner described Armstrong’s legacy in this way, rep-
resenting the mixed feelings that local residents felt about this strong woman 
who would not back down, and also the views that many home rule advocates 
exhibited toward social work and the social worker:
We doubt if any other woman in Manistee county history ever held so 
important a trust, ever was the subject of so great political outcry, or ever 
stuck to her tasks so quietly yet determinedly. We now see it wasn’t Mrs. 
Armstrong folks were fighting, it was the new state and national policy 
she represented. Going back to the simile of an invasion, we now realize 
she was an excellent soldier, winning her battle and consolidating her 
gains. Whether we admired the cause she was fighting for or whether we 
abhorred it, we must agree she filled her post well.153
The profession of social work enjoyed a brief and controversial career in pub-
lic relief in Michigan, but did not remain in force after 1939. The actions of 
Michigan’s county supervisors—including those in Manistee County—suggest 
that, in their eyes, the female social worker was the personification of FERA 
and SERA, a symbol of the government “invasion” that they so feared—and 
that they worked so hard to stop.
 153. “Listening In,” Manistee Examiner, June 10, 1938, in Armstrong Papers, Bentley 
Historical Library, Box 1, Clippings folder.
 the  welFaRe Reorganization Act and the federal Social Security 
Act of 1935 shifted the organization and funding of relief, but brought limited 
actual change to Michigan’s welfare system. The law resulted in a dual system 
of administration in most counties, with separate departments for the cat-
egorical-aid programs, governed by federal guidelines, and the general-relief 
programs. Categorical-aid programs, funded in part with federal matching 
grants, were implemented slowly, and few grants provided adequate support 
for recipients. In addition, families on WPA, and those who received ADC, 
OAA, or AB, often could not receive any supplemental aid in some counties, 
despite the low grants under those programs. Categorical-aid recipients con-
tinued to be subject to means testing and financial investigation. ADC, OAA, 
and AB were on the assistance track of welfare, and were not administered as 
entitlement programs. But while immediate change was limited, and continu-
ities persisted, the events of the 1930s began a process of centralization at the 
state level that would continue for the next three decades.
 The 1939 reorganization law was a compromise between old and new prac-
tices, and the lack of a consensus rendered the law unsatisfactory to people on 
both sides of the relief issue. Debates over welfare administration continued. 
Many counties continued to struggle with the financial burden of relief despite 
federal and state funds. Local officials did not have full control over all aspects 
of relief, including the categorical-aid programs. The state, when computing 

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matching formulas for categorical-aid grants, did not consider the expenses 
of the county infirmary or of soldiers’ and sailors’ relief or medical and hos-
pitalization costs, all programs that continued to be the full responsibility of 
counties. Local officials also wanted the state to earmark at least one-third 
of revenues from the 1933 sales tax for local relief. Supervisors attending the 
state association meeting in January 1940, just weeks after the new law was 
implemented, strongly endorsed resolutions on all those issues.1
 Many local officials and their organizations wanted to return home rule 
to all areas of relief. The new law, in creating the ADC program, which was 
subject to federal guidelines, effectively eliminated mothers’ pensions, a locally 
funded and administered program.2 Some officials resented this shift, despite 
the accompanying federal funds. Melville McPherson, chair of the state tax 
commission and a vocal home rule proponent, even advocated a return to 
locally administered mothers’ pensions, rather than the ADC program with its 
federal matching funds. He argued at the 1940 supervisors’ meeting that more-
efficient local administration, in conjunction with a larger OAA federal grant, 
would offset the $3.5 million ADC grant the state would receive.3 Saginaw 
County’s Arthur Hauffe, a former superintendent of the poor and member 
of the county’s social welfare board, advocated a wholesale return to the pre-
Depression system. The reorganized relief administration resembled the WRC 
too much, he insisted.4 Both the State Association of Supervisors and the State 
Association of County Social Welfare Boards (the successor to the Associa-
tion of Superintendents of the Poor) sought changes in the Social Security Act 
to allow local officials control over the categorical-aid programs. At its 1942 
meeting the Michigan State Association of Supervisors urged Michigan’s fed-
eral representatives to seek amendments to the Social Security Act to permit 
state and local, rather than federal, control, and reiterated, the following year, 
the power of supervisors in welfare administration.5
 Most local officials did not mourn the demise of the professional case-
worker in general relief. Social workers, who played such a central role in 
 1. “Local Control on Dole Given Dickinson O.K.,” Lansing State Journal, January 24, 1940; 
“Supervisors Ask One-Third of Sales Tax,” Lansing State Journal, January 25, 1940; and Proceed-
ings of the Michigan State Association of Supervisors Annual Meeting, January 25, 1940, 79, 83.
 2. The 1939 law did not explicitly eliminate mothers’ pensions, but the federal funds for 
ADC were the key reason for a switch to that program. Landers and Tharp, Administration and 
Financing of Public Relief, 19–20.
 3. “Local Control,” 4.
 4. “System No Good, Hauffe Declares; Urges Old Plan,” Saginaw Daily News, October 30, 
1940.
 5. The organization evolved into the Michigan County Social Services Association. Pro-
ceedings of the Michigan State Association of Supervisors, 1943, 26, 45.
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the battle over the 1938 referendum, largely disappeared from general-relief 
administration thereafter. Ira Dean, Kent County’s social welfare director 
and a longtime poor-relief commissioner and outspoken home rule advo-
cate, proudly stated that he required only a high school education of his staff, 
which was comprised of “nine young fellows about twenty-eight years old.” 
They did not need a college education, he said, and “I defy anyone to pick bet-
ter trained social welfare workers.” He rejected the help of “the Kent County 
Social Welfare group” in setting standards and selecting personnel, because 
“we feel we can pick our own personnel, and we have reduced our administra-
tive costs thirty-one percent.”6 Many counties reduced their costs by relying 
on supervisors’ recommendations on the eligibility of applicants, rather than 
having employees conduct extensive investigations. Kent County opted for the 
“professional” relief worker as defined by local officials. The absence of social 
workers was not one of the flaws of the 1939 law, according to Dean and other 
home rule advocates.
 Not all counties were unhappy with the new system, although a majority 
sought a revision of the matching-grant formula to include all local welfare 
expenditures, as well as an increase in the state’s relief contribution. Ironi-
cally, Van Buren County’s supervisors, among the most critical of the WRC 
and SERA in the early years of the New Deal, expressed few problems with 
the new system. They were the only county among the four to select the inte-
grated relief system, placing their entire relief administration under the state’s 
supervision. Their director, Louise Wilkinson, a former WRC caseworker, had 
to meet civil service requirements to hold her post, but had the board’s sup-
port from the time of her appointment as administrator in 1938.7 The county, 
which had faced a seventy-five-thousand-dollar deficit just a few years before 
and had suspended all poor relief and mothers’ pensions, had recovered finan-
cially in the meantime, and the county treasurer told the supervisors at the 
1940 budget meeting that the county was in its best financial shape in years.8 
Marquette and Van Buren officials did not fundamentally change their relief 
systems, or their personnel, in the years immediately following the new law’s 
passage.
 Detroit continued to operate a welfare department separate from the 
county system after the 1939 law. But all categorical-aid programs transferred 
to the Wayne County Bureau of Social Aid. Probate Judge D. J. Healy resisted 
 6. Proceedings, Supervisors Meeting, January 24, 1940, 46.
 7. Wilkinson remained head of the department until her retirement in 1966. See “Field 
Report, Nov. 1965–January 1966,” Field Service Correspondence, Archives of Michigan, Box 8, 
Folder 2.
 8. “Supervisors O.K. Finance Budget,” Courier-Northerner, November 1, 1940, 1. 
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the transfer of mothers’ pensions from the probate court, but those cases were 
nevertheless moved to the BSA beginning in January 1940.9 The DPW contin-
ued to provide aid for those waiting to transfer to ADC, OAA, and AB.10 The 
county chose a dual system, with the BSA separate from the DSW, and estab-
lished a part-time, policy-making board with a full-time director.11 Wayne 
County supervisors were committed to maintaining the standard of living in 
the shift from mothers’ pension to the ADC program, and agreed to provide 
supplementation from county funds to make up for the minimal ADC grants, 
as did the Detroit DPW.12
 Saginaw County faced a difficult year in welfare administration. Early 
budget projections called for an additional twenty-five thousand dollars to 
run the reorganized system.13 Repeated requests from the county for added 
funds to cover deficits angered city officials, who came to believe that the 
reorganized system, under county administration, was still too expensive.14 
The savings promised through local administration by home rule advocates, 
including many Saginaw County officials, failed to materialize. Instead, the 
city had spent double the amount in 1939–40 than it had in previous years, and 
city officials questioned the county’s ability to administer relief.15 Rumblings 
of discontent spread to the finance committee, which was upset at reports 
that administrative costs for the social welfare board were 25 percent, three 
times the rate of the WRC in the 1930s. Committee members called the costs 
“disgraceful,” arguing that “no business could carry an administrative burden 
of 25 percent.”16 An investigation and subsequent reorganization followed. 
Instead of a three-member full-time board, supervisors established a three-
member commission, with only one member serving full-time—as a director. 
They appointed to the social welfare board two “dollar-a-year” commission-
ers, in addition to Grover Stine, a former county clerk, as full-time director.17 
 9.  Proceedings, Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 1937, January 14, 1938, 867–69; Janu-
ary 21, 1938, 872–83; Proceedings, Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 1938, November 28, 
1939, 982; and Susan Stein-Roggenbuck, “‘Wholly within the Discretion of the Probate Court’: 
Judicial Authority and Mothers’ Pensions in Michigan, 1913–1940,” Social Service Review 79.2 
(June 2005): 308–9.
 10. Sullivan, “‘On the Dole,’” 223–24.
 11. Proceedings, Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 1939, November 28, 1939, 992.
 12. Ibid., October 18, 1939, 651; Proceedings, Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 1940, 
September 19, 1940, 530; “Minutes, Detroit Public Welfare Commission,” December 24, 1939, 
119; and Sullivan, “‘On the Dole,’” 224.
 13. “New Relief Setup Adds on $25,000,” Saginaw Daily News, October 31, 1939.
 14. Proceedings of the Council and Boards of the City of Saginaw, January 2, 1940, 1 and 8; 
January 22, 1940, 20; February 19, 1940, 47.
 15. Proceedings, City of Saginaw, July 15, 1940, 213–14.
 16. “Relief Budget Costs Scored,” Saginaw Daily News, October 18, 1940, 1.
 17. “County’s Relief Chief Dismissed,” Saginaw Daily News, November 8, 1940, 1; “Relief 
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Saginaw County’s intense conflicts over its new relief system were unique 
among the counties studied, although it was likely not the only one to under-
take changes in the first year of the new system. One criticism of the new law 
was that it allowed too many administrative choices, but personality conflicts 
exacerbated Saginaw’s problems. Clashes over relief administration calmed 
after the 1940 reorganization.18
 The 1939 law effectively segregated general relief (later to be General 
Assistance) from other federal programs. General relief included those in 
need who did not fit the categorical-aid programs, including those who were 
disabled or too ill to work, but too young to qualify for OAA.19 Funded by 
local and state dollars, general relief became the “third track” of welfare, often 
administered entirely by local officials,20 who established their own eligibil-
ity and administrative guidelines. State officials had only limited supervision 
over those programs, although the state provided at least 50 percent of the 
funding.21 Recipients of general relief, for the most part, faced a return to the 
pre–New Deal practices of poor relief when they sought aid from their local 
county social welfare boards. Relief applicants continued to face a maze of 
agencies, both public and private, to secure the help they needed. They also 
did not have the same avenues of protest—state and federal officials—as cat-
egorical-aid recipients. General relief was strictly a local concern, and recipi-
ents could appeal only to their local agency and township or city supervisor. A 
single agency did not guarantee change. Even states that merged the programs 
Shake-up Shifts System,” Saginaw Daily News, November 13, 1940; “Supervisors Limit Officers’ 
Fees,” Saginaw Daily News, November 14, 1940; and Proceedings, Saginaw County, November 
12, 1940, 154–56. 
 18. Public officials later joined private welfare agencies from the Saginaw Council of Social 
Agencies in establishing a central index of relief and welfare. The council paid half the cost, and 
the county the other half, implementing a mechanism to facilitate coordination between public 
and private welfare agencies. “Food Stamps Plan Opposed,” Saginaw Daily News, January 10, 
1941.
 19. Single women suffered perhaps the worst, as they likely worked in programs not cover-
ed by Old Age Insurance (the program now popularly known as Social Security). Thus their 
only avenue of support was OAA, or general relief if they were not yet eligible for an old-age 
grant. See Kessler-Harris, “Designing Women and Old Fools,” 102, 104–5.
 20. Minnesota followed a similar trend, and historian Raymond Koch argues that the 
decade saw little change in the general-relief practices. Raymond L. Koch, “The Development of 
Public Relief Programs in Minnesota, 1929–1941” (PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 
1967), 442–43.
 21. Landers and Tharp, Administration and Financing of Public Relief, 27. Allocation per-
centages were set by the State Social Welfare Commission, and some counties received up to 
95 percent of their relief funds from the state. The formula was based on the county’s financial 
situation and its relief needs. In 1940, Marquette, Saginaw, Van Buren, and Wayne all received 
50 percent funding from the state. “Minutes, State Social Welfare Commission,” November 29, 
1940, 96–98.
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into one department, localization, accompanied by minimal state funding, 
limited the changes. Jerry Thomas argues that West Virginia, which did create 
a single Department of Public Assistance for all relief, also saw regression in its 
relief programs: “What happened in West Virginia when the state and counties 
resumed control of relief reflected a national pattern of harsher administrative 
practices, reduced relief grants, and lower personnel standards.”22 Michigan’s 
funding was more generous than many states, but local officials sought to 
minimize general-relief costs as much as possible.
 Fiscal localism emerges in the development of this third track of welfare. 
Many counties, including Saginaw, used their restored authority over general 
relief to institute punitive measures to discourage relief applicants, reinforc-
ing distinctions between the federal programs and general relief. A key argu-
ment for home rule was that local officials could administer programs more 
efficiently and economically than professional social workers, and thus could 
more effectively contain the contagion of dependence. Restricting eligibility 
for relief was a strategic means to minimize local expenditures. Saginaw Coun-
ty’s Charles Bois proudly told supervisors at the 1940 meeting that Saginaw’s 
board sought “to perfect a system whereby we can catch up to chiselers. We 
have a Congress . . . and a Legislature in Michigan . . . to make laws and we 
have five million people to figure out how to break them.”23
 To limit potential chiselers, several counties placed restrictions on what 
services or goods rendered an applicant ineligible for relief. Both Saginaw 
and Manistee counties refused aid unless applicants turned over their auto-
mobile license plates; when their need for relief ended, the license plates were 
returned. No relief was granted to anyone who owned a telephone; exceptions 
were made if someone other than the applicant paid the bill or if the applicant 
was elderly or ill.24 Faced with a deficit early in their fiscal year, Manistee 
County supervisors refused to grant aid to anyone frequenting places that 
served alcohol, a practice also implemented in Van Buren County.25 When 
costs continued to climb, Manistee County supervisors further restricted eli-
gibility in 1940. Recipients had to maintain gardens and supervisors prohib-
ited newly married couples from receiving relief for a period of one year. The 
supervisors also denied any supplementation for WPA workers, regardless of 
their family size, as well as ADC and OAA grant recipients. In addition, the 
supervisors told the social welfare board not to exceed budgeted amounts; 
 22. See Thomas, An Appalachian New Deal, 156–57.
 23. Proceedings, Michigan State Association of Supervisors, January 24, 1940, 43–44.
 24. Ibid., 44–45; “Proceedings, Board of Supervisors, Manistee County,” February 1, 1940, 
401.
 25. “Relief Clients Must Cease Spending for Beer,” Courier-Northerner, October 14, 1938.
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when the money ran out, relief would stop. They sought more careful investi-
gation of cases before relief was granted, and by January of 1941 the supervi-
sors also wanted to see regular lists of recipients.26 The 1939 law forbade the 
publication of recipients’ names, but some counties persisted in that practice 
anyway, prompting the Social Welfare Commission to remind counties of that 
prohibition, stating that “it does not approve of any action which will tend 
to stigmatize recipients of public relief.”27 Fiscal localism, particularly with 
respect to economy and efficiency, was the guiding principle of relief admin-
istration in many counties.
 Several counties continued to rely heavily on township supervisors to 
screen applicants. A member of the Ottawa County social welfare board 
reported in 1942 that the staff was small “because we depend upon getting 
information direct from supervisors in the local units, who we feel know bet-
ter the conditions of each of those applicants . . . We go by the recommenda-
tion of the supervisors.”28 A 1944 study of the role of the boards of supervisors 
in the administration of relief found that supervisors played a central part in 
eight counties. In some cases supervisors were simply consulted on applica-
tions, but in several counties supervisors were the investigating officials and 
determined the amount of relief granted. Such actions violated the 1939 law, 
but continued regardless.29
 The responsibility of relatives to provide support for family members 
remained a feature of welfare in both the categorical aids and general relief 
for three decades. The administration of that policy, and the formulas used in 
computing the amount expected, changed, but the Social Welfare Commis-
sion stayed committed to the responsibility of families to contribute. Many of 
the changes sought to make it easier for caseworkers to determine the ability 
of relatives to help family members. The expectation of adult children living 
in the household shifted from the 60 percent rule to the setting of a “reason-
able” room and board rate.30 In the 1950s, the twenty-dollar-per-week limit 
on relatives’ contributions was rescinded to reflect rising incomes and costs of 
 26. “Proceedings, Manistee County,” vol. 14, April 11, 1940, 408–9; April 12, 1940, 411; 
January 16, 1941, 501.
 27. Minutes of the Michigan Social Welfare Commission, November 28, 1940, 92; Box 1, 
Folder 1.
 28. Proceedings of the Michigan State Association of Supervisors, 43rd Annual Meeting, 
January 27, 1942, 16–17.
 29. The Michigan attorney general ruled two years earlier that the law did not grant su-
pervisors the power to grant relief or make investigations. Minutes, Michigan Social Welfare 
Commission, Box 2, April 12, 1944, 163; May 19, 1944, 179–84.
 30. Minutes, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, Box 2, Folder 2, August 28, 1945, 
16–17.
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living. The legislature also passed a judicial-review option whereby relatives 
could have the decision of the agency reviewed by the probate court; while the 
review took place, the contribution would not be budgeted into the recipient’s 
grant. If the family did not request a review, the contribution was considered 
in the budget whether it was paid or not.31 The commission sought to alle-
viate the burden on caseworkers in this area of administration by simplify-
ing budgeting procedures and the required correspondence. The mandatory 
rechecking of relatives by caseworkers was also moved back to every two years 
instead of being annual.32 By 1968 local officials requested the removal of the 
responsible-relative provisions from welfare law, because of the difficulty in 
administering them and the lack of uniformity.33 The responsibility of relatives 
to support family members narrowed significantly in 1970, when state law 
required support only of spouses and parents.34
 The status of welfare recipients did not change significantly, although the 
targets shifted in the coming decades. The ADC program came under increas-
ing fire as caseloads escalated in the 1960s, and the recipients increasingly 
were nonwhite and unmarried. The demand for OAA diminished, and the 
program effectively disappeared in the 1970s. The single mother on ADC, 
therefore, became the picture of welfare, and increasing dissatisfaction with 
both ADC and welfare resulted in the state reforms of the early 1990s, and the 
1996 welfare-reform law. While the responsibility of relatives to support family 
narrowed primarily to spouses and parents, with increasing attention to “dead-
beat dads,” the emphasis on individual behavior and work increased. As with 
the 1939 law, the most recent reforms, rather than creating an entirely new sys-
tem, reshaped existing ones, producing even greater complexity for both case-
workers and recipients. The 1996 reforms added about one-third more rules, 
and many state manuals doubled in size.35 Although the goal was to foster the 
movement of people from welfare to independence and work, the outcome 
has been mixed, according to Sharon Hays: “What we have achieved with the 
decline of the welfare rolls is, in fact, the appearance of independence.”36 The 
 31. Eighth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1954–June 1956 (Lan-
sing: December 1956), 14–15; Minutes, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, Box 3, Folder 4; 
May 24, 1954, 122–23.
 32. Tenth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1956–1958 (Lansing: 
December 1958), 15–16.
 33. “Resolution, District X,” dated March 11, 1968, approved at Michigan County Social 
Services Association meeting, 1968, I–2 and I–16; Michigan County Social Services Association 
Records (hereafter cited as MCSSA), Box 12, Folder 4, Archives of Michigan.
 34. Public Act 88 of 1970, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan 
(Lansing: Speaker-Hines and Thomas, Inc, 1971), 263.
 35. Hays, Flat Broke with Children, 47.
 36. Ibid., 61.
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larger discourse about welfare has again masked the complexities of a person’s 
need for welfare, and equated the receipt of welfare with individual failing 
rather than larger structural issues or experiences, some beyond the control of 
the recipient.
 The decades following the 1939 law saw an incremental increase in state 
control and shifts in the formula for funding direct relief. All counties strug-
gled to finance their relief costs, and although the law called for a fifty-fifty 
match with the state, some counties secured much higher funding from the 
state. In mid-1940, seven counties paid just 10 percent of direct-relief costs 
and one paid just 5 percent. Just more than half of all counties paid 50 percent 
of their costs that year.37 By 1956 the state paid more than 50 percent in just 
seven counties. The formula changed to require a minimum of 30 percent con-
tribution by the state.38 The state extended control over general assistance in 
1967, when it enacted minimum standards for relief. The formula for funding 
shifted to 40 percent state and 60 percent local, but any county that expended 
the equivalent of a one-mill tax levy could secure state funding for any expen-
ditures over that.39 The centralization of general relief, sought in the debates of 
the 1930s, finally occurred in 1975, when the state assumed full administrative 
and fiscal responsibility for General Assistance.40
 In the years following passage of the 1939 law, local officials and the orga-
nizations that represented them resisted further efforts to integrate Michigan’s 
welfare system; instead, they fought to keep the dual-system option, and home 
rule, available to counties. A 1942 study of the state’s welfare system, requested 
by Governor Murray Van Wagoner, identified duplication and the concomitant 
need to consolidate agencies as the key issue. The report recommended inte-
gration of both the State Department of Public Welfare and county agencies. 
The state commission included that recommendation in its 1942 report, and 
also encouraged that the county be the unit for relief administration.41 Efforts 
 37. Minutes of the Michigan Social Welfare Commission, June 28, 1940, 291; November 29, 
1940, 96–98.
 38. Minutes, November 20, 1957, 3–4; Ninth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare 
Commission (Lansing: December 1956), 65; Public Act 286 of 1957, Public and Local Acts of the 
Legislature of the State of Michigan, 396.
 39. Fifteenth Biennial Report, State Department of Social Services, July 1966–June 1968 (Lan-
sing: December 1968), 47; Annual Report, Michigan Department of Social Services, Fiscal 1969 
(Lansing: December, 1969), 51. Five counties secured additional funding under the one-mill 
limit; that number increased to nine the following year.
 40. Report of the Michigan Department of Social Services for 1976, 12; Public Act 237 of 
1975, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, 607–11.
 41. “The Organization and Functioning of the System of Public Welfare Services in Michi-
gan,” submitted October 6, 1942, 1, 18–20. Box 1, Folder 7; Department of Social Welfare 
Records, Archives of Michigan; “Minutes, State Social Welfare Commission,” December 31, 
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to encourage integration, however, were met with disinterest on the part of 
many counties, and the Michigan State Association of Supervisors passed a 
resolution opposed “to any county integration of welfare administration” in 
1943. They also endeavored to bring the categorical-aid programs in line “with 
the conception of local home rule and self-government.”42 Efforts to encourage 
consolidation of the “dual system” into an integrated department (such as Van 
Buren County’s) began in earnest in 1945; one year later thirty-three counties 
had reverted to that system.43 The State Department of Public Welfare, divided 
into two administrations in the 1939 law, as were most counties, merged, by 
1944, into a single department administering all types of welfare.44
 Efforts to integrate at the local level continued, and the opposition of local 
officials waned somewhat by the 1960s. Many counties chose to merge their 
departments by 1965; eight counties did so in 1964 alone. Reducing admin-
istrative duplication was a major reason. Often applicants applied for one 
program (perhaps general relief) but were eligible for a categorical aid. The 
referral process slowed the application by weeks or up to three months. If 
the departments merged, one application could cover all programs. Medi-
cal-assistance programs further complicated the situation, particularly for the 
elderly. A single local welfare board overseeing all programs, with the state as 
an oversight, offered local officials the opportunity to play a greater role in the 
administration of the categorical-aid programs; some locals officials argued 
that merging could provide more local authority rather than less.45
 The consolidation of Michigan’s welfare services at the local level coin-
cided with the 1963 revision of the state constitution, a change that strength-
ened executive authority and streamlined state administration, which was a 
trend shared by other states in this period as well. The constitution required 
organizing state government around no more than twenty departments (down 
from the estimated 130 that had existed). It mandated four commissions 
1942, Box 1, Folder 3; Michigan Social Welfare Commission Second Report (Lansing: Michigan 
Social Welfare Commission, 1942), 1.
 42. Proceedings of the Michigan State Association of Supervisors, 44th Annual Meeting, 
January 26–28, 1943, 26, 45–46.
 43. See address by Social Welfare Commission member Carlton H. Runciman, Proceedings 
of the Annual Convention of the State Convention of County Social Welfare Boards and County 
Boards of Supervisors, 1946, 30. 
 44. Fourth Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1944–1946 (Lansing: 
December 1946), 9. The Director of Social Welfare also served as acting director of the Bureau 
of Social Security two years earlier, a practice made permanent in Public Act 217 of 1945. See 
Third Biennial Report, Michigan Social Welfare Commission, July 1942–June 1944, 1; Public Act 
218 of 1945, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, 288–89.
 45. Minutes, Welfare Advisory Committee, December 10, 1965, 1–3; Records Relating to 
Public Assistance, Box 2, Folder 3, Archives of Michigan.
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(education, civil service, civil rights, and state highways).46 Controversy 
occurred over how many departments would be headed by commissions, 
rather than a single department director. Governor George Romney—remind-
ing legislators that if a bill reorganizing state government was not passed in 
the 1965 session, the power to reorganize would rest with him—gained pas-
sage of a bill that included seven commissions and nineteen departments. All 
other departments were headed by single executives under direct authority of 
the governor, who appointed them. The senate could disapprove any appoint-
ment, but if it took no action, the appointment stood.47
 The reorganization affected both state and local welfare administration. 
Under the 1965 law, the Department of Social Services became one of the 
nineteen departments in the executive branch. The law also abolished the 
Michigan Social Welfare Commission, placing all authority in the director 
of DSS.48 The merging of county departments into a single agency adminis-
tering both the categorical aids and direct relief became mandatory in 1965. 
In addition to creating a single county agency for all welfare programs, the 
law established a ten-member advisory committee comprised of representa-
tives of the districts of the Michigan County Social Services Association.49 
The county association thus had control over who served on the committee. 
Its standing, however, was advisory only; it had no administrative or policy 
authority. Members of the county organization sought the reinstatement of 
the Social Welfare Commission, arguing that they had lost an important voice 
and resource in the development and administration of welfare, but to no 
avail.50 Centralization of welfare services and state supervision was achieved, 
although local administration continued for all programs.
 Michigan’s experiences during the New Deal years reveal the limited, but 
also important, changes of those years. The New Deal federalized parts of the 
welfare system, although some services provided through the Social Security 
 46. Albert L. Sturm and Margaret Whitaker, Implementing a New Constitution: The Michi-
gan Experience (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, 1968), 104, 109.
 47. Sturm and Whitaker, Implementing a New Constitution, 105, 114–16; D. Duane Angel, 
Romney: A Political Biography (New York: Exposition Express, 1967), 123–24; and Robert W. 
Carr, Government of Michigan under the 1964 Constitution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press 1967), 39–41.
 48. Public Act 380 of 1965, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan 
(Lansing: Speaker-Hines and Thomas, Inc. 1965), 768–69; Sturm and Whitaker, Implementing 
a New Constitution, 115–17.
 49. Resolution passed at the 1965 meeting of the MCSSA, Box 1, Folder 6, MCSSA Re-
cords; Public Act 401 of 1965, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan 
(Lansing: Speaker-Hines and Thomas, Inc. 1965), 803–19.
 50. Report of the Partnership Committee, “Minutes of Michigan County Social Services 
Association, August 27–29, 1968, I–20; MCSSA Records, Box 12, Folder 4.
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Act did exist in different forms before 1935. It injected needed federal funds 
into relief, and revealed the entrenched hardships of the ill, disabled, elderly, 
and single parents. Michigan created a third track of welfare, separating those 
who received general relief from those eligible for categorical aid. The New 
Deal also illustrates the importance of home rule ideologies, and the defense 
of local government, which both played out in very clear ways in the welfare-
reorganization debates. Competing visions of what professional skills were 
necessary for relief administration were central to those debates, and for the 
short-term, professional social workers were excluded. Reorganization debates 
would continue, but the New Deal years began the process of centralization.
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